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Directed by:

Dr. William Lauroesch

The purpose of this investigation was to carry out
a

systematic analysis of Massachusetts case law in order

to identify basic concepts of the law of contract, and to

synthesize provisions of Massachusetts General Laws relating to the formation and execution of contracts in

public higher education.

One hundred sampled cases in-

volving the law of contract and public higher education
were analyzed to determine the most frequently litigated
areas of contract law, thereby identifying primary domains
of needed quasi-legal training for the education profes-

sion

.

vi

.

vii

The premise or implicit hypothesis of this study
is that faculty and administrative personnel
in public

higher education need to know basic concepts of the law,
but the majority of them have not had formal educational

preparation in the field of law.

Thus, a marked dichotomy

exists between what is and what should be.

This is the

problem that this research has addressed.
School law research,

a

subset of historical research,

was utilized in this dissertation.

Historical research was

the approach of choice, since it allowed the focus of this

study to be on the development of law of contract in the

Commonwealth
The process employed was an analysis of basic contract

case law and a synthesis of it from the referenced cases.
The data reported are a tri-parte presentation:

(1)

a

briefing of 100 cases in higher education and an analysis
of them in relation to the area of the law of contact which
is in issue;

(2)

citations of the Massachusetts General

Laws which relate to the study; and

basic concepts of

(3)

the law of contract.

Major findings of the study are:

Contract litiga-

1.

tion in higher education and the law of contract goes back
to the early nineteenth century

(1819)

.

2.

There are

recurrent issues within the law of contract that have deep

historical roots.

3.

Sixty percent of contract litigation

—

Vlll

according to this sample emanate from faculty.

The other

forty percent are almost evenly divided between
students
(twenty-two percent) and institution-initiated (eighteen
percent) actions.

4.

Fifty— eight of the cases involved

Performance and Breach."

Of these, fifty— five percent

were in a combination of two categories (of eight)
"Expressed or Implied" and "Offer and Acceptance."
Six major conclusions are derived from the analysis
of the data:

Legal history informs on pertinent issues

1.

relative to contract law and public higher education.
2.

The cognitive content of quasi-legal training for

faculty and administrative personnel in higher education
should be primarily in seven areas:
Breach,
(d)

(b)

Offer and Acceptance,

Capacity,

ty and

(g)

(e)

(c)

(a)

Performance and

Expressed or Implied,

Fraud, Mistake and Duress,

Consideration.

(f)

Illegali-

Quasi-legal education is

3.

needed for all professional personnel in public higher
education.

4.

Preventive quasi-legal education for all

professional personnel, those who contract with professional personnel

(administrators)

,

and to a lesser degree

students, would enhance the internal harmony of institu-

tions of higher education.

5.

Quasi-legal education

programs should begin to focus on student-initiated litigation.

6.

Elimination of misunderstandings of contractu-

al relationships would reduce both monetary and human

.

IX

costs
On the basis of the principal findings, recommen-

dations are made that further studies be ini tiated in
two areas:

(1)

collective bargaining, and

initiated litigation.

(

2)

student
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CHAPTER

I

THE PROBLEM AND ITS SETTING

Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this investigation has been to
carry

out a systematic analysis of Massachusetts case law
in

order to identify basic concepts of the law of contract,
and to synthesize within the parameters of this study pro-

visions of Massachusetts General Laws relating to the
formation and execution of contracts in public higher
education.

One hundred cases involving the law of contract

and public higher education were analyzed to determine the

most frequently litigated areas of contract law, thereby
identifying primary domains of needed quasi-legal training
for the education profession.

Delimitations
This study was delimited to:

civil law

,

(1)

i.e., the law of contract;

one area of the
(2)

individual

contracts vis-a-vis collective bargaining contracts;

contract law of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts;

(3)

liti-

(4)

gation in higher education involving contract issues;

(5)

Massachusetts General Law which relate to the formation

2

and execution of contracts by
faculty and administrative
personnel in public higher education.

Basic Assumptions
In the formulation of this problem
and its implicit

hypothesis, three basic assumptions were made.

They are:

public higher education is interfaced with
professional
education; (2) inter-agency contacts are negotiated
(1)

by

agents of institutions of public higher education
to provide clinical facilities for use in professional
education;
and

(3)

the effect of the economy on public higher education

of the Commonwealth will necessitate improved management,

increased productivity, and cost control.

Definition of Terms
Since the law, as other professions, has a vocabulary

peculiar to itself, the definition of terms is incorporated
into the treatise when necessary for the purpose of clarity.

Other terms are listed in Appendix

I.

Research Methodology
School law research, a subset of historical research,
was utilized in this study.

Historical research was re-

quired to trace the development of the law of contract in
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

.

3

School law research was used to
demonstrate the
effect on educators and administrators
of public higher
education of the concept of "legalism"
as it exists today,
i.e., as an enabling mechanism to
understand the present
in light of the past.

An understanding of the history of education
(including legal history) is important to the
professional worker in this field.
It helps him
to understand the how and the why of
educational
movements that have appeared and in some cases,
continue to prevail in the schools.
It helps to
evaluate not only lasting contributions, but also
the fads and "Bandwagon" schemes that have appeared
on the educational scene, only to be discarded.^
An understanding of the development of the law of

contract is important to the faculty and administrative

personnel in public higher education.

It helps them

understand the how and why of the "legalism" of today's
society and its educational input, which is beginning to
be noticeable.

In some instances,

"legalism" is prolifera-

ting critical issues in public higher education.

Such know-

ledge will also help the educator to evaluate not only what
is the law,

but also the basic fallacies which often surround

law related controversy.

The level of knowledge required

by administrators and faculty in public higher education

today is not an indepth one, but a working one.
1

John W. Best, Research in Education (New Jersey:
Prentice Hall, Inc.
1970)
p. 96
,

,

4

Need for and Significance of the Study
Higher education is diversified and pluralistic.
Two different fractions of society control it:

public sector and

(2)

the private sector.

the

(1)

At the same time,

two forces affect it, namely, internal and external
forces.

The internal forces are its component parts:

the trustees,

administrative personnel, faculty, classified personnel
(other professional and non-professional employees)

students.

,

and

The external forces are the federal, state, and

local government, as well as private and public accrediting
(approving)

agencies.

The external forces, through the medium of statutory
and regulatory power ("police power"), have imposed controls

over the internal forces in the operation of the business
of higher education.

Since the law is defined as the study

of man and his interaction, the law directly affects both

the control groups and the forces affecting them.

Both the decision-making process and the decision

makers are affected by the law.

One area of the law is

especially significant as an operational tool in the "modus
operande" of higher education, i.e., the law of contract.

Major factors have directly influenced the use of contract
law in higher education and in doing so have highlighted
the need for and the significance of this study.

These

5

factors are:

(1)

the proliferation of laws impinging

on contract relations;

(2)

evidence of escalation in the

number of legal cases which involve issues of
higher education; and

(3)

the dollar and psychic costs of litigation.

The Proliferation of Laws
Impinging on Contract Relations
The commerce clause of the United States Constitution

empowers the federal government to regulate whatever moves
in or affects interstate commerce.

Accordingly, the federal

government through the National Labor Relations Board, has

regulated labor and management relations in higher
education.
tract)

The contract of employment

(individual con-

is a prerequisite to and inherent in the relation-

ship of labor and management.
The federal government through financial controls has

influenced, and in some instances regulated:

practices (non-discrimination);
(3)

(2)

(1)

hiring

privacy of records; and

student conduct (student loan programs)

through the

following legislation which ramifies into contract negotiations

:

Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
200 Od)

.

(42 U.S.C.

This law applies to all colleges and universities

which receive federal financial assistance for any purpose.
It prohibits discrimination in, exclusion from, or denial

6

of benefits of programs receiving
such financial assistance
.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
20p0e)

- as

amended in 1972.

(42 U.S.C.

This legislation applies non-

discr iminatory standards to the colleges or universities
as
an employer.

It covers employment of faculty, as well as

non-professional personnel.
Title IX of the Higher
(20 U.S.C.

1681-1683)

.

Education Amendment of 1972

This law provides for non-discrimina-

tion on the basis of sex.

Educational Amendments of 1974

(20 U.S.C.

821)

.

This

legislation sets forth the "Family Educational Rights and
Privacy Acts of 1974, "which allows the parent (or student
who is of majority age) to inspect and review all official
records, files, and data directly related to children (or
self)

,

including all material that is incorporated into

the cumulative folder.

Rehabilitation Act of 1973

.

This law provides for

non-discrimination on the basis of handicap.
Federal Equal Pay Act of 1963

(29 U.S.C.

206 Id).

This legislation requires "equal pay" for "equal work," re-

gardless of sex for all employees who are covered by the
Federal Labor Standards Act.

higher education.

It includes institutions of

-

7

The Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967

—9

U S ,C
'

*
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This law prohibits discrimination in em-

ployment because of age.
Office of Federal Contract Compliance Order 32 F.R.
14303 and Executive Orders 11246 and 11375

.

These execu-

tive orders (laws) require non-discrimination in the ad-

ministration and performance of federal contracts over
$10,000.

In addition to compliance assurances, they require

that affirmative action plans be filed by private institutions which have more than fifty employees.

Specific legislation in the Commonwealth which has

affected contract law in higher education is as follows:
M.G.L., Ch. 15 sec.

19B

.

This statute provides for the

indemnification of public officials.

Questions of personnel

liability have arisen for trustees, administrative personnel,
and employees of institutions of higher education.
M.G.L.
1975

.

,

Ch.

180 A,

added by Chapter 886 of the Acts of

This statute authorizes trustees in the management of

institutional endowment funds to appropriate and use capital
This legislation clarifies

gains, realized and unrealized.

the right of trustees in the exercise of individual contracts
in the operation of institutions when budgets are restricted.

M.G.L.

,

Ch.

225, sec.

13K

.

This law requires notice of

termination of student contracts, requiring tuition refunds

8

applying to proprietary schools.
M. G L
.

.

,

Ch.

69

,

sec

.

3

1C

.

This statute requires

disclosure of accreditation of non-accreditation status of
the school after the student is accepted by an instiution.

Escalation of Legal Cases Involving Higher
Education
Litigation involving colleges and universities has
increased during the past few years.

The number of court

decisions involving faculty employment increased this year
over the previous years.

Non-renewal of contacts of employ-

ment, coupled with retrenchment procedures, reflect the

national trends in higher education.

Decreased birth rates,

inflation, and lack of military evasion incentives contribute
to the fact that enrollments in colleges and universities

are not equal to the "Golden Years" of the sixties.

Issues

of the seventies revolve around affirmative action and non-

discrimination.

Higher education has been forced to choose

alternatives to meet the growing social and economic pressures.

Institutions have reorganized their offerings and

educational priorities.

Therefore, legal issues relative

to the law of contract with respect to the contract of em-

ployment have been frequently introduced in the courts.
The unique status of faculty members in their relation
to the institution of higher education has complicated the

.

.
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issues

and

resulting disputes which have arisen in re-

lation to the law of contract.

It should be noted that

the issues have been determined in the courts by
applying

the law of contract to the facts of the case

Case law involving the law of contract and higher

education is a dramatic omen of the inclination of citizens
to seek redress through the courts.

Contracts of employment have not necessarily been
clear documents in higher education.

As case law demon-

strates, the terms of employment for faculty may arise

from express or implied agreements, faculty handbook, or
statutes.

Under these contracts, faculty may be classified

as tenured or non-tenured.

The two leading cases in higher

education based on non-renewal of a contract are:
of Regents v. Roth

2
,

and

(2)

Perry v. Sinderman

3
.

(1)

Board

These

cases held:
The due process clause of the Constitution does
not require that a non-tenured professor receive a
hearing or written response prior to the non-renewal
of his contract unless he can show that the nonrenewal was a deprivation of an interest in "liberty"
or that he had a "property interest" in continued
employment 4

^Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
^Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U. S. 593 (1972).
4

Perry v. Sinderman.
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The courts have also held that a
contractual relationship exists between the student and the
institution

regarding academic matters.

The institution determines the

criteria for successful completion of courses,
programs, and
for graduation.
If the student does not meet the criteria,
he may be dismissed.

if the institution of higher education

fails to meet its standards, then the student may seek

judicial relief in an action for breach of contract.
The court has noted that in academic dismissal cases,
the student has the legal right to be advised of his aca-

demic deficiencies prior to termination.
a legal right to due process

He does not have

(notice and hearing)

.

With the

advent of "consumerism" in society and this concept being

applied to the student-faculty relationship in higher education, the need for faculty to be aware of basic contract law
is even more significant.

Mahavongsanan v. Hall^ is

a

case which well demon-

strates the need for a quasi-iegal understanding of the law
of contract by faculty and administrative personnel in higher

education (Re:
a

pp.

72-74

).

In this case,

the plaintiff,

graduate student, contended that the bulletins and cata-

logs of the university in effect at the time she enrolled

constituted a contract and that the university should be
ordered to grant her a degree.
^Mahavongsanan

v.

She completed the required

Hall, 592 F. 2d 448

(1976).

.
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course work but failed the comprehensive
examination on
two occasions.
She held that the examination requirement
came into effect after the date of her enrollment

and should

not apply to her.
law.

Issues all were in relation to contract

The student won in the federal district court but

the federal court of appeals reversed the district court's

decision
In relation to the student's charge that the univer-

sity breached its contract with the plaintiff, the court
held:

implicit in the student's contract with the
university on matriculation is the student's agreement to comply with the university's rules and
regulations, which the university clearly is entitled to modify so as to properly exercise its
educational responsibility.
.

.

.

The Dollar and Psychic Cost of Litigation

Values in society in the seventies have changed.

Edu-

cators have integrated within themselves and the system of

higher education the changing societal values.

Faculty and

administrative personnel have taken on the "consumerism"
value system of this decade.

The growth in size of institu-

tions of higher education, the shift to the public institutions, and the trend toward consolidated coordinating agen-

cies have affected decision making and, consequently, the

individual contract of employment of faculty and administra-

.
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trative personnel in higher education.

They have also

affected the individual contracts for learning.

Because

of these factors, institutions of higher
education are

making substantial changes in the system of
internal
governance.

"Accountability" is the issue of the day.

The courts have reinforced the continuation that institutions and individuals who provide educational services must
be "accountable" to one or more groups in relation to their

behavior

Coupled with "accountability" is the currently pre-

dominant value of the preservation of substative constitutional rights, as well as statutory rights.

Though educa-

tors are not litigious by nature, they have reverted to the

courts for resolution of constitutional and statutory issues

arising in their employment.

The cost of such controversy

In the majority of cases the educator has borne

is high.

the financial burden of the litigation personally.

In the

light of the individual's value, the importance of the

issue--at least at the outset--is held to outweigh the
dollar cost.
ever,

In addition to the monentary expenditure, how-

litigation has also imposed a psychic price on the

William Van Alstyne clearly puts this forth when

litigee.
he said:

the burden of proof falls upon the plaintiffteacher and is often exceedingly difficult to carry;
.

.

.
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off other institutions who sue
thei
launder their linen in public.
6

Xn this period of economic
recessiion, the purpose of

higher education remains

the production of knowledge.

However, the nature of the production
is presently unsure.
Higher education today is being challenged
to be what it

claims to be rather than what it is.

Intellectual capacity

cannot continue to increase at the expense of the
ability
to understand,

relate to, and emphathize with other people.

It is necessary that consumers,

spond to the

as well as educators,

re-

human condition" in addition to achieving

technical and conceptual requirements of an educational
program.
At the same time, America's institutions of higher

education have evolved into massive business enterprises

with priority issues challenging the structure and process
£

William W. Van Alstyne, "The Rights of Teachers and
Professors," The Rights of Americans: What They Are - What
They Should be ed. by Norman Dorsen (New York: Vintage
Books, 1971)
p. 558.
,

,

.
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of decision making in United States
higher education:
(1)

institutional independence,

of trustees and the president,
(4)

the role of the board

(2)
(3)

collective bargaining,

rules and practices of academic tenure,

influence on the campus, and
process.

(6)

student

(5)

the decision-making

Priority issue #4 is relevant to this research.

Colleges and universities grew rapidly in size and

complexity in the 1950's and 1960

's.

The management of the

escalating enterprises became full-time jobs.

In this pro-

cess, two distinct management systems developed:

collegial model and

(2)

(1)

the

the business management model.

In

the collegial model, administrators have been appointed

from the faculty ranks.

The business model has infiltrated

the ranks of collegiate administration with individuals

whose primary training has been in management.

To the ex-

tent that the business model has taken hold, the condition
to which this study is addressed has been mitigated, but

there is little evidence of "professional" managers taking

over higher education.

The traditional route to institu-

tional leadership through the academic ranks still prevails,
that is, higher education is still dominated by the colle-

gial model.

In this model, the administrators have come

from the academic ranks and have not necessarily been

equipped with the "tools" to perform their administrative
^Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, "Governance
Six Priority Problems" (April 1973)
of Higher Education:
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tasks.

Among the tools they lack is legal
knowledge,
particularly with reference to the execution

of contracts.

Administrators within the collegial model
need to
have a quasi-legal understanding of
the law, as well
as

excellence in their academic disciplines.
only

m

in 1978,

Excellence

academia, for an administrator in higher education
is not logical in our legal society.

the merits of the collegial model
to be many

— the

— and

Whatever

there are presumed

management of higher education by "gifted

amateurs" without augmentation of their academic training
is no longer feasible.

In the 1970's, the fluid labor market, new techno-

logical jobs, diversified life styles, and economic pressures have affected educational needs.

Tenure quotas,

faculty retrenchment, restricted budgets, increased work
loads and phase outs of educational programs have been im-

posed by the administrative hierarchy with little or no

consultation with those affected.

Faculty have been re-

garded as employees and their traditional academic value,
namely, tenure is under attack.

Faculty, and in many instances administrative personnel, have secured their employment and maintained their

status under the individual employment contact which in

public higher education led traditionally to the statutory

16

based tenure system.

Academic tenure has been challenged
for diversified reasons since
its inception in
1915.

it

was in that year that the American
Association of University Professors was formed to
protect the academic community
from unfair and arbitrary practices.
During its first
year, the committee on Academic Freedom
and Tenure of the
American Association of University Professors
was involved
with eleven cases of alleged infringement
of academic
freedom.
In 1973 the Commission on Academic Tenure
in higher

education issued a report entitled "Faculty Tenure"
which
indicated that an estimated ninety-four percent of all
faculty members in American universities and colleges were
serving in institutions which conferred tenure.

8

The

Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, in 1973, reported
that by 1990 the percentage of teachers with tenure could
be up to 90 percent.
a

Therefore, this Commission predicted

widespread tendency toward

"

judicalizations" of the issues

on college and university campuses.^ 8
g

Commission on Academic Tenure in Higher Education,
"Faculty Tenure" (March 1973).
9

.

.

Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, "Priorities in Action" (October 1973).
10

Ibid.
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Two major responses appear to
be arising in response
to the attack on tenure.
These responses tend
to be in-

herent in response to the changing roles
and relationships
in higher education, namely:
1
faculty unionization
(

and

)

substitution of term contracts for tenure
commitments.
Unions tend to facilitate a bargaining
process which
is an orderly, neutral mechanism for
resolving issues
(2)

into

a bilateral mutual binding agreement enforceable
under law.

Unionization in the United States demands separation of

management and employee, the latter being the faculty.
Faculty cannot be both the employer and employee.
The term-contract system is a means by which an

institution issues contracts for

a

specified period.

After this period, the professor's employment would be

terminated unless another agreement were negotiated.
Therefore, irrespective of the alternative accepted,
it is necessary for faculty and administrative personnel

in public higher education to have a quasi-legal knowledge

of the basic concepts of the law of contract to ensure

their economic well being in 1978.

Employment for faculty

and the inherent academic freedom so valued by education

will conceivably in the future be terms of a contract, be
it individual or collective.

Institutions of public higher education cannot
function effectively and safely without their employees

:
.

.

,
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having a working knowledge of
the law of contract or the
legal structure of their employer.
While professional
legal counsel is available to
institutions to oversee the
legal aspects of their major
operational functions, there
is often no such provision for
avoiding or resolving minor
disputes which may be equated to hidden
cancerous lesions
which will cripple and can ultimately
kill an institution.
It should be noted that since the
sixties, with
the

surge of focus on students' rights, college
educators and

administrators have recognized the need for
of legal information.

a

constant flow

At the outset of that decade, in a

litigation known as the Dixon Case (Dixon v. Alabama State
Board of Education

11
)

due process rights for students in

institutions of public higher education were ajudicated.
Facts
Several Alabama State college students
ar
"ticipated
in a sit-in at a lunch grill.
P
Some
of the students were expelled while others were
placed on probation. The disciplinary action was
imposed on the students without their receiving
notice of the charges against them. They also did
not receive a hearing prior to the disciplinary
action.
Judgment was for the defendant Alabama
State Board of Education in the United States
District Court and the plaintiff students' appeal.
Issue
Does due process require that students receive notice and some opportunity for a hearing
before they are expelled for misconduct in a tax
supported college?

Decision:
11 -

Yes.

Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, 294

2d 150

(1961)

F.

:
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Re asoning

the disciplining of colleae
consider ations of immediate
danger to the U 1C
^° r ° f peril to the national
security which
whTch should
=i
prevent the Board from ex1SaSt thS fun<^ amen tal principles
of
by giving the accused students
notice
U
of
tht
the charges and an opportunity
to be heard in their
own de fens e
(2
The State cannot condition a
pr^vienu ciatlon of the Constitutional
rioht
J
^
right to procedural due process.
in

(1)

6

,

F

^

)

This case is relevant to this study
as this decision
triggered the beginning of a chain of
legal decisions.
Today students in general are aware of
their legal rights.
They take a wide variety of issues to court.
Studies of
the colleges' responses to student litigations
show that

college administrators and attorneys have been unprepared
to answer issues raised by students

.

The organizational

behavior of the institutions of public higher education has
become that of crisis management, stemming in

a large

part

from minimum knowledge of legal parameters.

Legal reporting systems have developed over the past

decade to publish up-to-date legal decisions.

These ser-

vices cover all aspects of the law from basic civil law
to taxation.

Information is voluminous and not readily

accessible to the educator or administrator in reference
to a single, specific topic-issue or area of the law, not
to mention a specific jurisdiction.

More significantly,

little information is available as to how the law relates
to the operation of institutions of public higher education

and the contractural rights of administrators, faculty and
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students within these institutions.
The

—

ted States District fo r the
Western Districtof Missouri sitting en banc
(45 R.R.D. 133) issued a
significant and comprehensive statement
on the relationship between the courts and education:

Education is the living and growing
source
of our progressive civilization,
of our open
repository of increasing knowledge,
our salutary democratic traditions. culture and
As
cation deserves the highest respect and such, eduthe
protection of the courts in the performance fullest
of its
lawful
missions.

There have been and no doubt in the future
there
will be instances of erroneous and unwise
misuse of
power by those invested with powers of management
and teaching in the academic community, as in
the
case of all human fallible institutions. When
such
misuse of power is threatened or occurs, our political
and social order has made available a wide variety
of lawful, non-violent, political, economic, and
social means to prevent or end the misuse of power.
These same lawful, non-violent, political, economic
and social means are available to correct an unwise
but lawful choice of educational policy or action by
those charged with the powers of management and
teaching in the academic community.
It should be noted here that erroneous misuse of

power can be actualized in the making of unconstitutional

contracts--illegal contracts

— fraudulent

contracts, etc.

The courts have long since declared that the rela-

tionship of enrolled students to

contractual.
contractual

a

private institution is

Similarly, Krawez v. Stans established the

nature of transactions between enrolled stu-

:
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dents and the agents of public
institutions. 12
Facts
Federal
w"" Narcotics
ngents
Agents and a Nassai
T
Nassau
r'nnnfv
q “ estloned midshipmen at the
United ftat« Merchant
m®
Academy concerning9
the use
ut of marijuana on Marine
the campus.
The quesloners acting as agents for the
Academy
assured
U e
hat heY °° Uld be " fr ^k" Y and
"
"speak
freely
treely,
tH
since nothing
they said would be held
1
t them
After the midshipmen admitted their
uS nf
0 " CamPUS
theY Were sus P er) ded
from°t h Acidly.
,

S

*

r

’

Issue:
Does an offer made by authorized
agents of
an institution, and the acceptance
of that offer
y students, constitute a binding contract between
the institution and the student?

Decision

Yes.

:

Reasoning
As agents, the questioners were authorized to make promises to the students concerning
the
use of their statements.
They told plaintiffs that
if they spoke freely, nothing they said would
be
used against them.
Plaintiffs, by speaking freely,
accepted this offer, and a contract was made. The
Academy is bound by this agreement.
It cannot use
as evidence in disciplinary proceedings admissions
made by plaintiffs to the agents.
:

Arbitrary dismissal of the midshipmen on the basis
of immune testimony manifested blatant ignorance of funda-

mental concepts of law.

The monetary costs of such ignorance

are considerable; the emotional costs to individuals and
the damage to the reputation of the academy are incalculable.

Krawez v. Stans in a sense is the epitome of the
problem.

Ignorance of basic legal principles precipitated

unnecessary expenditure of public monies and did irreparable
damage to individuals acting in good faith.
12

The signifi-

Krawez v. Stans, 306 F. Supp. 1230 (1969).
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cance of this study lies in its
modest substantive contribution to the means for eradicating
legal ignorance
and ultimately avoiding the consequences
of such ignorance
that the public can ill afford and
will not
abide.

CHAPTER

I

I

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Background research pursuant to the present investigation proceeded along several lines, including

a

computer

search for extant studies, surveys of interpretative literature in academic and business management, law-related educa-

tion literature, contract law (in general), landmark cases
in contract law, and seminal commentary on basic and contract
law.

The initial inquiry was generally useful insofar as it

reinforced the researcher's implicit hypothesis

— that

faculty and administrators in higher education need quasilegal knowledge beyond what presently characterizes the

profession of education.

In particular, elements of the

literature justified the researcher's focus on substantive
aspects of contract law, supported the election of an historical case study methodology, and

— by

omission--revealed

the potential of the current study for contributing sig-

nificantly to the literature.
Computer Search
An ERIC computer search was used to initiate the

investigation.

The researcher was unable to find explicit

treatment of the subject of her inquiry

23

.

Only fifteen

"

:

"
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research projects which involve the law of
contract existed
at the time of the undertaking of this study.
The researcher categorized these fifteen studies
into
four areas:

due process,

(1)

bargaining, and

(4)

other.

(2)

tenure,

(3)

collective

This categorization was as

follows
(1)

Due Process

"Termination and Due Process"
"The Process that is Due"
"The Case of the Expectant Professor and
Other Mysteries"
(2)

Tenure
"Security of Tenure: The Position of Academic
Staff in English and Welch University
Institutions
"Academic Freedom, Professional Responsibility,
and Tenure in the Utah System of Higher
Education, Statement of Policy Adopted by
the State Board of Regents, December 20, 1973"

(3)

Collective Bargaining
"Resources on Academic Bargaining and Governance"
"Collective Bargaining Comes to Campus"
"Collective Bargaining on Campus"
"Dues Check Off and Union Security Study"
"Grievance Procedures in Higher Education
Contracts

(4)

Other
"The College Catalog as a Contract"
"Recent Development in Two Year Community
Student, Faculty and Tort"
College Law:
Legal Implications
"First Level Management:
and Responsibilities for Selection and
Retention of Faculty"

"

.
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|i

® 1 kliography of School Law Dissertations"
Policy, Documents, and Reports of the

American Association of University
Professors

The investigator postulated that though the law
of

contract is inherent in these studies, only one in the
Other

category treats of the law of contract per se.

This study is termed:

"The College Catalog as a Contract."

Sections of the substantive law of contract are applied to
the dictum of the catalog in this study, establishing its

relationship to the present investigation, since "Catalogue"
issues cluster around the area of Offer and Acceptance of
the law of contract.

The three studies in the "Due Process" category relate
to the constitutional right of faculty to due process.

The

research projects categorized under "Tenure" and "Collective
Bargaining" focus on specific statutory rights and contribute

nothing to the researcher's investigation.

Similarly, the

ERIC Clearinghouse maintains a file of faculty contracts
and faculty handbooks.

These are objective manifestations

of the form of the contract and the terms of the inherent

descriptors, which contribute nothing to the understanding
of the substantive law of contract and, therefore, to this

study

3

,
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Literature of Academic and
Business Management
Since the focus of this study is on the individual

contract and collective bargaining, as the name implies,
leads to a group contract, that is, a contract in
behalf of

all members of a bargaining unit, collective bargaining

contracts lie outside the scope of this study.

Moreover,

since the statutory law and precedent which control collective bargaining are distinct from the common law, statutes,
and precedent that control individual contracts, collective

bargaining contracts are not within the delimitations of
this study.

Therefore, the aforementioned publications do

not make a contribution to this research.
In the area of business management,

general works have been published.

Contract Law in America:

since 1968 five

They are:

(1)

Friedman,

A Social and Economic Case Study;

(2)

Kessler and Gilmore, Contracts:

(3)

Gordon and Kurzman, Gordon's Modern Annotated Forms of

Agreement
(5)

;

(4)

Cases and Materials

Cappola, Law of Business Contracts

Wincor, Law of Contract

1
.

;

and

These works are broad

scope and a minimum of eight years old.

;

m

Contract law in

many instances has been modified or changed by legal decisions rendered between the publication of these works and
13

Paul Wasserman et al., Encyclopedia of Business In
formation Sources (Detroit: Gale Research Co.) p. 177.

:
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the current investigation.
C_ases and Materials,

Kessler and Gilmore, Contracts

as a case study approach,

methodology of this study.

informs the

Four handbooks and manuals have

also been published which are subject to the same
variables,

namely scope and age.

Literature of Education
A review of the literature in education reiterates
the need for this study.

The literature does not share

information on specific aspects of the law but focuses on
failure of the faculty and administrators in higher education to know it.

Schimmel in his article, "The Bill of

Rights and the Public Schools:

Change and Challenge,"

indicates that educators today have hidden agendas--lessons
in legal hypocrisy based on their own lack of information.
He alleges that educators seem to be doing everything they

can--except teaching the way the courts have applied the

Constitution to the classroom and applying the Bill of
Rights to students and teachers

m

the schools.

14

A Legacy of the Past

Why don't most educators teach and apply the Constitution? One reason is that many do not understand when or how the Bill of Rights is applicable
This is because these rights did
to the schools.
not apply to them when they were students and
14

David Schimmel, "The Bill of Rights and the Public
Schools: Change and Challenge," Social Education (Virginia
National Council for Social Studies, April 1975), p. 209.

.

.

«
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because they learned almost nothing functional
about the subject during their schooling. Even
courses which taught the history and principles
of the Constitution rarely considered their
application to the public schools. Thus, since
many teachers and administrators have had almost
no education or personal experience in this area,
they are poorly prepared to apply the Bill of
Rights in the schools today
15

Schimmel further indicates that one reason that the current
legal decisions are not found in the school curriculum is

that many teachers do not know about the cases, or if they
do,

they do not know where to find them.

A second reason

he identifies is that educators see these decisions as con-

troversial.

Thirdly, he points out that educators see

themselves as having few rights and students as having so

many 16

Faculty and administrators in public higher education
must change the self-concept that Schimmel suggests that
they have, i.e., that they have few legal rights.

Schimmel

findings reiterated the need for this research,

's

since an understanding of the law of contract transmits to
the faculty and administrators an understanding of their

inherent rights, thus fulfilling their own need for security.
The end result will be that this self-concept will change.

I5

ibid.

16

Ibid

.

,

p

.

273

.
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Fischer and Schimmel in their text, Civil
Rights of
Teachers indicate that:
,

It is paradoxical that in schools, which
have as one of their major purposes preparation
citizens for effective participation in a
democracy, civil rights have never been consistently applied.
One reason for this inconsistency is that
teachers are generally unaware of their rights.
A recent survey in Massachusetts, for example,
indicated that the law gives teachers a much wider
range of freedom of speech and action than most
teachers realize.
Some even believe that they
voluntarily give up many of their rights when they
sign their teaching contracts 17
.

Fischer and Schimmel have concentrated on the civil
rights of teachers.

These rights emanate from the consti-

tutional law vis-a-vis the law of contract.

Therefore,

their findings do not directly contribute to this investi-

gation

.

In pursuing the justification for this study, the

researcher found that many of the grievances filed on
faculty contracts were based on violation of the terms of
the employment contract with which administrative personnel

were not familiar.

Specific terms with bilateral rights

(management and labor) in a contract directly affect the

management of any institution of higher education.
Following the reasoning of Fischer and Schimmel, when
^7

Louis Fischer and David Schimmel, The Civil Rights of
Teachers (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), p. xi

8
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faculty become aware of their contract rights,
civil
rights in education will be more consistently

applied.

The strength of an institution will be
reinforced by in-

creased knowledge of faculty and administrative
personnel
in relation to the law of contract.

The ability to re-

spond and to account is in direct ratio to the level of

understanding.
"Governments are instituted among men, deriving
their just powers from the consent of the governed."

This

statement in the Declaration of Independence is predicated
upon the conviction that "all men are created equal."

From this belief, it follows that each person has the right
to live his life according to his own philosophy and has a

right to an equal voice in decisions which affect the whole
community.

These principles of consent and political

equality facilitate the conception of democracy as

a

system

which embodies the ideal of equality and political power
among all members of the community.

1

This equality of

power recognizes the dignity of the person and provides
him with the opportunity to develop his powers and per-

sonality while advancing his own interests.

The law of

contract is a medium for the maintenance of the equality of
power.
18

Peter Bachrach, The Theory of Democratic Elitism:
p. 83.
A Critique (Boston: Little, Brown and Company)
,

9
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Rule by law is one of the crucial
meanings of
America.
Our constitutional tradition created
a political
system for us that preserves human liberties
and at the
same time permits us to respond to changes
in our conditions.
One of the most sacred rights granted to
us by

our forefathers in the Constitution is the
right to discuss our law.

The problem arises in these United States

that the issue is not the right to do but the failure
to

know how to so do.
Jethro

K.

Liberman indicates:

Perhaps the most encouraging by-product of the
constitutional crises that Richard Nixon threatened
to provoke was the reawakening talk about constitutional law not merely in the law schools but
at the dinner tables and in the streets.

—

1

Liberman goes on to say:
But there is much more to be done.
Aside from
the lawyers themselves, who constitute something
less than one-fifth of one percent of the population, the American public is schooled in law only
when one of its members needs to write a will, buy
a house, recover from an automobile accident, sue a
doctor, or separate from a spouse.
This is not
sustained, sophisticated, or sensible education.

William W. Van Alstyne, Professor of Law at Duke
University's School of Law, has written on academic freedom
and other aspects of constitutional law.
19

He is the former

200 Years of
Jethro K. Liberman, Milestones
American Law Milestones in Our Legal History (Minnesota:
West Publishing Co.), p. xvii.
I

:

20

Ibid

.
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General Counsel to the African
Association of University
Professors.
In his article, "The Rights
of Teachers and
Professors," he indicates that the
protection and implementation of the substantive law in
education will
cut

down on the recourse of educators
to the procedural aspects
of the law.
Knowledge of the substantive law of
contract
will assist faculty and administrative
personnel in avoiding the inconvenience and stigma of
the litigation process
that Van Alstyne relates to by fortifying
them with
the

tool to use the constitutional pre-termination
procedural
due process to their advantage, thus negating
the need to
go on to court litigation 21
.

Justice Frankfurter said, "The history of liberty
has largely been the history of observance of procedural

safeguards." 2 2

Frankfurter's point is well taken in

education
Suppose, for instance, that a public school
teacher on annual contract simply fails to receive
any notice that his teaching contract is being renewed for the coming year. Or suppose that an
assistant professor in a state college receives
notice that his three-year contract is not being
renewed and, upon inquiry to learn the reason, is
advised that it is contrary to institutional practice to provide a statement of reasons.
Or suppose
that a full professor in a state whose legislature
has neither adopted a tenure system nor even delegated authority to the state regents to provide for
one receives notice in midyear that his service
21
22

Ibid.

,

Van Alstyne.

McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
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lnate the f °l lowing June.
in
u
hhe teacher
may believe that one of the each case
reasons
significantly contributing to his
termination
involves a standard forbidden
by the Bill of
Rights possibly retaliation
for a projected extra
mural utterance, a disfavord
political1 af filial™
or something similar.

,

Here it is interesting to point
out that fear is an
emotion arising from the unknown.
How many teachers would
be afraid to question the reasons—
not to mention the
justification for the above mentioned
actions? The procedural safeguards to the substantive
rights of the faculty
are embedded in the history of liberty
that Frankfurter
speaks to.
Law of Contract

A review of case law serves as

a

good foundation to

assist the reader in understanding the need to undertake
this study
said,

,

Alexis de Tocqueville in Democracy in America

"There is hardly a political question in the United

States which does not sooner or later turn into a judicial
one.

In the United States, the law permeates the whole.

Frankfurter stated, "The law touches every concern of man,
nothing that is human is alienated to it."

Transferring

the words of Frankfurter to the activities of daily living,

we conclude that the law affects our lives personally and
23

Ibid., Van Alstyne.
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and professionally from the
proverbial "cradle to the
grave." The law is concerned with
the conditions of one's
conception legitimate or illegitimate,
and one's intrauterine life.
The interruption and/or continuance
of
,

intrauterine life is a legal matter today.

Following

birth and during the process of life, the
law concerns
itself with our health, education, and welfare.
Finally,
the circumstances of our death and disposition
of our

material assets concern the law.
is to protect its citizens.

The purpose of the law

Educators as citizens should

be aware of the implications of the law as it affects
one's

rights, the rights of others, and one's profession.

This charge is more relevant to educators today than

ever before because the only way that the law will lose
its face in a democracy is when the people themselves have

no understanding of it.

We are living in an age in which

more and more educational issues are being resolved in the
courts.

The courts have in essence become an important

factor in shaping policies in higher education.
In order to understand the effect of the concept of

"legalism" as it exists today, the researcher studied the

historical development of the law of contract.

This in-

vestigation assisted the researcher in understanding the
how and why of the "legalism" of today's society and its

educational movements in the courts.

.
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Historically

,

English law (which came aboard the

first English ships to reach the
American coast in 1606)
was the cornerstone of American
jurisprudence.
English
law was not however, implemented
per se in America.
Historical differences in the founding of
the colonies affected the law.
,

In Massachusetts, and the other colonies,
where the

Puritans dominated the political structure, the
role of
the church in politics took precedence.
So too in
the

crown colonies the law was not the same as law in the
states
that began as proprietary colonies.

The common law tra-

dition was one of the significant factors in the resentment
and alienation that led to the breach with England.

The

Anglo-American system of law attempts to achieve flexibility by using precedents that arise from changing con-

ditions in society, thereby following the old adage that the
law should be a guidepost not a hitching post.

Our system

of law makes provisions for dealing with problems as they
arise.

One of its greatest advantages is that by examining

the principles that are derived from past experience, one

can foresee with considerable accuracy the places where

difficulties are likely to occur.
Operational guidelines are set forth by the Constitution for educators both substantively and procedurally

Substantively, the Constitution has provided for the adoption

,
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of effective, valid rules and
regulations.

Procedurally

it has handled disciplinary actions
concerning faculty,

employees and students.

Case law has repeatedly demon-

strated that procedural problems would not
have come before
the court if more attention had been paid to
the substantive
law.

Landmark Cases
One of the major cases contributing to the develop-

ment of the American common law system in the Supreme
Court was the Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward
(1819):

The Sanctity of Contracts

.

Through this case,

the basic concepts of contract law contributed to bringing
the American system of the law to life. 24
In 1974 members of the American Bar Association were

invited by the West Publishing Company to vote on what

they as individuals believed to be the major milestone cases
in the first two hundred years of law in the United States.

The purpose of the survey vote was to organize the major

identified cases into a commemorative text in celebration
of the United States Bicentennial and the one hundredth

year of the West Publishing Company as a law book publisher.
The eighteen cases which received the highest number of votes
24

Trustees of Darmouth College v. Woodward,
Wheaton 518 (1819)
.

4

.

:
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in the balloting were
compiled into the commemorative
volume . 25 What is significant to
this study is the fact

that the Dartmouth College case,
a contract case, ranked
eighth in importance by rank order
in the national poll.
The Dartmouth College case in 1819
set the

stage for the

development of the private corporation.
A series of early nineteenth century
cases decided
the g-a P ctlt Y ° f Contracts
Nine years before the Dartmouth
College case in 1810, Fletcher y. Peck held
the inviola.

...

bility of contracts.

In this decision, the Supreme Court

held that the original grant of land was a contract.

The

purchasers, in good faith, were entitled to keep what they
paid for.

Fletcher v. Peck is

a

significant case not only

for contract law but it was the first time that a court

struck down a state law as being unconstitutional.^^
Facts
Fletcher conveyed land to Peck. The deed
contained a covenant that the title had not been
impaired by any later act of Georgia.
In a suit on the covenant, it was alleged that,
because of undue means practiced on members of the
legislature which made the grant, a subsequent
legislature had passed another statute which annulled
and rescinded the Act by which the original grant had
been made, and reasserting title to the land on behalf
of the State.
Defendant pleaded that he and all the
intermediate holders after the first grantors were
purchasers without notice. Judgment was given for the
Defendant
25

Ibid., Liberman.

^Fletcher

v.

Peck,

6

Cranch 87

(1810).
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t

Se

Wi hin the Cons titution
5§TKe Unitld
united States
Stat^ which
h°T^declares
^
that no state
shall
,

,

pass any bill of attainder,
or laws in pairing the obligation ex post facto law
of contract?

Decision

Yes.

;

R easoning
(1) a contract is a promise
between two
or more parties, and it is either
executory
or executed
An executory contract is one in which
a party bi^ds
3 partlcular thing.
This was
under ^which^t-h
which the conveyance was made by the the law
governor.
A contract executed is one in which
the object of a
contract is performed. Blackstone says this
differs
in nothing from a grant.
The contract between Georgia
and the purchasers was executed by the
grant.
An
executed contract, as well as one which is executory,
contains obligations binding on the parties. A
grant
its own nature amounts to an extinguishment of
the
right of the grantor.
It implies a contract not to
reassert that right. A party is, therefore, always
estopped by his own grant.
(2) A grant is an executed
contract, the obligation of which continues.
Since
the constitution used the general term contract,
without distinguishing between those which are executing
and those which are executed, it must be construed to
comprehend the latter as well as the former. A law
which annuls conveyances between individuals, and
declares that the grantors should stand of their
former estates, notwithstanding those grants, would
be as repugnant to the Constitution as a law discharging the vendors of property from the obligation of
executing their contracts by conveyances.
It would be
strange if a contract to convey was secured by the
Constitution, while an absolute conveyance remained
unprotected.
(3) The estate having passed into the
hands of a purchaser for a valuable consideration, without notice, the State of Georgia was restrained, either
by general principles which are common to our free
institutions, or by the particular provisions of the
Constitution of the United States, from passing a law
whereby the estate of the plaintiff in the premises
purchased could be constitutionally and legally impaired and rendered null and void.
:

m

In 1812,

the second Supreme Court contract case was

New Jersey v. Wilson

.

In this case, Chief Justice Marshall

.
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voided a state tax on the land as an impairment
of the
new owner's contract right. 27
Facts
Under an arrangement embodied in an Act of
the New Jersey Colonial Legislature in 1758, for the
settlement of claims by a tribe of Delaware Indians,
it was agreed that certain lands shall not hereafter
be subject to any tax.
An Act of the New Jersey State
Legislature repealed the exemption in 1804. Taxes
were levied on the lands.
:

Issue

Did a contract exist?
If a contract existed, is it violated by
the Act of 1804?
:

Decision

(1)
(2)

Yes.
No.
Act of 1804 is invalid as a viola-

(1)
(2)

:

tion of the contract clause.

Reasoning
All requisites to the formation of a contract are found in the proceedings between the then
colony of New Jersey and the Indians. The subject was
a purchase on the part of the government of extensive
claims of the Indians, the extinguishment of which
would quiet the title to a large portion of the
province. A proposition to this effect is made, the
terms stipulated, the consideration agreed upon (which
is a tract of land with the privilege of exemption
from taxation)
and then in consideration of the
arrangement previously made, one of which this Act of
Assembly is stated to be, the Indians execute their
This is a contract clothed in forms
deed of cession.
of unusual solemnity.
:

;

The Dartmouth College case in 1819 set the stage for
the development of the private corporation.

28

By a royal charter issued in 1769, corporate
Facts:
powers and privileges were granted to the ''Trustees
of Dartmouth College," authorizing the trustees to fill
By a statute of 1816,
all vacancies in their own body.
the State of New Hampshire undertook to increase the
27

New Jersey v. Wilson,

7

Cranch 164

^Trustees of Dartmouth College

v.

(1812)

Woodward.
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SJS.&S'S.K S ST^SSW ?„«.
10nS
and brought thirLt^r^orde?
?o°reCOrp ° rate seal and other
articles and records
of^he^
of
the corporation which were in
the possession of
persons holding under the Act of
1816.
A special
f
defendant was conditioned upon the
valid?h y of
°f S®
the Act of 1816.
On this verdict the
Urt ° f
Hampshire 9 ave judgments for the
Def endant?

of this act

,

'

I ssues
(1) Is this contract protected by
the Constitution of the United States?
(2) Is it impaired by the acts
under which the
Defendants hold?
;

Decision

(1)
(2)

;

R e asoning

Yes.
No.
Judgment for Plaintiff.

(1) This is a contract to which the donors,
the trustees, and the crown (to whose rights and
obligations New Hampshire succeeds) were original parties.
It is a contract made on valuable consideration.
It is
a contract for the security and disposition of
property.
It is a contract on the faith of which a real and personal estate has been conveyed to the corporation.
It
is then a contract within the letter of the Constitution, and within its spirit also, unless the facts that
the property is invested by the donors in trustee, for
the promotion of religion and education, for the
benefit of persons who are perpetually changing, though
the object remains the same, shall create a particular
exemption which takes this case out of the prohibition
contained in the Constitution.
(2) Although a particular
and a rare case may not, in itself, be of sufficient
magnitude to induce a rule, yet it must be governed by
the rules, when established, unless some plain and
strong reason for excluding it can be given.
It is not
enough to say that this particular case was not in the
mind of the Convention when the Article was framed, nor
of the American people when it was adopted.
It is
necessary to go further, and to say that had this particular case been suggested, the language would have
been varied as to exclude it, or it would have been made
a special exception.
The case, being within the words
;

.
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of the rule, must be within its operation
likewise,
unless there be something in the literal construction
so obviously absurd or mischievous, or
repugnant to
the general spirit of the instrument, as to justify
those who expound the Constitution in making it an
exception.
(3) The crown was bound by this contract
and could have made no violent alteration in its
essential terms without impairing its obligation.
(4) In this case, the will of the State is substituted
for the will of the donors, in every essential operation of the college. This is not an immaterial change.
The founders of the college contracted not merely for
the perpetual application of the funds which they
gave to the object for which those funds were given,
they also contracted to secure that application by
the Constitution of the corporation.
They contracted
for a system which should retain forever the government of the literary institution they had formed in
the hands of persons approved by themselves.
This
system is totally changed. The Charter of 1769 exists
no longer.
It is reorganized, and reorganized in such
a manner as to convert a literary institution, molded
according to the will of its founders, and under the
control of private literary men, into a machine entirely subservient to the will of government.
This may be
for the advantage of literature in general.
It is not
according to the will of the donors, and is subversive
of that contract on the faith of which their property
was given.
.

,

The year 1819 saw three cases of constitutional signi-

ficance.

Sturges v. Crowinshield held that a state bankrupt-

cy law that discharged debtors who had contracted their debts

before the law was passed was an unconstitutional impairment
,
of the contract between the debtor and the creditor
.

29

Plaintiff is a payee on two promissory notes.
Facts:
Defendant who is maker of the notes, pleaded that he
was discharged of his obligation under a New York bankruptcy statute which was enacted after the notes were
(1) that New York had no
Plaintiff contends:
made.
power to pass bankruptcy laws; and (2) this New York
statute impairs the obligation of control.
,

^Sturges

v.

Crowinshield,

4

Wheaton 122

(1819).
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Issue
is the statute invalid as applied to
contract s
in existence when it was passed?
:

Decision

Yes.

:

Reasoning
Chief Justice Marshall, delivering the
opinion of the court said:
:

What is the obligation of a contract? And
what will impair it?
The law binds him to
perform his undertaking, and this is, of course,
the obligation of his contract.
In the case at
bar, the defendant has given his promissory note
to pay the plaintiff a sum of money on or before
a certain day.
The contract binds him to pay
that sum on that day, and this is its obligation.
Any law which releases a part of this obligation
must, in the literal sense of the word, impair
it.
Much more must a law impair it which makes
it totally invalid, and entirely discharges
it
The plain and simple declaration, that
no State shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts, include insolvent laws
and all other laws, so far as they infringe the
principle (the inviolability of contracts) the
Convention intended to hold sacred, and no
farther
the distinction between the obligation of a contract, and the remedy given by the
legislature to enforce that obligation, has been
taken at the bar, and exists in the nature of
things.
Without impairing the obligation of the
contract, the remedy may be certainly modified
as the wisdom of the nation may direct.
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

Confinement of the debtor may be a punishment
for not performing his contract, or may be allowed
But the
as a means of inducing him to perform it.
State may refuse to inflict this punishment, or
may withhold this means, and leave the contract
Imprisonment in no part of the
in full force.
to release the prisoner does
simply
contract, and
obligations.
not impair its

McCulloch v. Maryland declared the power and supremacy
of the federal government at a time in which the historical

question was

:

What was the extent to which our federal

:
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government could act and dominate
the states? 30 America
at this time was divided
into two camps:
(1) Supporters
of a political group that
supported the adoption
by the

state of the Constitution; and

(2)

supporters of a political

group that favored a state in which
there was a government
of the people.

—

Facts
r-

An aotion in debt ‘-'i
by the
'-“c ucienaam:
Defendant in error
° f th ® United States, established
er an Act of Congress,
under"an
r*"*
was doing business in Maryland, without the authority of the
state.
McCulloch
c shler in the bank.
He issued notes on behalf
of the J
bank without complying with the requirements
of a Maryland statute which governed
the issuing of
notes, fees for same and penalties if fees
not paid.
-r

—

.

Issues:
(1) Does Congress have the Constitutional
power to incorporate the Bank of the United States?
(2) May the bank and its branches claim
to be exempt
rom the ordinary and equal taxation of assessed
property of the states in which they are located?

Decision

(1)
(2)

:

Yes.
Yes.

Reasoning
(1) In addressing the issue, does Congress
have the Constitutional power to incorporate the Bank
of the United States, the court indicated that the
conflicting powers of the general and state governments
must be brought to light and their respective supremacy,
when they are in opposition, must be settled.
It then
declared the power and supremacy of the federal government
:

:

If any one proposition could command the universal
assent of mankind, we might expect that it would be
this that the government of the Union, though limited
in its powers, is supreme within its sphere of action.
This would seem to result necessarily from its nature.
It is the government of all; its powers are delegated by
all; it represents all; and acts for all.
Though any
one state may be willing to control its operations, no

—

30

McCulloch v. Maryland,

4

Wheaton 316 (1819).

'

'
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state is willing to allow others to control them.
The nation, in those subjects on which it can act,
must necessarily bind its component parts. But
this question is not left to mere reason:
the people
have, in express terms decided it by saying, 'this
Constitution,' and the laws of the United States,
which shall be made in pursuance thereof, shall be the
supreme law of the land, and by requiring that members
of the state legialture, and offices of the executive
and judicial department of the state shall take the
oath of fidelity to it.
,

The
limited
made in
supreme
tion or
ing.

government of the United States, then, though
in its powers, is supreme, and its laws, when
pursuance of the Constitution, form the
law of the land, and 'anything in the Constitulaws of any state to the contrary notwithstand-

'

The court continued its reasoning and concluded by
saying:
'The act to incorporate the Bank of the United
States is a law made in pursuance of the Constitution,
and is a part of the supreme law of the land.
(2) Using the basic premise that the Constitution, and
the laws made in pursuance thereof are supreme, the
court held that 'The states have no power by taxation
or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden, or in any
manner control, the operations of the Constitutional
laws enacted by Congress to carry into execution the
powers vested in the general government. This is, we
think, the unavoidable consequences of that supremacy
which the Constitution has declared.

Two out of three of these landmark cases, at a time
in which the power and supremacy of the federal court was

being tested, were contract cases.
The Dartmouth College case rested on the proposition

that once a state gives a specific power to a private party,
it cannot change its mind later.

The Dartmouth College case

still has validity today for Dartmouth College.
the grant of the corporate right was a contract.

It held that

This

^

1

.
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corporate grant was held to be property,
and property,
the court said, cannot be taken away
from the rightful
owner
.

From the Dartmouth College case on, the bulk
of the
Supreme Court decisions which involve the law of
contract
are relevant to the issue of the limitation under
the
"contract clause" upon actions by state legislatures in

respect to pre-existing contracts.

With the advent of the "due process" provisions
of the Constitution, issues also arose involving the "due

process" clause in the economic field.

Dubuque

,

Gelpcke v. City of

in 1863, applied the contract clause to retro-

active decisions of the courts. 32

However, despite this

declaration and others, the contract clause does not apply
to retroactive decisions by the courts.

Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan (1924) held that:
It has been settled by a long line of decision
that the provisions of Section 10, Article 1, of
the Federal Constitution, protecting the obligation
of contracts against state action is directed only
against impairment by legislation and not by judgments
of courts.

The 1926 decision in Appleby v. City of New York

clearly demonstrates the court's delineation of the law of
3

Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward.

"^Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque,
33

1

Wall 175

(1863)

Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263, U.S. 444

(1924).

.
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contract in approaching the
Constitutional issue.
questions we have to determine are,
first
her a oontract second, what
was its proper"
cnn=£
iconstruction, and thirdly, was its
obligations
quent le 9 islation as enforced by the imnair3
state
court’
’

'

34

In 1935,

the Supreme Court treated the
national fiscal

power as it had treated the state regulatory
power by reading a reservation of power into private
contracts.
Contracts, however, expressed cannot fetter
the
Constitutional authority of the Congress. Contracts
may create rights of property, but when contracts
deal with a subject matter which lies within the
control of Congress, they have a congenital infirmity.
Parties cannot remove their transactions from the
reach of dominant constitutional power by making
contracts about them >35
The finality of state court decrees was the basic issue
in the Irving Trust Co. v.

Day (1942)

.

In this decision,

the Supreme Court held:

When this court is asked to invalidate a state
statute on the grounds that it impairs the obligation
of a contract, the existence of the contract and the
nature and the extent of its obligation become federal
questions for the purposes of determining whether they
are within the scope and meaning of the Federal
Constitution, and for such purposes finality cannot
be accorded to the review of the state court. ,,
Jb

This decision, as do others, reiterates the fact that
the scope of the review under the contract clause is broad.

^Appleby
35

v.

City of New York, 271 U.S. 364

Norman v. Baltimore

&

(1924).

Ohio R.R. Co., 294 U.S. 240

(1935)

"^Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U.S. 556 (1942).

.
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Although the Constitution contains no
express
provision limiting the federal government's

power to im-

pair contractural obligations, the concept
of "due process" contained in the 5th Admendment is
flexible enough
to provide such protection, as in the
protection against

the taking of property without just compensation
contained
in the 5th Amendment.
In 1978,

legal literature relative to the law of

contract may be divided into three categories:
sources;

(2)

search books/finding tools; and

(1)

(3)

primary

secondary

materials
Primary sources of the law, by definition, are those

recorded rules of human behavior which will be enforced by
the state.

legislature;

They include:
(2)

(1)

statutes passed by the

decisions of the courts;

orders of executives; and

administrative bodies.

(4)

(3)

decrees and

rules and regulations of

Federal and state statutes and

appellate court decisions are the most important primary
authorities.

The primary sources of the law relevant to

this study range in time from the first enactment of our

law making bodies to the most recent decisions, statutes,

and rulings.

A current decision may be based on a precedent

many generations old.
The Massachusetts General Laws and the Massachusetts

Decisions served as the primary sources of the law for this

,
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study.

They are the keystone for the
information and
edify the methodology.

Seminal Works
The investigator has made reference to
Simpson and
Alperin, Summary of Basic Law 2d ed., vol.
14, of the

.

Massachusetts Practice Series.

Dean Frank L. Simpson has

been an outstanding researcher in Massachusetts
law.

His

studies contribute directly to the substance and form
of
this research.

Second

,

The Restatement of the Law of Contract,

was utilized by the researcher.

a secondary source of legal information.

The Restatement is

This work lacks

legal authority in the legal sense but has a persuasive

influence in the law making process, as it has been prepared
and published during the last thirty years under the

auspices of the American Law Institute.
Second

,

The Restatement

contributes to the substance and form of this study.

Summary
An implicit hypothesis underlies this research

undertaking, namely, that faculty and administrative personnel in public higher education need to know basic concepts
of the law (on a quasi-legal basis)

,

but the majority of

them have not had formal educational preparation in the
field of law.

The scope of the study was delimited to the

knowledge of basic concepts of one field of law, i.e., the
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law of contracts.

A comprehensive study of the litera-

ture and research projects indicates
that this problem
has been only treated peripherally.
Only fifteen research

projects which involve the law of contract
existed at the
time of the undertaking of this study.
There

was only one

indirectly related project.

The researcher found no evidence

the substantive law of contract has been
researched.

What, from a research point of view, is interesting
to note is that issues of due process, tenure, grievance

procedures in higher education, and collective bargaining
the other topics researched to date.
a focus on the

These comprise

procedural aspects of the law rather than

the substantive.

The inherent core of the procedural issue

is the substantive right which has not been adequately

researched.

Van Alstyne has indicated that the protection

and implementation of the substantive law in education will
cut down on the recourse of educators to the procedural

aspects of the law. 37
litigation)

Recourse to the procedure (i.e.,

involves monetary and psychological costs that

public higher education can ill afford.

Ergo, the focus

of this research is on the substantive aspects of the law

of contract, particularly with a view to determining the

comparative frequency of litigations emanating from the
substantive law of contract.
37

Ibid., Van Alstyne.

The findings of such analysis

.
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inform the quasi-legal training of higher
education
personnel

CHAPTER

III

DESIGN OF THE STUDY

Faculty, and in many instances, administrative personnel, have secured their employment and maintained their

status under the individual employment contracts which in

P^klic higher education led traditionally to the statutorily
based tenure system.

Academic tenure has been challenged

for various reasons since its inception in 1915.

It was in

this year that the American Association of University Pro-

fessors was formed to protect the academic community from

unfair and arbitrary practices.

During its first year, the

committee on Academic Freedom and Tenure of the American

Association of University Professors was involved with
eleven cases of alleged infringement of academic freedom.
This traditional academic value (tenure)
attack.

is still under

The intensity of the attack has increased with

every year of its existence.
Two major responses appear to be arising in response to
the attack on tenure.

These responses tend to be inherent

in rejoinder to the changing roles and relationships in

higher education, namely:
(2)

(1)

faculty unionization and

substitution of term contracts for tenure commitments.
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Irrespective of the alternative accepted, it is
necessary
for faculty and administrative personnel in public
higher

education to have a quasi-legal knowledge of the basic concepts of the law of contract in order to know their respective rights and responsibilities.

Employment for faculty

and the academic freedom so valued by education will

inevitably continue to be in terms of a contract, be it
individual or collective.
Institutions of public higher education cannot function

effectively and safely without employees having

a

working

knowledge of the law of contract or the legal structure of
their employer.

While professional legal counsel is avail-

able to institutions to oversee the legal aspects of major

operational functions, there is often no such provision for

avoiding or resolving minor disputes, which may be equated
to hidden cancerous lesions that will cripple and can ulti-

mately kill an institution.
Legal reporting systems have developed over the past

decade to publish up-to-date volumes of legal decisions.
These reporting services cover all aspects of the law from
basic civil law to taxation.

While information is voluminous,

it is not readily accessible to faculty or administrative

personnel with reference to a single specific topic, issue,
or area of the law, not to mention a specific jurisdiction.

.
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More significantly, little information is available
as to

how the law relates to the operation of institutions
of
public higher education and the contractual rights of administrators, faculty, and students within these institutions.

Preliminary investigation suggested that this information voids— or more precisely, the inaccessibility of legal

information to laymen

— is

a root cause of the mounting inci-

dence of unnecessary litigation in higher education, with

consequent toll in monetary and human cost.

a

Acting on the

premise that quasi-legal education of professionals in higher

education is the most practicable intervention for the reduction of litigation, the researcher has undertaken a twofold

investigation:

first,

to determine what aspects of the law

of contract should be the focus of a program of quasi-legal

education; second, to identify basic concepts of the law of

contract
Procedures Used
Once the researcher identified the goal and, subsequently, the purpose of this investigation, she explicitly

defined the following objectives:
(1)

(2)

to use current case law to present information
on the ramification of contract law in the
field of education;

to trace the sources of the common law which
form the basis of the law of contract in the

Commonwealth;

.

.
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(3)

to report the statutory provisions
of the
Massachusetts law which relate to Higher
Education in the Commonwealth and the contractual powers of its constituents, and

(4)

to identify concepts from the law of
contract
as established by statutory and case law
in
the Commonwealth.

The overall approach the researcher decided upon
to

meet the established objectives is the utilization of conscious testimony (primary sources of the law) as the research
dfita

.

Thus, school law research was the methodology of

choice
The rationale for this approach for the procedures to
be used in collecting and treating the data is based on the

fact that school law research is an application of the his-

torical research methodology.

The interpretation of legal

problems involves an expertise that few graduate students in

education possess. 3

8

The researcher's legal and educational

background gave her the required expertise for this type of
research
The means and modes of action to meet the established

objectives were:
(1)

(2)

38

to thoroughly review and analyze the research
in higher education in relation to the law of
contract to date;
to review and analyze literature in higher education in relation to the need for this study;

Ibid., Best, p. 111.

.

,
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(3)

to research the case law in relation to:
a.

b.
c.

the historical development of the law of
contract
constitutional law as it affects the law
of contract,
cases specifically relating to issues in
higher education;

(4)

to research the Massachusetts General Laws in
relation to higher education and contract
powers and analyze same;

(5)

to research and analyze 100 cases in higher
education which involve issues in the area of
the law of contract;

(6)

to synthesize concepts from the law of contract
integrating the statutory powers in higher

education;
(7)

to organize data from #6 above for faculty
and administrative personnel in public higher
education

Data Sources

Sources of data for the purpose of this research are
the "conscious testimony" or the primary sources of the law.

Primary sources of the law may be defined as those recorded
rules of human behavior which will be enforced by the state.

Primary sources of the law include:
the United States;
(3)

(2)

(5)

treatise; and

istrative bodies.

the Constitution of

statutes passed by the legislature;

decisions of the courts;

tives;

(1)

(6)

(4)

executive orders and direc-

rules and regulations of admin-

Within the primary sources of the law,

the federal and state statutes and appellate court decisions

.

;

.
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are the more important authorities of the law.

American law has a number of characteristics which
should be recognized for its research significance.

The

law is:
(1)

subject to constant change through new
decisions (approximately 30,000 a year) and
new statutes (approximately 10,000 a year)
which require regular and prompt supplementation and updating;

(2)

marked by a search for certainty and stability;

(3)

derived from many governmental agencies
(judicial, legislative, and executive) and
from a variety of jurisdictions (federal,
state, county, and local)

(4)

composed of different components, i.e., relative
authority (binding, persuasive or no legal
force)

The primary sources of the law relevant to any problem may

range from the first enactment of our law-making bodies to
the most recent decisions, statutes, and rulings.
law may vary greatly in its range in time.

Thus, the

A current deci-

sion may be based on a precedent which is many generations
old (this precedent is repeatedly demonstrated in Chapter II)
The primary sources of the law retain their legal effect

until they are expressly overruled or repealed.

Thus, in

Chapter II, the sources of data for this study are focused
on the constitutional law as it affects the law of contract

and case and statutory law as primary data bases.
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One hundred cases in higher education in which
legal
issues relate directly to the law of contract are
analyzed
(see Chapter IV)

to:

determine the most frequently

(1)

litigated areas of contract law, thereby identifying primary

domains of needed quasi-legal training for the education
profession; and

(2)

demonstrate the application of the law

of contract to facts of the case.

These cases, as previously

indicated, uphold the common law precedent and demonstrate
the concept that the primary sources of our law-making bodies

relate to the most recent decisions, statutes, and rulings.
The legal reasoning and basic legal concepts set forth in the

three nineteenth century cases are commensurate with those
of the present court's decisions in the seventy-eighth year
of the twentieth century.

The body of the study (Chapter IV) uses as the primary

source of data the Massachusetts General Laws, the Restatement
of the Law of Contract

,

and the case law.

Method of Gathering Data
The methodology in relation to the review of the literature requires little comment, since it is synthesized in

Chapter II.

Though the review of the literature is delimited

to the law of contract,

the methodology utilized demonstrates

that the literature of the American law is rich and varied and
has a distinguished human story.
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The primary sources of the law contain the rules of

human behavior by which society is governed.

The legal

literature, as demonstrated in Chapter II, reflects the

continual struggle for justice and order which is

a

part of

the cultural heritage of men.

Diverse finding tools have been used by the author in

researching the body of the law involved in this study.
They are:

Digests of Decisions

(1)

;

(2)

Advance Sheets

(3)

Shepard's

(5)

Massachusetts General Laws and Massachusetts Laws,

Annotated
Books

;

;

(8)

Citations

:

(4)

Restatement of the Law of Contract

(6)

Looseleaf Services

Court Bulletin

Black's Law Dictionary

)

;

and

(9)

(

;

;

;

(7)

Phrase

U.S. Law Week and Supreme

Indexes

.

The process employed was an analysis of basic contract

case law and a synthesis of it from the referenced cases.
The data reported in Chapter IV are a triparte presentation:
(1)

briefing of 100 cases in higher education, and an analy-

sis of them in relation to the area of the law of contract

which is in issue;

(2)

citations of the Massachusetts General

Laws which relate to the study; and
the law of contract.

(3)

basic concepts of

CHAPTER

I

V

PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF DATA
Introduction
The body of this chapter is a triparte presentation.

(1)

briefing of 100 cases in higher education in-

volving contract issues, and an analysis of them in relation to the area of the law of contract which is in
issue to provide the data bases for determining the most

frequently litigated areas of contract law, thereby identifying primary domains of needed quasi-legal training for
the education profession;

(2)

citations of the Massachu-

setts General Laws which relate to the study; and

(3)

basic concepts of the law of contract.

Higher Education
The researcher investigated current litigation in
the field of higher education which involved the law of

contract.
and

(2)

Word and phrases:

(1)

Colleges and Universities

Contracts were cross-referenced.

process, 100 cases were selected.

During this

The investigation was

further restricted to cases decided in the 1966-1977
period.

One hundred sampled cases involving the law of
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contract and public higher education were
analyzed to
provide the data base for determinining the
most frequently
litigated areas of the law of contract, thereby
identifying

primary domains of needed quasi-legal training for
the

education profession.

There was no logical way to justify

inferences other than to brief selected cases sufficient
in number to be a representative sample.

These cases

demonstrated typical contract litigation and served as

a

means of measuring different elements of contract law.
The analysis of the 100 cases in higher education

which relate to higher education and the law of contract
further confirms the need for this study, as well as

demonstrating the application of the concepts of the law
and contract to the facts in issue.

These cases are cate-

gorized according to emanation of issues:
(2)

faculty, and

(3)

institution.

(1)

student,

These cases include de-

cisions from both the state and federal courts.

State

court decisions are primarily those from the appellate
court which is usually termed the supreme court of the
state.

Since the supreme or appellate court is the highest

court of the state, its decision carries more weight as

precedent value.

The delivery system of public higher

education is an agency of state government, and therefore,
must guarantee students their rights under the Constitution
of the United States.

In litigations involving higher
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education, three Constitutional
Amendments and three
Federal Acts have been most
frequently used by students
and faculty.
They are as follows:

Constitutional Amendments
Amendment.
Congress shall make no law respectrng an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof;
or abridging the
reedom of speech, or of the press;
or the right
of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition
the Government for a redress of
grievances.

Fourth Amendment. The right of the
people to be
secure
their person, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

m

Fourteenth Amendment
All persons born or naturalized
in the United States and subject to the
jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
State wherein they reside. No State shall make or
eniorce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without the process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
.

of the laws.

Federal Acts
Civil Rights Act of 1871 (42 U.S.C.A. 1983)
Every
person who, under cover of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, or any State or
Territory, subjects or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
.
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Education Amendments Act of
“
of Sex Discrimination^

1 972-

Title IX Prohibition

ctl °n 901;

(a) No person in the United
States shall
from Participation in, be denied the
b
f
° r be sub ^ ected to discrimination
under
anv Pdnr^
any
education program or activity receiving
Federal
y
financial assistance ...

|g-

'

Educational Amendments of 1974 (20 USC 821)
Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974. --The Family
Section 438 (a) (1) No funds shall be made available
under any applicable program to any state or
local
educational agency, any institution of higher education, any community college, any school, agency
offering a preschool program, or any other educational
institution which has a policy of denying, or which
effectively prevents, the parents of students attending
any school of such agency, or attending such institutions of higher education, community college, school,
pre-school, or other educational institution, the
to inspect and review any and all official
records, files and data directly related to their
children, including all material that is incorporated
into each student's cumulative folder, and intended
for school use or to be available to parties outside
the school or school system and specifically including, but not necessarily limited to, identifying
data, academic work completed, level of achievement
(grades, standardized achievement tests scores) attendance data, scores on standardized intelligence
aptitude, and psychological tests, interest inventory
results, health data, family background information,
teacher or counselor rating and observations and
verified reports of serious or recurrent behavioral
patterns
Each recipient shall establish appropriate procedures for the granting of a request
by parents for access to their child's records within
a reasonable period of time, but in no case more than
forty-five days after the request has been made.
The Rehabilitation Act of 197 3--Nondiscrimination on
the Basis of Handicap

Section 504: No otherwise handicapped individual in
the United States, as defined in Section 7(6), shall
solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from

.
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participation in, be denied the benefits of,
or
be subjected to discrimination under
any program
or activity receiving Federal assistance.
The Federal Court System
The federal courts include the District Courts,

which are the main courts of original jurisdiction, the
Courts of Appeals, to which cases are appealed from the

District courts

,

special courts as the Custom Court and

the Court of Claims and the United States Supreme Court.

The United States Supreme Court is the highest court in the
land

Jurisdiction of the court varies according to the
court.

A decision of the United States District Court ap-

plies only to that district.

A decision of the United

States Supreme Court applies to the nation.

The Judicial

Circuits are as follows:
First

Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Puerto Rico,

:

Rhode Island

Second
Third

:

:

Connecticut, New York, Vermont
Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Virgin
Islands

Fourth:

Maryland, North Carolina

South Carolina,

Virginia, West Virginia

Fifth

:

Alabama, Canal Zone, Florida, Georgia,

Louisiana, Mississippi
Sixth:

Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, Tennessee

:
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Seventh

Eighth

:

:

Illinois, Indiana, Wisconsin

Arkansas, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri,
Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota

Ninth

:

Alaska, Arizona, California, Idaho, Guam,
Hawaii, Montana, Nebraska, Oregon,

Washington
Tenth

Colorado, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Kansas,
Utah, Wyoming

The District of Columbia is a separate Judicial

Circuit.

Case Analysis
One hundred cases are presented by related areas in

higher education to show the application of the law of

contract to the issues in question.
Student Related

Various issues relative to the law of contract as

applicable to students in higher education have been litiga
ted since the nineteenth century in the United States. 39

Though this research is limited to the 1966-1977 period,
respectively, the researcher points out the Middlebury
39

In the student, faculty and institution related
categories, one 19th century case is briefed in each area
to indicate that issues relative to the law of contract
have been litigated well over a century in Higher Education

.

65

College v. C handler case which in
1844 was a contract
case in higher education. 40

Defendant was sent to plaintiff
college
when a minor by his father.
Defendant's father
supported him as well as communicated
college s president during his first with the
year at the
e
efe ant S father died durin< his
second
?
vear
ye
r It‘thp
at the college.
He was supported by funds
h
f
Sr S eState
The college continued to
+-hp> defendant
^
allow the
to matriculate and now sues
for accounts due.

^

'

*

Isjsue:
Were the items charged in the plaintiff's
account actually furnished upon the defendant's
implied contract to pay?

Decision

No

:

Reasoning
The court used the legal premises of the
legal right of a minor to bind himself for necessaries
in this case.
It held:
:

An infant may bind himself for necessaries.
And the reason assigned was, that without this
power he might be exposed to perish or want.
But though this was the alleged ground on
which the infant's obligation was placed, yet
the law has never limited its definition of the
term necessaries to those things which are
strictly essential to the support of life,
as food, clothing, and medicine in sickness.
The practical meaning of the term has always
been in some measure relative, having references as well to what may be called the
conventional necessities of others in the same
walks of life with the infant, as to his own
pecuniary condition and other circumstances.
Hence, a good common school education, at the
least, is now fully recognized as one of the
necessaries for an infant.

The court then reasoned to the need of an infant for
higher education and held:
4 0

(1844)

.

Middlebury College v. Chandler, 16 Vermont 686

.
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Now it does not appear that
extraneous
circumstances existed in the defendant's
case, such as wealth or station
in society,
or that he exhibited peculiar
indications of
genius or talent, which education for
more than for the generality of youth him
in
community.
And we, therefore, consider that
such an education should not be ranked
among
those necessities, for which he could, as
an
infant, render himself absolutely liable by
contract.
The contractual theory is the most prevalent
and

readily accepted relationship which is held to exist
between the student and the institution.

This theory holds

that the student agrees to abide by the rules and regulations, and standards established and published by the

institution.

In return, the institutions will offer a

degree to those who met the established standards.
Green v. Howard University

,

In

the court held that statements

in a catalog of a private institution constitute a contract

and, therefore, relieves the institutions of affording

students with "due process," specifically notice and hear-

mg. 41
Facts
Howard University was a private institution,
party supported by federal funds.
In its catalog,
Howard University stated that the University reserved
the right to deny admission to and to require withdrawal of any student at any time for any reason
Students condeemed sufficient to the University.
ceded this right to the University.
:

When the head of the Selective Service System of
the United States was invited to speak at the UniverThe students
sity, students caused a disturbance.
who participated in the disturbance were sent formal
41

Green v. Howard University, 271

F.

Supp.

609

(1967)

.
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letters informing them that they would
permitted to return to the University not be
for
subsequent academic year. The University the
without giving the students the opportunityacted
of
notice and hearing.
Issue
Do statements in a private university
constitute a contract which therefore relieves catalog
institution of the need to afford students with the
"due
process," specifically notice and hearing?
;

Decision

Yes

:

Reasoning
The procedural safeguards and the privileges
accorded by the Constitution of the United States are
confined to judicial and quasi— judicial proceedings
whether in the court or before administrative agencies.
These safeguards are directed solely
against governmental action,
:

Jones v, Vassar College

,

in 1969, upheld the right of

the private college to govern itself in any manner it may

choose so long as there is an absence of arbitrary or

capricious action.

In this case, the court held that a

drastic change in the rules and regulations by

a

private

college did not constitute a breach of an implied contract
with a student or his parents. 42
Facts
Students at Vassar College, through their
elected representatives, had the responsibility for
enacting and enforcing undergraduate social regulations.
This responsibility was derived from the
Constitution of the Vassar College Student Government
Association.
The Student Government enacted new rules
which allowed the female students who lived in each
corridor of the residential halls to decide whether
or not they wished limitations to be placed on the
hours during which they might entertain male guests
The president of Vassar College had
in their rooms.
He did not exercise it over this
the power to veto.
He therefore gave apstudent enacted legislation.
rules and regulations.
these
proval to the change in
:

42

Jones v. Vassar College, 299 N.Y.S. 2d 243 (1969).

.
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Th 0 plaintiff is the mother of
one of
students who claims that the new rules the female
constituted
s breach of implied contract
D ° es a ?«tic change in a
private college's
social rules and regulations constitute
a breach of
an implied contract with the student
or his parents?

Decision:

No.

Reasoning
Private colleges and universities are
governed on the principle of academic self
regulation
which is free from judicial restraints. Mere
speculations as to the projected hypothetical consequences
of conduct complained of is insufficient for
judicial
interference
:

Krawez v. Stans was a case involving Midshipmen at the

Merchant Marine Academy. 43

authorized

agents

It held that an offer made by

of a public institution of higher edu-

cation, and the acceptance of that offer by students,

constitutes a binding contract between the institution and
the students.

(Re:

Chapter

1

for Case Brief.)

This case

clearly pointed out that there is and can be contracted

relationships between public institutions and students.
The receipt of state funds by a private institution
of higher education from a contract with the state calling

for the operation of various programs or courses of study

does not involve that institution in a "state action" subject to the provisions of the Federal Civil Rights Act was
the decision in Powe v. Miles.
43
44

Krawez v. Stans, 306

44

F,

Powe v. Miles, 407 2d 73

Supp.

1230

(1968).

(1969).
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Facts:
Alfred University in New York is a private
institution.
Alfred University students held a
demonstration during an R.O.T.C. drill ceremony
which caused disruption and alteration of the
ceremony.
The demonstrators were suspended for
one semester following "due process" procedures as
established by Alfred University. The students now
sue seeking relief in court.
They allege that the
Ceramics College operated by the university under
a contract with New York State was sufficient to
make the university an instrument of the state for
the purpose of the Federal Civil Rights Act.

Issue
Does the receipt of state funds by a private
institution form a contract with the state which calls
for the operation of a College of Ceramics involve
the institution in a "state action" subject to the
provisions of the Federal Civil Rights Act?
;

Decision
The court held no with the exception of
the College of Ceramics.
:

Reasoning
There is no evidence of the slightest
contract between the State of New York and the
specific action taken against the students. If state
financial aid alone were the test, construction and
many other enterprises with extensive contracts with
the state would be charged with 'state action.'
The
Court of Appeals upheld the lower court but with the
It reasoned:
exception of the College of Ceramics.
The very name New York State College of Ceramics at
Alfred University identifies the college as a state
institution.
Thus, students enrolled in the College
of Ceramics can regard themselves as receiving public
education and are entitled to be treated by those in
charge in the same way as their counterparts in other
portions of the state university. Therefore, action
against students in the College of Ceramics constitutes
state action.
:

A medical student sued the University of Miami and

raised the issue:

can a private college or university

specify the terms under which it will graduate students?
the Unive rsity of Miami v. Militana

,

In

the courts held in the

affirmative in regard to this issue by stipulating that

'
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promotion from one class to another is clearly
within the
discretion of the faculty’s promotion committee. 45
it

further held that the terms and conditions for graduation
are offered by the publication of the college at the
times
of the enrollment of the students.

These terms and condi-

tions have some of the characteristics of a contract.
Facts
A University of Miami medical student was
promoted to the fourth year of study on probation,
subject to a satisfactory work and re-examination
in two subject areas.
The student was dismissed for
academic failure as he did not complete work in one
of the subject areas.
Conditions for promotions were
outlined in the university's catalog. The student
sues to require the university to promote him.
The
student won in the lower court and the university now
appeals the judgment.
;

Issue
May a private college or university determine
the terms under which it will graduate a student?
:

Decision

Yes.

:

Reasoning
The court held that the terms and conditions
for graduation are spelled out by the publications of
the college at the time of enrollment and have some
It said:
of the characteristics of a contract.
promotion from one class to another is clearly
within the discretion of the faculty (Promotions
Committee)
:

'

.

.

.

.

An interesting application of contract law was made
in Healy v.

Larson

46
.

This case has relevance to all

Student Service Departments of institutions of higher education.
4
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^University of Miami v. Militana, 184 So. 2d

(1966).
46

Healy v. Larson, 323 N.Y.S. 2d 625 (1971).

:
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Facts:
A _prospective student consulted
with the
vri/iit
Dean, Director
of Admissions,
Acting President?
Guidance Counselor and Chairman of the
epartment about his proposed course of Mathematics
study, prior
° hl
enrollment in Schenectady Community College.
When fthe student applied for graduation,
he was denied
clearance as he had failed to take the proper
credits within the area of concentration
leading to
his degree.
He claimed that he had completed all
of the courses which he was advised to take.
/-» •«.

i

•

Tl

Issue
May a student be denied his degree because
he failed to take the proper credits within
his area
of concentration if he has successfully completed
all
requirements that were outlined to him by the proper
officials in prior consultations?

Decision:

No.

Reasoning
There is an implied contract between the
college and the student that if the student complies
with the terms set forth by the college for graduation, he will obtain the degree sought.
The court
further indicated that additional requirements may
not be placed on him by proper officials.
In this
case, the court pointed out that the contract theory
is valid in private colleges and there is no reason
why it should not also apply to public institutions
of higher education as well.
:

Begley v. The Corporation of Mercer University was an
•

action

m

contract for breach of contract. 47

•

it was an

athletic bound case.
Facts
Mercer University, a private institution, signed
a high school basketball player, to a financial grant
Prior to the signing of the contract, the
in aid.
assistant coach checked Begley's grade point averge.
He found that Begley had a 2.9 predicted grade point
The National Collegiate Athletic Associaaverage.
tion required a 1.6 grade point average of participaMercer University belonged to the
ting athletes.
National Collegiate Athletic Association. Several
:

47

367 F.

Begley v. The Corporation of Mercer University,
Supp.

908

(1973)

.

:
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months after the signing of the
grant in aid contract, officials student financial
of Mercer Sn^versitv
learned that Begley's grade
Y
point average was
graded on a 8.0 system, while the
National Collegiate
Athletic Association recognized 4.0.
Mercer
repudiated the contract with Begley who sued Univlrlity
for
breach of the contract while seeking monetary
damages.
Issue
is an institution of higher
education which
voids an athletic scholarship contract,
ir^light^of
new information, guilty of breach of
contract?

Decision

No.

Reasoning
The assistant coach erred in assuming that
Begley s grade point average was based on a 4.0
system.
The terms of the contract clearly expressed
the intent
of the parties that a 1.6 grade point average
was to
be maintained in return for the scholarship aid.
From the commencement of the contract, Begley was
unable to comply with the relevant stated condition
of a 1.6 grade point average.
Therefore, he was unable
to perform his part of the contract and he was not
entitled to the performance of the contract by Mercer
University.
:

ln

Mahavongsana

v.

Hall

,

plaintiff won a court

judgment which ordered the Georgia State University to

grant her a degree.

48

Facts
The plaintiff was a graduate student in the
Master's program at Georgia State University. She
completed the required courses for her degree. She
failed the comprehensive examination on two different
occasions.
The plaintiff, a citizen of Thailand,
claimed that the examination became a requirement
for the degree after she had enrolled in the program
and, therefore, the requirement could not apply to her.
She further held that the bulletins and catalogs of
the university in effect at the time she enrolled as
a student constituted a contract and that the defendant
university should be ordered to grant her her degree.
She also claimed violation of her due process rights.
:

48

Mahavongsana

v.

Hall, 401 F. Supp. 381

(1975).

:
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The defendant held that the
catalog had a reservat °n
f rlght clause within
the faculty to chance
^2 to the
or add
standards of performance at any
time.
eS

ri9htS ° f a graduate student
is required to pass a coniDreS
e
ln
n
Whea the university catalog does
not so state,
nor
s tate
and° where
and
h
the student received notice
of the required examination only
two weeks prior to
e aXaminatl ° n and Slx weeks
prior
to her completion
n £ course work for the
of
degree?

dated if the
HflftecMLf
?he ^°a
studentf

Decision

Yes.

:

Re asoning
The court held that the catalog and bulletin in effect at the time that the student
;

enrolled
did constitute a contract.
The court ordered the
defendant university to grant the degree because;
In order to be properly prepared for the
examination, plaintiff would have had to
take other and further course work and that
notice given was neither designed to inform
plaintiff of the course work required nor did
it permit plaintiff the time necessary to take
such course work prior to the examination.
Withholding the degree from plaintiff because
of her failure to satisfy the examiniation
requirement is in the absence of adequate
notice with respect to the scope and depth
of the examination a deprivation of a valuaable property right without due process of law
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution and Article 1,
Section 1, Paragraph 3, of the Constitution
of the State of Georgia.
,

,

The University appealed this decision in Mahavong -

sana v. Hall, (529 F. 2d 448), United States Court of

Appeals, Fifth Circuit, 1976.

Facts and Issue:

Decision

No.

Same as lower court.

Reasoning
Misconduct and the failure to attain
the standards of scholarship cannot
be equated.
A
hearing may be required to determine
charges of 'misconduct.
A hearing may be useless or harmful
in
finding out the truth concerning scholarship.
There
is a clear dichotomy between a student's
due process
rights in disciplinary dismissal versus an
academic
dismissal.
The court pointed out that the plaintiff
with ample notice was allowed to take the
examination for the second time.
She was also offered a
special tailormade program.
she was not treated
arbitrarily or capriciously. She was not denied
procedural or substantive due process.
Implicit
in the student s contract with the university upon
matriculation is the agreement to comply with the
university's rules and regulations, which the
university is clearly entitled to modify so as to
properly exercise its educational responsibility.
:

'

In the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc.,

State University of Stony Brook

,

the court held that a

collective bargaining agreement between

a

union and a

state university cannot be construed to deny

a

student

organization the right to invite speakers from

a rival

union where the purpose of the meeting is other than

organizing employees. 49
•

•

The court said:

If the contract between C.S.E.A. and the state
precludes the University from granting equal
use of its facilities to outside organizations
for purposes unrelated to union organization
efforts, it is a fortiori discriminatory and
cannot stand.

In an action in tort and contract, three contract

issues arose in the Brown v. Wichita State University
49

.

Civil Service Employees Association, Inc. v.
State University of Stony Brook, 368 N.Y.S. 2d 927
(1974)

.

v,
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case.

This case was a tort liability case
but also

gave rise to the following contract
issues:

(1)

did

the agreement between the Athletic
Director and Golden
Eagle constitute an enforceable contract
binding the

university,

(2)

did the plaintiffs have rights under the

contract as third party beneficiaries, and

(3)

could the

university claim sovereign immunity under Kansas
statute?

,

Facts:
In the summer of 1970, the Athletic
Director of Wichita State University entered into
a contract in behalf of the university with Golden
Eagle Aviation, Inc. to transport the football
team to away games during the season. The aviation service was to provide a qualified flight
crew under the terms of the agreement, and the
university was to lease a Douglas DC 6-B from a
third party as well as to provide liability
insurance for the passengers as required by the
federal regulations.
The football team departed
for the Utah State game in two Martin 404 planes.
One of the planes crashed into a mountainside after
an intermediate stop.
It was later proven that
the crashed plane was 2,900 pounds in excess of
the allowed take-off weight.
There was no written
contract for the lease of planes. The university
had not purchased the passenger liability insurance.
The plaintiffs are either the survivors or the
representatives of the deceased. They allege a tort
action in negligence as well as a breach of implied
and expressed warranty and strict liability.
They
also claim, as third party beneficiaries, the failure
of the university to obtain the liability insurance.
The defendant university held that the Athletic
Director did not have the authority to bind the
university.
He only had the power to obligate the
Physical Education Corporation and that the contract
under question was between the Physical Education
Corporation and the Golden Eagle Aviation CorporaThe university further held that the statute
tion.
requiring the approval of the Board of Regents for

^Brown
66

(1975).

v.

Wichita State University, 540

P.

2d

:

.
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the

contract

“i Lr? c?a^
t

Issue

;

S

.

3.

Decision

lained by the diversity

IT

Did the agreement between the
Athletic
Director and Golden Eagle constitute
an
enforceable contract binding the
university?
Did the plaintiffs have right
under the
contract as third party beneficiaries'
5
Could the university claim sovereign
immunity under Kansas statues?

1

2

s?

1.
2

.

3

.

Yes
Yes
No

Reasoning
The Physical Education Corporation was
the agent of Wichita State and that Mr.
Katzenmeyer,
as an officer of the corporate agent,
had the implied
power and authority to bind the principal
Wichita
State University. Wichita State is subject
to
liability for any negligent acts of its corporate
agent.
The Physical Education Corporation was a
mere instrumentality of the university. The
university cannot purposely delegate to a corporate
entity, or otherwise, its responsibility for conducting intercollegiate athletic activities, directly
control that corporate agent, and then disclaim any
liability.
The court said:
;

—

The provisions of KSA 1974 Supp. 76-721 fix
a method of procedure intended to secure order,
system and dispatch in contracting with state
educational institutions.
Its provisions are
directive, and as such, require implementing
rules or regulations by the Board of Regents.
No policy, rule or regulation by the Board of
Regents has been cited or furnished to this
Court regarding contract matters and none can
be found in Kansas Administrative Regulations.***
However, absent any rules and regulations, Wichita
State cannot use the statue to deny the validity
of the Aviation Service Agreement following
execution and partial performance. Common honesty
forbids repudiation now.

.
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Eden v. Board of Trustees of State
University
found that although the state is generally
not subject
to the same rules governing estoppel as
an individual is
in a situation which is justified by the
facts and

pertinent to prevent injustice, the doctrine of
estoppel
may be applied against the state, as in this case,
from

arguing its lack of capacity to contract with

a

student

his or her admission to an academic program.

Facts
The State University of New York at
Stony Brook established a new School of Podiatric
Medicine.
Students were accepted for admission
for the first class.
The students were notified
that they had to "suspend" their "plans to
inatriculate at Stony Brook in the coming academic
year." The reason given was an alleged fiscal
crisis.
Students sue claiming that they had acquired
a vested contractual right to be admitted to the
entering class. The defendant university claimed
that it acted in good faith due to a fiscal crisis.
:

Issue
May students under New York State law acquire a vested contractual right for admission to
a school when they have received written acceptance
for admission especially where there is inadequate
evidence of a fiscal crisis to justify the abrogation of the contractual obligation?
:

Decision

Yes.

:

There could be no doubt that the univerReasoning
sity's acceptance of the applications of the students
In
satisfies the classic requirement of a contract.
petitioners,
with
contracts
the face of the existing
there was no rational basis for State's conclusion
that saving money for future years justified the
failing to open the school for the 1975-76 academic
The evidence was undisputed that the deferment
year.
decision would not save money but would result in a
:

51

Eden v. Board of Trustees of State University,

374 N. Y. S.

2d 686

(1975)
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n

a

E?EoJF
th
i^r^S"
Students
rwere
thev will
tney
will lose
lAco
e

=^^es

e

e
„iuS:d add'

not admitted,
year in furtherance of their
n ar
S
Th6y might lose their chance
ever
to°K
o be admitted to a School
of Podiatry.

^

J

a

’

Miller v. Long Island University
was a student housing
case which turned on an issue
of contract law. 52

Fa^s;

Long Island University, a private
institu0rmed wo stude nts that their housing
t!f
eo°?'
contracts
were ^
being terminated. The
informed the students, one of whom was universityY
a paraplegic, to seek other housing
accommodations.
The
university s housing contract has a
clause which
states that any violation of college
regulations
may result
termination of the contract. The
ere notified that the university was
taking
^
action under
this clause even though no formal
c arges were made against them.
An appeal was made
by the students to the university's
president to no
avail.
The students sue claiming that they were
never notified of the charges against them nor
granted
a hearing, thus their constitutional right
to due
process was violated both on a national and state
basis.
They also allege deprivation of "equal
educational opportunities."

m

.

Isjsue:
May a private university terminate a student s housing contract without notice and hearing
to the students?

Decision

Yes.

:

Reasoning
Students in private institutions of higher
learning are not clothed with the protections of the
United States Constitution and amendments except when
racial discrimination is practiced against them and
probably where irrelevant standards of ethnic background or sex are used to exclude them from full
participation in a university which benefits from
state aid or tax exemption.
:

52

917

Miller v. Long Island University, 380

(1976)

.

N. Y.S.

2d

3
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DeMarco v. University of Health Sciences
held
that a college may grant a degree to
a student who has
been arbitrarily dismissed for non-academic
reasons and
when on readmission, he achieved the academic
requirements
in effect at the time of his dismissal. 53
Facts
Plaintiff on his application to the
Chicago Medical School in 1941 indicated that he
had never attended another medical school, when
he in fact had been dismissed from a non-accredited
medical college in Massachusetts. Plaintiff claims
that he thought the question related to the issue
of transfer credit.
At the end of his third year
at Chicago, he ranked 23 in a class of 58.
He was
within six weeks of completing his senior year when
the medical college learned that he had attended
another medical school and dismissed him. Officials
of the Chicago Medical College discussed with him,
prior to his dismissal, the fact that he was the
only student who failed to make a contribution of
$500.00 to the school.
:

Plaintiff attempted over the years to be readmitted to the college.
In 1968 or early 1969, he
met with the college president who indicated the
high cost of educating returning students. He pointed
out that every returning student was expected to
contribute to the college.
Plaintiff agreed to
contribute $40,000.00 and eventually paid $20,000.00
of that pledge.
Plaintiff was readmitted in 1970 with
the following stipulations:
(1) he take specific
course work and (2) take the National Board Examinations.
Plaintiff failed Part 1 of the National Boards
and then filed suit claiming that the National Board
Examinations requirement was unfair. He alleges
that he met the academic requirements of the 1941
Bulletin of the college which comprised his contract
with the college. The lower court found for the
plaintiff and ordered the college to grant his degree.
The college appealed claiming that the court cannot
mandate the awarding of an academic degree because
this is a faculty prerogative.
5

2d 356

M
DeMarco
v. University of Health Sciences, 352 N.E.
_

(1976)

.

.
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Issue:
May a court order the college to grant
a
degree to a student who had been arbitrarily
dismissed for non-academic reasons and when on
readmission he achieved the academic requirements
in effect at the time of his dismissal?

Decision

Yes.

:

Reasoning

Withholding a diploma conferring the
of Doctor of Medicine is a unique injury.
The courts will take cognizance of it.
The 1941
contract provided for the issuance of a diploma
at successful completion of the academic program
as stated in the catalog. The evidence established
the plaintiff earned the degree.
It was proper for
the court to order the mandatory injunction.
The court went on to say:
:

The 1970 requirement whereby the plaintiff
was required to demonstrate current knowledge
of medicine by passing Parts 1 and 2 of the
National Boards was not responsive to the injustice done to him in 1944, when he was
dismissed or in later years when he was
denied re-admission, and reflects the inequitable
use of power by the school.
The extra requirement of demonstrating current medical
knowledge was arbitrary and unreasonable, in
light of the fact that the examinations have
never been required for a degree then or now.
It is recognized a school is entitled to enter
into a special degree program with a student
with whom there has been no previous history of
bad faith; however, in this case the school
admittedly acted in bad faith as stated by Dean
Levitt

A 1976 Supreme Court case dealt with the issue of
racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of

private contract.

5^

The parents of Michael McCrary and Conlin
Facts:
Gonzales were unable to enroll their respective
children in programs offered by two private schools
The children were denied
in the State of Virginia.
54

Runyon v. McCrary, 96

S.

Ct.

2586

(1976).

a

s

81

admission because they were black. Both
schools
advertised by mail and the telephone directly.
laint f fS res P° nded to these advertisements.
^?
i
Neither
school
had accepted a black student for
any of its program.
Plaintiffs (children through
their parents) filed a class action alleging
that
they were prevented from enrolling in the
school
violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1981. The district
court and the Court of Appeals held that 42
U.S.C.
Sec. 1981 makes the schools' discriminatory admission policy illegal and enjoined the defendant
and member schools of the Southern Independent
School Associtions from discriminating against
applicants for admission on the basis of race.
•

m

Issue:

Does 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1981 prohibit
private commercially operated nonsectarian schools from denying admission
to prospective students because they are
black?
If yes, is it constitutionally valid?

1.

2.

Decision

1.

:

2

.

Yes
Yes

Reasoning
(1) The racial exclusion practiced by the
Fairfax-Brewster School and Bobbe s Private School is
a classic violation of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1981.
The
parents of Conlin Gonzales and Michael McCrary sought
to enter into a contractual relationship with Bobbe
Private School for educational services. Gonzales'
parents sought to enter into a similar relationship
with the Fairfax-Brewster School. Under these
contractual relationships, the schools would have
received payment for services rendered. The prospective
students would have received instruction in return
The educational services of the
for those payments.
Fairfax-Brewster School and Bobbe s Private School
were advertised and offered to the general public.
Neither school offered services on an equal basis to
42 U.S.C. Sec.
(2)
white and non-white students.
this principle
From
1981 is constitutionally valid.
First Amendment
a
have
it may be assumed that parents
institueducational
right to send their children to
segregation
racial
that
tions that promote the belief
is desirable, and that the children have an equal
It does not
right to attend such institutions.
:

'

'

'

.

.
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follow that the practice of excluding
racial
minorities from such institutions is
also
pro
tected by the same principle.
The acceptance by a private school
of an admission

application fee creates

a

contractual obligation on the

part of the school to evaluate the
credentials of the
applicant according to the admission criteria
published
in the school's bulletin and brochure.
Facts
Plaintiff was rejected applicant to
Chicago Medical School (private institution)
Plaintiff claims that the school did not evaluate
his application and others according to the
entrance criteria which was printed in the school's
bulletin and brochure. He further claims:
.The prospective students' familial
relationship to members of the school's
faculty and to members of its board of
trustees, and the ability of the applicant
or his family to pledge or make payments of
large sums of money to the school
was a basis of criteria for admission.
Steinberg
holds that a contract was created between him and
the school when the school accepted his $15.00
application fee. This contract was breached when
the school claims that a contract did not come into
being as the school's bulletin and brochure do not
constitute offers.
:

.

.

Issue
Does the acceptance by a private school,
such as Chicago Medical School, of an admission
application fee create a contractual obligation
on the part of the school to evaluate the credentials
of the applicant according to the admission criteria
published in the school's bulletin and brochure?
:

Decision:

Yes.

Reasoning
On the basis of contract law, the court
pointed out that the school's bulletin and brochure
was an invitation to make an offer. The student's
response was an offer and the school's retention
:

55

2d 586

Steinberg

(1976)

v.

Chicago Medical School, 354 N.E.

a
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°f t:he application fee was an acceptance
of that
offer.
it reasoned:
We believe that he and the school entered
into an enforceable contract; that the
school's
obligation under the contract was stated in
the school's bulletin in a definite manner
and that by accepting his application fee—
valuable consideration— the school bound itself
to fulfill its promises.
Steinberg accepted
the school's promises in good faith and he was
entitled to have his application judged according to the school's stated criteria.
In the area of academic affairs, Lyons v. Salve

Regina College held that various college documents

,

such

as the college catalog and other publications which relate

to procedures to be followed by a student in appealing

grades and academic decisions constitute a valid contract

between the college and the student. 56
Facts
Lyons (P) was a fourth year nursing student
at Salve Regina College.
She accompanied an ill
friend via ambulance to Boston.
Lyons therefore
lost three classes and two clinical experiences.
Lyons holds that an instructor assured her that the
only result of her absence would be that she would
receive a grade of "Incomplete" for the course.
Lyons subsequently completed the course, took the
examination.
She received an F grade.
She appealed
the F grade according to the college's Academic
Information and Registration Material for 1975 which
provided for a Grade Appeals Committee consisting
of a three-member Grade Appeals Committee whose
recommendation would be made to the Dean of Students.
Lyons had received almost all A's and B's in her
By
She was also President of her class.
courses.
an
recommended
2-1
Committee
Appeals
vote
the
a
"Incomplete" grade instead of an F to the Dean who
overruled the Committee and denied her appeal. As
a result of this decision, plaintiff Lyons was
dropped from the School of Nursing but was allowed
:

56

(1976)

.

Lyons v. Salve Regina College, 442

F.

Supp.

1354

.:

:

84

to cbange h e r major
she has graduated from
college with a degree in Psychology.
Plaintiff
claims that the Dean’s decision
constituted a
ntraCt
Published college materials
slttt ? h
eC n,mend ;tion of the (Appeal)
Committee
S
is
fcl e
Dean of Students/Associate Dean of
tL
?
the Dean s written guidelines it
stated^h^Vh
stated
that the decision of the Committee
was
final
.

f

'

^%f

'

.

Issue

Do various college documents
such as
the college catalog and other publications, which relate to procedures to
be followed by a student in appealing
grades and academic decisions constitute
a valid contract between the college
and the student?
In determining whether or not the terms
of a college rule or regulation are ambiguous and/or to determine the intent
of the parties in interpreting the
underlying rule or regulation, may a
court examine written procedures and/or
memorandas of college administrators?
,

Decision

1

.

2

.

Yes
Yes

Reasoning
(1) The written procedures and memorandum
by the Dean intended that the Committee's decision
would be final. The court indicated:
the college will not have fulfilled its
contractual obligation to Lyons until it gives
her the opportunity to meet its requirements
for a nursing major.
The
defendant's action in refusing to abide by
(2)
the deicsions of the Appeals Committee constituted
a breach of contract.
In making this finding, the
court reasoned:
;

.

.

.

the court is not, as defendants contend,
arbitrarily imposing the legal technicalities
of a commercial transaction upon what is essenRather, the court
tially an academic dispute.
college,
as another
is simply holding that the
which it
to
procedures
promissor must abide by
such
until
has bound itself and its students,
procedures.
those
change
time as it seems fit to
(This case is in hearing on appeal.)
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A suit in higher education which involved
students
who borrowed funds under the guaranteed Student
Loan

Program and schools who administer financial aid
programs
was based on contract issues, 57
Facts:

Plaintiff, American Training Services, Inc.,
is a New Jersey corporation which is in the business

of providing vocational training on a contract
basis in several fields. Defendant is a Tennessee
corporation.
Plaintiff and defendant entered into
a contract in which the defendant bank agreed to
finance the tuition loans of plaintiff's students.
Both plaintiff and defendant qualified for participation in the Federal Guaranteed Student Loan Program.
In compliance with the Federal Guaranteed Student
Loan Program, defendant paid plaintiff the proceeds
of each loan that the defendant made to a student
as payment for the student's tuition.
Plaintiff
was to periodically notify defendant of students'
withdrawals. A pro-rated portion of the unused
tuition was to be paid by the P to the D bank to be
applied to the student's note. This refund was to
accompany the notice of withdrawal. American Training
Services (P) held that the bank was not handling the
loans properly and filed an action in tort for negligence and in contract for breach and ceased sending
the withdrawl refunds to the bank though it forwarded
Defendant bank filed a
the notices of withdrawal.
counter suit against plaintiff for recovery of
Plaintiff held that the withthe refund payments.
drawals were caused by the defendant's negligence in
handling loan applications and the refunds were the
subject of a set-off against amounts due to plaintiff.
Plaintiff also rejected the notion that the repayments
were accrued to the students.
.

May the American Training Services (P) use
Issue
for unused tuition as a set-off against
refunds
the
defendant?
the
:

Decision:
57

No.

American Training Services, Inc.

Union Bank, 415 F. Supp.

1101

(1976).

v.

Commerce

.
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Reasoning
The refund of unused portions of
tuition when a student withdraws are due and pay^kle to the student. Any refund payments are
legally owed to the student who has withdrawn and
form the basis of a set-off against amounts
claimed to be due to ATS by C.U.B. as a result of the
latter's alleged negligence or breach of the
contract
:

Commonwealth v. Howell, 181 A. 2d 903 (1962).
Facts
Defendant appeals from an order of the
Philadelphia County Court which required him to pay
college tuition for his minor daughter from the
proceeds of an insurance policy which he maintained
for that purpose.
Both appellant and his wife are
college graduates. Appellant is a pharmacist and
operates his own drug store. Appellant's daughter
was born in 1943.
In 1952, a child's educational
endowment policy was issued to appellant by the
North Carolina Mutual Life Insurance Company, to
mature in ten years in principal sum of $1,500.00.
Appellant concedes that this policy was designed
"to send the child to college."
On graduation from
high school in 1961, the daughter expressed a desire
to continue her education at Temple Community College.
The policy's value was then in excess of $1,000.00.
Originally, appellant's wife petitions the court
for support.
The lower court scheduled a hearing
for September 21, 1961, which was limited to the
Judgment was given to wife.
issue of tuition.
Appellant contends in this appeal that the ownership
of this policy, even though coupled with the intention
as the time of issuance to use the proceeds from it
for the daughter's college education does not "amount
to a valid and binding agreement or voluntary offer
such as can be enforced by the court."
:

Is this insurance policy in question one which
Issue:
"amounts to a valid and binding agreement or voluntary
offer such as can be enforced by the courts?"

Decision

Yes.

:

Reasoning
(1) A parent is not liable for the support
college in the absence of an exattending
child
of a
the circumstances warrant
unless
and
contract
press
:

,

.

,
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it.
On the other hand, where there is an
agreement
to support, which it is within the
contemplation
o
the parties, a father may be liable to
support
and furnish his child with a college
education.
T he i Stant situation falls within
the exception
It
J P
outlined
by President Justice Rhodes in the Martin
case.
Although the educational insurance policy
may not be an express agreement to support, its
existence is clearly a circumstance which warrants
the action of the court below.
Order affirmed.

In Abrams v. New School for Social Research

,

the

court affirmed that a doctoral candidate in psychology

who had failed two oral examinations and who, pursuant
to agreement with school, submitted to interviews with

evaluators who rejected student's proposed dissertation
and thus disqualified student from a third oral examina-

tion could not recover from school earnings while

engaged in pursuit of degree or for alleged wrongful

deprivation of opportunity to further pursue his studies. 58
Facts
Doctoral candidate in psychology who was required to withdraw from school brought action for
damages for earnings lost while engaged in pursuit
of degree and for alleged wrongful deprivation of
opportunity to further pursue his studies. The
Supreme Court, New York County, George Postel, J.
denied school's motion for summary judgment dismissing
The Supreme Court,
the complaint and school appealed.
Appellate Division, 50 A.D. 2d. 778, 377 N.Y. S. 2d.
74, reversed and dismissed the complaint and student
The Court of Appeals held that the record
appealed.
established that procedures employed by school to
effectuate additional review procedure after the
student had failed two oral examinations were in
accordance with the school s agreement with the student
:

'

.

"^Abrams v. New School for Social Research, 390 N.Y.S.
2d 818

(1976)

.
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Issue:

Was a contract breached?

Decision

No

:

Reasoning
The institution had agreed to permit
the plaintiff, a doctoral candidate in
psychology
who had failed two oral examinations, to take
a third
examination provided that two of three social
psychologists favorably reviewed his dissertation
proposal.
Plaintiff voluntarily submitted to separate
interviews with two evaluators and both rejected his
proposal after an independent review.
Hence, plaintiff
was required to withdraw from the institution. The
record establishes that the procedures employed to
effectuate this additional review procedure were in
accordance with the institution's agreement with
the plaintiff.
The resolution of this case does not
turn on any disputed issues of act and the Appellate
Division properly directed the entry of a judgment
dismissing plaintiff's complaint.
:

,

In Tanner v. Board of Trustees of University of

Illinois

the court set forth the following rule of law:

,

Although University of Illinois is under discretionary
and not mandatory duty to issue degrees to persons
participating in its curricula, it cannot act
maliciously or in bad faith by a student who fulfills
its degree requirements.^
Facts
A thesis committee composed of five professors
from the department was formed to evaluate plaintiff's
dissertation and to conduct comprehensive oral and
written examinations of the plaintiff. In December
1972, plaintiff completed the written examinations
submitted by two members of the committee and, in
March 1973, he completed a written examination submitted by a third member of the committee. Although
plaintiff completed his oral examination and submitted
his dissertation to a committee member in August 1973,
he was informed in December 1973 that he would have to
be re-evaluated in a single, written examination, but
that the university thereafter informed him that the
:

S9

.

Tanner

v.

_

Board of Trustees of University of

Illinois, 363 N.E. 2d 208

(1977).
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examination would be in two parts, both
oral and
written.
In June 1975, plaintiff was informed
b y George Russell, vice Chancellor and
Dean
Graduate College, that the thesis committee, of the
the
examinations and dissertation submitted by
plaintiff
were all unacceptable because the committee
was never
formally recognized by the Graduate College,
and that
he would have to be re-evaluated.
On July 25, 1975,
plaintiff commenced his action in the Circuit Court
of Cook County, seeking a writ of mandamus
compelling
the university to issue him a Ph.D. degree in
Business Administration, or alternatively, $100,000.00
damages for breach of an implied contract to issue
the degree.
The university was granted a venue transfer to the Circuit Court for the Sixth Judicial
Circuit, Champlain County, on September 29, 1975, and
on February 13, 1976.
That court dismissed the
complaint, finding that no set of facts could be
proved to support plaintiff's stated theories of
mandamus and contract.
Issue

:

Decision

1.
2.

Does an action of mandamus stand?
Does an action stand for damages on
theory of implied contract?
1.
2.

:

a

Referred for repleading.
Needs to be filed in Court of Claims.

Reasoning
(1) Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy
and should not be issued unless the plaintiff demonstrated a clear right to the writ and a clear obligation on the defendant to perform the act sought to
be performed.
Although we recognize that the university is under a discretionary and not a mandatory duty
to issue degrees to persons participating in its
curricula, the university may not act maliciously or
in bad faith by arbitrarily and capriciously refusing
to award a degree to a student who fulfills its degree
requirements.
The case is remanded to the trial court
(2)
for repleading on plaintiff's mandamus theory.
Action for money damages against University of Illinois
on theory of implied contract had to be filed in court
of claims.
:

In Basch v.

The George Washington University, a class

action by students against the University, the court laid
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the following procedures:

(1)

Whether given section

of university bulletin becomes part of the contractual

obligations between students and university depends upon
general principles of contract construction, including

principle that document must be viewed as a whole, but
terms are to be given their common meaning, and principle
that court should view

language

as would reasonable

person in position of the parties, 60

(2)

Viewed as a whole,

the language of university bulletin at most expressed

expectancy by the university regarding future tuition
increases, and not any promises susceptible of enforcement.
Facts

Appellants represent a class of approximately 500 students attending the medical school in all
four current classes.
Prior to their acceptance
of the university's offer to attend the medical
school, each of these students received a copy of
:

School
The George Washington University Bulletin:
While the language
of Medicine and Health Services.
of the bulletins received by each class varied somewhat, all of the parties agreed that those differences
were insignificant, and that only the language on
the 1974-1975 bulletin need be considered for purposes
That bulletin specifically set the
of this action.
tuition rate for the 1974-1975 academic year at
$3,200, but went on to state that:

Academic year tuition increases have been
1975-76, $200; 1976-77,
estimated as follows:
Every
$200; 1977-78, $200; 1978-79, $200
increases
effort will be made to keep tuition
within these limits. However, it is not possible to project future economic data with
certainty, and circumstances may require an
adjustment in this estimate.
.

6

1364

.

°Basch v. George Washington University, 370 A. 2d

(1977).
6

.

‘*'Basch v.

George Washington University.

fi 1
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Appellants aver that their decision to
attend the
was based in part, in reliance
on
these estimates.
Subsequently, on January 17, 1975
the university issued a Statement on
Tuition Rates^
which provided:
'

The Board of Trustees of the George
Washington
University has approved a tuition of $5000
two semesters) for the fiscal
^ ear
1975-76 for all candidates for the degreeyear
of
Doctor of Medicine in the School of Medicine
and Health Sciences.
This increase in tuition
rate was necessitated by the anticipated impact
of inflation and on the projection of a recently
(mid-December) proposed decrease in the funding
support provided by the District of Columbia
Medical and Dental Manpower Act, a Federal
Government program. The combination of the
projected increase in expenses due to inflation
and decrease in income totals approximately
$900,000 and the increase of $1600 per student
will yield an amount approximately equal to
the projected gap.
The operations of the School
of Medicine and Health Sciences are planned to
proceed on a no-growth basis; that is, there
will be no increase in staffing or in other
aspects of the School.
(

In addition, the Board of Trustees also approved a
maximum tuition rate for the academic year of 1976-77
of $12,500 for each candidate for the degree of Doctor
of Medicine.
The exact amount, which will be set by
the President of the University under authority granted
him by the Trustees will be determined when the extent
of the impact of cost increases and the anticipated
loss of funding support from such federal programs
as the Medical and Dental Manpower Act and the Health
Professions Capitation Grant Program are determined.
Continuation of current rates of inflation combined
with the total loss of funding support from federal
programs would necessitate the maximum $12,500 tuition
rates for 1976-77.
Both local and national efforts
to provide financial support to students continue; and
should efforts to secure funding support to the School
prove fruitful, tuition will be set at the lowest
On August 7, 1975, appellants initiated
feasible figure.
this action, arguing below that the new tuition rates
were instituted in breach of their contracts with

:

.

.
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the University's bulletin,
contention on appeal.

They are renewing this

Issue
Were there new tuition rates
instituted in
breach of the student
e
Pr ° :eCted lncreases in
'

Univ^ s ^y bunetin?
Decision

No

R e asoning
(1) The mere fact that the bulletin contained language regarding a projected tuition
increase
is not enough to support a finding that
the language
amounted to a contractual obligation.
In construing
the terms of a contract, the document itself
must
be viewed as a whole.
it has been noted that:
;

In ascertaining intent, we consider not only
language used in the contract but also
circumstances surrounding the making of

the
the
the
the

contract, the motives of the parties and
purposes which they sought to accomplish.

(2) The terms of the document are to be given their
common meaning.

In arriving at that menaing. the court should
view the language of the document as would a
reasonable person in the position of the
parties.
Viewing the pertinent language as a
whole, in the context of a University bulletin,
we cannot conclude that a reasonable person would
have assumed that the University intended to
bind itself by the construction appellants urge

on us

Harris, Associate Judge, concurring:
I concur in the affirmance.
The statements in
appellee s bulletin concerning future tuition
increases were too hedged with qualifications
to be considered promises which the University
Appellants had no
was obligated to perform.
reasonable expectations which deserve protection.
'

Giles v. Howard University held that since the

University's Medical School's student promotion policy
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was not an integrated agreement,
standard in interpreting
it was that of reasonable expectation.^
F^cts.
Plaintiff enrolled in the Howard
College of Medicine in August 1973. He University
passed all
his first semester classes except
biochemistry, which
he fai le d.
The college permitted him to participate
fully in the second semester program, provided
agreed to retake biochemistry in the Directed he
Study
Program during the summer of 1974. He passed all
his second semester courses but failed biochemistry.
Plaintiff then received a letter from the Dean of
the Medical College, Marion Mann, M.D., informing him
that he would be allowed to continue as a medical
student if he repeated biochemistry and retook and
obtained satisfactory grades in the other courses
in his curriculum that he had already passed.
Dean Mann's letter also stated:

Section IV of the Student Promotions Policy
is applicable only to students who begin the
academic year in good academic standing. The
Committee hereby informs you that you are not
in good academic standing but are on probation;
and that if you fail any course during the
first semester, you will be dropped from the
College of Medicine.

Plaintiff repeated the courses and passed biochemistry,
but failed anatomy.
On March 7, 1975, he was dropped
from the College of Medicine.
He thereupon requested
readmission.
By letter of July 7, 1975, Dean Mann
informed the plaintiff that his request for readmission had been considered and that the committee
considering the request would be reconvened if the
plaintiff passed special National Board Examinations
in anatomy, biochemistry, microbiology, and physiology.
The plaintiff took these examinations and failed all
four.
No further action was taken on his request for
Plaintiff sues alleging denial of fifth
readmission.
amendment procedural due process rights and a common
law claim for a breach of contract or tort.
Issue:

1.
2

62

.

Was plaintiff denied his fifth amendment
procedural due process rights?
Does he have a common law claim for breach
of contract?

Giles v. Howard University, 428

F.

Supp.

603

(1977).

94

Decision

1.
2.

:

No.
No.

Reasoning
(1) Howard University is not sufficient^ i nv °lved with the federal government to make its
actions equivalent to federal government
actions and
thus subject to the restraints of Fifth
Amendment
.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5.
Only the federal government
is subject to constitutional restraints
of Fifth
Amendment procedural due process. U. S.C.A. Const
Amend. 5.
:

(2) To state an actionable claim for breach of
contract
or tort because of refusal of university to readmit
plaintiff to medical school, plaintiff must adduce
evidence of a violated contractural right or improper
motivation or irrational action on part of university.
After reading the Student Promotions Policy, the reasonable expectation of any student is that if he fails
a course and does not make up the deficiency in the
Directed Study Program, he can be dismissed or can be
retained upon compliance with any reasonable condition.
This is the interpretation the Court gives the Student
Promotions Policy. Under this interpretation, the
plaintiff has failed to adduce any evidence of a violated
contract right.
He has also failed to present any
facts to show improper motivation or irrational action
on the part of the university or any of its officials.
On the contrary, all the evidence indicates the
university went out of its way to help the plaintiff
remain in medical school without compromising its
academic standards.
It gave him at least three second
chances.
Under these circumstances, the facts necessary
to sustain an actionable claim have not been shown.

In conclusion, twenty-two of the 100 cases were in the

area of student related cases.

In these twenty-two student

related cases, five of the areas of contract were in issue
(RE:

Table

1,

page 95).

Issue in this category did not

arise in relation to the area of Consideration, Fraud,

Mistake and Duress or the Statute of Frauds.

A graphic

representation of the distribution of the percentage of

TABLE

1

ANALYSIS OF 22 STUDENT-RELATED CASES
ACCORDING
THE AREAS OF THE LAW OF CONTRACT IN
ISSUE

Source:

100 Cases

^
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student issues, in the 100 cases as briefed
in this
chapter to the area of the law of contract is
found in
Figure 1, page 97.

Faculty Related
Case law in relation to faculty and the

contract may be divided into two categories:
and

operational.

(2)

lav;

of

(1)

personal

By the personal classification,

the rights of the individual faculty person under his

contract of employment including the issue of tenure are
set forth, while the operational classification may be

defined as the academic rights and freedom of the faculty
person while functioning as an educator under his contract
of employment.

This research proved that as far back as

1893, students questioned in the courts the latter classifi-

cation.

The academic prerogative of faculty to make aca-

demic decisions, e.g., recommend candidates for

a degree,

was clearly set forth by the court in People v. New York
Law School

.

3

Facts
In 1892, the Dean of the school suggested
that a committee be appointed to arrange for the commencement, secure a hall and engage a speaker. The
committee was so appointed. By a majority vote, after
much contention, they decided to invite a clergyman
of one faith to offer the invocation and a clergyman
On June 2, the Dean
of another faith the benediction.
indicated to the committee that this was a poor
:

63

(1893)

.

People v. New York Law School, 22 N.Y.S. 663

:
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Figure 1. Distribution of the percentage of
student issues in the 100 cases to the areas of the
law of contract.

Legend

2.

Expressed or Implied
Offer and Acceptance

3.

Consideration

4.

Capacity

5.

Fraud, Mistake, Duress

6.

Illegality

7.

Statute of Frauds

8.

Performance and Breach

1.

,
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decision and suggested that they did not
have
religious participants. The committee
accepted
the
Dean s suggestion.
On June 3, the Dean was informed
by telegram that Bishop Doane, one of the
would confer the degrees. Because a churchtrustees,
dignitary
was to confer the degrees, the faculty determined
that he should be asked to conduct the appropriate
religious exercises.
This determination was communicated to the committtee. On the same day, the
relator
and eight or ten others demonstrated against the
action
of the faculty.
Mr. O'Sullivan charged the dean with
underhanded conduct and the students then present
threatened not to attend the commencement exercise
unless the faculty action was reversed. On June 6,
Mr. O'Sullivan had a meeting with the dean.
The
meeting as described by Mr. O'Sullivan is sufficient
to say it justified the refusal of the faculty to
recommend him as a student upon whom a degree should
be conferred.
The relator has admitted the truth of
the answering allegations.
_

,

Issue:
Did the conduct described justify the Dean's
refusal to award the certificate to the relator?

Decision:

Yes.

Reasoning
The court focused on the right of faculties
to recommend candidates for degrees.
It held:
:

Assuming the relator's conduct is correctly
stated by the Dean, as we must, it was, to say
the least, contumacious and calculated to breed
disorder and trouble in the school. That there
should be some power vested in the faculties of
schools and colleges to repress and punish such
It cannot be
conduct will be conceded by all.
that a student having passed all examinations
necessary for a degree can, before his graduation,
excite disturbance and threaten injury to the
school or college without being amenable to some
No course would seem open to forthpunishment.
In this
him
or refuse his degree.
expel
with
faculties
The
taken.
was
course
latter
the
case,
to conpower
having
institutions
educational
of
having
schools
of
teachers
and
the
fer degrees,
the right to recommend to the Regents of the
University, students deemed worthy of degrees,
are necessarily vested with a broad discretion as
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to the persons who shall receive those
honors or
be recommended for such distinction; and
when
the conduct of a student has been such,
intermediate
is final examinations and the time of
conferring
that there is a fair occasion for the
exercise of discretion on the part of the faculty,
and there clearly was in this case, it should be
reversed by this court, and the case must be an
extraordinary one to justify judicial interference.
The court further indicated that it
saw no reason why the right to discipline is not
as great between the final examination and the
graduation.

Thus, in the nineteenth century, the court clearly

upheld the right of faculty to make academic decisions.
Case law presently, as later cases will validate, uphold
the;

separation of the academic decision and the courts,

when the faculty are not arbitrary or capricious in their
judgment.

The aforementioned case clearly indicated "the

case must be an extraordinary one to justify judicial interference."

It should be noted that,

irrespective of the

classification, faculty rights emanate from the contract.
Therefore, the legal issue to be determined by the court is
one relative to basic contract law.
In researching litigation in higher education relative
to the law of contract and faculty and administrative

personnel, the researcher found that faculty and administrative personnel related cases were voluminous.

For this

section of case reviews, the terms faculty and administrative

personnel are used interchangeably.

Thus, in the following

.
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pages, selected cases

(1966-1977) are briefed to

present the pertinent research data.
The issue of probationary teachers was
discussed
in the Harvard Law Review

;

In deciding whether to rehire or grant
tenure, the
consideration involved goes well beyond a judgment
about general teaching competencies. College
professors are ordinarily specialists teaching
particular courses.
In seeking to mold a balanced
department the institution must take into account
the particular contributions which each potential
teacher will make to the department as a whole; for
this purpose personal factors, such as the political
or economic biases of the professor, may well be
legitimate considerations. An attempt must also be
made to evaluate the potential academic contributions
of the new teacher, as well as his teaching ability.
In addition, in many institutions the practice is
to hire several probationary teachers in contemplation of filling our tenured positions. A
decision not to rehire thus does not involve issues
of 'proof' of the teacher's unsuitability; it involves rather a complex comparative and evaluative
process.
Although dismissal during the term of the
contract must entitle the probationary teachers who
are not rehired to a full hearing, to grant such a
hearing to all probationary teachers who are not
rehired would be both administratively too burdensome
and practically useless, for the issues involved may
not be suitable for a judicatory
,

Numerous statutes and regulations entitle certain
public employees to permanent job security, i.e., they can

only be discharged for enumerated causes.

For employees

who have tenured status, these statutes create property

interests within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Such employees cannot be deprived of this property interest
64

Harvard Law Review 1048, 1101 (1968).
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without first having a hearing that satisfied
due process
hearing.
This is the decision in Perry v. Sindermann 65
.

Fact_s:

Sindermann had been employed on a series of
one year contracts in the Texas public higher
education system for ten years.
During his tenth
year of teaching, he was given timely notice that
his
contract would not be renewed.
Sindermann petitioned
the federal court urging that he was entitled to a
statement of reasons for his non-retention and a pretermination hearing to contest those reasons. He
alleged that while the public junior college where
he had been employed had no provision 'in the college's official Faculty Guide' and on "guidelines
promulgated by the formal tenure system, it had a de
facto tenure program which was passed on a Coordinating Board of the Texas College and University System
that provided that a person, like himself, who has
been employed as a teacher in the state college and
university system for seven years or more has some
form of job tenure."
Issue

;

Decision

Does Sindermann have a right to a hearing?
Yes, if he could prove his allegations.

:

Reasoning
Though a subjective "expectancy" of
tenure is not protected by procedural due process,
respondent's allegation that the college had a de
facto tenure policy, arising from rules and understandings officially promulgated and fostered, entitled him to an opportunity of proving the legitimacy
of his claim to job tenure.
Such proof would obligate the college to afford him a requested hearing
where he could be informed of the grounds for his
non-retention and challenge their sufficiency.
:

Mr.

Chief Justice Burger, concurring:

concur in the Court's judgments and opinions
in Sindermann and Roth but there is one central point in both decisions that I would like to
underscore since it may have been obscured in
That
the comprehensive discussion of the cases.
state
point is that the relationship between a
institution and one of its teachers is essentially a matter of state concern and state law.
I

,

65

Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 600 (1972).

.
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The Court holds today only
that a
employed teacher who has a right state
to
employment under state law, arising refrom
either an express or implied
contract, has,
in
urn a right guaranteed by the
Fourteenth
Amendment, to some form of prior
administrative or academic hearing on the
cause
renewal of his contract. Thus, whetherfor nona parteac er in a Particular context has
any
^ administrative
right to such
hearing hinges on
a question of state law.
The Court's opinion
makes this point very sharply: Property
interests
are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or
understandings that stem from an independent source
such as state law ...
/

.

,

.

Because the availability of the Fourteenth
Amendment right to a prior administrative
hearing turns in each case on a question of
state law, the issue of abstention will arise
in future cases contesting whether a particular
teacher is entitled to a hearing prior to nonrenewal of his contract.
If relevant state
contract law is unclear, a federal court should,
in my view, abstain from deciding whether he is
constitutionally entitled to a prior hearing,
and the teacher should be left to resort to
state courts on the questions arising under state
law.

Mr.

Justice Marshall, dissenting in part:
I agree with Part I of the Court's opinion
holding that respondent has presented a bona
fide First Amendment claim that should be
considered fully by the District Court.
I
would modify the judgment of the Court of Appeals
to direct the District Court to enter summary
judgment for respondent entitling him to a
statement of reasons why his contract was not
renewed and a hearing on disputed issues of
fact

Board of Regents v. Roth argued issues relative to

whether or not a non-tenured teacher acquires due process

.
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rights under a one year contract of
employment. 66
Facts
Roth was a non- tenured assistant
professor
in his first year of hi s first
teaching position
in the Wisconsin public higher
education system,
In accordance with the relevant
Wisconsin statutes
and regulations, he was given timely
notification
that his contract would not be renewed for
the second
year.
He filed suit in the federal court claiming
that he was entitled to a statement of reasons
for
his non-retention and a pre-termination
hearing to
contest those reasons.
:

Issue
Does Roth have a legal right to a statement
of reasons for his non-retention and a pre-termina:

tion hearing?

Decision

No

:

Reasoning
(1) The requirements of procedural due
process apply only to the deprivation of interests
encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment's
protection of liberty and property. A public employer's decision not to retain a probationary
employee did not ordinarily constitute a deprivation
of liberty.
:

It stretches the concept too far to suggest
that a person is deprived of liberty when
he simply is not rehired on one job but remains free as before to seek another.
(2) A public employer's decision not to retain a
probationary employee did not ordinarily constitute
a deprivation of property.
The terms of the respondent's appointment secured absolutely no interest
They supported
in reappointment for the next year.
absolutely no possible claim of entitlement to reemployment
.

Issues relative to pre-termination hearings were

decided in Papadopoulos v. Board of Higher Education

.

court held:
66

Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564

(1972).

The
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Whether a public employee is entitled to a pretermination hearing depends upon his entitlement
to continued employment, i.e.
his job security;
the existence and extent of a public employee's
job security depend upon state law governing public
employment.
,

The court indicated that employment contract of

public employees may create the right to continue their

employment over and above that provided by statute or

regulation but such contract, standing alone, does not
create interest requiring due process hearing before

breach and employee's remedies are measured by law of
contract, not by constitutional law.

Q

Plaintiff is a state university professor
(Oregon) of mathematics from September 1967 to June
1970.
In 1969, defendant or its subordinate officils, decided to deny plaintiff his tenure and to
Plaintiff received a
terminate his employment.
written notice of non-reappointment dated February
In December of 1968, the tenured faculty
25, 1969.
of the Plaintiff's Department voted 20-1 in favor
The chairman
of indefinite tenure for plaintiff.
recommenfavorable
own
added
his
department
the
of
These recommendations were forwarded to
dation.
John Ward, Dean of the School of Science, who in
turn did not recommend plaintiff for tenure.
Plaintiff appealed to the Review and Appeal Committee
of the Faculty Senate who after a review of his case
recommended to the president that indefinite tenure
The president
be granted to Dr. Michael Papadopoulos
nonplaintiff's
upheld
facts
the
after a review of
September
dated
plaintiff
to
letter
renewal in a
The Faculty Senate thus formed an Ad hoc
24, 1969.
Committee to study the situation. Their final report
again recommended that tenure be granted to the
The president, on Feburary 19, 1970,
plaintiff.
advised plaintiff that after reconsidering the
Facts

:

.

^
^

P.

2d

Papadopoulos v. Board of Higher Education, 511

(1973).
68

Papadopoulos v. Board of Higher Education.

—
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Faculty Senate s recommendations his decision
(of September 24, 1969) remained the
same.
"This
decision is based on the judgment that the Ad
hoc
Committee's report concerning the adequacy of
performance constitutes additional reasonable
doubt that tenure should be granted." Plaintiff
then appealed to the Board of Higher Education.
In March of 1970, the Board's Academic Affairs
Committee held a hearing on plaintiff's appeal.
Th® Committee limited its inquiry as to questions
of procedure.
It concluded that proper procedures
were followed.
Plaintiff filed with the circuit
court which ruled that the Board had to accord plaintiff a hearing on the grounds for the termination
of his employment.
At the end of a four-day hearing
the Board ruled "that the decision of the Oregon
State University to grant indefinite tenure to
Dr Papadopoulos and not to renew his academic
appointment are affirmed."
'

,

.

Issue
Was plaintiff entitled to a contested case
hearing before the Board terminated his employment
effective June 1970?
:

Decision

Yes.

:

Reasoning
One of the Board's regulations in effect
at the time material to this case provided:
:

If any appointment of an academic staff member
not on indefinite tenure, is to be terminated
otherwise than for cause he shall be given a
timely notice of termination as follows:
at least twelve months' notice.
1969 Adm. Code Sec L-3-F.

The effect of this regulation is to entitle the Board's
academic employees to continued employment unless
and until they receive timely notice of termination
in accordance with the requirements of the regulation.
When June 1969 passed without plaintiff having been
told his employment would be terminated effective
June 1970 by somebody with authority to make that
statement, he then had an entitlement to continued
employment until June 1971.
In Schlecting v.

Bergstrom

reasoning of Curran v. Laird:

,

the court followed the

"not all operations of

,
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government are subject to judicial review even
though
they may have a profound effect upon our lives.

it

pointed out that all levels of government occasionally
make decisions based on "determinations that lie outside
sound judicial domains in terms of aptitude, facilities

and responsibility."

The court went on to say that

personal decisions involving probationary employees are
such matters.
Facts
Plaintiff was discharged as a county
employee.
She claims her discharge was an
arbitrary decision. A demurer was sustained
and plaintiff appeals.
:

Issue
Did the plaintiff state a legal cause of
action?
;

Decision

No

:

Reasoning
The discharge of a probationary employee
as the plaintiff is not subject for review for arbitrariness.
The court went on to say:
'If we were
to entertain the claim that a probationary employee
discharge was arbitrary, then there would have to
be an examination of the reasons for the discharge
This is a
and the sufficiency of these reasons.
familiar exercise when a tenured public employee
If it is also necessary when a
is discharged.
probationary employee is discharged, then the distinction between two groups of public employees has
been rendered largely meaningless.'
:

Alberti v. County of Erie was

a case in

which

a

non-

tenured teacher at the Erie Community College was held to
69

Schlecting v. Bergstrom, 511

70

Schlecting v. Bergstrom.

P.

2d 846

(1973).
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be entitled to timely notice
of termination. 71

Com-

pensation due to him was restricted
to the pay for the
year
which he would have worked

m

if he had not been

improperly terminated, less the amount
of any earnings
that he received that year.
F acts

Petitioner was hired by the Erie
Community College in September 1967. His County
appointment continued for two years until it
was terminated by the Urban Center in August
1969, allegedlv
because of philosophical differences between
the
Petitioner and the board of directors of the
institution.
Petitioner had taught for two
years and his status was as a non-tenured but
full
term employee.
Plaintiff instituted an Article 78
proceeding seeking reinstatement and back pay.
Defendant contends that the procedural rights are
not available to a faculty member who is not to be
rehired at the conclusion of his yearly appointment.
;

Issue
Must notice of termination be given to a
term appointee? Should plaintiff be reinstated?
;

Decision

1.
2.

;

Yes.
No.

Reasoning
(1) The requirement that notice of termination be accorded a term employee (appointee) is not
obviated.
The Faculty Handbook requires that written
notice be given to the term appointees as to whether
their appointments will be renewed not later than
February 15.
The regulation under the Education Law
requires a written notice to term appointee who has
served for two years, not later than December 15.
Petitioner was not given notice of his termination
until May 1969 and even this was informal. No written
notice was communicated until actual termination.
Therefore, the decision not to rehire petitioner for
the academic year 1969-1970 was defective for lack
of timely notice.
(2) Since the respondent (defendant)
had the right to terminate petitioner without stating
reasons, reinstatement is inappropriate.
The purpose
of the notice requirement is to provide appointees who
:

71

Albert v.

County of Erie, 360 N.Y.S. 2d 343 (1974).

.

,

,
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a re not being hired

with an opportunity to look
tor other employment.
We conclude that the
petitionesr is entitled to an award for
the amount
or nis salary for the academic year
1969-1970, the
year that he would have worked had he not
been improperly terminated less the amount of any
earninq
he received that year.
A non-tenured faculty person through his contract
of employment, does not have a property right
in or

legal expectancy of further employment

.

was the holding

in Shephard v. West Virginia Board of Regents 72
.

Facts
Suit was brought against the West Virginia
Board of Regents and others by a non-tenured
assistant professor who sought to compel her reemployment for the 1973-74 school year, and to recover the wages and benefits to which she would
have been entitled as such an employee during the
said school term.
On the defendant's motion to
dismiss, the District Court held that (1) the defendant
did not have any property rights in or legal expectancy
of further employment, (2) she was given written
notice of her non-reappointment by a communication
more than 12 months before the expiration of her
appointment for the 1972-73 academic year, consistent
with controlling regulations, (3) she was not entitled to a statement of reasons for her non-reappointment or to a hearing thereon, and (4) the Board of
Regents and its members, in their official capacity,
are not "persons" within the meaning of the Civil
Rights Act.
:

Does the complaint state
Issue
relief may be granted?
:

Decision:

a

claim upon which

No.

Reasoning
(1) The West Virginia Board of Regents is
authorized and empowered by law to make, promulgate
modify and amend as well as enforce rule s and regulations re lating to and controlling the employment
tenure and the non-reappointment of the faculty
members at the state institutions under its jurisIn this case, the regulations controlling
diction
:

72

Supp.

4

Shephard v. West Virginia Board of Regents, 378
(1974)

.

F.
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granting of tenure requires positive
and
affirmative action.
Plaintiff was not granted
tenure and had no property right in or
leqal
expectancy of further employment.
(2) Plaintiff
was given written notice of her
non-reappointment
by communication of May 9, 1972, more than
twelve
months before the expiration of her appointment
for the academic year 1972-1973, consistent
with
controlling regulations. The record discloses
no issue as to any claimed protected rights
under
the First or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.
The plaintiff is not entitled to a statement
of reasons for her non-reappointment or to a hearinq
^
1:he

on it

.

Burdeau v. Trustees of the California State College
hold that a non— tenured assistant professor

1

s

personal

hope or even expectation of re-employment or his sincere

belief in his own qualifications gave him no hope or claim
to a job for the ensuing year.

73

Facts
Plaintiff appeals an opinion of the District
Court dismissing without leave to amend the action
he had filed resisting the failure of the university
to rehire him.
He was a probationary assistant
professor with a one year appointment. On February
19, 1971, plaintiff was informed by President Pfau
that he would not be re-employed.
The letter gave
no reason for the action.
By California statute, the
trustees have the power to provide by rule for the
government of their appointees and employees, including reappointment of non-tenured academic employees.
California State College, San Bernardino, has formulated procedures which include a consultative process
In accord with this
for rehiring of professors.
process, President Pfau obtained the evaluations
and recommendations of the Division of Social
Sciences Committee on Retention, Promotion and
from the college-wide Committee on Retention,
Tenure:
Promotion and Tenure; and from the Vice President for
Individuals participating were to
Academic Affairs.
:

73

,

Burdeau v. Trustees of California State

College, 507 F. 2d 770

(1974).

:
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evaluate and base their recommendations
on
aching, professional recognized
research
and creative activity and college service.
All three
recommendations were considered by the
president
nhis decision. Plaintiff availed himself
of
existing grievance procedures and a
hearing was held
upon his grievance.
At the hearing, plaintiff
refused to proceed until he was furnished
the evidence that the several committees or
President
Pfau had relied upon in making their
or until he had been given access to determinations,
his personal
2
With the matter in a standoff the plaintiff
Z :,'
filed this suit.
He claims a denial of his Fourteenth
Amendment due process rights.
Issue
Did the plaintiff
~
have
V
a legal
^
a
right to the
materials from the file of the committee?
4-

_L

.

Decision

No.

:

_L

Judgment Affirmed.

Reasoning
The grievant had no information from
the committees or their files as to their recommendations of findings and he was entitled to none.
The Faculty By-Laws provide for the confidentiality
of the committee's findings and recommendations.
Therefore, where the state rules and the faculty rules
do not provide a grievant with materials from the
files of the committe, he may not be filing his
grievance to turn the proceeding into a fishing
expedition for the information he was not otherwise
entitled to obtain.
:

Lyman v. Swartley was a case in which a tenured

faculty person at the Idaho State University was terminated

without being given the opportunity to respond.

The

court ordered the university to reinstate him and to provide him with monetary benefits because the Board of

Education in the termination process violated the plaintiff's due process rights.
74

74

Lyman v. Swartley, 385

F.

Supp. 661

(1974).

s

Ill
C 5
Plainti£f is a
t
5 ^ State University. tenured faculty member of the
Idaho
in 1948, he began his
duties at the school and has an impressive academic
:

background being a medical doctor and also holding
a doctorate in zoology.
Defendants Swartly,
Alford, Deaton, Hay, Munson and Thatcher are members
of the Idaho State Board of Education which controls
the Idaho State University.
Defendant Benoit was
not officially sworn in as a member of the board
to the act complained of
Defendant Davis is
the president and executive officer of the university
and subject to the orders of the Board of Education.
From April 3, 1973, through April 5, 1973, the board
was in session in Moscow, Idaho, for the purpose of
discussing faculty salaries, the input of faculty
members, and proposed reappointments of faculty members at the institutions of higher learning in the
state.
The board directed the president to provide
them with an indepth evaluation of Dr. Lyman on
April 5, 1973. This was a unique procedure and set
up an unprecedented occasion.
Plaintiff was the one
and only person selected for evaluation.
Defendant
Davis (President) delegated this duty to the University Faculty Advisory Committee, chaired by Dr.
Kenneth Smith. Faculty members elected by faculty
vote comprised the membership of this committee.
Smith convened his committee and they voted less than
unanimously to undertake their charge. An ad hoc
subcommittee was appointed to prepare and submit
the proposed guidelines for the evaluation process.
Lyman was then invited to express his ideas for incorporation into the guidelines. On April 13, 1973,
guidelines were formally adopted by the faculty
committee.
The plaintiff responded to the proposed
evaluation quickly, positively and aggressively. He
talked to Dr. Smith on the telephone on April 16,
1973, and wrote a letter addressed to Dr. Smith with
copies to the board, to Davis, to the president of
the local Chapter of the American Association of
University Professors and of the Idaho State University
Faculty and Professional Association. He also posted
the letter on a bulletin board of the Biology
Department and placed one on the table in the Student
Union Building. The letter was admitted into evidence.
As a result of the letter all agreed that Lyman
actions in writing the letter and talking to Smith
had the effect of making a fair and impartial evaluation by the evaluation committee impossible. The
.

'
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Faculty Committee felt that it
could proceed
r
all
There was a general consensus
fhat ^h
T’ nt
3Ct constituted
for
discharge!
•

1973
P Xl 23
the
t uhe was discharged board notified the plaintiff
that
because of his letter and
telephone cails which had in effect thwarted
a direct
order of the board, i.e., the evaluation
of Lyman.
ob 3 ected to this discharge and on May
12,
1973 a PP ea ed with counsel before a
regular meeting
f
of the board.
Mr. Benoit speaking for the board
announced that the board believed that it had
the
authority to discharge Lyman and stated that the
phone calls and letter constituted cause for his
discharge.
Lyman's counsel indicated that no discharge of a tenured teacher without due process was
authorized to determine the existence of good cause.
The chairman offered to entertain a motion from the
b<^ a ^d to reconsider the discharge order
but no motion
was offered.
The meeting then adjourned.
Plaintiff
represented by the attorneys of the Civil Liberties
Union then entered the suit.
'

'

'

Issue
Were the plaintiff's rights to due process
violated?
:

Decision

Yes.

;

Reasoning
(1) Tenure as a legal right means a reasonable expectation of continued employment, so
long as the employment is performed properly.
This
right of public employment is a property right. A
law.
In such a case the due process requires as a
minimum:
(a) specification of charges of conduct
or performance alleged to warrant deprivation of
continued employment, (b) an opportunity to respond
to those charges, and (c) a fair and impartial factfinding process to determine the validity or nonvalidity of the charges.
Here, the board without
affording the plaintiff any opportunity to respond,
determined, unilaterally, that cause for discharge
existed and purported to terminate the employment.
This action deprived the plaintiff of a valuable
(2)
property right without due process of the law.
The court held that the plaintiff must be reinstated
He was entitled to be
in his employment status.
reimbursed for the salary and other monetary benefits
he should have received had he not been wrongfully
:

113

dischairged.
Defendants were ordered to reinstate
the plaintiff and were restrained from
any further
acts designed to interfere with the plaintiff's
right to employment except those in which
due
process is provided. Money damages from the
indidefendants were denied as they were not
motivated by bad faith.

Plaintiff
renewed.

s

contract as an instructor was not

The reason for the non-renewal was to allow

the employment of people working on their doctorate.
Pl^ifttiff claims this non— renewal was an infringement

of her liberty interests.

The court held that the non-

renewal of the contract was not an infringement of

liberty interests in Ducorbier v. Board of Supervisors of

Louisiana State University

7S
.

Facts
Plaintiff sues under the Civil Rights
Act, 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that she was wrongfully discharged from her position as instructor
at the University of New Orleans, formerly Louisiana
State University in New Orleans (UNO)
She was
first employed as an associate in the Department of
Sciences at UNO for one semester from September
1964 to January 1965.
She left UNO to complete
work on her master's degree in mathematics which
she received in June 1965.
Plaintiff was appointed
as instructor of mathematics from September 1965 to
She was offered and accepted three sucMay 1966.
cessive appointments covering the periods September
She only completed the first
1966 through May 1969.
semester of the 1968-1969 contract when she resigned
Plaintiff returned to UNO
for maternity reasons.
in September 1969 and served as instructor of mathematics for two successive academic appointments.
In February 1971
These were September 1969-May 1971.
she was notified that she would not be reappointed at
Her period of notification was well within the
UNO.
:

.

75

Ducorbier v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana
State University, 386 F. Supp. 202 (1974).
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time recomm ended in the University
Regulations and
the American Association of University
Professors.
Plaintiff taught from September 1971 to May
and she was not appointed for the following 1972,
year!
In May 1972, plaintiff used the UNO grievance
procedure by requesting that her case be reviewed
by a grievance committee which consisted of five
faculty members. This committee concluded that
the plaintiff had not been unfairly treated and that
there was no basis for her grievance. At all
times after September 1965, the plaintiff's position
at UNO was that of instructor.
According to the
University's By-Laws, the University Regulations,
and the Faculty Handbook, persons with the rank of
instructor are on an annual appointment and are not
eligible for indefinite tenure.

Issue
Does the plaintiff have a legal cause of
action for breach of contract?
:

Decision

No.

;

Reasoning
(1) The non-renewal of employment of a
non-tenured teacher in order to implement a reduction
in the size of the faculty does not require notice
and hearing because such non-renewal does not stigmatize or label the teacher in a degrading way. As a
matter of law, the court could not say that the nonrenewal in order to reserve instructor's positions
for persons working on their doctorate degree resulted
in such stigma that her liberty interests were infringed.
(2) The record sufficiently showed that if
the college instructor was under the impression that
she had tenure, such an impression was not reasonable
in view of the year to year renewal of the contract
of employment, as well as the explicit provisions
on tenure in the University By-Laws, Regulations and
Faculty Handbook.
:

Another case dealing with the issue of the termination of contract of a tenured professor was King v. Conser -

vatorio de Musica de Puerto Rico

.

The findings in this

case upheld the violation of the plaintiff's due process
rights.

A major factor in this case was the fact that the
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defendant institution received public
funds and was
sufficiently entwined with the government
to bring its
action under the restriction of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 76
Facts:
A civil rights action alleging that the
plaintiff was suspended from his duties and
pay as
at hS Conservat °rio effective on January
.u
14, 1975
without
a prior hearing and because he is
a. Negro and/or Stateside American in
violation of his
rights to due process of law and of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, respectively.
A prayer is made for injunctive relief to stop the
defendant from unconstitutionally terminating plains employment and for compensatory and
punitive
damages together with costs and reasonable attorneys
fees.
Defendant answered the complaint and argues that
the termination of the plaintiff's employment without
prior hearing was carried out in accordance with the
pertinent school regulations and, therefore, was
legal.
All allegations founded on discrimination have
been denied.
The regultions governing disciplinary
proceedings at the Conservatorio de Musica provide
full due process protection for all employees prior
to involuntary termination of employment including
a prior hearing upon request.
The regulations also
provide that a professor may be suspended without
prior procedural guarantees if both the Dean of
Administration and the Dean of Studies consider it
advisable.
The defendants argue that the application
of this regulation was proper because "no student
wanted to enroll in the classes conducted by Professor
King and the fact that the hearings on the charges
would take more time, which would mean that there
would be no teacher for percussion during the semester
beginning in January was sufficient cause to take the
action of suspension."
4

1

—

Issues

:

1.
2.

3.

76

Does a tenured professor have a legal
right to a pre-termination hearing?
Is the plaintiff required to exhaust
his state remedies before going to the
Federal Court?
May a private beneficiary come within the
structure of the Fourteenth Amendment?

King v. Conservatorio de Musica de Puerto Rico,
746 (1974).
Supp.
378 F.
.
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Decisions

;

1.
2

.

3.

Yes.
No.
Yes.

Reasoning
(1) The Supreme Court has ruled that
public college professor dismissed from an office "a
held under tenure provisions has an interest in
continued employment that is safeguarded by due
process, and which includes the right to a prior
hearing."
(2) A Section 1983 plaintiff is not
required to exhaust the state remedies before coming
into the Federal Court:
the federal remedy is separate,
and it supplements the state remedy.
(3) The defendant
Conservatorio de Musica de Puerto Rico is a musical
teaching center at the University level subsidized
by annual appropriations by the legislature from
the Treasury of the Government of the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico.
Government financial support has
been held to bring a private beneficiary within
the strictures of the Fourteenth Amendment.
:

Chung v. Park held that a tenured professor's con-

tract may be terminated for incompetence. 7 7
Facts
U.S.C.

This is a civil rights action pursuant to 42
section 1983 which was instituted by a college
professor at Mansfield College who alleged that his
constitutional rights had been violated when he
was terminated at the school.
In a prior decision
the court held that the plaintiff was entitled to
tenure under the college's tenure policy. The court
then heard evidence on the issue of whether Dr. Chung
received "due process" under the Fourteen Amendment
to the Federal Constitution in the proceedings which
The Faculty Handbook sets
led to his discharge.
forth the procedures to be utilized by the college in
dismissing a tenured faculty member. The state claims
that is is immune from that part of the plaintiff's
claim which is based upon the embellishments to his
federal constitutional rights contained in the Faculty
The Commonwealth made a motion for summary
Handbook.
judgment in the immunity ground at the time of the
The Commonwealth also asserts
trial which was denied.
that when Chung accepted the type of hearing which had
been worked out by his attorney for the Commonwealth,
:

77

Chung v. Park, 377 F. Supp. 524

(1974)

.

.
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he waived his right to the type of hearing
which
was prescribed by the Faculty Handbook.
in any
event, the Commonwealth claims that the scope
of
the hearings received by the plaintiff was in all
respects in conformity with the requirements of
the due process" clause of the Constitution.
Dr.
Chung received an eight day hearing. No interest
in liberty such as free speech was involved.
The
hearing panel after an exhaustive hearing, clearly
found that Dr. Park's reasons for dismissal of Dr.
Chung were indeed motivated by the two factors
noted, intransigf ence and incompetence.

May a college use sovereign immunity
as a defense?
Did Dr. Chung have a "due process
hearing"?
Was there a breach of contract?

1.
2.
3

Decisions

:

.

1.
2.

No.
Yes.

3

Yes

.

Reasoning
(1) The defense of sovereign immunity
can be waived by a general appearance and litigation in federal court. The court had no hint that
the Commonwealth would indeed raise this defense
until the receipt of a letter dated March 27, 1974,
by the Deputy Attorney General Robert F Nagel several days before the hearing. No evidence was introduced on this issue at trial and legal argument
will not be entertained at this time.
(2) Contractual provisions can be waived expressly or impliedThrough the process of negotiation, Dr. Chung
ly.
made the conscious choice of obtaining a "due process" hearing which had some procedural aspects
which were different from those employed in a norThe burden of
mal tenure revocation proceeding.
proof rested upon Dr. Chung in his hearing. A
careful reading of the materials surrounding the
hearing afforded Dr. Chung has convinced the court
that the college came forward with all the evidence
necessary to establish that Dr. Chung's lack of competency and that Dr. Chung had the opportunity to
refute all the evidence presented. The hearing was
held prior to the effective date of his termina;

.

.
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tion of employment.
(3) There was no breach of
n
nsfield State Colle 9 e in failing^
to follow
fo^o„ the precise procedure of the
Faculty
Handbook as Dr. Chung did not
request that those
procedures be followed in his case.

Lf

A college librarian received

a

judgment for

a

one-

year renewal of her contract in
Barrett v. Eastern Iowa
C ommunity College 78
This was a case in which how does
one terminate a contract was an issue.
.

The court, for

colleges and universities ruled that the
college librarian
to whom statutorily required notice
that the Board of

Directors was considering terminating her
contract was
mailed with 65 cents postage due and who did not
receive
a second notice,

which was properly stamped, until three

days after the statutory deadline, did not receive timely

notice of her termination and thus her contract was

automatically renewed for an additional year.

79

Facts:

On May 15, 1970, plaintiff and defendant
entered into a written employment contract, under
which the plaintiff agreed to serve as libraian and
receive from the defendant $916.00 on the last
day of the month for 12 consecutive months starting on the last day of September 1970.
The term of
the employment was to begin on August 24, 1970 and
end on July 30, 1971.
Code section 279.13 in regard
to such contracts required the college by certified
letter to mail the notice of termination not later
than the tenth of April.
,

On March 25, 1971, the defendant's board of
directors decided that contracts for Marguerite
Barrett, librarian, and
be terminated effective
,

78

221 N.W.
79

Barrett v. Eastern Iowa Community College, Dist.,
2d 781

(1974)

Barrett v. Eastern Iowa Community College.

.
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at the end of the 1970-71
academic year and that
the board Secretary be directed
to mail letter
term iriate by March 26, 1971
and
letters of termination by April
10, 1971
as
prescribed by Chapter 279, Section 13
of'
the
Code
of Iowa.
The board Secretary on March
26, 1971
and by certified mail, with
attached, mailed to the plaintiff a proper stamps
"Notice of
Consideration of Termination of Teacher's
continuing contract." On April 6, 1971,
secretary of defendant's Superintendent the
typed letter of termination addressed to took a
the
plaintiff, Davenport, Iowa.
She testified that
When I came to the post office substation
at the
Schlegal Drug Store in Davenport, I had a 6-cent
stamp, which was required on it, and I told
the
lady at the substation what I wanted, and that
I
wanted the letter mailed Certified Mailing and I
paid for it and obtained a receipt. The receipt
of the substation was made out by the lady at the
post office substation." When the letter was
delivered to the plaintiff at her home in Clinton
it was stamped "Certified Mail" and "Postage Due
65 cents.
Another certified letter, with proper
postage attached, was mailed on April 13, 1971.
Defendant concedes the second mailing was not timely.
Following April 13, plaintiff was afforded a hearing
before the board.
It made no change of the termination action voted, without plaintiff's knowledge on
,

]

March
Issue

2

:

Decision

Was the contract legally terminated?
No.

:

Reasoning
(1) Statutory provisions specifically
require the college by certified letter to mail the
notice of termination not later than April 10. The
verb mail means: To place a letter or other mail
matter, properly enveloped or packaged, addressed
and stamped, in a mail slot, mail chute, or mail box,
provided by the post office department for reception
of mail, or to deliver a letter or other mail matter
so prepared to a postman or letter carrier employed
The trial court without the benefit
by the department.
of Flanders v. Waterloo Community College erroneously
applied the substantial compliance rule. Plaintiff
on the record made was entitled to a judgment declaring
:
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defendant had failed to give termination
notice
not later than April 10, 1971, and
therefore her
contract was automatically renewed for
another
year.

Another case arising out of retrenchment was
the
American Association of University Professors,
Bloomfield
College Chapter v. Bloomfield College 80
This
.

case

involved a collective bargaining contract as well as
a

personal contract.

The law of contract was applied

consistently in this case.
f^c^ts^
Action for declaratory relief and specific
performance in relation to the academic tenure of
faculty members at Bloomfield College.
Bloomfield
College is a private institution of higher education
licensed under the laws of the State of New Jersey.
Plaintiff is a labor organization within the meaning
of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A.
section 152, and for the purposes of Article I,
paragraph 19 of the 1947 New Jersey Constitution,
which has been certified and recognized by the
National Labor Relations Board as the exclusive
representative for collective bargaining on behalf
of the college faculty.
The individual plaintiffs
include faculty members who seek clarification of
their claimed tenured status and those services have
been terminated and seek reinstatement to their
former positions.
Their periods of accumulated
service range from 8 to 22 years.
In addition to
Bloomfield College, also named as defendants are
Merle F. Allhouse, president of the college, and
the individual members of the college board of trustees.
The legal basis for the claim of tenure is to be
found in the Faculty Handbook of the college under
the heading of "Bloomfield College Policies on
Employment and Tenure." This document forms an
essential part of the contractual terms governing
the relationship between the college and faculty.
Under paragraph C thereof tenure is a means to certain
ends, namely:
(1) freedom of teaching and research
.

on

American Association of University Professors
Bloomfield College, 322 A. 2d 846 (1974).

v.

)
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and of extramural activities anri (o\ = _ ccdegree of economic security to
make the profession
attractive to men and women of
ability
Tenure
(freedom and security) are
indispensable to the
success of an institution in
fulfilling its obliqations to its students and to
society.
Followinq a
d
Pe
f S6Ven YearS
which
a11 the
^? a° subparagraph C (3) provides:
plaintiffs completed,
'

a teacher will have tenure and
his
services may be terminated only for
adequate
cause, except in case of retirement
for age,
°r under extraordinary circumstances
because
of financial exigency of the
institution.
•

*

:

Fertinent also in subparagraph C
which provides:

(

6

of the "Policies"

Termination of continuous appointment because
of financial exigency of the institution
inust be demonstrably bona fide.
A situation
which makes drastic retrenchment of this sort
necessary precludes expansion of the staff
at other points at the same time, except in

extraordinary circumstances.

On June 21, 1973, the Board of Trustees adopted
Resolution R-58 which in material part resolved:

Upon the recommendation of the Executive Committee,
the President, the Dean of the College, and
with the advice of faculty size due to financial
exigency, and in accordance with the action of
the Board on March 1 and of the special
Evaluation Committeee for the reduction the
recommendation of the Academic Affairs
Committee that thirteen faculty members be
terminated in the reduction of faculty size due
to financial exigency, the following persons
be informed that they will be terminated as of
June 30, 1974, and their duties for the
1973-74 academic year be defined to include no
teaching, participation in College governance,
or voting privileges.

Defendant Allhouse on June 29, 1973, notified 13 members of the faculty that it was his "unpleasant duty
to inform you that the Board of Directors, at its

.
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eeting on June 21, 1973, took action
to
Y.ur services as part of the reduction of terminate
the faculty
size due to financial exigency."
On the same day,
all the remaining members of the
faculty, tenured
n
nU ed ™? re notified by letter memorandum
T
that at the June
21 meeting, the Board of Trustees
10n /°
effect that every faculty member
in°i/?
should
be informed that all the 1973-74 contracts
are one year terminal contracts." Between
June 21,
1973, and the commencement of the school year,
the
college engaged the services of 12 new and untenured
faculty members, defendants assert that they were
hired to replace others who were lost to the school
over a period of time as the result of "normal
attrition," not those who were terminated under
Resolution R-58.

J^ °r^

Issues

;

'

Did the action taken follow from a bona
fide belief on the part of the Board of
Directors in the existence of a financial
exigency?
Was there sufficient evidence of "exigency"?

1.

2.

Decisions

:

1.

No.

2

No

.

Reasoning
(1) The court held that the actions of
Bloomfield College with respect to the tenured status
of its faculty members in terminating the services of
some and placing others on one year employment contracts under the circumstances presented overflowed
the limits of its authority as defined by its own
policies, and therefore failed to constitute a legally
valid interruption in the individual plaintiffs'
continuity of service. Whatever other motivations
defendants might have had, they have failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that their
purposed action in good faith related to a condition
(2)
of financial exigency within the institution.
Further confirming the impression that the defendant's
primary objective was the abolition of tenure at
Bloomfield College, not the alleviation of financial
stringency, is their careful eschewal of other
obvious remedial measures such as across the board
salary reductions for all faculty members and the
reduction of faculty size by the non-renewal of contracts with teachers on probationary status, rather
:

1

1

.
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than the termination of those
who had
status by years of competent service. earned tenured
The reasons
of economy were used in a
subterfuge.
Therefore
tSnUred teachars i> held to
be

in^d?

^

Meetings of the minds" concept in the
law of
contract was the essence of Tobin v,
Louisiana State
~

Educatlon

"

8

Here, the court held that there cannot

-

be a contract unless the wills of the
parties coincide,

and even when there has been

unequivocal

communication

of consent in writing, obligations arising
from it still

may not be enforceable if the consent has been
produced
by some vice 82

Facts:
Suit for damages arising out of breach
of contract.
Judgment was for dismissal and the
plaintiff appeals.
In March 1969, the plaintiff
was employed teaching history at the Southern
University in Baton Rouge. Plaintiff was in his
sixth year of teaching and held the rank of Assistant
Professor.
In a conference with his department
chairman (Dr. Cobb), plaintiff told him’ that he intended to pursue a Ph.D. degree in history during
the academic year of 1969-1970.
On March 19, 1969,
Mr. Tobin wrote Dr. Cobb saying that he did not
plan to work at Southern during the 1969-1970
academic year.
Plaintiff applied for admission
to two graduate schools.
On or before May 1, 1969,
the plaintiff had either been rejected by both
schools or knew that he was going to be rejected.
After a short time the plaintiff received a letter
dated May 1, 1969. At the bottom of the letter was
a place for the plaintiff to indicate whether his
services would or would not be available to Southern
for the coming year.
Plaintiff did not sign or
return the letter.

Plaintiff testified that he had received
8

So.

Tobin

2d 823
82

v.

a

similar

Louisiana State Board of Education, 319

(1975)

Tobin v. Louisiana State Board of Education.

:
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th year before which he
had not returned
and that ?
he had eventually received
his contract*'
of employment.
in early August 1969, the
plaintiff
received a contract for the 1969-1970
school year
signed by the president of the
university.
The plain1
returned it to the university
within a few days.
in the middle of August
the
piaintiff testified that he had a
brief^eeiing
with Dr. Cobb at the post office at
Southern.
He testified that he told Dr.
Cobb that he had
S
Ved a contract
He could not remember Dr.
S
uS'i'
Cobb
s response.
Dr. Cobb had relinquished his
post as Chairman of the History Department
to Dr.
Moran at that time.
He had no recollection of the
meeting.
On September 5, 1969, the plaintiff called
Dr. Moran to inquire why he had not
been called to
return to work. The plaintiff testified that
he
was told that he would be placed on the registration
committee, but he heard nothing further.
Dr. Moran
testified that he told the plaintiff that he had
not been called because he was not expected to
teach during the coming year. On September 19,
1969, the plaintiff sent a telegram to the president
of the university asking if the university intended
to honor the contract of employment.
The Dean of
the College of Arts responded the same day, saying:
'

^^ ^

^

-

Appears contract missent through clerical
error.
Department Chairman indicated your
intention to return to school. Consequently,
no courses assigned you this fall.
Kindly
inform me of your plans for further study.

Plaintiff consulted counsel and entered this suit.
Plaintiff testified that had he not received the letter
of May 1, 1969, and the contract, he would have sought
employment elsewhere. He relied on the contract with
Southern University.
It is clear from the testimony
in the record that both the letter of May 1 and the
contract were sent in error. The plaintiff was not
expected to teach in the 1969-1970 academic year
and a replacement was obtained for him that year.
Issues

:

Did the plaintiff have a valid contract?

Decision
Reasoning

No.
:

Judgment Affirmed.

The court held:

125
It was clear from the evidence
offered that
U 1VerS t
SSnt thS contract to the
Dlaintiff h m istake
t v
and that it never intended
to offer
of fp^t-hp
the position to him.
since the plaintiff never advised the university
of any change
in his plans to further his education,
he must
have known that he was not expected
to teach
the 1969-1970 year.
His own consent to
contract was flawed. This was because when the
signed the contract, he knew or should have he
known that it did not represent the true intention of Southern University.
If the wills
of the party concurred in anything, it was
that
the plaintiff would not teach at Southern
during the 1969-1970 academic year. The court
went on to indicate that it is fundamental in
our law of contract that there can be no contract unless the wills of the parties coincide,
^"ticle 1766 of the Civil Code provides that no
contract is complete without the consent of both
of the parties.
,

m

Under evidence that the teaching professor was

appointed temporarily to the university, and that uni-

versity regulation allowed termination of temporary appointments at will, the university’s termination of

a

professorship without citing cause was within the terms
of the contract was a rule of law in Pryles v. State

O O
.

Facts
Claim is for damages arising from the alleged
wrongful discharge of plaintiff from his position of
Professor in the Pediatric Department of the state
Medical Center of the State University of New York
(School).
In 1965, plaintiff was hired to serve
jointly as the Director of Pediatrics at the Brooklyn
Jewish Hospital and Professor of Pediatrics at the
Medical School.
In addition to being in charge of
the hospital's pediatric department and the teaching
of pediatrics at the hospital to medical students
of the school, his professional duties would also
include supervising the other doctors teaching
:

83

Pryles v. State, 380 N.Y.S. 2d 628

(1975).

.
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pediatrics at the hospital. Plaintiff' ann „'
P
ment was temporary, apparently
because hi s salary
aid eX 1US1Vely by the hospital
?
and the school
wo,n5
ould not+ give
permanent appointment to proressors
professors
whose salaries it did not pay.
<=

t
e
d
dual ca P acit for seven
years
vears until
unfi? J;r
he was discharged by the y
hospital in
ovember 1972 because of dissatisfaction
performance of his administrative duties. with the
The school
was aware of plaintiff's problem with
the hospital
but did n°t object to his discharge.
On January 23,
1973, plaintiff wrote to the then president
of the
school requesting clarification of his
status with
the school indicating that he declined
to stay at
the schooi.
The president replied on February 26,
1973, that when the plaintiff's activities at the
hospital terminated, "it is my obligation to also
terminate your professorship." Plaintiff then
entered
this claim for damages for loss of wages, loss
of
reputation, and reinstatement.

Issue
Does plaintiff have
contract for breach?
:

Decision

a

cause of action in

No

:

Reasoning
The plaintiff's letter of appointment
clearly specified the appointment unequivocally stated
a temporary appointment was terminable at will.
The
representations which allegedly were made by the
employer are not only inadmissible to bind the
state because of their hearing nature, but they are
also immaterial.
There are no ambiguities (the
regulations are definite on the termability of
temporary appointments) and that rule proscribes the
use of prior oral representations to vary the terms of
the contract.
The court, therefore, finds plaintiff
only received a temporary appointment in 1965. By its
terms, said appointment was terminable at will by the
president of the school. The court further held
that prerequisites for a tenured continuing appointment were not present here and, therefore, such an
appointment could not rise by estoppel or otherwise.
:

Michigan College Federation of Teachers

v.

Lake

Michigan Community College involved rights of faculty who

^

.

.
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participated in a strike.
following rule of law:

This case brought forth
the

Due process liberty interests

are not implicated when a
teacher is charged with failure
to meet minimum standards
in his professional
relationship
with students.
C erS

:

communit

junior

Y
college and
fHflf
their union
unTnn brought
K
action against college board
trustees, college and the president
college for reinstatement with damages of the
after the
teachers had been discharged for allegedly
participating
an illegal strike.
The District Court
entered a temporary restraining order
which
vacated by the Court of Appeals. The United was
States
1S r
Court for the Western District of Michigan,
M
? i

m

Noel P. Fox, Chief Judge, granted remedial
relief
against the college and the college appealed.
Court of Appeals, Harry Phillips, Chief Judge, The
held
that
the circumstances of the case the striking
teachers did not enjoy the protection of the due
process clause in that teachers were not deprived
of a property interest or a liberty interest by
discharge; and that even if the teachers were
within the protection of the due process clause the
hearings to be conducted before the college board of
trustrees would not be procedurally deficient.

m

Issue:

Decision

Were plaintiff's due process rights violated?
No

:

Reasoning Where the only fact that community college
board of trustees would be called upon to decide was
whether a particular employee in fact participated in
illegal strike and board's sole objective in conducting
hearings is to assure that the innocent teachers were
not mistakenly identified as strikers, hearings on
discharges would satisfy the procedural due process
requirement of an impartial decision maker even though
college was the party against whom the strike was
directed
:

84

.

Michigan College Federation of Teachers v. Lake
Michigan Community College, 518 F. 2d 1091 (1975).
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Holstrop v. Board of Junior Colleges pointed
out
that even if the president of the Public Junior
College

deceived the board by the manner in which he submitted
the renewal of his contract, this fact did not
establish

that he did not have property interest subject to due

process protection.

Apart from the fact that had not it

been superseded, the earlier contract would have been in
effect at the time of termination.
was at most voidable for fraud.

The new contract

As there was a genuine

dispute on the issue of fraud, the president, asserting

denial of due process in connection with his discharge,
had a claim of entitlement that gave him

hearing.

a

right to a

This was true with respect to the issue raised

by contention that there was no meeting of the minds on

the new contract.

85

Facts
Plaintiff was appointed President and Chief
Administrative officer of Prairie State Junior
College in Chicago Heights by the defendants through
a series of contracts which extended his tenure unOn May 25, 1970, as part of his
til June 30, 1972.
official duties, plaintiff prepared a confidential
memorandum for circulation among his administrative staff which requested that the staff consider
certain proposed changes in the college's ethnic
studies program for discussion at the next staff
An unknown party made the memo public.
meeting.
Plaintiff, on July 13, 1970, was summoned to the
office of the Counsel of the board and told he had
The publithe choice of resigning or being fired.
the basis
as
mentioned
was
memorandum
the
cation of
fired
be
would
he
that
told
was
he
for firing but
that
charges
of
list
A
notification.
without
:

^Holstrop
569

(1975).

v.

Board of Junior Colleges, 523

F.

2d
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supposedly justified his termination was
given
him after his termination.
Plaintiff claimed
that the facts showed a deprivation of
his riqht
t0 f ee speec ^ and a denial of due
process
of law
j ^
and
his contract rights.
District court held for
the defendants.
Issue:

Were the First Amendment rights
violated?
Did plaintiff have a property right
in his job?
Was the Board empowered to make more
than a one year contract?
Did the plaintiff get a fair hearing?

1.
2.
3.

4.

Decision

1.
2.
3.

:

4

.

No.
Yes.
Yes.
No.

Reasoning
(1) The evidence indicates, and the District Court could properly have found, that the
board members were disturbed because a memorandum
proposing the repudiation of their commitment to
continue the ethnic studies program for another
year was withheld from them until the fortuitous
leak to the newspaper compelled its disclosure to
them, which occurred less than three weeks before
the date proposed in the memorandum for effectuations
of this highly controversial action; and this "timing
and concealment" rather than expression of views "in
the memorandum" constituted one of the reasons for the
board's action. The facts do not show a violation
of the plaintiff's First Amendment rights.
(2) Plaintiff had a claim of entitlement to his job even assuming he deceived the defendant by the manner in
which he submitted the form for the new contract.
Apart from the fact that the earlier contract covering
the period July 1, 1969 to June 30, 1971, would still
have been in effect if the new contract had not superThe new contract was at most voidable for
seded it.
So long as there was a genuine
fraud, not void.
dispute on the issue of fraud, plaintiff had a
claim of entitlement that gave him a right to a hearThe same is true as to the issue raised by the
ing.
contention that there was no meeting of the minds
assuming that issue to be analytically different from
(3) In 1927, the Illinois General
the fraud issue.
Assembly conferred on school boards the power to con:

"
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prlnclpals and
tor
for a oerLfl
nf three years after an superintendents
period of
expiration of
a two year period.
Thus, we think that the board
empowered to enter into contracts for a
duration of
longer than one year.
in the case at bar, the board
prior to the April 1970 election,
to
extend plaintiff's contract until purported
June 30, 1972 or
two years beyond its term. After the
mid-April election, the new board did not object to the
plaintiff's
new contract and permitted him on July
1, 1970, to
commence serving under it. This adoption of the
contract by the new board meant that plaintiff had
a valid contract at least through June
30, 1971.
This is so whether plaintiff was working under his
original (1969-1971) or his superseding (1970-1972)
contract. We also conclude under the enabling
statutes and the board s own rules adopted pursuant
to the statute, the board had authority to contract
with the president of the college for a period of
more than one year.
(4) The court stated "our review
of the evidence leaves us with the definite and firm
conviction that plaintiff was never offered a fair
hearing on termination, and that, in fact, the board
prejudged his case before making any hearing available
to him.

^

'

'

The court decided two rules of law relevant to

colleges and universities in Decker
College

They are:

.

(1)

v.

Worcester Junior

If a college drops a formal proce-

dure requiring that a faculty member be given notice as
of a certain date if he is not to be reappointed to the

faculty, the college can be bound to the terms of the

procedure;

86

and

(2)

The Executive Committee of the College

Board of Directors, in adopting "a policy of seeking to

establish probable enrollment for the coming year in
sufficient time to permit decisions to be made on faculty
needs, and to allow faculty contracts to be extended on or
8 6_

Decker v. Worcester Junior College, 336 N.E. 2d

909

(1975).

.

.

.
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about March

annually

1

f

"

had not adopted a policy to

effect that the reappointment of a faculty
member was
automatic unless he received notification on
or about
March 1 that he was not to be reappointed.^^
Facts;

College faculty members who were not reappointed brought a bill seeking determination that
they had been reappointed for another academic
year
because they had not received a lawfully effective
notice of the termination of their appointments.
The plaintiffs were reappointed in March 1972 to
the faculty of the defendant college for the academic
1971—1973.
Each had received and countersigned
annual letters of reappointment in prior years.
Allegedly, because of the college's financial
problems, neither one was reappointed for the 19731974 academic year.
They sue seeking a determination that they, in effect, had been reappointed for
another academic year because they had not received
a lawfully effective notice of the termination of
their appointment pursuant to an alleged policy and
practice of the college.
Issue:
Were the plaintiffs rehired for the 1973-1974
academic year?

Decision

No

:

Reasoning
The Executive Committee of the college's
Board of Directors adopted the policy of seeking to
establish probable enrollment for each coming year in
sufficient time to permit decisions to be made on faculty
needs.
This allowed faculty contracts to be extended
This policy does not
on or about March 1st annually.
contain a commitment to the plaintiffs or an assurance
of reappointment in the absence of notice to the
contrary
:

Under college and university's teacher's tenure law,

pursuant to which State Board of Education adopted regulations imposing a three year probationary period, and by
87

Decker v. Worcester Junior College.

.
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virtue of a special contract resulting from the
teacher's

accepting appointment as a university teacher, upon
affirmative representation that tenure was acquired after
three years of satisfactory probationary service, teacher

acquired tenure upon completion of such and was entitled
to all rights and privileges inherent in that status,

even though it was the practice to grant tenure only

upon the recommendation of the university president and
upon approval of the state board was the rule in State ex
rel Chapdelaine v. Torrence

8 8
.

Facts
Appellee (Chapdelaine) applied to Tennessee
State University for a position of Assistant Professor.
The Dean of Faculty, on May 27, 1966, notified in writing that he was being recommended to the
State Board of Education for employment effective
September 15, 1966. The Dean advised:
"The
University offers the faculty certain fringe benefits such as:
Teacher retirement, tenure after three
years of satisfactory service, group life and hospital
service, free admission to all University-sponsored
cultural and athletic programs and social security
benefits." Appellee relied upon this offer of appointment and their representations and accepted the
tenured position and received a letter from the Dean
finalizing his appointment. He was re-employed for
the next two years and completed his three-year probationary period in June 1969, and was employed for
His salary was also inthe school year 1969-1970.
Statute provided for tenure for a teacher
creased.
who has been employed by the Board and has served
The president of
for at least three school years.
period
probationary
the
thought
University
State
the
satisfaca
after
only
tenure
gave
and
years
five
was
tory probation period of five years.
:

Did Appellee acquire tenure under his conIssue:
tract of employment?
88

2d 542

State ex rel Chapdelaine v. Torrence, 532 S.W.

(1975)

.
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Decision

Yes.

;

Reasoning
Appellee accepted appointment in
reliance upon the affirmative
representation that
among the fringe benefits offered by
the university
was tenure after three years of
satisfactory service
This created a viable understanding
that satisfactory
service for three years would result
in tenure
status.
A college can create a contractural
relationship, independent of tenure laws,
which would
r SU t
n tenure.
Courts may apply the conventional
f
i
i of
standard
transactions in the marketplace to any
agreements reached by the unqualified acceptance
of an unqualified offer.
:

ihe terms of employment by contract is
property

interest which cannot be extinguished without conforming
to dictates of due process and this property interest
con-

sists not only of right of receipt of money under employ-

ment contract but also to hold the position in a maxim
law set forth by McClanahan v. Cochise College 89

Facts
McClanahan was a continuing education teacher
who was first employed as a full time classroom teacher
and subsequently as a Dean of Occupational Instruction.
His contract had been renewed for more than four
consecutive years of employment with Cochise College.
His contract for 1972-1973 was as Dean of Occupational
Instruction.
His total tenure at the college was in
excess of eight years. On June 9, 1972, he was given
until February 1, 1973 to resign as Dean of Occupational
Instruction.
On January 19, 1973, the governing board
of Cochise College gave him notice that his services
with the institution would be terminated.
In accordance with Policy 2019 of the College Manual and
Policy 2006 he requested a hearing. Prior to the
hearing set for April 1973, plaintiff's attorneys were
notified that the college would not allow faculty
witnesses to be called to testify in plaintiff's behalf
nor would a transcript of the hearing be made available.
Plaintiff brought an action in the U.S. District Court
which ordered a hearing before the Governing Body of
:

OQ

McClanahan
(1975)

.

v.

Cochise College, 540

P.

2d 744
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Cochise College.
The hearing was held and plaintiff was terminated for cause.
Issue

:

1.

2.

Decision

Whether the due process hearing must be
held prior to the termination of the
contract or can it be held post-termination?
Is a community college district a political
subdivision of the state?
1.
2.

;

Either.
Yes.

Reasoning
A term of employment by contract has been
recognized as a property interest which cannot be
extinguished without conforming to the dictates of
due process.
This contractual property interest
consists not only of the receipt of money under the
employment contract, but also of the right to hold
the position.
The court also said:
:

once it is determined that due process
applies, the question becomes what due
process is due? Due process if flexible
and calls for such procedural protection
as particular situation demands.

—

McLachlan et al., v. Tacoma Community College District No. 22 laid the precedent that Community College

teachers who knew they were hired on a full time basis
for one year to replace teachers on sabbatical leave and

who were employed under contracts in which they waived
"all rights normally provided by the tenure laws of the

state," validly waived their rights to statutory notice
of non-renewal of their one year contract, despite argu-

ments that public policy prohibited such waiver.

They also

validly waived their statutory right to converging of
evaluation committee to review their progress in their

135

progress in their teaching courses. 90
Facts
Four instructors, who were employed at
defendant community college, under part time
teachinq
contracts for the 1971-1972 school year, sued
seeking reclassification of their status to full
time
faculty appointees and enforcement of statutory
tenure rights.
Superior Court entered summary
judgment for defendant and dismissal of complaint.
Plaintiffs appeal.
;

Part A
Facts
Two plaintiffs, McLachlan and Wiseman were
employed by the college for the 1970-1971 school
year under full time teaching contracts. Their
contract provided in part:
:

This contract is written for one year only.
During that time, the employed waives all
rights normally provided by the tenure laws
of the State of Washington.

They taught during the 1970-1971 school year and
were not notified of any decision that their full
time contracts would not be renewed.
However, at
the time of contracting, they were told their employment was to replace full time instructors on
sabbatical leave.
In September 1971, McLachlan and
Wiseman were offered part time teaching contracts
for the fall of 1971 and later for the spring of
1972.

Issues

:

1.

2.

Decisions

:

Did McLachlan and Wiseman validly
waive their right to statutory notice
of non-renewal of their one-year
contract?
Did they validly waive their statutory
right to continuing evaluation?
1.
2.

Yes.
Yes.

Reasoning:
(1) Neither McLachlan nor Wiseman filled
Both knew
a vacant, full time teaching position.
who continued
faculty
replace
to
hired
they were being
90

McLachlan et al.,

Dist. No.

22,

541 P.

v.

2d 1010

Tacoma Community College
(1975).
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2° W

h lr tenured Positions while on
sabbatical
AA ?teacher may waive the statutory
notice provisions in advance of the notice renewal
date,
provided he knows the purpose of his employment
is
to replace the regular occupant of that
position
who is on a one year sabbatical leave. McLachlan
and Wiseman validly waived their rights to
statutory
notice of non-renewal of their one year contract.
We also see no serious reason why a probationary
(2)
faculty member should be prohibited from waiving
the benefit of a possible recommendation to tenured
status after an abbreviated period of teaching.
lp
leave.

Part B

Facts
Adams and Shelley were employed by the
defendant to teach under a part time quarterly
contract, in the 1970-1971 school year.
In the
1971-1972 year, they accepted contracts to teach
in excess of 10 hours per week in the 1971-1972
school year.
Interim, a collective bargaining agreement was signed by defendant which provided:
:

No faculty member who teaches more than
ten credit hours unless he replaces a
person for one year on a sabbatical leave.
A person who has taught more than ten hours
per quarter during the 1970-1971 year on a
part time basis is excluded from this limitation for 1971-1972 year only.

Plaintiffs claim this agreement is arbitary, irrational and unenforceable.
Is the collective bargaining agreement arbiIssue
trary, irrational and unenforceable?
:

Decision:

No.

The court found that the collective barReasoning
gaining contract enlarged the number of persons to
whom part time contracts could be offered and,
specif icially as to Adams and Shelley, preserved for
them the right to teach (and be paid for) a greater
number of hours than otherwise would have been
available to them. The court further held that: we
do not find that an instructor's contractual obligations under a full time contract are distinctly dif:

.

.

137
f erent f r ° m and greater
than an instructor's
obligations under a part time contract.

At the end of each yearly appointment,
assuming

proper notice, the school administration
could choose
not to renew college teacher's employment
for any reason
or for no reason other than for a
constitutionally im-

permissible reason such as race.

Even assuming a col-

lege teacher received a favorable tenure
recommendation

from his immediate peers in the faculty, Nace v, Oregon

State System of Higher Education held this did not create
any right to tenure under the statutory scheme, as

personnel decisions as to faculty members are made by
the Board of Higher Education and its subordinate offi-

cials

91

Facts
Petitioner appeals from a decision of the
State Board of Higher Education made by its subordinates, affirming the non-renewal of his
annual appointment to the faculty at the Oregon
College of Education.
Petitioner received a
series of three one year appointments to the OCE
faculty.
They were "yearly tenure" appointments.
They provided that the petitioner could not be discharged during the year except for cause, but did
not guarantee that petitioner's employment would
necessarily be renewed for following years. After
three years' employment, petitioner was entitled
to one year's notification that his employment
would not be renewed. At the end of the petitioner's
third year, college officials notified him that his
fourth year would be his last. Petitioner objected
A series of informal efforts to
to that decision.
mediate the dispute were unsuccessful. The Board,
through counsel, then afforded petitioner a formal
:

91

543 P.

Nace v. Oregon State System of Higher Education,

2d 687

(1975)

.

]

38

contested case hearing pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act, ORS Ch. 183.
The formal
was conducted before a subcommittee of
the Faculty Welfare Committee of the OCE
Faculty
Senate.
The committee recommendations were
generally favorable to petitioner. On review,
the college president's findings and conclusions
were all adverse to petitioner, the ultimate
conclusion was "the termination" of Dr. John B.
Nace as a faculty member of Oregon College of
Education is hereby affirmed."
Issue

:

1.

2.

Decisions

Reasoning

:

Does the Due Process Clause prohibit
the government from depriving citizens
of liberty or property?
If a faculty person receives a favorable
peer evaluation for tenure, does this
recommendation create any "right" to
tenure?
1.

No.

2

No

.

(1) All the Due Process Clause requires
in circumstances such as these, government
action be preceded by allowing the affected citizen
an opportunity to be heard.
The court indicated
that petitioner was heard thus, the possible existence
and extent of his alleged property interests are
now irrelevant, and (2) The court clearly indicated,
but assuming for the sake of discussion that
:

is that,

petitioner received a favorable tenure recommendation from his immediate peers on the faculty, this
Under the
does not create any right to tenure.
depersonnel
a,
scheme,
ORS
statutory
351. 070(1)
subordinate
Board
and
its
cisions are made by the State
officials in other words, the administration.

—

Statutory provisions that Regents of

a

university had

power to remove any officer connected with the university
when, in their judgment, interests required that it was

insufficient to justify discharge of the head football
coach from the university in absence of evidence that the

.

.

.
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coach was an officer of the
university was a holding
ln Feldman v. Regents of New Mexirn 92
.

Facts:

Plaintiff is a head football coach was
ischarged during his contract term.
He sued
five theories for recovery of damages.
When defendants moved to dismiss,
parties
sstipuiated that the motion to dismiss
be considered a motion for summary judgment.
Issue:

Decision

Is defendant entitled to a summary
judgment?

No

:

Reasoning
Absent a showing that the plaintiff
did or did not exhaust his administrative remedies
prior to this suit, the court held that the
defendants failed to make a prima facie showing
entitling them to summary judgment.
:

Contracts between board of regents of state

university systems and faculty members included relevant
state laws and consitutional provisions as they existed

when contracts were signed in a rule of law from Georgia

Association of Education

v.

Harris

93
.

Facts
This is a class action, under the 1871
civil rights statute, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to certain contracts
of employment between the Board of Regents of a
university of Georgia system and faculty members.
This action was filed by the Georgia Conference of
American Association of University Professors, the
Georgia Association of Educators, and certain
aggrieved faculty members of those associations
against the Board of Regents of the university
system of Georgia. The plaintiffs attack the announced
intention of the Board of Regents not to honor the
:

92

Feldman v. Regents of New Mexico, 540

93

Georgia Association of Education v. Harris, 403

P.

2d 872

(1975)

F.

Supp.

961

(1975)
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stated salary terms of the plaintiff's faculty
employment contract for the 1975-1976 academic
year as violative of the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Georgia Constitution. Defendants
moved to stay proceedings pending adjudication of
pending state court proceedings.
Issue

:

Decision

Should defendant's motion be granted?
Yes.

:

Reasoning
All of the substantial claims raised
by the plaintiffs arise from the alleged breach of
the employment contracts by the defendant Board of
Regents and the dimensions, interpretation and
construction of the subject employment contract is
a matter of state law.
Basic contract law dictates
that all contracts include relevant state laws and
constitutional provisions. The instant action is
in the state court, therefore motion granted.
:

Collins v. Wolfson was a case in which in a period
of retrenchment,

several Miami-Dade Community College

teachers were not rehired.
a

This action was to implement

reduction in the size in college personnel.

Question

arose in litigation as to whether or not the trustees of
the college made their decision of non-renewal in light
of their established criteria.

The court held that a

tenured teacher has the legal right to a due process hearing.

The purpose of the hearing would be to assure that

his position was in fact 'discontinued' within the meaning of the contract and,
a

if he was instead the victim of

'reduction in force' that the trustees made their

decisions pursuant to their previously announced cri-
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teria. 94
Facrbs:

Suit by seven instructors who
that their non-renewals were effected allege
pursuant
to an arbitrary and subjective set
of criteria
employed by the Board of Trustees in
determining
which teachers would not be rehired on
the
school's implementing a reduction in the
size
of personnel.
One of the four instructors charged
that his non-renewal was retaliatory in nature
punish him for participation in a well publishedto
demonstration at the Democratic National
Convention in July 1972. Two instructors charged
the arbitrary nature of the board's evaluative
criteria.
One claimed that he enjoyed the Miami—
Dade s genre of tenure, a "continuing contact" and
that this vested property interest was not
summarily defeasible by the board's couching the
termination as a "reduction in force" rather than
as a discharge.
In an amended complaint, three
additional instructors joined as plaintiffs
alleging that, although their employment was not
terminated, their constitutional rights were violated by a college official's depositing in their
files an uncomplimentary memorandum charging
neglect of duty for their unexcused absence from
campus on the morning of February 7, 1973, and inviting their response to these charges. The District Court dismissed the entire suit for failure
by all plaintiffs to state a claim for relief under
U.S.C.A. Sec. 1983.

Issues

:

Did the non-tenured faculty have a
legal cause of action?
Did the faculty person alleging genre
of tenure have a legal cause of action?

1.

2.

Decisions

:

1

.

2

.

No
Yes

Reasoning
(1) There is no mere conjecture that the
possibility that subjective standards could mask an
improperly grounded failure to renew. To bring
themselves within section 1983, they must allege
that the trustees' employing these criteria actually
operated in some manner to deprive him of presently
enjoyable First Amendment rights. The trustees'
:

^Collins

v.

Wolfson, 498

F.

2d 1100

(1975).
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failure to renew the contracts was not
any
wrongdoing, but simply that someone on the alleqed
had to go because of a necessary reduction faculty
in staff
size.
In fact, by definition, a reduction in
means that someone who otherwise would likely force
be
invited to stay must be relieved. Employing admittedly general criteria or guidelines is thus
confined to determining who among qualified instructors is more or less expendable, rather than
deciding who on the faculty has so misbehaved as to
warrant dismissal for cause. There is simply no
"stigma" or "badge of infamy" associated with this
sort of non-renewal.
(2) The tenured faculty person
should have been permitted by the court to establish
entitlement to such a hearing the purpose of which
would be to assure that his position was in fact
'discontinued' within the meaning of the contract
and, if he was instead the victim of a 'reduction
in force,' that the trustees made their decision
pursuant to their previously announced criteria.
,

In Busbee v. Georgia Conference A.A.U.P

held:

.

,

the court

Contracts which were entered into by Board of

Regents and faculty members at institutions of university

system after effective date of Act appropriating sum
for salary increases for university system personnel but

prior to the effective date of the appropriate Act amend-

ment eliminating such funds for salary increases, after
it became apparent that revenue estimate for fiscal year

was excessive, and which contained no provisions that

payments provided for were subject to reduction depending
on availability of funds, were valid contracts and were

binding on Board and any failure to make payment under such

contracts would constitute
Q C

2d 437

a

breach of contract.

95

The

Busbee v. Georgia Conference A.A.U.P., 221 S.E.

(1975)

.
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court further held that the Board of Regents of
the

University system of Georgia is

a

person in law, able

to sue and be sued and that it does not have
sovereign

immunity in a suit for breach of the express terms of
a contract which it is authorized to and has entered

into.

It also declares that the governor does not have

statutory authority to enter into faculty employment
contracts not to sue and be sued therein.
Facts
A suit for declaratory judgment instituted
by and on behalf of certain faculty members at
institutions of the University System of Georgia
seeking an adjudication that certain employment
contracts entered into by the Board of Regents
of the University System of Georgia are valid and
binding.
The defendants are George Busbee, Governor,
Johnnie L. Caldwell, Comptroller General, Gayden
W. Hogan, Director of the Fiscal Division of the
Department of Administrative Services and the Board
of Regents of the University System of Georgia and
its members.
The trial court ruled in favor of
the plaintiffs and the defendants appeal.
The
General Assembly met in regular session beginning
in January 1975 and enacted an appropriations Act
for the fiscal year commencing July 1, 1975,
appropriating almost two billion dollars based on
The
a revenue estimate of $1,823,000,000 plus.
the
that
Georgia Constitution prudently provides
fiscal
in
any
General Assembly shall not appropriate
revenue
in
year more money than it expects to collect
during the fiscal year plus that which it has on
hand in revenue sharing funds. The appropriations
Act for the fiscal year beginning in July 1, 1975
was approved by the Governor and became effective
It appropriated to the Regents,
on April 25, 1975.
among other purposes, $223 million for personal
services (salaries and wages) at its instructional
In addition, that Act appropriated
institutions.
$11,500,000 for salary increases for University
System personnel and approximately $44,500,000 for
:

:
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salary increases for certain other state
employees
such increases to commence September
1, 1975
Once the Governor approved the appropriations
the Board of Regents executed contracts with Act
many'
faculty members increasing their 1975-1976
salaries
over their 1974-1975 salaries by varying amounts.
When the Governor realized that the revenue estimate for FY 1975-1976 was excessive, he called a
special session of the General Assembly which met
from June 23-July 3, 1975. The General Assembly
amended the FY 1975-1976 appropriations Act by reducing it almost $125 million.
Included in this
reduction was the $56,000,000 state employee salary
increase provisions, including the $11,510,000 to
fund salaries.
Plaintiffs are faculty members who
received salary contracts between April 25, 1975,
the effective date of the original FY 1975-1976
appropriations Act, and July 3, 1975, the effective
date of the repeal of those increases. The Regents
announced that the plaintiffs and other faculty
members who received contracts containing salary
increases will not be paid those increases but
will be paid their 1974-1975 salaries.
.

Issues

;

Did the Board of Regents breach the
plaintiffs' contract for the 1975-1976
academic year?
Did the Amendments to the appropriations Acts which the General Assembly
enacted, impair the obligation of
plaintiffs' employment contracts?
Did the Regents' failure to honor the
plaintiffs' contracts violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution
of Georgia?

1.

2.

3.

Decisions

1.
2

.

3.

Yes.
No.
No need to decide.

Reasoning
(1) The court considering the merits noted
contract forms do not contain a
faculty
the
that
effect that the payments provided
the
to
provision
to reduction depending upon
subject
are
therein
for
as provided by the appropriafunds
of
the availability
The faculty emthereto.
Amendments
and
tions Act
April 25 and
between
into
entered
contracts
ployment
Regents and
upon
binding
and
valid
are
July 3, 1975
:
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that nonpayment thereof according
their written
emS constitute a breach ofto such
contract
(2) No economic necessity
vital to the interests
of the people
the state has been
shown to invoke such power as the sufficiently
state may have to
impair the obligation of its contract.

m

Dissenting Opinions

:

(Issue of Sovereign Immunity)

A ma i°rity of this court has held
tnat this litigation is controlled by
the 1785
statute and its predecessor Acts relating
to the
old corporation known as the Regents of
the University
System of Georgia and that because of those
Acts
e P resan t department of State Government
known as
*T
the Board of Regents of the University
System of
Georgia has no sovereign immunity,
I conclude that
the Board of Regents of the University System
is a
department of State Government with the same degree
of sovereign immunity as any other department of
State Government.'
'

.

_

A Central Virginia Community College teacher, who

was non-tenured, applied for a multi-year contract and

was denied the contract.

He criticized the report which

was the basis for the decision not to grant him tenure.
His criticism was misinterpreted as threats to various

college officials and he was dismissed.
Puryear

,

In Phillips v.

he won his suit when the federal district court

held that he had been denied procedural due process prior
to dismissal and was due his back pay.

The court also

held that no punitive damages would be assessed against
the defendants.

96

Facts
Plaintiff complains that his dismissal from
his teaching position as an Associate Professor of
Health, Physical Education and Recreation at CVCC
violated his constitutional right to procedural due
:

96

Phillips v. Puryear, 403

F.

Supp.

80

(1975).

.
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process of law and freedom of speech.
Issues:

1.
2.

Decisions

:

Was the college president impartial
plaintiff's adversary hearing?
Did plaintiff's dismissal violate
his
constitutional right to freedom of
speech?
1.
2.

No.
Yes.

Reasoning;:
This is not a case in which plaintiff's
contract was not renewed because of his failure
to
maintain good relations with fellow faculty members.
In this case, plaintiff was dismissed in the
middle
of a school year, and branded a 'substantial
threat
to the welfare of the institution' solely on the
basis of two brief conversations with fellow faculty
members
The speech which resulted in these severe
sanctions against plaintiff was a criticism of a
report which had stigmatized him. There is no doubt
that the plaintiff's rights under the Constitution
allowed him to criticize the report of the Ad Hoc
Committee and those persons who prepared it and
it is further clear that this criticism as such could
not be a basis for his dismissal and stigmatization.
The court found that the plaintiff's statements to
the two faculty persons were remarks and the later
personal reactions could not make them threats.
It
should be noted that in relief in this case plaintiff
was ordered reinstated in a teaching contract for
the current school year because he was dismissed
and stigmatized in violation of his constitutional
rights
.

On the basis of fraud, the court held,

"damages re-

coverable in action against community college district
board for negligent misrepresentation as to the source
of funding for teacher position were damages for any in-

jury which was the direct and natural consequence of fact
that the teacher who was not told that position which he

moved to Arizona from Alaska to accept, was specially

.

.
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funded, they acted on the faith of the district

board

s

representations and special funds ceased to be

available" in Van Buren v. Pima Community College

97
.

Facts
Husband and wife who resigned teaching
positions in Alaska and moved to Arizona so that
the husband could accept position there for the
1972-1973 school year brought action against
community college district board, alleging
that husband had not been told that his position,
which was not renewed when special funds were no
longer available, was dependent upon the existence of special funds.
Superior Court awarded
damages in amount of $3,000 and the plaintiff's
appeal asserting that the damages were inadequate and that punitive damages should have
been awarded.
:

Issue

:

Decision

Should the court award punitive damages?
No

;

Reasoning
The trial court could have legitimately
concluded that the losses allegedly incurred after
the 1972-1973 school year were the result of the
appellant's decision to remain in Arizona.
:

In Billmeyre v. Sacred Heart Hospital of the Sisters

of Charity,

Inc.

y

an

Instructor of Practical Nursing's

contract was held to be automatically renewed in the
absence of proper notice of non-renewal, even though the
school was funded by a federal grant subject to the

annual renewal.

98

Action for breach of an employment contract.
Facts:
The Circuit Court rendered judgment for the defendant
hospital and the plaintiff appealed. The Court of
^7

540 P.

Van Buren v. Pima Community College District,

2d 763

(1975)

^^Billmeyre v. Sacred Heart Hospital of the Sisters
of Charity, Inc., 331 A. 2d 313 (1975).

s

.

.
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Appeals held that there was testimony that the
hospital's School of Practical Nursing had been
furnished by federal grants routed through the
State Department of Education, and that funding
was for a one-year period and renewed annually,
the letter agreement whereby either party could
terminate the employment contract at the end of
the school year by giving notice in writing to
the other not later than May 1 of such year was
not tailored to meet realities of supportive program and, absent an ambiguity, could only be read
as meaning that the contract was automatically
renewed for a second year in the absence of notice.
The plaintiff's conduct, in whatever its form
could not be said to have justified her dismissal,
as permitted by contract, in accordance with the
hospital's personnel policy, in the absence of
evidence that an effort was made to terminate the
plaintiff's employment in a manner contemplated by
policy.
Plaintiff seeks to recover $10,037.48 in
damages for breach of contract. By letter agreement dated 15 October, 1972, Mrs. Billmeyre was employed as a Coordinator-Instructor in the hospital's
School of Practical Nursing.
Mrs. Billmeyre was on a 30-day leave of absence for
surgery in April-May, 1973, and on her return
received a letter written on 13 May from Sr. Mary
Agnes, the hospital's Director of Nursing Services
which indicated that Sister did not think it wise
for Mrs. Billmeyre to continue in the Practical
Nursing Program. The principal thrust of Mrs.
Billmeyre s argument is that the contract must be
construed as renewing itself for another year in
the absence of notice from either party prior to
'

1

May

Issue

:

Decision

Is the contract ambiguous?

No

:

The court indicated that the hospital
Reasoning
School of Practical Nursing had been funded by federal
grants, routed through the State Department of
Education, and that funding was for one-year periods
and renewed annually. The difficulty with the
letter agreement was that it was not tailored to
meet the realities of the supportive program. To
make it fit would require us to write a new contract
:

'
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for the parties, which we cannot do.

Where the probationary period for Associate

Professor was three years, at the beginning of the

plaintiff's full third year as Associate Professor of
History he was notified that he would be employed for
the fourth year but he was specifically informed that

the letter of rehiring was not a notification of

tenure and prior to completion of his third full year
he was notified that he would not be granted tenure and

that his employment would be terminated at the close
of his fourth year.

Re-employment for the fourth year

did not work an automatic grant of tenure, and hence,
the Professor complaining of the wrongful termination,

had no property right to continued employment, was the

holding in Kilcoyne v. Morgan

99
.

Associate Professor of History brought
Facts
suit against the University Board of Trustees and
others to recover for alleged wrongful termination
Both sides moved for summary judgment.
of employment.
The District Court held that where the probationary
period for Associate Professors was three years,
at the beginning of the plaintiff's full third
year he was notified of continued employment for
the fourth year but was specifically informed that
the letter rehiring was not a notification of
tenure and prior to the completion of his third
full year, he was notified that he would not be
granted tenure and that his employment would be
terminated at the close of the fourth year, reemployment for the fourth year did not work an
automatic grant of tenure and, hence, the plaintiff
had no property right to continued employment.
:

^Kilcoyne

v.

Morgan, 405 F. Supp. 828

(1975).

.

.

.

'

:
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Issue

Did the plaintiff acquire tenure?

:

Decision

No

:

Reasoning
Plaintiff had clearly not completed
the probationary period requisite to receiving
tenure when he was notified of his dismissal.
There is no provision in the Faculty Manual that
no faculty member can be employed without tenure
beyond the expiration of his probationary period.
Paragraph G of Section I of the Appendix B states
'Appointments without tenure are probationary.
The plaintiff, therefore, has never had tenure and
has no property right.
The court further found no
requirement in the Faculty Manual to continued
employment
:

In Green v.

Richmond

law of contract was held:

,

the following concept of the

where there is no conflicting

evidence as to the terms of the oral contracts, construction of those terms is a matter of law for the judge

rather than the jury.^^
Facts
An action in the nature of quantum meritum
against the personal representative of the estate
of decedent to recover for services rendered by
the plaintiff in reliance on the decedent's oral
promise to leave a will bequeathing his entire
estate to her. The Superior Court entered judgment
for plaintiff and defendant appeals.
:

Issues

:

Was the oral agreement illegal on the
theory that it included sexual intercourse or cohabitation as part of the
consideration?
Should a preliminary showing of reliability have been required before
the amount of inventory?

1.

2.

Decisions

100

:

1.

No.

2

Yes

.

Green v. Richmond, 337 N.E. 2d 691 (1975).

.

151
Re asoning
1
The oral agreement
promise to make a will, and as such involved a
was not
d
H ° wever
if the oral agreement was
legal
^nd
and no?’
not contrary to public policy,
the olaintiff
h
fair
of her services.
From
the totality of^ the evidence, the
jury was warranted
inferring that the illicit relations were
not
r
f the P laintiff 's performance.
P
(2) The value
2
^u°
°
the estate is relevant.
The court indicated
tnat at the same time it recognized the
great
tiality for unfair prejudices even if the
P t
value
?
??
of the estate were accurately shown.
The likelihood
of irremediable unfair prejudice would
be greatly
increased if the value of the estate was substantially
overstated. A preliminary showing of reliability
was
required before the amount of the inventory, which
may or may not have been reflective of the value of
the estate, was disclosed to the jury. While in
most cases the requirement of fairness would be
met by the fact that the defendant had the opportunity
to prevent rebuttal evidence.
This is not the case
here
:

(

)

'

\

m

Plaintiff Blouin, in Blouin v. Loyola University
claimed that his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights

were infringed upon when defendant did not renew his
teaching contract.

The issue in this case was were various

alleged state involvements by the university sufficient
to support a finding of "state action."

The court held

that the alleged state involvements by the university were

insufficient to support a finding of "state action" and
therefore the court did not have jurisdiction under
Civil Rights laws.^

01

Appellant brought suit for damages against
Facts
Loyola University (Loyola) and certain of its
officials, claiming that his First Amendment right
of free speech and Fourteenth Amendment right of
:

101

Blouin v. Loyola University, 506

F.

2d 20

(1975).

.
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due process had been infringed when the defendant
university refused to renew his teaching contract.
The district court granted Loyola s motion for
summary judgment and dismissed the suit on the basis
that Loyola was not clothed with state action and
that the court had no jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
1331.
Appellant alleges certain facts which he
contends result in the requisite "state action."
He asserts that Loyola is the sole owner and
operator of a radio station and a television
station which are licensed under the Federal
Communications Act of 1934 and are subject to its
regulatory provisions. Additionally, appellant
points out that Loyola, as a private, non-profit
corporation, enjoys certain federal and state tax
exemptions. He claims that it receives substantial
federal and state monies in the form of grants,
subsidies, student scholarships, and loans. Appellant
suggests that a finding of state action would be
justified by the fact that Loyola is a corporation
organized and incorporated under the laws of the
State of Louisiana.
'

Issue
Were appellant's rights to due process and
free speech infringed upon when his contract was
not renewed?
:

Decision

:

No

Reasoning: Although university, against which
teacher brought suit, claiming university refused
to renew his contract, owned and operated a radio
station and television station which were licensed
under Federal Communications Act, although the university as a private, non-profit corporation, enjoyed
federal and state tax exemptions, although it received federal and state money, and although it was
organized and incorporated under Louisiana law,
those factors were not of the nature, kind or degree
necessary to support a finding of "state action," and
federal jurisdiction did not exist. The licensing
of an otherwise private entity by the government
does not, of itself, require a finding of state
Furthermore, the record does not disclose
action.
any "nexus" between the alleged unconstitutional
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activity and the purported federal
and state
g over nm ent involvement.
Accordingly, the order
of the district court dismissing
the complaint
^
is affirmed.

Where a letter which was sent by the
chairperson
of the Department of Otolaryngology at
the Medical School
to a physician, concerning the possibility
of the

physician joining the staff of the medical school
made
reference to the "Promotion and Appointment Committee"
which would have to approve any hiring suggested by the
chairperson, the "best offer" made in the letter from
the chairperson was not the type of an offer which the

physician could accept in such

a

manner as to form a

binding contract, but rather it was merely

a

recommenda-

tion which the chairperson would pass along to the

appropriate committee, was the rule of law in Jacobsen
v.

.
Leonard.
r

102

Facts
In the fall of 1971, the plaintiff received
a telephone call from Dr. Leonard, chairperson of
the Department of Otolaryngology at Jefferson, regarding the plaintiff's availability to join the
staff of Jefferson, in that department. Plaintiff
who was a citizen of the State of Colorado, expressed
interest in the position.
By a subsequent letter,
he made arrangements to visit the Jefferson facilities
He was to
in Philadelphia on December 18-21, 1971.
subvisit
meet personally with Dr. Leonard. The
plaintiff
the
sequently took place during which time
and Dr. Leonard discussed the particulars of the
position, the salary range, academic title and
general hiring and promotional policies at Jefferson.
On December 29, 1971, Dr. Leonard wrote the plaintiff
and offered him the position of Chief of Audiology
:

102

Jacobsen v. Leonard, 406

F.

Supp.

515

(1976).
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S
Dir * Ct ° r of the Hearing and
Center at
ir?h«
the rank of Assistant Professor Speech
The
starting sa larywas to be $18,000
per year.
Plainn hlS re P 1 y letter expressed
disappointment
fu
i
with Dr. Leonard's offer and stated
that he
n0t
ly t0 bSgin aS the Chief of Audiology,
hn^?L
^
but
also as 2?
the director
of the Hearing and Speech
Center and at the Associate Professor
level.
Dr. Leonard then offered the
plaintiff, by a letter
dated January 13, 1972, the same position
and
starting salary as stated in the December
29th
but at the higher rank of Associate Professor, offer
and
the opportunity to become the director of
the
Hearing and Speech Center at a later time if
plaintiff's interim performance was satisfactory.
On
January 18, 1972, plaintiff accepted Dr. Leonard's
latest offer and proceeded to make arrangements to
move to Philadelphia, which included the sale of
his house and termination of his employment in
Colorado.
By letter dated January 31, 1972, Dr.
Leonard rescinded his offer for the reasons that
the majority of the staff of the Hearing and Speech
Center opposed plaintiff's joining the staff under
the terms contained in the January 13, 1972, letter,
and that the rank and promotion steps contained in
that letter would find little support at the level
of the office of the Dean of the medical school.

Issue
Did the court err in not granting a motion
for directed verdict?
;

Decision

Yes.

;

Reasoning
There is no question that Dr. Leonard did
not have expressed or implied authority to enter
into binding employment contracts on behalf of
Jefferson.
The plaintiff did not attempt to prove
his case on the merits of such authority.
Plaintiff
did, however, contend and attempt to prove thoughout
the trial that Dr. Leonard had apparent authority
to enter a binding employment contract.
While it
may be true that the plaintiff subjectively believed
that it was not possible for the appointment committee
to turn him down, he is nevertheless charged with
the knowledge that Dr. Leonard did net possess final
hiring authority. Thus, it held that the plaintiff
had knowledge that further steps of approval were
In light of this knowledge,
required before hiring.
;
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plaintiff could not have relied
upon the apparent authority of in qood faith
Dr.

Re-appointment in

a

Leonard.

non-tenured status, or back

pay in lieu of re-appointment, was
the appropriate remedy
for failure to give timely notice
of re-appointment to
a non-tenured instructor who had
been employed by the

university for more than two years was held
in Simon
103
Boyer

v.

.

Fact_s:

Petitioner was employed as an instructor
the Department of Physical Education for Men
at
the State University of New York at Buffalo from
1965 to 1969.
On July 1, 1969, he was appointed
to the position of assistant professor of physical
education and served in that capacity until June
1972.
In the summer of 1971, just prior to the
commencement of petitioner's seventh year of
university service, his employment record was
reviewed by the President's Board on Faculty Promotion
and Tenure which recommended to the Chancellor of
the State University that petitioner be denied tenured
status and that his employment be terminated at the
end of the next academic year.
Because petitioner
had been employed by the university for more than
two years, he was entitled to twelve months' notice
that he was not to be reappointed, but such notice
was not given petitioner until December 21, 1971.

m

Petitioner thereupon commenced a grievance proceeding
under the collective bargaining agreement in effect
between the university and its professional employees,
contending that because he was not timely notified
of his termination he was entitled to be reappointed
for another full academic year commencing in September
1972 and that such reappointment must carry with it
an automatic conferral of tenure under 8 NYCRR 355.4(b).
The grievance proceeding culminated in arbitration,
under a broad stipulation of power in the arbitrator,
and an award was made directing that petitioner be
reappointed for an additional academic year but without
tenured status. Throughout these grievance proceedings petitioner urged that under the terms of the
collective bargining agreement and the stipulation
103

Simon v. Boyer, 380 N.Y.S. 2d 178 (1976).

.

.
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the arbitrator was empowered to
award him tenure
Pr ° Priate remedy
Petitioner commenced this
proceeding as an action for declaratory
judgment
seeking a determination that the
arbitrator was
without power to grant him tenure under
the collective bargaining agreement and ordering
that
tenure be conferred upon him notwithstanding
the
arbitrator's award.

^n"l^

*

Issue:
Should tenure be conferred under his
contract?

Decision

No

:

Reasoning
Reappointment in non-tenured status, or
back pay in lieu of reappointment, is the appropriate
remedy for failure to give timely notice of reappointment in this situation. Petitioner's appointment
additional year did not grant him tenure
rights.
Tenure may not be conferred by a back-door
maneuver.
Furthermore, by attempting to enforce
provisions of the collective bargaining agreement
so as to confer power upon the arbitrator to award
tenure, petitioner elected his remedy and cannot
later be heard to repudiate the same terms and
contend that such power was not conferred. For purposes of the doctrine of election of remedies, inconsistent remedies are those which proceed on opposite
and irreconcilable claims of rights.
The test is
whether the facts necessary to support one remedy
are consistent with the facts necessary to support
the other.
:

A community college teacher whose employment was

terminated because of her exercise of First Amendment
rights of free speech and free press was entitled to

specific performance even though her contract was one for

personal services was the holding in Endress v. Brookdale
104
„
Community College
.

Plaintiff is a discharged community college
Facts
teacher who had served as a faculty advisor to the
:

*-

2d 1080

04

Endress v. Brookdale Community College 364

(1976)

A.

:

:
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college s student newspaper.
she brought a civil
rights action against the college and
and members of the Board of Trustees. its president
Plaintiff
e an edlt °rial which a
PPeared
in
the
April 26,
Vq 7 i
the student newspaper of
° f thS Sta11
l
which she was the faculty advisor.
it accused the
chairman of the Board of Trustees of a
conflict of
interest in allegedly "making a deal" whereby
his
nephew s company received a contract from
the colleqe
or the furnishing of audio-visual equipment.
president in recommending plaintiff's dismissal The
asserted as the alleged causes for such action,
her
violation of "both the tradition established under
board policy and the philosophical platform and
goals of the college as the same pertain to freedom
of the press and student responsibility for the
college
newspaper," and of the "editorial prerogative of the
student editor and the student staff," in ordering
and directing the editor of the newspaper "to publish
certain material without his approval" and "in causing
the publication of libelous material contrary to
accepted journalistic standards." The Superior Court,
Chancery Division, entered judgment in favor of the
plaintiff and awarded compensatory and punitive
damages and attorneys' fees and defendant appealed.
'

Issues

Did the evidence sustain finding that
the teacher had been terminated for
exercise of First Amendment rights?
Should college officials have known
that termination for that reason violated
the teacher's First Amendment rights
so that qualified immunity could not be
asserted?
Could college officials assert qualified
immunity with respect to the contention
that they should have known that
termination without a hearing violated
due process rights of the teacher?
Could punitive damages be awarded against
the president?
Were the compensatory damages excessive?

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

Decisions

1.
2

.

3

.

4.
5.

Yes.
No.
No.
Yes.
Yes.
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Reasoning
(1) The court found that there is
no
proof
this case that the plaintiff's activities
led to a material or substantial disruption
of class
W r 0r
a substantial disorder or to the
invasion
l!u
$
^°i.
of the rights of others.
The court said it "perceived
no countervailing public interest which
would -justify
a restriction of plaintiff's First
Amendment
activity."
(2) Lack of intent on the individual
defendant's part (except President Smith) to violate
plaintiff s constitutional rights would not necessarily
be a defense, if they should have known that their
conduct would have that effect. The court said that
it cannot be said that the individual defendant
reasonably should have known then that their action
would violate a clearly established constitutional
right of plaintiff to a procedural due process, i.e.,
the right to a hearing.
(3) The court pointed out
that careless disregard or negligent ignorance of
clear, well established constitutional rights will
not insulate the defendants from liability. The sum
of $2,500.00 as punitive damages in the case of President Smith is a sufficient penalty to impose upon him
for his wrongful conduct and as a deterrant against
such action in the future.
Punitive damages are
"allowed to punish the wrongdoer for a willful act
and to vindicate the rights of a party in substitution for personal revenge thus safeguarding the public
peace." Taking into accord the absence of proof of
any significant emotional effect upon the plaintiff
as the result of the action taken and considering
factors referred to above, the sum of $2,500.00 will
fairly and adequately compensate her for the deprivation of her civil rights.

m

:

Under the circumstances in Anapol v. The University
of Delaware

,

the court held that a college professor's

confession of forgery did not eliminate the necessity
for pre-termination procedural protections.

105

Plaintiff was employed by defendant from
Facts
In the fall of 1974,
1960 through December of 1975.
At this
he attained the rank of Associate Professor.
time, he submitted a dossier to the Promotion and
:

''^Anapol v. University of Delaware, 412
675

(1976).

F.

Supp.

.
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enure Committee of his department in
support of his
application for promotion to rank of Full
Professor
Among th e publications in Dr. Anapol s
dossier
was
a photocopy of an article written
by him for a publication cal led the Barrister
The masthead at thetop
irst P a 9 e of this article contained the
heading
Trial fLawyers Association" beneath its title
logo.
The application for promotion was not granted.
Durinq
the fall of 1975, plaintiff Anapol again
submitted his
dossier for promotion and this time periodic faculty
evaluation. The dossier again contained the article
in barrister
but this time the volume number and date
were missing.
Investigation proved that plaintiff had
forged a letter, purportedly from a Philadelphia
attorney, praising the Barrister
It was also found
that Dr. Anapol had not been candid when questioned in
the course of this investigation by his department
chairman.
Dr. Berten (Department Chairman) set forth
these conclusions in a memo. The ultimate result was
that, effective December 31, 1975, Dr. Anapol was
terminated for cause pursuant to a December 17, 1975
letter of Dean Gouldner (falsification of documents)
Dr Anapol sued and his motion for a temporary restraining order was denied on December 29, 1975.
The motion
for preliminary injunction was merged with the merit
of Dr. Anapol 's procedural due process claim and this
case was tried in the court on January 23, 1976.
'

.

,

.

.

.

Issue
Whether the Due Process Clause guaranteed to
Anapol procedural safeguards which he was not
awarded?
;

Dr.

Decision

Yes.

:

Reasoning
Dr. Anapol was not accorded the pretermination procedural due process to which he was enThis does
titled.
He must be reinstated with back pay.
not mean the university cannot hereafter terminate
Dr. Anapol 's employment based on the events which gave
rise to this litigation, provided adequate procedural
If such charges are resafeguards are afforded him.
instated against him and processed with reasonable
alacrity, the university if it determines suspension to
be in its best interest, need not return Dr. Anapol to
the classroom or campus pending final disposition of
those charges.
;

;

-

.
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What is of interest to this research is the
fact
that the court in its decision went on to point
out the

reason that it could not honor

a

plea of the defendant in

relation to the collective bargaining agreement was due
to the ambiguous terms of the contract.

Implicit in Skehan v. Board of Trustees of Blooms
berg State College

,

was the rationale that termination of

a contract is an event which solidifies positions in the

inference that a professor, after notification of the

opportunity to prepare and fully present his side of the
case prior to that event.

Skehan

'

s

minimum requirements

at the pre-termination stage:
(1)

clear notice of the charges being considered;

(2)

a

(3)

an explanation of the substance of the evidence
supporting the charges, and

(4)

an opportunity to present his side of the case
in a manner which will permit the decision maker
to weigh both sides.

reasonable time interval to marshall facts and
evidence

Plaintiff was terminated during his contract
Facts
term on the grounds that he had failed to fulfill his
"classroom obligations" and "had flagrantly, wilfully
and maliciously disrupted the instructional program."
He was notified in writing of those charges by the
president of the college on October 9, 1970, and given
:

106

Skehan v.

College, 538,

F.

Board of Trustees of Bloomsberg State

2d 53

(1976)
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an opportunity to respond in writing
within five
days.
On October 23, 1970, the Trustees
terminated
his employment effective October 17.
On December 1,
1970, the Committee on Academic Affairs was convened
to hold a hearing concerning dismissal.
The court
held that the professor was entitled to a pre-termination hearing and that the December 1 post-termination
hearing did not meet the requirements of due process.
Judgment for plaintiff with minimal damages, plaintiff
appeals.
Remanded from the Supreme Court to the
United States Court of Appeals for an opinion.

Issue:
Is the plaintiff entitled to an award of
attorney's fees under the theory that he had acted as
a "private attorney general"?

Decision

Dependent on Facts

:

— Case

Remanded.

Reasoning
The theory upon which it was suggested that
the district court could award attorneys' fees the
private attorney general theory has been foreclosed by
Alaska Pipeline Service Company v. Wilderness Society
and the obduracy ground was not previously considered.
We reward this aspect of the case to the district court
for additional findings on the obduracy issue.
The
court went on to vacate its prior judgment and that of
the district court and remanded the case for finding
of fact.
The court clearly indicated that if Skehan's
only contract right expired by its term at the end of
the 1970-1971 academic year, and there was no First
Amendment violation, a back pay award against the individual defendants, covering the 1970-1971 period, must
be considered.
:

—

—

Reassignment of the college president's assistant
for community affairs to the position of "Acting Associate,

Office of the Vice President for Planning and Development"
was within the District of Columbia's Board of Higher

Education's discretion to assign duties to such person under

employment

contract

which required him to perform all duties

assigned to him by the president or the board was a legal

9
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determination in Robertson

v.

District of Columbia Board

Board of Higher Edu ration 107
Facts:
l

Appellant was employed at Federal
City

Colleqe
9
r ° m July 1970 t0 June 30
1973.
'
On June 9
Je
tered
into a one year employment contract
®^

q7
•

with Appeliee Board of Higher Education,
signed by
the president of FCC.
The contract was to serve as
the Assistant to the President for
Community Affairs
n JU Y
1972 and to terminate on
1
o July
!
June 30, 1973.
On
28, 1972, the
FCC was relieved of his duties and Dr. president of
Elgy Johnson
was later named acting president. The
employment
tract incorporated a memorandum of understanding conpermitted the president of FCC to terminate or which
modify
the contract for acts detrimental to FCC,
but only "in
accordance with established policies and procedures
of the Board of Higher Education."
Appellant agreed in
the contract to "undertake and perform those duties
assigned to him by the President or the Board of Higher
Education." Suit was brought by the Appellant against
the District of Columbia Board of Higher Education for
equitable relief and actual, compensatory and punitive
damages on theory that the board had breached plaintiff |s one year employment contract to serve as college
president's assistant for community affairs by withholding paychecks, by reassigning him to the position of
"Acting Associate, Office of the Vice President for
Planning and Development," by willfully and maliciously
denying him a step increase in salary, and by willfully
and maliciously failing to renew his contract.
The
Superior Court awarded plaintiff the amount of one withheld check, but otherwise found in favor of the
defendant.
Plaintiff appealed.
*

Issue
Did appellant prove
contract?
:

Decision:

a

breach of his employment

No.

Reasoning
The appellant did not establish either a
breach of his employment contract or an intentional
tort or constitutional deprivation on the part of the
appellees.
Each event appellant argues to be an adverse
action is authorized or allowed under the terms of the
:

107

Robertson v. District of Columbia Board of Higher
Education, 359 A. 2d 28 (1976).

.
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contract itself either expressly
or
Appellant agreed in the contract to impliedly.
perform all
S as Slgned to him by the
president
or the
hoard
D
of .5PP ellan t from his position
arasiistan^^Tvf^
assistant to the president thus falls
appellees discretion to assign duties to within
appellant
The contract did not provide for step
increases or
automatic renewal.
Appellees agreed to pay appellant
a fixed salary for his one year
contract, which was
done, and appellees agreed to give appellant
notice of nonrenewal of his contract, which 90 days'
also was
done.
Appellees' actions in these respects did not
breach their contract with appellant, but rather
were
accord with that contract.

m

In the case of Bruce v.

the Board of Regents for the

Northwest Missouri State University
a

,

the court ruled that

non-tenured state university faculty member, who had

a

written contract which provided for sabbatical leave and
required him to serve at least two more years on faculty,
had a legitimate claim of entitlement to benefit of his

sabbatical leave contract.

This benefit constituted a

"property interest" within the meaning of procedural due

process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Therefore,

Bruce had a constitutional right to a hearing to provide

him with the opportunity to vindicate his claim to that
^
interest

108

Facts
Plaintiff, from September 1966 through
the 1970-1971 academic year, held a one year employment contract as an instructor in the Speech DepartIn
ment at Northwest Missouri State University.
sabbatical
a
for
applied
September of 1969, plaintiff
leave to work on his Ph.D. during the 1971-1972 academic year. On September 8, 1970, the defendant
:

108

Bruce v. Board of Regents for Northwest Missouri
State University, 414 F. Supp. 559 (1976).
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"rote plaintiff advising him that
the defendant Board approved plaintiff's request
for a sabbatical
71 " 1972 "anemic year with leave
paj
of
ofs4
500 for i2
$4,500
the purpose of permitting plaintiff
to
continue his education toward the degree
of Ph D
° f Nebraska
The university ‘regarded
the documents and resolution concerning
plaintiff's
sabbatical leave as a 'sabbatical contract.'
ber 1969 plaintiff was made Acting Chairman in Octoof
Speech Department and in November 1969, he was the
promoted to Assistant Professor effective February
1,
1970.
Robert Bohlken, the new chairman of plaintiff's
department, polled the tenured members of the departand received a unanimous vote in favor of
recommending plaintiff for tenure. Chairman Bohlken
endorsed this recommendation in a letter sent to the
Dean of Faculties on September 21, 1970.
Interim,
Bohlken and plaintiff had strong differences of
opinions
In October 1970, Bohlken obtained a return
of the tenure recommendation he forwarded to Dr. Small
on September 21, 1970.
He also prevailed on Dr.
Folsom, another member of the department to change
his vote.
He then placed himself in a position to
break a tie vote, did so, and advised Dr. Small on October 20, 1970 of the result of the "second" tenure vote.
A "second" tenure vote was not provided for in the
Handbook.
He did not give plaintiff written notice
that he recommended that plaintiff should not receive
tenure.
By November 12, 1970, the faculty in-fighting
was so bad that Bohlken formally requested Bruce's
termination effective June 1971. The defendants
approved the "second" tenure vote and voted not to renew Bruce's contract effective May 14, 1971. This vote
was amended to read effective December 22, 1971.
The
Board also resolved in the same November 23, 1971
resolution that it rescinded the leave of absence
granted Bruce for the 1971-1972 academic year.
-

,

.

Issue Did plaintiff have a legal right to procedural
due process in regard to his sabbatical leave contract?
:

Decision:

Yes.

The court held the test for determining
Reasoning
whether a person's interest in a benefit must be
considered a "property" interest within the meaning
of the Fourteenth Amendment by stating that:
:

.

.
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person s interest in a benefit is a
interest for due process purposes if property
are such rules of mutually explicit there
understandings that support his claim of
ment to the benefit and that he may entitleinvoke
at a hearing.
Controlling guidance in how to
apply the test is stated as followsA written contract with an explicit
tenure provision clearly is evidence
of a formal understanding that supports
a teacher's claim of entitlement to
continued employment unless "sufficient"
cause is shown. Yet absence of such an
explicit contractual provision may not
always foreclose the possibility that
the teacher has a property intrest in
re-employment.
Roth (408 U.S. 601)
In Goodyear v. Junior College District of St.

Louis, the court applied basic concepts of the law of

contract when it held:

"when an individual seeks to

work for a school district without complying with requirements of statute requiring all contacts to be in
writing, he does so at his own risk."

In interpreting

statutory requirements the court further said-

'require-

ments of a statute requiring school districts to make
all contracts in writing are mandatory and not

directory.
.

merely

109

Plaintiff sued defendant to recover in
Facts
quantum meruit for services performed for the
Plaintiff did not have a written
school district.
contract.
The Circuit Court of the City of St.
Louis dismissed the actions and plaintiff appealed.
:

109

540 S.W.

Goodyear v. Junior College Dist. of St. Louis,
2d 621

(1976)

.

,
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Issue:
Does plaintiff have
quantum meruit?

Decision

:

a

course of action in

No

T e
Urt quoted Section 432-070
£
K° states 'No
R.S.MO 1969 which
school
make any contract unless the same distr ict--shall
shall be in
W 1 1 g
It held that the requirements of
this
f
?
^
statute are mandatory and not merely
directory
Therefore, the court reasoned 'that the
statute requiring all contracts with school districts
writing precluded recovery against school to be
district
on quantum meruit or any theory of implied
contract:
and that plaintiff could not recover
even though
school districts are authorized by statute
to sue
and be sued.
The court went on to indicate that
by statute, a County Board of Education in North
Carolina may terminate the employment of a teacher
at the end of the school year without filing
charges or giving its reasons for such termination,
or granting this teacher an opportunity to be heard.
A contract of employemnt which contains no provisions
for the duration or termination of employment is
terminable at the will of either party, irrespective
of the quality of performances by the other party.
^

—

—

*

m

.

Due process rights of a tenured faculty person,

when the faculty person initially breaches his contract
of employment was defined in Kalme v. West Virginia Board

of Regents:

When a state college president's letter informed
tenured professor that the reason for his
termination was his violation of contractual agreements to perform assigned teaching responsibilities,
professor knew of his right to a hearing and immediate
ly exercised it, proceedings of faculty hearing commit
tee cooperated in all respects with requirements of
due process, and professor's termination and loss
of tenure were ratified by hearing panel and reaffirmed by Board of Regents, 'dismissal' of
professor satisfied due process requirements.
Ill
‘*'

d

^Still v. Lanu, 182 S.E. 2d 403

^*'"*'Kalme v.

2d 1346

(1976)

(1971).

West Virginia Board of Regents 539

F.

°
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P
p° f SS f r 5 lme SUed the West Virginia
Bo ard of
° f Regents
and the president of West Virginia
State College, contending that he
was deprivedof
a tenured professorship without
due process of law
Summary judgment was awarded defendant—
plaintiff
appeals
During the 1972-1973 academic year
Kalme
VS ° f absence from th ® college Y in
order
to complete research for his
doctoral thesis.
During this time he taught at
Inter-American
Un^ersity
Puerto Rico. West Virginia State
beard nothin g from Kalme so that on March
b, 19/3, the Dean of Instruction
wrote to Kalme
inquiring what his intentions were. On March
16
having no reply, the Dean wrote again, enclosing
a
copy of his March 6th letter. He emphasized
that
the college had to know Kalme'
plans in order to
make personnel decisions. Thiss letter crossed
in
the mail with Kalme' s letter of March 15th which
indicted that he intended to return to West
Virginia State for the fall semester of the 1973-1974
school year.
Interim correspondence followed regarding Kalme 's progress toward his doctoral degree.
On March 1, 1973, Kalme was assured of reappointment
to Inter-American University and he accepted and
returned this contract on May 31st. On June 16th
Kalme also signed and returned a contract offered
by West Virginia State for the same 1973-1974 school
year
Both colleges were kept conveniently ignorant
of Kalme 's conflicting contractual obligations.
Kalme failed to appear at West Virginia State to
resume his teaching duties there. The day classes
began, August 30, 1973, the president of the college
received a letter from Kalme in which he requested
an extension of his leave of absence in order
to complete his doctorate at the University of
Ottawa; this letter made no reference to his teaching
contract. A check at Ottawa revealed Kalme was not
a full time resident nor had his thesis topic been
officially accepted. On September 4th, the president
responded to Kalme that the school "no longer
considers you in the employment of West Virginia
State College or in an official leave capacity."
At a faculty hearing held on December 14th, with
Kalme and his attorney present, the president's
decision was affirmed. After the Board of Regents
declined to reinstate him, Kalme filed suit.
*

’

w

m

.

.
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l£sue:

Did plaintiff violate his contract
of

employment?
Decision

Yes.

;

R easoning
The Constitution protects individuals
against deprivation by the State of their
libertv
or property without due process of law.
The employment rights of a tenured professor constitute
a sufficient. property interest' to warrant due
process
protection.
Kalme intentionally and flagrantly
violated his contract of employment with the college,
and it was upon this contractual relationship
that
any property interest depended.
;

A community college president's power to accept an

assistant professor's resignation was incidental to his

delegated powers from the Board of Trustees to hire,
promote and dismiss employees was a maxim of law set
forth in Carroll v. Onondaga Community College.
The court further decided that where there was any doubt
in an assistant professor

'

s

mind as to whether her

resignation had been accepted was resolved by unequivocal
statements in community college president's letter

which was received by her before she attempted to with-

draw her resignation, the assistant professor's resignation was accepted by the president and his acceptance
was conveyed to her in a language sufficiently clear to
be understood by her before she asked that the resignation

be withdrawn
112
323

Carroll v. Onondaga Community College, 384

(1976).
Ill

Carroll v. Onondaga Community College.

N. Y.S.
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Facts:
The petitioner resigned by a letter dated
April 16, 1975, as an assistant professor at
Onondaga Community College. Her resignation was accepted by the president. He conveyed his acceptance
to her in a language sufficiently clear to be
understood by her, before she asked that the resignation be withdrawn. The president accepted her
resignation in a letter dated April 22, 1975, and
a second one dated May 14, 1975.
Both letters were
received by petitioner before she attempted to withdraw her resignation.
Issue:
Did the president have the power to accept
petitioner's resignation?

Decision

Yes.

:

Reasoning
The court reasoned that the Board of
Trustees had the power to delegate the authority
to the president to hire, promote and dismiss
employees.
The evidence establishes that it did so
by resolution September 24, 1965 and that the power
to accept petitioner's resignation was incidental
to this power.
:

In Vallejo v. Jamestown College,

the court ruled

that the measure of damages for breach of contract is
the amount which will compensate party aggrieved for
all detriment proximately caused thereby or which in the

ordinary course of things would be likely to resolve
therefrom; person injured is, as far as it is possible
to do so by monetary award, to be placed in position he
_

,

would have been in, had contract been performed.

114

Facts: Vallejo was employed by defendant as an
instructor and acting chairman of the Department
On December 15, 1972,
of Modern Foreign Languages,
he was offered a contract for the nine month period
beginning September 1, 1973. On December 15, 1973,
Vallejo was advised that "because of financial

H^Vallejo
75

(1976).

v.

Jamestown College, 244 N.W. 2d

170

exigencies and/or low enrollments in
the academic
area for whlch you have had a
responsibility." he
would not be offered a contract for
the
academic year. The college claimed that 1974-1975
this
a t
n Was taken at the discretion of
the Board
?
i°
of Trustees of the college because
the
was in a poor financial position, and college
that the overSt f reduction and consolidation
scheme,
fr ii
Vallejo s non-renewal was only a part, would of which
result
in a saving of funds.
Vallejo claimed his contract
was not renewed because of clashes with
administration over academic matters. He claimed he
was denied
his academic freedom as provided for in the
faculty
manual and has been separated from his position
without due process of law, and that the failure of
the college to follow the provisions of the faculty
handbook is a breach of the contract between himself
and the college.
Vallejo states that he was fired
and his academic freedom violated because of his
failure to change a student's grade, because of his
criticism of the Board programs, and because, as the
administration claimed, "he failed to support the
college." Vallejo holds that the 'Statement of Academic Freedom' is part of the contract of employment.
,

Issues

;

1.

2.

Decisions

:

Whether or not there was sufficient
evidence to sustain the verdict of the
jury?
Were damages excessive?
1.
2.

Yes.
Yes.

Reasoning
(1) After examining the evidence, the
court held there is sufficient evidence to sustain
the verdict of the jury.
(2) The court quoted
the North Dakota Legislature through Sec. 32-03-09,
North Dakota Century Code, which has set out the
measure of damages for breach of contract:
:

For the breach of an obligation arising from
contract, the measure of damages, except when
otherwise expressly provided by the law of this
state, is the amount which will compensate
the party aggrieved for all the detriment
proximately caused thereby or which in the
ordinary course of things would be likely to

S

:
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result therefrom. No damages
can be recovered
from a breach of contract
if they are no?
clearly ascertainable in both
their „a?£e and
i

t

of ?he

Dissent

?«ny iaw?ViSi °n
:

±S in effect the

(Justice Vogel)

Here we are dealing with damages
affecting the
career of a professional man for
years to come.
In such an area, the range of
permissible verdicts
is much wider, and we should be
most reluctant
to second-guess juries, prove damages
to his
professional future because of the nonrenewal
of his teaching contract, but the
trial court
did not allow him to do so.
He made an offer
of proof that he was unable to obtain
employment
any of the fifty or eighty colleges he applied
to, that his unemployability in any
college was
due, in his opinion, to the wrongful nonrenewal, and that he was thereby damaged in the
sum of $10,000. to $12,000,
I believe this offer
of proof was proper.
_

m

In the University of Colorado

v.

Silverman

,

the

court held that a letter from an Associate Dean to an

assistant professor which

advised

her that her current

employment was for a one year period and that her reappointment was subject to certain prerequisites and did
not constitute an offer of employment by the agent of
the Board of Regents which thereafter ripened into a

contract binding on the Board of Regents upon satisfaction
of the stated conditions, since no contract could come

into being without affirmative action by the Board of

Regents itself.
115

115

11

University of Colorado

(1976).

v.

Silverman, 555 P. 2d

:
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U
rSit ei"P lo y ed respondent to teach
lor the 1972-1973
19 ? 2 ?q 7 t academic
!
year.
in December 1972
she received a letter from an Associate
Dean, advising her that her current employment was
one-year period and the reappointment was for a
subject
to two conditions:
(1) The renewal of a grant under
which she was hired; and (2) Evidence of
and recommendation from the program area competence
and
division faculty peers that she be continued in
her
present position. Respondent was notified, however
by letter dated February 14, 1973, that she would
not be reappointed.
She was told that the school
desired to open the position to other applicants.
The same letter stated, "your work has been quite
satisfactory and we are sure the committee would
welcome the resubmission of your papers." This
notification of nonreappointment complied with the
standard set forth in the University of Colorado
Faculty Handbook 1970 in effect at the time of this
controversy. Respondent then filed a grievance with
the faculty committee on privilege and tenure.
The
committee recommended to the university president
that respondent be reappointed. The president did
not respond, nor did he submit the recommendation
to the Board of Regents.
Respondent was not rehired.
As a result, in December 1973, she commenced an action
in Boulder County district court.
She alleged five
causes of action: breach of contract, estoppel, and
deprivation of property without due process of law.
Upon petitioner's motion, the trial court dismissed
the action.
The court of appeals reversed and
remanded the case for trial. Respondent's contract
claim was essentially that a binding contract or
re-employment arose when the two conditions prerequisite to reappointment, as set forth in the
December 1972 letter from the Associate Dean, were
satisfied; and that the university breached this
contract when it advised respondent of her nonreappointment by the February 1973 letter.

Issues

1.
2.
3.

Is the hiring authority of the Board of
Regents delegable?
May estoppel be invoked against the
university?
Did the university president's failure
to transmit the recommendation of the
faculty committee to the Board of
Regents deprive respondent of property
without due process of law?

.
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Decisions

;

1
2
3

.

.
.

No.

No
No

R e a soning
(1) The power to hire teachers
involves
considerable judgment and discretion,
whether
at the
university or high school level.
Absent legL?ative
9
authorization, the Board of Regents'
hiring authoritv
^legated.
(2) The court pointed out that*
the doctrine of estoppel is not
favored.
There is
no manifest and injustice' requiring
the invocation of the estoppel doctrine.
Respondent
received adequate notice of the Regents'
decision
not to retain her.
She was, in fact, notified well
before the March 1 deadline set by the
university's
Faculty Handbook 1970. The Regents' decision
not
to rehire her made within their statutory
authority,
cannot be considered manifestly unjust.
(3) The
respondent s right to have the procedural regulations strictly followed is a right without substance,
and to remand for the purpose of ordering a transmittal of the committee's recommendation by the
President to the Board of Regents would be an exercise
in futility.
This is so because the recommendations
of the committee on privilege and tenure are advisory
only as they must be in light of the Board of
Regents' exclusive hiring authority under the statute.
:

^

^

,

Groves, Justice (dissenting):
I dissent because I agree with the court of
appeals in its conclusion that the statute
did not preclude delegation of authority
by the Board of Regents.
I further agree
with the court of appeals in its conclusion
as to estoppel based upon reliance.
I concur
with the majority opinion here as to the question
of estoppel predicated upon manifest injustice
and the question of due process.

Shaw v. Board of Trustees held that the fact that
two college teachers, who were division chairmen, were

subjected to a June 30th deadline for submitting

a

letter

of contrition in connection with violation of policy

"
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manual while other faculty members
had until August
did not work a denial of equal
protection since the

chairmen were classified as "twelve month
administrators
whose new contract year commenced on
July 1st, while
116
the others were not.
Facts:
Roger Shaw and Richard Winn had been
teaching at Frederick Community College since
1968 and 1969, respectively.
Professor
Shaw was tenured and Professor Winn was under a
continuing appointment. Both were designated
Division Chairmen, positions that entailed considerable administrative responsibilities in
addition to teaching duties. The Policy Manual
which sets forth regulations adopted by the Board
of Trustees for the governance of the college, and
which all teachers were expected to be familiar
with, specifically imposed upon Shaw and Winn the
obligation to attend and participate in, among
other things, commencement and scheduled workshops.
On about May 22, 1973, Professors Shaw and Winn
received letters from Dr. Stephens, the college
president, stating that termination of their employment as of June 30, 1973 was being considered.
The assigned reasons were that they willfully and
in concert with others refused to attend the workshop on May 17, 1973, and refused to participate in
commencement exercises on May 20th. These letters,
which were received in slightly different form by
the other protesting faculty members who were not
Division Chairmen, far from represented an irrevocable
decision of dismissal.
Indeed, Dr. Stephens made
known his desire to meet with each protestor, and
solicited letters from each explaining his actions.
Everyone understood the deadline for action by Shaw
and Winn was June 30th.
Following discussions in
mid-June with an attorney representing all (including
Shaw and Winn) but one of those who received termination letters, Dr. Stephens indicated that termination proceedings would be dismissed against all those
who met the following conditions: Acknowledged that
116

Shaw v. Board of Trustees of Frederick Community
College, 549 F. 2d 929 (1976).

175

the activities engaged in were
a neglect of
professional duties; promised not to
participate
ln thS future and agreed that
the Policy Manual was the basis upon
which the
college would be run. Dr, Stephens even
agreed to
accept a prepared form letter incorporating
these
conditions, subject to the requirement
that each
faculty member desiring to avail himself
of this
procedure also have a personal conference
with
him.
Professors Shaw and Winn, despite the
availability of this form letter procedure, failed
to take action to head off dismissal proceedings
prior to their deadline of June 30th. The
record
reflects Dr. Stephens' continuous desire prior to
that date to sit down and discuss the matter with
them, and his encouragement that they accept the
conditions that had been set forth. They declined
to do so, however, until July 2, 1973, Professor
Winn having previously indicated his unwillingness to
admit that he had neglected his professional duties.
When letters similar to those that had previously
been found acceptable were finally received from
Shaw and Winn on July 2nd, Dr. Stephens advised the
two that their action had come too late and that
the matter had been referred to the Board of
Trustees.
Following hearings by the Board in July
and August, at which Shaw and Winn were represented
by their attorney, an alternative dismisal was offered
to the four remaining faculty members, including
Shaw and Winn, who had failed to meet the June 30th
deadlines. They were offered one year employment
contracts, provided they perform work off campus,
Shaw and Winn declined this offer and were subsequently discharged.
'*

Issue
Whether the dismissals were for violations
of legitimate conditions of employment, or as
plaintiff claims, for engaging in constitutionally
:

protected activity?
Decision
Dismissal was for violation of legitimate
conditions of employment.
;

The court in this case quoted Wood and
Reasoning
"It is not the role of the federal
Bishop saying:
courts to set aside decisions of school administrators which the court may view as lacking a basis in
:

:
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wisdom or compassion," Wood, 420 U.S.
at 326
95
C
because of mistake, Bishop, ll s.Ct
|?;
at 2080.
The question is whether the dismissals
constituted a denial of plaintiff's rights
association and expression guaranteed by theof
Amendment, as they claim. They, of course, First
did not
surrender those rights by virtue of accepting
employment in a public educational institution
T hey had every right to disagree with
the changing
of the tenure system and the trustees
failure to
grant formal bargaining rights with the college
administration, and to say so. But because their
position is that they could not, consistently with
the First Amendment, be discharged for violating the
terms of their employment simply because those
violations were a part of such a protest, must be
rejected. The conduct of Shaw and Winn went beyond
P^e speech into the realm of breach of the express
obligations of their employment. They admit that
they willfully absented themselves from the scheduled
workshop and failed to participate in commencement
in the manner expected of them.
It was within
the discretion of the Board of Trustees to discharge
them for those reasons. After the deadline of
June 30th had expired without Shaw or Winn having
met Dr. Stephens' conditions, the Board of Trustees
offered them one year contracts as an alternative
to dismissal.
They declined to avail themselves of
this second opportunity to avoid discharge, and now
ask the court to provide a third opportunity.
This
we cannot do.

f

1

Butzner, Circuit Judge (dissenting)

Except for the judge's assessment of the
competency of the legal advice Dr. Shaw and
Dr. Winn received, I agree with his comment
on the evidence.
I do not agree with his
conclusion that the facts 'provided legal
justifications' for the college to discharge
these professors. Therefore, I would reverse
the judgment of the district court, and
direct their reinstatement.
The rule of law that the By-Laws of the governing

body with respect to termination and conditions of em-

ployment become part of the employment contract between

.
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the college and the Associate
Professor, who at the
time of the offer and acceptance
of his initial appointment was advised in writing
that the offer and acceptance
of the appointment constituted
a contract honoring policies and practices set forth
in the faculty handbook
which was furnished to him at that
time, was set forth
ln g rad Y v. Board of Trustees of
Nebraska State Col•

Facts
The plaintiff was a tenured Associate
Professor at Wayne State University. He was
missed without a hearing in June 1973. This diswas after the college budget for 1973-74
school
year had been reduced by the Legislature. This
action is for damages and for declaratory relief
as
a result of the termination of his employment.
:

The District Court found that the plaintiff was
entitled to procedural due process before the
termination of his tenured employment. The
trial court dismissed the plaintiff's petition
upon the ground that procedural due process had
been available to the plaintiff under a grievance
procedure in a collective bargaining agreement, but
the plaintiff had missed a time limit in that
procedure and was therefore bound by the resulting
dismissal on procedural grounds. From the fall of
1968 through the summer of 1970, the plaintiff was
employed as an Assistant Professor at Wayne State
University.
During the 1970-71 school year, the
plaintiff took a leave of absence for additional
work on his Ph.D. He was offered and accepted reappointment for the 1971-72 school year, and was
promoted to Associate Professor. Due to funding
problems, he was not offered appointment for the
summer of 1972.
He was again reappointed for the
1972-73 school year with tenure at a salary of
Plaintiff's contract of employment
$10,400.
specifically included the college bylaws, policies
and practices relating to academic tenure and
117 n

^
Brady
v. Board of Trustees of Nebraska State

College, 242 N.W. 2d 616

(1976)
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facult:y d is m i S s al procedures.
The tenure provisions
of the bylaws provided that dismissal
of
member with tenure must be initiated by a faculty
the President
or other administrative officer, who
must hold a
personal conference with the faculty member
to
discuss the anticipated action.
if the problem
is not resolved in the first step, the
President
is to present a formal statement of
reasons for
termination and provide the faculty member with a
date for a hearing by a faculty committee. The
full formal faculty committee hearing includes
the
right to counsel, presentation of evidence, witnesses
and affidavits and requires recording and a transscript of the hearing. The faculty committee makes
its recommendation to the President but regardless
of that recommendation, a hearing may be requested
before the governing body of the college by either
the President of the faculty member facing termination.
This hearing is also a formal hearing and the
decision of the governing board is final. At no
time did Brady ever have a hearing nor was he ever
n °tified of his termination or prospective termination until after the college board took official
action to terminate his employment on June 16, 1973.
.

On February 21, 1973, the President of the college
wrote Brady:
"You are hereby offered reappointment
in your present assignment for 1973-1974.
Salary
statements may be made only after the legislature
has acted on our budget request." On March 10, 1973,
the interim President of the college wrote Brady:
"Due to the condition of funds, it is not possible
to offer extension of appointment for the third term
of summer session of 1973."
By letter dated June 18,
1973, the interim President informed Brady that because of the level of legislative appropriations he
would not be offered reappointment for the 1973-1974
academic year. The letter advised him that this
termination was based on "financial exigency." In
that letter, the interim President advised Brady that,
by appointment, he would discuss the conditions
under which Brady's termination was made and under
which Brady was selected as one of the people to be
terminated; and that he would be pleased to give Brady
any assistance possible in helping him find employment.
Brady was in Oregon when he received the notice of
On June 30, 1973, the plaintiff Brady
termination.
wrote to the Chairman of the Department of Social

^
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Sciences attempting to initiate a grievance
procedure provided for in a collective
bargaining
agreement between the board and the Higher
Education
Association of Nebraska. He was not a member
Association but was entitled to the benefit of of the
bargaining agreement. He set out as the basis the
for
his grievance that his tenure status had
been
violated and that the college had not dismissed
him in accordance with the provisions of the
bylaws,
which were a part of his contract. On July
6, 1973
the Chairman of the Department of Social Services
denied Brady's grievance. On July 10, 1973, Brady
wrote to the Dean of Arts and Sciences for the college.
He again indicated the two grounds for his
complaint.
On July 16, 1973, the Dean wrote a
letter to Brady in Oregon advising him that his
termination was based on financial exigency and
denied his grievance. On August 3, 1973, Brady
wrote to Dr. Wills, the earlier denials of grievance
had relied upon "financial exigency" but had ignored
his specific requests.
On August 13, 1973, Dr.
Wills advised Brady that his August 3rd appeal had
been carefully reviewed and that Dr. Wills had
determined that the grievance was denied "for a number of reasons," Dr. Wills first asserted that
Brady's appeal was out of time because it was after
July 26, 1973.
Second, that Brady had not enumerated
any specific provisions of the bylaws or the collective bargaining agreement which had been violated.
Third, that under the bylaws, tenure ceases when the
position in question no longer exists, and because
the plaintiff's position was eliminated due to lack
of funds, his tenure status ceased at the time his
position was eliminated. Fourth, Dr. Wills asserted
that the notice provisions of the bylaws applied
only to probationary employees and they were not
applicable to the plaintiff. On August 20, 1973,
Brady appealed to the Chaiman of the Faculty Senate,
and on August 24, 1973 the appeal was rejected on
"procedural grounds" that he had not appealed the
grievance to Dr. Wills within 10 days after the July
16th letter denying his grievance. The legislative
appropriations for the college in the spring of 1973
provided for approximately 80 full-time equivalent
faculty members where there had been 99 in the 1972Because of authorized terminations
1973 school year.
for other reasons, only seven faculty members were

:

.
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recommended for involuntary termination.
Three of
those were in the history department,
when Bradv
was terminated, one untenured member was
retained
in the history deparment and another
untenured
p e rson, the tormer President of the college was added
aCulty at a salar Y higher than other members
of the £
history department. The plaintiff's position
was not eliminated but he was.
Others including an
untenured person taught his former courses in the
1973-1974 school year.
it is uncontested that Brady
was a good teacher and that no termination for
cause could be justified.
Issues

Were the bylaws of the governing
body with respect to termination and
conditions of employment a part of
the employment contract between the
college and Brady?
Did the action of the legislature in
reducing appropriations make it impossible for the university to perform
its contractual commitments to Brady?
Because Brady began a grievance
procedure under the HEAN collective
bargaining agreement, did he waive
his constitutional right to due process
and also his contractual rights?

1.

2

.

3.

Decisions

;

1.
2.
3

.

Yes.
No
No.

Reasoning
(1) The court said that there can be no
serious question but that the bylaws of the governing
body with respect to termination and the conditions
of employment became a part of the employment contract
between the college and Brady. At the time of the
offer and acceptance of the initial appointment in
1967, Brady was advised in writing that the offer
and acceptance of appointment at Wayne constituted
a contract honoring the policies and practices set
forth in the faculty handbook which was furnished to
The court pointed out that courts
him at that time.
have generally held that where a college faculty
member is employed using annual reappointment forms
which do not set forth in full the terms and
conditions of employment, the employment policies,
:

.
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and re 9ulations of the college
become a nar-<tbe ei lo yTnent contract
between the college^nd
fP
aCUl
member
(2) The reduction in funds
de lt: financially impossible
to pay the
salarLr
H
alaries under
seven faculty contracts.
it did not
S
le t0 PaY Brady any m ° re thanlt
made
i? impossTb?e to
io pay any one of the mor
e than 100
f CU ty contracts.
In any event, the reduction
i
in the 2funds
could not and did not in any way
make
it impossible for the defendant
to perform its
contractual obligations to give Brady
notice and hearing prior to termination.
A tenured professor has
S f
en pr ° perty inter est in continued
employment
to ^
entitle ^him to the protection of procedural due
process.
(3) The HEAN grievance procedure
required
a hearing at each step of the appeal.
It also
required that any grievance initiated by a tenured
faculty member which involved a dismissal or nonreappointment required a hearing procedure in step 4
The defendant simply ignored these provisions.
There
is no evidence in the record to support the
dismissal
of the appeal as out of time except an assumption
as to the time of receipt of a letter, and then the
computation of time is based on an erroneous interpretation of the bargaining agreement by reference
to other provisions which are inapplicable.

?

t^J

‘

-

^^

L

The plaintiff was deprived of his right to notice and
hearing required to be granted to him before he could
be deprived of rights.
The termination was ineffective to terminate his teaching contract. That contract, therefore, continued on the same terms for the
1973-74 contract year.
There is no practical justification for an indefinite extension. His salary for
the previous year was $10,400.
There had been no
agreement as to salary for the following year. Under
such circumstances, the measure of damages is the
amount of his salary for the last effective year of
his contract, $10,400 less the amount which he earned,
or with reasonable diligence could have earned from
other employment during the 1973-74 contract renewal
period.

Failure to negotiate

a

contract was the basis for

the civil rights action in Franklin v. Atkins.
118

Franklin

v.

118

Im-

Adkins, 409 F. Supp. 439 (1976).
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portant rules of law for
colleges and universities
derived from this case are:
(1, There is no
requirement

“

^

Constituti

-

that a college teacher's
classroom
conduct be the sole basis for
determining his fitness
for teaching, in that
fitness for teaching depends
on
a broad range of factors.
This is particularly true
in
a case of potential
applicant rather than a case of
present employee seeking to
continue in his position, 119
and (2) university Regents
may decline to hire a professor
for good reason or perhaps,
for no reason, but they may
not do so for bad reason if that
reason is one's lawful
exercise of a constitutionally protected
right. 120
Facts:
On December 3, 1973, the plaintiff
applied
for one of two available faculty
positions in the
Sh D artmen at the Univ ersity of
Colorado.
^
a ?u
u ??
Although
his application
was one of several hundred
submitted, the English faculty approved his
applica1
Januar y' 1974 by the "overwhelming" vote of
2b to ?
5 with one abstaining.
Prior to subsequent
independent investigations and interviews, the
plaintiff s appointment also received the approval
of the Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences.
The Vice President and the President at that time
also approved his appointment. At the regular meeting
of the Board of Regents of the University of Colorado
on April 25, 1974, Dr. Thieme presented the plaintiff's
application for consideration with his recommendations.
However, the Regents voted 8 to 1 against approval.
On June 25, 1974, at another regularly scheduled
meeting of the Board, the same Regents voted to refuse to reconsider the earlier vote.
The eight in1

T

119
120

Franklin

v.

Adkins.

Franklin

v.

Adkins.

,
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dividual Regents voting against the
plaintiff
on each oocasion are the named
defendants.
Plaintiff brings this action under
42 u S c
section 1983, seeking injunctive
relief and*
m
a
ln
each defendant a ^d, pursuant
?n Rn?
ale 57 r,
Fed
R civ
a declaratory judg_
ment.
Injunctive and declaratory relief are
also sought for the alleged violation
of the
university’s own regulations by the defendants.
Plaintiff s claim that each defendant's
decision
was based primarily if not solely on
Professor
Franklin^s belief in Marxism, his advocacy
of
that political belief and philosophy in his
speeches and writings and his participation in
various political movements, groups, and demonstrations, thus abridging his First Amendment
right to free speech and association as well as
violating university regulations. Defendants
respond that the decision not to hire Mr. Franklin
was a valid exercise of the discretion vested
in them, and involved a determination that the
hiring of the plaintiff was not in the best
interests of the University of Colorado.

S

Issues

;

'

'

*

;

-

May the Board of Regents consider
factors other than a teacher's classroom conduct when reviewing his application for employment?
Did the defendants base their decision on grounds which impermissibly
abridge the plaintiff's constitutional rights on a consideration
prohibited by their own regulations?

1.

2.

Decisions

*

1.
2

.

Yes.
No

Reasoning
(1) The Board of Regents were not
limited to their consideration of the plaintiff's
application to his academic qualifications and
teaching abilities alone. There is no requirement in the Federal Constitution that a teacher's
classroom conduct be the sole basis for determining
his fitness for hiring.
Fitness for teaching depends upon a broad range of factors. This is
particularly true in the case of a potential
applicant, rather than that of a present employee
seeking to continue in his position. The state's
interest in obtaining even marginly relevant in:

.

184
r
i
b t
PPllCa
±S greater because
of ?he ?aok of o?h e r
2lr
1
t
n
0n
dU t 33 an emp ™°^ e
This is°™t to sfy
thIt°th d
The
e
°r
erhapS f °r no reason. B?? i? a
m
nol:
no? do f°?
E
so for a bad
reason if that reason is one’s
Xer
e
f 3 con ® titut i°nally
protected
righ?U?>• ??? T?
The
speeches and activities of the*
i
}
anford were the paramount reasons
Which^ri
h X d t0 fc e votes to disapprove
his appointment
Hnih K e CaUSe u defendants
perceived that conduct
as f,i
i
allmg
outside the realm of protected free
speech, and because the pattern of
conduct indicated
them a substantial risk of similar
on the University of Colorado campus occurrences
should the
plaintiff receive a faculty appointment.
As the
plaintiff concedes, a separate but related
basis
or the refusal to hire which could have
been and
was relied upon was the fear of disruptions
on the
University of Colorado campus
Certainly, in a situation of potential disruption, there is no
ment in the law that the proper authorities requiremust
wai t f° r the blow to fall before taking remedial
’

-

SrS^S.E £*

'

'

^

.

^^

^

.
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In Smith v, Greene

Universities held:
a

(1)

,

the court for Colleges and

A college faculty member may have

property interest’ protected by the due process clause

if there are policies and practices promulated and fostered
by the college officials that constitute legitimate claim
of entitlement to the continued

employment,"

121

and

(2)

where the probationary period for the community college
teachers was limited by statute to three consecutive regular

college years, notice that the teacher's contract would not
be renewed for the fourth year was equivalent to notice

both that the tenure was not awarded and that the teacher's
121

Smith v. Greene, 545

P.

2d 550

(1976).
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probationary faculty appointment would not be
renewed. 122
Facts:
The appellant held a "probationary faculty
appointment" with Washington State Community
Colleqe
District No. 17, He brought this suit against
the
officers and trustees of the district. The
respondents
allege error in their denial of tenure to him.
Respondent s motion for summary judgment was granted
by the superior court.
Beginning in September 1971,
the appellant was employed by the Community College
District No. 17 under the terms of three one-year contracts which designated appellant's status as a
probationary faculty appointment," under the Community
College Act of 1967. A review committee established
pursuant to the act periodically observed and evaluated
the appellant's teaching during each of these years.
The evaluations covered appellant's performance in a
number of areas.
Some of the reports, in a number of
areas, indicated that the appellant needed improvement,
although the committee twice recommended the appellant
be granted tenure.
Affidavits filed in the case indicated that the district's board of trustees had uniformly decided not to consider tenure until the third
probationary year. On Febrary 5, 1974, copies of the
review committee's reports and recommendations, along
with letters of District President Johnson and Spokane
Falls Community College President Snyder recommending
denial of tenure, were mailed to the appellant and
each trustee.
The letters of Johnson and Snyder did
not state the reasons for their recommendation that
tenure be denied. On February 21, 1974, the trustees
considered all of the recommendations submitted and
allowed the appellant and his supporters to speak in
his behalf.
The trustees then unanimously voted not
to grant the appellant tenure without stating any
reason for this decision. The following day, President
Johnson, as Secretary of the board of trustees, notified
the appellant by letter that his employment contract
would not be renewed for the 1974-75 school year or for
any other year.

Issues:

122

1.

Did the appellant have a legitimate
claim of entitlement to continued employment sufficient to invoke due process
protections?

Smith v. Greene.

.
,
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2

Did a statutory requirement
of
reasonable consideration” by the
board of trustees create a
property interest or requireprotectable
that
reasons be given for their decision?
Did the members of the board
of trustees
act beyond their authority in
considering the recommendations of
the presidents of the college and district?
Is the trustees' practice of
requiring
three years of probationary teaching
before consideration of an award of
tenure

.

3.

4.

invalid?

the letter from the Secretary of
the board of trustees constitute the
required notice of non-award of tenure?

5.

Decisions

:

1.

No,

2

.

3

.

No
No

4

.

No.

5

.

No

Reasoning
(1) a faculty member may not have a "property interest protected by the due process clause if
there are policies and practices promulgated and fostered by the college officials that constitute a legitimate claim of entitlement to continued employment.
The Supreme Court has stated that to have a property
interest in a benefit, a person must have more than
an abstract need or desire for it.
He must have more
than a unilateral expectation of it.
He must have a
legitimate claim of entitlement to it. Property interests are not created by the Constitution itself.
They are created and their dimensions are defined by
existing rules or understandings that stem from an
independent source such as state law, rules of understandings that secure certain benefits and that support
claims of entitlement to those benefits.
(2) Appellant's
faculty appointment for a designated period of time
was subject to termination "without cause upon the
expiration of the probationer's term of employment."
Under the terms of his third one year contract with
Community College District No. 17, appellant's appointment ended in June 1974. The fact that the review
committee's recommendations are usually followed is
not the kind of conduct which should confer a legitimate expectancy of tenure.
(3) The action of the board
:

"
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the^istri^

1

= ons
, nd

^1 erin 9

™

the recommendations of
e dentS WaS " 0t b

its ^ttority? As°a :ittlr o|
tive procedure it is reasonabl P
directors to seek thf=> ^c C -io+-^ e for

C
a
•

m

1St a

",
“oard
board °f
of school
h

St t t °^ry ri ght to tenure
.consideration "at anv
n ^
time
during the probationary period
This qo<-+--;o 1S
clear and unambiguous.
(5) WAC 1321-88-080(2) re-”
quires that written notice of the
award or nonaward
e
r
mit ted t0 * he P^tioner. ?he
letter
of *FebruLv
e ^uary 22 d?d
did not, use the word "tenure"
°r
but
stated
that the appellant's employment
contract
with
District
No. 17 would not be renewed for
the 1974-1975 or any
enSU ng year " However since the
probationary
n^?oH is tlimited to three consecutive
period
regular
college
years under the statute, notice that
the appellant's
contract would not be renewed for a fourth
year is
3
tlce both that tenure was not awarded
£°
nd that his probationary faculty
appointment would
not be renewed.
The pertinent statutory provision
requires notice of a decision "not to renew a
tionary faculty appointment and does not refer probato
tenure
+

*

'

-

.

Grimm

v.

Cates brought forth two rules of law

specifically for Colleges and Universities.
(1)

They are:

Exercise of First Amendment rights are not the basis

for discharging non— tenured teacher unless the exercise of

such a right clearly overbalances the teacher's usefulness
as an instructor and

(2)

In view of the witnesses'

testi-

mony that the terminated university professor's activities
for the teachers' organization had not been considered in

their recommendation to terminate the professor's employ-

ment at the university, the trial court in civil rights

action brought by the professor was correct in its determination that testimony offered at trial did not prove by a

.
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preponderance of the evidence that
the professor was
dismissed for reasons relating to the
exercise of
First Amendment rights,
Facts:
University professor brings a civil
rights
action, claiming that his constitutional
rights
under
the First and Fourteenth Amendments were
abridged
when he was issued a terminal contract. The
Court for the Western District of Texas held U.S.
that the
professor was not entitled to a hearing, or a statement of reasons for his dismissal. The professor
appealed.
The Court of Appeals held that the evidence
supported the trial court's finding that the professor
did not have a de facto tenure under the practice and
policy prevailing at the university and that he was
not entitled to a hearing to determine whether the
issuance of a terminal contract constituted a violation of his academic freedom.

After receiving his Ph.D. from the University of
^Hi n °i s in 1963, the appellant taught for one year
at the University of Illinois, three years at Texas
Tech. University and one year at Sam Houston State
University.
Dr. Grimm was hired as an Associate
Professor by Southwest Texas State University for the
academic year of 1968-1969. He completed three ninemonth teaching contracts at SWTSU for the academic
years 1968-1969 prior to receiving terminal notice
in May of 1971 and being issued a terminal contract
in June 1971.
Issues

:

Did the district court incorrectly hold
that the plaintiff did not have tenure?
Was the plaintiff denied due process of
law?
Was the plaintiff entitled to a hearing
before a faculty committee to determine
whether the issuance of a terminal
contract violated his academic freedom?

1.
2.
3.

Decisions

:

1.

No.

2

No

.

3.

No.

Reasoning:
(1) Under the policy and practice at SWTSU
from the fall of 1968 to the spring of 1972, Dr. Grimm
had no legitimate claim of entitlement of tenure. Dr.
123

Grimm v. Cates, 532

F,

2d 1034

(1976).

.

:
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Grimm possessed no property right by
which he
was entitled to the procedural
protection of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
(2) and (3) Dr. Grimm was
6d f ° r reasons related to the
exercise
2 the First
°f.
Amendment rights and he was not
stigmatized by his termination. Therefore,
it is
axam ne the adequacy of the hearings
j
granted to him by the
administration at SWTSU,
In Bishop v. Wood

,

the courts declared that the

federal court system was not a forum for review
of all
liberty" rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
It held that the United States Constitution cannot

feasibly be construed to require federal judicial review
for every error in connection with discharge of a public

employee.

"In the absence of any claim that the public

employer was motivated by a device to curtail or penalize
the exercise of employee's constitutionally protected

rights, federal courts must presume that official action

was regular and, if erroneous, can be corrected in other

ways than by review of personnel decisions in the federal
court."

124

However, the dissenting opinion agrees yet

disagrees by elaborating on the need not to review all
but to ensure this constitutional mandate of due process
are followed

Bishop v. Wood Dissenting Opinion (Justices Brennan
and Marshall)

These observations do not, of course, suggest

"^^Bishop v. Wood, 96 S.Ct, 2074
125

Bishop v. Wood.

(1976)

.

,

.
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that a Federal court is— the
forum in which to review the appropriate
multitude of
personnel decisions that are made
daily by
public agencies.
However, the federal
the a PP ro Priate forum for ensuring
Co s titutional mandates of due
process
^ by those
are followed
agencies of government
making personnel decisions that
pervasively
influence the lives of those affected
thereby; the fundamental premise of
the Due Process
C 1 1S
1S that those procedural safeguards
?t S
will
help the government avoid the ’harsh
fact' of 'incorrect or ill advised
personnel
decisions.
'

.

'

12 D

Facts:
On respondent Chief of Police's recommendation respondent City Manager terminated
petitioner's
employment as a policeman without a hearing, tellinq
him privately that the dismissal was based on a
failure to follow orders, poor attendance at police
training classes, causing low morale, and conduct
unsuited to an officer. A city ordinance provides
that a permanent city employee (as petitioner was
classified) may be discharged if he fails to perform
work up the standard of his classification, or if he
is negligent, inefficient, or unfit to perform his
duties.
Petitioner brought suit against Respondents,
claiming that as a "permanent employee" he had a
constitutional right to a pre-termination hearing that
the ordinance, even though not expressly so providing,
should be read to prohibit discharge for any reason
other than those specified and therefore to confer
tenure on all permanent employees that his period
of service, together with his "permanent" classification, gave him a sufficient expectation of continued
employment to constitute a protected property interest
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and that the false explanation for his discharge
deprived him of interest in liberty protected by that
clause.
During pretrial discovery petitioner was
again advised of the reasons for his dismissal. The
District Court granted respondents' motion for a
summary judgment, holding, on the basis of its understanding of state law, that petitioner "held his
position at the will and pleasure of the city." The
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial
courts
,

;
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I5sue=

Was the petitioner
denied his due process?
Decsision No.
:

of~cours e

1 in
crSted^or^
r inance

be
contract,
in
n either
i
of the c 1 a i » o ;
*

^t

caL h
SSt^t
Sr^
f

em P lo
can,
or by an implied
£
iency
decided by

6
Court has helfthat^n'
enforceable expectation^?"
11

£

contract
1
actually granted some form of
guarantee
(still v

“

we recognized t K Tt the
nonretention of an untenured
e teacber might make him
somewhat less attractive
!!?
0
5
bUt ™theless concluded tSat
^"
Jr
w
would
u
stretch the concept too far "to suacrest=
person is deprived of 'liberty' when
he simply is not
tamed
one position but remains as free as
S
nother *" This same conclusion applies before
to
the d?Q ^ arge ° f 3 publlc employee
whose
position
is
term?i^ at the will of the employer when
terminable
there
s no public disclosure of the
reasons for the discharge.
'

strS

'

m

In LaTemple v. W arns ley

,

through an action to recover

damages for an alleged breach of

a

written contract, the

court decided that under employment contract between
teacher and community junior college which provided that

contract of employment would be deemed to continue for
next succeeding school year unless written notice of in-

tention to terminate contract was properly served by Board
of Trustees before certain date or teacher gave written

notice to president on or before certain date that he did
not desire continuation of contract, where prescribed
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notice of termination was not given
or notice was improperly given and teacher was discharged,
teacher was
entitled to damages in the amount of
the salary teacher
would have received for the next school
year had
his

employment not been terminated

.

^7

Facts:
Action for breach of written contract
which the defendants as Trustees of the Garden in
Community Junior College employed the plaintiff City
to teach speech and theater courses and
direct
dramatic activities for a term of nine months
commencing on August 24, 1970, for a consideration
of $9,568, payable in twelve equal installments.
Previously, the college had adopted a policy manual.
Section 17, which states:

Section 17

.

The Continuing Contract

The contract of employment of an instructor
shall continue in full force and effect during
the good behavior and efficient and competent
service rendered by the instructor. The
contract of employment shall be deemed to
continue for the next succeeding school year
unless written notice of intention to terminate
the contract is served by the Board of Trustees
on or before the fifteenth day of March, or the
instructor has given written notice to the
President on or before the fifteenth day of
April that he does not desire continuation of
said contract.
The Board of Trustees upon the
recommendation of the President, may consider
an instructor for discharge or termination of
contract for any of the following causes:
,

Immoral character, conduct unbecoming an instructor, insubordination, inefficiency, incompetency, physical unfitness, or failure to
comply with reasonable requirements of the Board
of Trustees as may be prescribed to show normal
improvement and evidence of professional training
.
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LaTemple
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Wamsley, 549

F.

2d 185

(1977).

.
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In the event that an
instructor is beinq
considered for discharge or
his employment contract, he termination^
shall be given
a warning and a specific
statement in writing
defects or reasons for the
proposed discharge or termination of contract.
Thus, he
will have an opportunity to show
improvement.

Following this procedure, if it becomes
apparent
a
1
trUCt
S contract wil l
terminated
he shall
sha?l h»
°S’ a written notice
be served
by the
Trustees on or before the fifteenth day Board
of
arch that his contract will terminate
at the
close of the academic year and will not
be in
effect for the succeeding school year

^

Instructors desiring a hearing before the Board
of Turstees must file a request for same
with
the President within a fifteen day period
after
receipt of notice.
The trial court held as a matter of law that
the
plaintiff's contractual rights included the rights
provided by Section 17 as well as those rights set
forth in the written contract of employment. The
discloses dissatisfaction on the part of
the college admininistration with plaintiff's
conduct by letter dated January 29, 1971.
On March 10, 1971, defendants notified plaintiff as
follows:

Dear Mr. LaTemple:
This letter shall serve as written notice that
your contract of employment with the Board of
Trustees of the Garden City Community Junior
College will terminate at the close of this
academic year.
You will not be offered a contract for the succeeding school year 1971-1972.
Should you desire a hearing before the Board of
Trustees, please advise and file a written request
with President Raymond Wamsley within fifteen
days after receipt of this notice

Sincerely yours,
/s/ John G. Collins
Vice Chairman
Board of Trustees
(Exhibit 6)

.
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^

Plaintiff requested a hearing
before the Board
d
he
™“2id
on'AprSIs
prii 28, 1971, with no changes
in the
01” 10 " t0 terminate
P^intiffs employment
contract?

^

“

Issues:

1

was plaintiffs employment contract
terminated for one or more of the causes
Paragraph 2 of Section 17?
Was plaintiff given the warning
described
Paragraph 3 of Section 17?

.

m
m

2.

Decisions

:

1.

No.

2

No

.

Re a soning
Section 17 clearly contemplates a contract
of employment continuing from year to
year but terminable by either party upon notice.
If the prescribed notice is not given, or the notice is
impropery given, the employee is entitled to a contract for
the succeeding year and his discharge prior thereto
is a breach of the contract.
The measure of damages
is the salary the plaintiff would have received
the
school year had his employment not been terminated.
:

Two rules of Constitutional Law emanated from Tyler
v.

College of William and Mary

.

They were:

(1)

A property

interest in employment, for purposes of due process, is

indicated by a legitimate claim of entitlement to continued
employment;

and

(2)

One has the right to due process for

loss of employment if he can prove he has a property in-

terest in the job, and a property interest is indicated by
actual or implied guarantees of continued employment. 12 8
Facts
Plaintiff was hired by the College of
William and Mary as Assistant Professor of Modern
Languages and Literature for the academic year of
1969-70.
That contract was renewed each year for
six years and the final contract signed for plaintiff's
seventh year of teaching was designated as a
:

128

Supp.

Tyler v. College of William and Mary, 429
29

(1977).

F.
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T

S

££ 32 »*‘32

S followed in accordance
wi?h the wellt
gSneral C ° Uege poli
° £ ^ploying

^

^ a
teachet for six years to determine
his or her
qualifications for tenure and then,
if tenure was
no granted, terminating
employment at the end of
the seventh year.
The criteria set out in the
tY Handbook and generally recognized
by the
ront
College
as requisites to tenure include:
t:e a che r

Possession of education, experience and
degrees necessary to perform the individual's
duties; (2) Ability to effectively teach,
based
on command of material and good student
rapport;
(3) Evidence of research, publications
and
other contributions to his field of study;
and
(4) Participation in department,
faculty and
college governance.
(

)

Additional requisites which appeared in the testimony
D3
George R. Healy Vice President for Academic
f*
Affairs, include:
,

(1) Tenure requirements set up by the individual
departments; (z) Needs of the College as a whole,
i.e., available funds; and (3) Needs of the
department, i,e., future directions and goals,
over-tenured faculty.

The Department of Modern Languages the department
in which plaintiff was employed, incorporated the four
criteria set out in the Faculty Handbook in its
requisites for tenure and included an additional
emphasis on teaching effectiveness, scholarly activities not limited to publications, and participation
in special services to students.
During his seven
years within the Department of Modern Languages,
plaintiff was appointed to the Board of Student
Affairs, the Computer Center, and as coordinator of
the French and Italian section for three years.
He
was awarded his Ph.D. in French Literature from the
University of Virginia in 1971 and in 1974 published
A Concordance to the Fables and Tales of Jean de la
Fontaine a work running over a thousand pages and
reviewed as one of the three most important basic
reference works to appear on that author. Plaintiff
generally served as French instructor for the lower
,

,

.
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a
d fi
d
freshman and sophomore
.'
classes) and
c!Issest
Inf contributed
f
^
to the language laboratorv
by utilizing his electronic
7
skills to install new
equipment and to modify existing
facilities
For
these contributions plaintiff
was highly Raised bv
the former head of the deparment,
Mr. J. Worth
r
e
Urrent department head, Ms. Elsa
S.
Did£k
He wa ,fls ° recomme nded by these
department
5 u
heads and
his department for promotion to
Associate
Professor on three occasions and for
tenure
twice
He was denied the promotions and
tenure on all
occasions for the stated reasons that
plaintiff is
an average but not excellent academician
and that his
inclusion within the Department of Modern
Languages
would not greatly strengthen it.

r T
,

'

Issue
Did the plaintiff develop some property
interest in his job as would entitle him to special
consideration outside the well-established policv
on tenure?
:

Decision

No

:

Reasoning
The College of William and Mary had a formal
tenure system.
The system operated on a clearly
enunciated policy that a teacher could remain within
the system beyond a probationary period of seven years
only if granted tenure which required the approval
of his department and department head, the Advisory
Committee on Retention Promotion and Tenure, the
Dean of Arts and Sciences, the Vice President for
Academic Affairs, the President of the college, and
the Board of Visitors.
Plaintiff did not receive
the required approval and therefore did not receive
tenure.
The court did not find from the evidence that
plaintiff enjoyed actual or implied guarantees of
continued employment, or a legitimate claim of
entitlement to continued employment in a formal tenure
system or a claim of entitlement supported by rules
or mutually explicit understanding in a de facto
tenure system so as to give rise to a property interest
protected by due process.
:

,

For college and university precedent, the court in

Gupta v. Boyer ruled that the trial court in Article 78
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proceeding brought by a professor who
claimed that nonrenewal of his term of employment was
subterfuge by the
college to avoid according him substantive
and procedural
due process required on discharge for
professional misconduct, erred in ordering that, if professor's
allegations were found to be true, trial court should be
held
to adjudicate professional misconduct charges; if
professor

should have been charged with such conduct, trial court
was required to remit matter to college for proceedings

consistent with governing labor agreement. 129
Facts:
Petitioner in this article 78 proceeding
alleges that he is a professor of history at State
University College at Brockport, having initially
received a three year term appointment in 1970 which
was renewed for a two year term in July of 1973.
Petitioner further asserts that subsequently, by a
letter from respondent-appellant College President
Brown dated August 26, 1975, he was notified that
his term appointment would not be renewed and that
as of August 31, 1976, his status as a faculty
member at the college would automatically cease.
This non-renewal of his term appointment, petitioner
contends, 'was a mere subterfuge and ploy' created
to secure (his) dismissal without having to
accord him with substantive and procedural due
process of law, as provided for under the policies
of the Board of Trustees of the State University of
and the Agreement between the State of
New York
York
and
United
University Professors, Inc.
New
where
an employee is charged with
in cases
professional misconduct.
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

Respondents-appellants appeal only from that part of
Special Term's order which sets forth the so-called
The argue that 'because
'third step' of the trial.
agreement establishes
relations
the controlling labor
for the conduct
procedures
jurisdiction and
exclusive
129

Gupta v. Boyer, 391 N.Y.S. 2d 255 (1977).

:

.
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d s i P linar Y hearings, it
was an error for the
J
courtJ below
to have ordered that such
hearing is
to be conducted, if at all, by
the court.'

^

Issue
S
ld th = har 3 es of misconduct
be remitted
.
?
to resolution by
the college in proceedings consistent with the governing labor
agreement?
,

Decision

Yes.

;

Reasoning
As a result of the exclusive nature
of
the disciplinary procedures set forth
in the "Agreement which supplants otherwise extant
rights
remedies of petitioner, the court may properly and
police
the fair administration of said Agreement to
prevent
one side, or the other, from circumventing,
by any
pretext, its controlling provisions and/or procedures.
The trial court should proceed with the first step
of its proposed trial in order to 'preliminary determine whether, on the facts adduced, respondents were
required to present charges of professional misconduct
against petitioner so that he may be afforded a hearing
on such charges as provided in the Agreement.
As respondents-appellants state in their brief, it it is
found that petitioner should have been presented with
charges of professional misconduct, and that he should
have been afforded a hearing as a condition precedent
to the non-renewal of his term appointment, the trial
court should, at that point, remit the matter for
resolution to respondent appellant college for proceedings consistent with the governing labor Agreement.
:

In Gorman v. University of Miami

,

the court reasoned

that where faculty member's right to tenure and, therefore,

continued employment, was fixed by terms of his employment,
alleged oral promise of university president to take

specified action upon faculty member's appeal to him did
not constitute an individual contract

Rehearing Denied
130
(1977)

.

:

January 12, 1977

Gorman v. University of Miami, 340 So. 2d 1180

.
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^PP ella nt seeks damages for wrongful terminatron of his employment.
Dr. Gorman contends that he
arneC
S Ure under his contract of
employment
whf^ included
? ^ 2
which
provisions of the faculty manual of
the university.
On the other hand, the defendants
contend that the terms of the plaintiffs
employment
are to be determined from the annual Faculty
Appointments, which gave a later date for the plains obtaining tenure than that which
would be
computed from the faculty manual. it is undisputed
that the later date was an error occasioned by the
action of the university. There is conflicting
evidence concerning plaintiff s actions upon learning
that he had been mistakenly assigned a later date
for the attainment of tenure.
'

Issue:
Does the oral promise of the president of
the university to take specific actions on the plaintiff's appeal to him constitute an individual
contract?

Decision

No

:

Reasoning
The court correctly entered summary final
judgment on count two of the complaint, which claims
the breach of an oral contract by Henry King Stanford,
President of the University of Miami. There is uncontroverted proof that plaintiff's right to tenure
and, therefore, continued employment were fixed by
the terms of his employment and the alleged oral
promise of the president of the university to take
specified actions upon plaintiff's appeal to him does
not constitute an individual contract.
In addition,
it appears that at all times defendant Stanford was
acting as an officer of the university and not in his
individual capacity. The court considered plaintiff's
point directed to the granting of defendant's objection
to certain interrogatories and find that no error
has been demonstrated on this point, especially in
light of the holding upon count two of the complaints.
Finally, because of the views expressed herein, the
trial judge's order striking the plaintiff's prayer
for the remedy of reinstatement should be reversed.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.
:

Where tenured teacher submitted written resignation
at the end of the next academic year and it was accepted,

.

.

.
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the college had right to refuse to
honor teacher’s at-

tempted withdrawal of resignation especially
since college
had acted on resignation in planning
reduction
in

faculty, was the holding for colleges and
universities
131
in Gras v. Clark.
The court also held that a tenured

professor's letter of intention to resign at end of
next academic year was a voluntary relinquishment of
her

right to claim a continued contractual status as tenured

teacher

,

and could have been withdrawn at any time prior

to effective date if it either had not been accepted by

employer or not been acted upon by employer in a manner
to prevent employee from insisting on revocation. 132

Facts:
The affidavit of Robert J, Clark, the
Dean of Faculty of Elmhurst College, stated that
either in the month of July or August of 1972, Donna
Gras advised him of her decision to retire as a member
of the teaching staff in the fall of 1974; that on or
about November 1, 1972, the verbal decision was
confirmed in writing by the following letter which
plaintiff handed to Clark:

This is to confirm my decision to retire in
the fall of 1974.
I had already mentioned
it to you and also Dr, Frick this summer.
However, I understand that a written confirmation is necessary at this time.
It was further stated that in reliance on the resigna-

tion Clark conferred with plaintiff and with another
member of the teaching staff, Paulette Hatmaker and
that both of the parties agreed to accept an
appointment for the 1973-74 teaching program.
This was confirmed and accepted by the following
,

131
132

Gras v

Clark 361 N.E. 2d 316

Gras v

Clark

(1977)

.
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letter sent by Dr. Frick to Mrs.
Gras dated
December 4, 1972:
1
easons the Executive Committee
? the S
5 of
f
of
Board
Trustees has authorized that
your appointment for 1973-1974 will
be halftime.
During this year your full fringe benefits program will continue.
You are an
outstanding teacher and we do appreciate
your
services to Elmhurst College.
'

P leadin 9 s showed that plaintiff had notified
the defendants in August of 1973 that she
was withdrawing her resignation but that defendants advised
her that she would not be allowed to do so.
Defendants'
motion for summary judgment was granted, based upon
the pleadings, affidavits and a transcript of
plainhiff s testimony at a hearing on a motion for a
preliminary injunction. Judgment was entered in favor
of the defendants from which plaintiff appeals.
Plaintiff seeks to enjoin the college in violation of
the employment contract to recover damages.
^

Issues

:

Does the plaintiff have a contract
right to continued employment?
Is plaintiff estopped from claiming
that the college was not permitted to
prevent the withdrawal of her resignation?

1.
2.

Decisions

:

1.

No,

2

Yes

.

Reasoning
(1) In effect, the plaintiff's letter of
intention to resign on the prospective date fixed by
the end of the 1973-1974 academic year was a voluntary
relinquishment of her right to claim continuing contractual status as a tenured teacher. The resignation
could have been withdrawn at any time prior to the
effective date if it had either not been accepted by
the employer or not acted upon by the employer in a
manner to prevent the employee from insisting on
revocation.
(2) The doctrine of waiver is based
upon the principle that one may dispense with something
of value by a voluntary act done with full knowledge
of the rights involved and with an intention to
relinquish those rights. When consideration for the
:
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waiver is lacking the resignation may be
supported
by proof of conduct which gives rise
to an estoppel.
Mrs. Cras
ietter of resignation was a statement
of
her intention to waive her right to
continuing
contractuai employment as a tenured teacher
effective
at the close of the 1973-1974 academic
year.
Mrs
Gras was acting with full knowledge of the
rights’
which she would be giving up. A written resignation
tendered to the proper officials and filed by them,
is considered accepted.
Upon acceptance of a tenured
teacher s resignation even though the effective date
is prospective the employing authority has the
right
to refuse to honor a withdrawal of the resignation.
The delivery of Mrs. Gras' written resignation to
the president of Elmhurst College upon his reguest
after plaintiff's previous oral statements that she
intended to resign amounted to an acceptance of the
resignation.
The college could refuse a subsequent
withdrawal.
In any event, plaintiff's additional
circumstance that the college acted on plaintiff's
resignation in planning a reduction in the French
Department faculty is sufficient to estop plaintiff
from claiming that the college was not thereafter
permitted to prevent the withdrawal of her resignation
Trimier v. Atlanta University, Inc.

,

held that

Administrative Assistant to Dean of School of Business

Administration at the university was not entitled to recover for breach of contract on alleged ground that notice
on June 26 of termination effective July 31 due to general

economic conditions came too later after offer in May of
renewal of her contract for following year, where both
her existing contract and renewal contract clearly provided
for termination with 30 days' notice because of budgetary
or economic situations on part of university; clause in

employment manual, on which Administrative Assistant based
her claim, requiring notification of non-reappointment for

.
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following academic year by March 15 of
existing academic
year had reference to non-reappointment
and renewal of
contract of employment which did not control
termination
of service by reason of lack of funds and
economic

consideration.

13 3

Facts
Ms. Trimier was employed as an Administrative
Assistant to the Dean of the School of Business
Administration at Atlanta University, Inc. and had
served in that position since June 8, 1971.
she
was employed on a year-to-year basis from the beginning of September of one year to the last of
August of the following year.
In May 1975, she
was offered a new contract for the following year
for the period from September 1, 1975 to August 31,
1976, being under contract at that time which did
not terminate until August 31, 1975.
The contracts
under which she was employed provided for effective
termination with 30 days' notice and referred to an
employment manual which provided for severance pay
of one month's pay for each full 12 months' service
up to a maximum of three months' salary of an
employee with tenure. On June 26, 1975 the university
notified Ms. Trimier that her employment was being
terminated effective July 31, 1975, due to present
general economic conditions her release to be
effective on June 27, 1975, but that she would be
paid for July and August (vacation months) and for
three months thereafter in severance pay. Whereupon
Ms. Trimier brought suit for breach of contract,
contending that she had been re-employed for a full
12 months in May of 1975, and that the employment
manual providing for conditions of employment clearly
states that if an employee is not reappointed the employee must be notified no later than March 15 of any
academic year after the first year of service. Defendant answered, admitting generally all averments
of the complaint, but denying that the employment
terminated other than under the terms of the contract
and denied that plaintiff was entitled to any judgment
against it. After discovery, which involved admission
of facts and genuineness of documents with reference
:

,

13 3

2d 342

Trimier v. Atlanta University, Inc., 234 S.E.

(1977)

.
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pl0y ‘
t"
manual which are pertinent, and
based on certain

ment^a^the^IriourexSerpts^^the 1 ^
favor of defend;nt
Issue:

“•

Did defendant breach plaintiff's
contract?

Decision

:

No

Reasonin£: At the time of termination
of employment
ere were two contracts in existence,
the first
of which ended on August 31, 1975;
and a renewal
contract commencing the first of September
1975 for
one year.
There seems to be no dispute as to the
facts, even though her employment was
terminated.

Where college agreed to pay employees specified

commission on tuition received by college from approved
enrollments credited to employees, and college, by its

voluntary act of ceasing to operate schools, placed
performance of its obligation under employment contract
beyond its control, employees were entitled to compensation
under contract even after employer ceased to operate its

schools was

a

rule of law laid down in Cannon v. Stevens

School of Business, Inc .^^

The court also pointed out

that a person cannot avoid liability for nonperformance
of its obligation under contract by placing such performance

beyond his control by his own voluntary act, and no one
can avail himself of nonperformance of a condition precedent, who has himself occasioned its nonperformance. 135
134 ^

Cannon v. Stevens School of Business, Inc

560 P.

2d 1383

135

(1977)

Cannon v. Stevens School of Business.

.

,

.
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ts
—
under

Plaintiff sues in contract for recovery
contract of employment. Plaintiffs
were
^ defendant, to engage "aggressively in
student
tudent recruitment." Defendant
operated two
business colleges, one in Salt Lake
City, and one
in Ogden, Utah.
The terms of employment were set
forth
a written contract, drawn by
defendant.
Those provisions relevant to this dispute
were
contained in sections VII and IX of the
agreement.
;

*T

a

m

VII.

To accept as compensation under this
employment agreement: 13^ percent for all
enrollments taken where the current address
is in Weber, Salt Lake or Davis Counties,
and
15 percent for all enrollments taken outside
these three counties.
An additional 5 percent
incentive commission will be credited to your
commission account at year end in addition
to the commissions shown above for all
tuition income over $100,000 paid by your
students during any calendar year (January
1st to December 31st)
IX.
In the event this agreement is
terminated by either party and there exists a
deficit balance in your commission account,
the commission earned from the date of
termination forward will be applied toward
the deficit balance until that balance has
been satisfied.
Credit balances on this
commission account after termination can be
drawn quarterly, the draw to be made during
the last month of each quarter, permitting
the college to complete the accounting statements and reports for that quarter.

Since plaintiffs were soliciting enrollments over
geographical area, they were required frequently to obtain lodging and meals away from
home.
Defendant would make advancements of $1,000
per month to plaintiffs, to assist in defraying
these soliciting expenses.
Under its bookkeeping
system defendant entered these advances as
Monthly, defendant issued a
accounts receivable
It showed
computer printout to its salesmen.
commissions earned, tuition refunds, other adjustments; and the balance in the commission account at
a broad

.
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the end of the month.
On December
defendant entered into a contract 17 1973
Business College located in Salt with L D s
In
exchange for $200,000, defendant Lake city
agreed to' settle
an asserted anti-trust action
against the
Business College.
Defendant alio agreed to disionG
° P ® r * tl0n of its school in
Salt Lake
Cit!
city, and not to compete with
(or sell its assets
to anyone wtio would compete with)
L.D.S. Business
f ° r 3 pe lod of five years.
Defendant
fniJho!!' covenanted
f to
further
use its best efforts to influence and encourage its present
students to enroll
at the L.D.S. Business College; to
refer
concerning present or future educational all inquiries
needs of
prospective students to L.D.S.; to grant
immediate
and exclusive access to all files and
records of
prospective students, student directories, and
mailing
lists; and to deliver the permanent records
of all of
defendant's students of the Salt Lake City school
from commencement of its operation to present
time.
In conformity with this agreement defendant
closed
its school in Salt Lake City on December
31, 1973,
Defendant sold its Ogden school to the Robinsons on
December 31, 1973, for a basic purchase price of
$267,000.
In addition, Robinsons agreed to pay
certain accounts receivable, viz. the accounts of
plaintiff Cannon for $5,544,06, and plaintiff Van
Luyk for $3,069.07.
Defendant conducted no further
operations at either school after December 31, 1973;
consequently, no further tuitions were collected.
Plaintiffs had fully performed the services which they
were required to render in order to be entitled to
compensation under the employment contract at the
time a prospective student was deemed by defendant
an "approved enrollment."
Plaintiffs contend that
they were entitled to compensation for services render
ed and that defendant's voluntary actions which
prevented its performance in accordance with the terms
of the contract constituted a breach entitling plaintiffs to damages.
The trial court granted judgment
to the plaintiffs and defendant does not challenge
the measure of damages.
On appeal, defendant contends
the trial court erred in its determination that
plaintiffs were entitled to compensation under the
contract after defendant ceased to operate the schools
Defendant asserts it did not breach the contract, because its duty of performance was excused. This
assertion is predicated on the theory the terms of the

LDS

,

,

.

.
,
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contract create an implied condition
precedent
Z
mUSt bS °P eratin <J the business'
if
s to be rec3 ui ^ed to
*5 it
perform.
Defendant cites
1Gm plaint ffs compensation was
based
on "tuitto
J by the
tuitions received
college from all
r
enrol ments "
It urges it had no duty to
oav °h^
pay,
because it^ received no tuitions.
its contention
is there was no breach of contract,
because there
was no duty to perform, because its
duty to perform
was subject to an implied condition
precedent, viz.,
the continued existence of the school,
and receipt
^
of tuition.
.

’

:

Issues

1
2

:

Was there a breach of contract?
Was there an accord and satisfaction?
Was there a set-off?

.

3.

Decisions

:

1.
2

.

3

.

Yes.
No
No

Reasoning
The court reasoned that the defendant
would not be entitled to prevail even if its assertion of an implied condition precedent were accepted.
:

Where, as here, the compensation agreed
to be paid for services rendered is to be paid
out of a fund to be collected by the party for
whom such services were rendered, there is
an implied obligation on the part of the
promissor to exercise reasonable diligence to
collect the fund from which the promisee may be
compensated for such services; and in default
of the exercise of such diligence, payment may
become due without the performance of the
condition. As stated by Professor Williston,
it is a principle of fundamental justice that
if a promisor is himself the cause of the
failure of performance of a condition upon
which his own liability depends, he cannot take
advantage of that failure.
.

.

.

By its voluntary act, defendant placed performance
of its obligation beyond its control, i.e., discontinuing the schools so it could not collect the
tuitions, and pay the percentages to which plaintiffs
were entitled.
(2) An accord and satisfaction is
a contract, or settling a
of
discharging
method
a
by substituting for
contract,
arising
from
a
claim
for the satisfacagreement
an
or
claim
such contract
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tion thereof, and the execution
of the substituted

ip

Su-=5JS,SS^-

uoni
S
1
1
SatiS aCti °n and the cond ition
mu S t be
be°such
s ch thft
ih
f
that the
party,
to whom the offer is
^
made, is bound
to understand that if he accepts
it
he does so subject to the conditions
imposed
The accord is the agreement and the
satisfaction
1S the ® xecutlon
performance of such agreement
m
This new substitute agreement must be
founded
upon a legal consideration and must be
consummated
by the assent or meeting of the minds
of the parties
to the agreement.
where we deal with an unliquidated
or disputed demand, consideration may
rest on the
settlement of the dispute, e.g., the parties agree
the debtor will pay and the creditor will
accept an
amount as a compromise of their differences and
in satisfaction of the claim.
At the time plaintiffs
cashed their checks the court found they were
unaware of their rights, or that their claims were in
dispute.
They were unaware of the nature of the
contracts defendant had entered into with the third
parties, and as a consequence, defendant had breached
the employment contracts.
Furthermore, neither by
the statement on the check or by other communication
did defendant express the intention the payment was
offered upon the condition it be accepted in full
satisfaction, or not at all.
(3) In defendant's
agreement of sale of the Ogden school to the Robinsons, the Robinsons were required to pay for these
specific accounts.
The court reasoned this indebtedness to defendant had already been discharged. Mr.
Robinson testifies he did not pay plaintiffs (whom
he employed) a commission on the old students who
continued in the school after he purchased it. He
further stated, under his contract with defendant,
he was not required to remit to defendant any of the
tuition he did not require Cannon and Van Luyk to
reimburse him, for paying, to defendant, the accounts
receivable. When this law suit was initiated,
Robinson refused to assign these accounts to defendant, as requested.
The evidence here sustained a
finding that the employer was not entitled to a
set-off for amounts advanced to employees to assist
in deferring soliciting expenses.
'

'

.

.

.

,

,

.

.

’

:

.

.
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The issue of the legal effect
of the regulations
of the Board of Education
implementing the Florida
school code was set forth in
Phillips v Santa Fe
Community College. 136
,

Facts
by the ticaiueuc
——— inOn complaint
President or
of banta
Santa
Prv 1 ^
_
Fe Community
College, petitioner
Phillips has been
dismissed from his teaching position for
competence and misconduct. The complaint inwas
successively considered by a hearing officer
of the Division of Administrative
Hearings,
round the facts and recommended suspension who
for
six months, by the Board of Trustees of
the
college, which accepted the recommended findings
and conclusions but imposed the penalty of
dismissal
and which on Phillips petition reviewed and
sustained the trustees’ decision. Phillips now
petitions for judicial review of the final agency
action discharging him.
.

1

l

i

«

•

•

_

_

1

Issues

Does the order of the Board of
Education satisfy the statutory
requisites for agency's final order?
Was plaintiff's petition for review
untimely?

1.

:

2.

Decisions

:

1.
2

.

Yes.
No

Reasoning
(1) To require such final agency action
by the Board of Education, as sought by petitioner
Phillips, would effectively displace the Santa Fe
Trustees as the body having authority to discharge
instructional personnel at that college. A hearing
would be required before the Board of Education
itself, or before one of its members, or before a
hearing officer whose proposed order would be submitted to the Board. Any prior proceedings before
the district trustees would thereby be eclipsed.
We decline to so emasculate the specific design of
the Florida school code to make it conform to the more
general scheme of the Administrative Procedure Act.
The district board of trustees of each community
college is the agency responsible for final action in
:

13 6

So

Phillips v. Santa

2d 108

(1977)

.

Fe

Community College, 342,

.
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disputes concerning dismissal of
instructional
personnel.. (2) The affected party may
seek
that administrative remedy, in the
time and manner
prescribed, without jeopardizing the
judicial review
secured to him by Section 120.68. Thus,
Phillips'
timely application for review by the Board
tion tolled the time for seeking judicial of Educareview;
and, after the Board of Education sustained
the
Santa Fe trustees, Phillips had 30 more days
in
which to seek judicial review of the trustees'
final action.
In this case, the petition for review
is dismissed, it appearing that Phillips'
petition
for review was filed more than 30 days after the
decision of the Board of Education reviewing and
sustaining the final agency action.
Issue of the legal effect of an oral contract of

employment in the Junior College District of East
Central Missouri arose in Neal
of East Central Missouri

1

v.

Junior College District

07

Facts
Plaintiff taught education psychology as a
part-time instructor at the Junior College during
the 1973 spring semester, the 1973 summer session,
the 1973 fall semester and the 1974 summer session.
For the first sesssion plaintiff was personally
contracted by Boyd H. Eversole, Dean of Academic
Affairs, inquiring whether she wanted to teach
educational psychology for the 1973 spring semester.
Thereafter, communication from the school concerning plaintiff's teaching other sessions came through
plaintiff's husband, Thomas L. Neal, then an instructor
Thomas
of psychology and sociology at the college.
received his information from Terry A. Zanin, chairman
of the division, who was relaying information from
either Dean Eversole or Dean Edward B. Conway.
During each session's registration, plaintiff and
her husband kept track of the number of students who
were signing up for the class because instructors
were only paid the full salary if twelve or more
If less than twelve students
students enrolled.
registered the class would either be dropped or
taught by an instructor who was willing to be paid
In each session the course scheduled
at a lower rate.
:

137

Neal v. Junior College District of East Central
Missouri, 556 S.W. 2d 580 (1977).

f

.
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h
y pla ntlff had en °ugh students
i
so that ??
it was not dropped.
No one ever officiallv
Y
told plaintiff to start teaching;
she jus? shewed
W
la S
en ° Ugh stude " ts
In each
^

tw

session plaintiff
plaintif signed a written contract
several
a
r
he had be<3 un teaching the new class.
?
Before ^h«
the start
of the 1974 fall semester plaintiff
again received, but only through her
husband,
communication from the college inquiring as
to
plaintiff s interest in teaching the same
course
again.
Plaintiff expressed interest and prepared
for class and ordered books.
During registration,
however, plaintiff's husband was informed
another
instructor would be teaching educational psychology
place of plaintiff. The course was given but it
was taught by this other person. Plaintiff made no
complaint about the action of the college. Her
husband, however, wrote a memorandum to Terry A.
Zanin, division chairman, requesting that he request
Dean Eversole to write plaintiff to the effect
^-h^t if 3. class in educational psychology was to
be taught the next semester (spring 1975) that
plaintiff would be the one to teach it. Dean Conway
responded by writing, in effect, that it was against
school policy to give a commitment like that. Later
plaintiff received the usual oral communication from
the college inquiring about her availability to teach
during the 1975 spring semester but again the class
was taught by someone else.
Plaintiff was unable
to secure another teaching position either semester,
despite her efforts. Plaintiff's husband testified
that the communication he received from the college
concerning plaintiff were inquiries as to plaintiff's
availability, willingness and interest in teaching
the course,
Zanin testified that he only asked
plaintiff's husband if plaintiff would be interested
in teaching if the opportunity arose and that he
had no authority to do more.
The college President,
Dr. Donald E. Shook, stated that deans had no authority
to offer teachers a contract but could only locate
faculty.
He further stated that the college does
not commit itself to part-time faculty (such as
Plaintiff
plaintiff) until after registration.
agreed that the inquiries from the college were no
more than requests as to her availability and interest.
However, plaintiff believed from her past experience
that if the college asked about her availability,
then she would be the one to teach the class if it was
given
-

.

.

m
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l£suej_

Does the record support the
trial mnrfc
Were n ° -tracts between
?***
plaint if f^nd
f ° r fal1 1974 and s rin<
P
3
1975 semesters?

ff

Decision

:

Yes.

n
faCtS ° f this Case do not compel
f
l ndina
h
find
ing ?
that
there was an oral contract between a
a
ies '. There was sufficient evidence
?? u
from
which
the trial court could find that
there was no
contract and such a determination is not
against the
weight of the evidence. Furthermore,
although not
advanced by defendant on appeal, 432.070,
RSM 1969
teacher's contract must be in writing
inis statute is mandatory and is a part
of the
substantive law.
It was therefore necessary that
plaintiff allege and prove a written contract to
be entitled to judgment.
All of the evidence proved
there was no written contract between the parties
for the fall semester of 1974 and the spring
semester
of 1975.
The judgment is affirmed.
~

^

The following legal concepts are derived from Board
of Trustees of the State College of Maryland v. Sherman:
(1)

Clear language of agreement will not give way to what

parties thought agreement meant or intended it to mean
and

(2)

When language of contract is clear, true test

of what is meant is not what parties to contract intended
it to mean,

but what a reasonable person in position of

parties would have thought it meant. 1

7

Q

Facts
On July 8
1970 Dr. Sherman executed a form
headed "Application for a Non Teaching Position,"
the "Non" having been inserted by someone above
the title on the form.
On July 14, 1970, she was
hired for the school year beginning September 1,
On March 3, 1971, Dr. Sherman addressed a
1970.
letter to the President of Bowie in which she said
:

13 8

,

,

Board of Trustees of State Colleges of Maryland v. Sherman, 373 A. 2d 626 (1977),

:
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^

1
1
t0 make £ormal application
for the
position !*
f
as a professor
in the graduate school
gram for the acad emic year 1971-1972 "
P
j?
added
that if she were "accepted for InAh qh P
10 "
(she) would relinquish (her)
function as Director
e
U
e ln9 Cen erThis was £ °H°«ed on
Aprii i5° T<)
7i
h Y what
K
1 71
was styled "Addendum to
J?
r.
?
u
Faculty Contract
between
Dr. Sherman and the colleae
by which she was hired as a
professor for the
811 ™° nth P eriod
effective September 1. 1971
mu
The addendum indicated that her
"tenure status" would
e Probationary
it was on a prepared form which
*** dune 30 1974," inserted after the
statement,
tl0nary period b Y ••• The similar date of
"July 1,
?Q?o»
1972 was inserted on the "Current
regulations require that you be notified concerning the
termination
of your addendum dated April 11,
1972, in which her
salary was agreed upon for the school year beginning
September 1, 1972, The latter form had on it, "A
condition of offering this addendum is that you submit
a statement waiving rights to tenure
before July 1,
1975."
This was done under date of April 24, 1972.
The April 11, 1972 addendum was accompanied by a
letter from the college president saying in pertinent
part

J

•

«.

''

'

'

11

.

,

'

Technically, you were employed at Bowie State
College under the old system that required
five years of service before attaining tenure;
however a new contract was issued to you which
specifies a period of three years of service
as a requirement for attaining tenure.
,

I am prepared to extend your contract for another year only if it does not lead to tenure.
If you accept these conditions, please submit
to me by May 1 a written statement waiving rights
to tenure before June 30, 1975.

On April 16, 1973, the last addendum was executed.
It pertained to employment for the college year
beginning September 1, 1973.
It, too, referred to
her having probationary tenure status and said that
regulations required that she be notified concerning
the termination of her probationary period before
June 30, 1974.
On June 6, 1973, the president
of Bowie advised Dr. Sherman that it was his "unpleasant duty to inform (her) that (her) contract
as a faculty member at Bowie State College" would
be terminated "at the end of the (then) coming

.
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academic year, after which it
would not be renewed.
He added, "This means that
you will no
^° yed at Bowie State College after

Junfao
Issue;

I 97

Is Sherman a tenured faculty
member?
university breach her contract?
Dld the facts involve fraud and
mis-

1.
Z'
J

’

representation?

Decision

;

Re_ason_in 2

1.

No.

2

.

3

.

No
No

(D This is a case of contract construcThe principles of which are well known and
have been enunciated by this Court numerous
times:
.

:

tion.

the clear and unambiguous language of an
agreement will not give way to what the
parties thought the agreement meant or
intended it to mean; where a contract is
plain and unambiguous, there is no room for
construction, and it must be presumed that the
parties meant what they expressed; and when the
language of a contract is clear, the true test
of what is meant is not what the parties to
the contract intended it to mean, but what a
reasonable person in the position of the parties
would have thought it meant.
(2) For the first year of her full-time employment
and therefore, the first year subject to the regulations, 1971-72, Dr. Sherman would be considered
hired for the next "full academic year" (1972-1973)
unless she received notice before March 1, 1972.
Her contract was actually dated April 11, 1972.
In
her second year (1972-1973) she should be regarded
as hired for the next "full academic year" (19731974) unless she was given written notice before
December 15, 1972. Her contract was actually dated
April 16, 1973.
By these regulations, having
been hired for the year 1973-74 (her third year)
she would be considered hired for the next succeeding
year, appointment for that 1973-74 school year.
That appointment would expire June 30, 1974-75, unless written notice was given 12 months prior to the

.
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xpiration of her 1974 contract.
Notice had to
1
r
f ° re June 30
197 3.
This notice
artniTf
actually was given June 6, 1973.
Accordingly,
Y
there was full compliance by the
college and
Dr. Sherman did not acquire tenure.
'

In conclusion, sixty of the 100
random sampled

cases were in the area of faculty related
case.

Table

p. 216,

2,

indicated that in the sixty faculty

related cases, only four of the areas of contract
were
in issue.

The areas of Consideration, Capacity, Illegali-

ty and the Statute of Frauds were not litigated as

major issues.

Therefore, though there were approximate-

ly three times as many faculty related suits than

students in the sample, student related suits covered
a

broader spectrum, in terms of area of contract in-

volved in issues.

A graphic representation of the

distribution of the percentage of faculty issues, in
the 100 cases in higher education as briefed in this

chapter to the areas of the law of contract is found in
Figure

2,

page 217.

Institution Related
In Sterling v.

University of Michigan in 1896, the

court dealt with an issue relevant today, namely, did
the legislature have the Constitutional right to interfere with or dictate the management of the university?
1

68 N.W.

O Q

.

13

Sterling v. Regents of University of Michigan,

253

(1896)

TABLE

2

ANALYSIS OF 60 FACULTY- RELATED CASES ACCORDING
THE AREAS OF THE LAW OF CONTRACT IN ISSUE

Source:

100 Cases

:
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Figure 2. Distribution of the percentage of
faculty issues in the 100 cases to the areas of the
law of contract.

Legend

1.

Expressed or Implied

2.

Offer and Acceptance

3.

Consideration

4.

Capacity

5.

Fraud, Mistake, Duress

6.

Illegality

7.

Statute of Frauds
Performance and Breach

8.

.
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The fiscal autonomy of the
University of

Massachusetts has been a controversial
issue in the
legislature in the past few years and
relates directly
to the issue in this 19th century
case,
what
is more

relevant to this study is that the court in
its dictum
of this case relates directly to the State
College
in

Massachusetts which had been a failure under
management
by the state, thereby citing the need for a

Board of

Regents to control the University of Michigan.
Facts
Mandamus by Charles Sterling to compel
the Regents of the University of Michigan to
comply with Act. No. 257, Pub. Act 1895, providing for the removal of the Homeopathic Medical
College from Ann Arbor to Detroit. The Act No. 257,
Pub. Act 1895 was passed by legislature in 1895.
In summary, it authorized and directed the Board
of Regents of the university to establish a
Homeopathic Medical College as a branch or as a
department of the university in Detroit and to
discontinue the existing school in Ann Arbor.
The Board of Regents claims:
(1) that this act
was not for the best interest of the university
and (2) that the legislature did not have the
Constitutional right to interfere with or dictate
the management of the university.
:

Issue
Did the legislature have the Constitutional
right to interfere with or dictate the management
of the university?
:

Decision

No

:

Reasoning
The Constitution of 1850 placed the
university under the control of regents elected by
the people.
The legislature has no control over the
It was not the
university of the Board of Regents.
intention of the framers of the Constitution to take
away from the people the government of this inThe designed and did provide for its
stitution.
:

„
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management and control by a body of
elected men by the people at large. eight
They
recognized the necessity that it should
be in
® 1 ® cted for lon
g
terms, and whose
9
offf
sole official
duty it should be to look after
1 s interest
and who should have the opportunity
instigate its needs, and carefully deliberate
th:U S would best Promote its
usefulness for
2?
the benefit
of the people.
Some of the members
of the Convention of 1850 referred in
the debates
to two colleges (one in Virginia and the
other
Massachusetts which had been failures under
management by the State.

^
,

Tuw

m

)

Diverse legal suits in contract have been litigated in the courts against the corporate institutions.
As the following pages

,

through the medium of briefs

and selected cases, show the diversity of the focus of
the action, yet all actions are suits in contracts.
In the State ex rel.

Sigall et al., v. Aetna

Cleaning Contractors of Cleveland, Inc.

,

the court set

the following precedent for colleges and universities:

Board of Trustees of a state university has the
authority to enter into contracts with independent
non-civil service employers to perform custodial
services
„
.

,
140

Facts
This is an appeal from a decision of the
Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court permanently
enjoining the further performance of a contract
entered into between the Aetna Cleaning Contractors of Cleveland, Inc, (hereinafter "Aetna")
and Kent State University (hereinafter "Kent
State").
The contract in question provides that
Aetna shall perform custodial services at thirteen
Civil service employees,
Kent State buildings.
hired directly by Kent State, perform 75 to 80
:

140

State ex rel. Sigall et al. v. Aetna Cleaning
Contractors of Cleveland, Inc. et al., 353 N.E. 2d 913
(1974)

.

.
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percent of all the custodial work
at Kent State
In some buildings civil service
employees perform131 uties durin 9 the day while
Aetna
?
custodial employees
work at night. The civil
service employees were paid $1.94 per
hour
t ine °? the bearing before the
Custodialt employees in the classified trial court.
civil service are assigned by statute a "pay range
number."
Testimony elicited at the hearing below
indicated
that the civil service custodial employees
were
paid a minimum of $2.55 per hour, plus fringe
benefits.
The trial court found that the contract
question was illegal in that it violated
constitutional and statutory law of Ohio relating
to civil service employment.
Kent State, Aetna,
the President of Kent State, and the various
officers and members of the Board of Trustees of
Kent State have perfected this appeal.

m

.

Issue

;

Decision

Was the contract illegal?
No

:

Reasoning
It is possible that the Board of
Education might provide for this janitorial service
by an independent contract or by direct employment.
There is nothing complex or difficult to understand
about civil service laws and rules. The fundamental purpose is to establish a merit system,
whereby selections for appointments in certain branches
of the public service may be made upon the basis of
demonstrated relative fitness, without regard to
political considerations,. To carry out this purpose
elaborate rules have been formulated, designed to
thwart the purposes of the civil services system,
the Board of Trustees of a state university may lawfully contract to have an independent contractor
perform services which might also be performed by
civil service employees.
Plaintiffs introduced no
evidence tending to establish that the Board of
Trustees of Kent State entered into the contract in
a bad faith attempt to circumvent the purposes of
the civil service system.
:

In Appel Media v. Clarion State College

,

the

plaintiff terminated the installation of a television

.
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distribution system after its work
failed to meet
contract specification. The issue
related to plaintiff's compensation under the contract.
The court

held that plaintiff was not entitled
to receive the
full contract price but the contract
price minus the
cost of contract completion as provided in
the contract
141
plus interest.
Facts
On September 3, 1969, the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania acting through the Department
of
Property and Supplies (Department)
accepted the
bid of Appel Visual Services, Inc. (Appel
Visual) for furnishing television distribution
facilities at Clarion State College.
:

,

Appel Visual's bid was $61,239. On October 15,
1969 the Director of Purchases for the department
was notified that Appel Media, Inc. (Appel Media)
would be assumed the contractural responsibility of
Appel Visual for the installation of the system,
Appel Media having recently contracted with Appel
Visual to assume and perform contracts which had
already been negotiated by Appel Visual and for
which work had not yet been begun. Appel Media
is a Pennsylvania corporation engaged in the business of installing and servicing audio-visual equipment and video systems for school and university
use.
Installation was begun by Appel Media in
December of 1969, at which time the anticipated
completion date was February 15, 1970. Problems
in installation developed almost immediately, however, and there was a series of meetings and inspections during the ensuing months of 1970 which involved representatives of Appel Media, college
personnel, engineers and a representative of the
Attorney General. Finally, after an inspection on
October 21 and 22 of 1970, the engineer commissioned
by the department issued his inspection report,
which detailed numerous defects. Appel Media
141
2d 420

Appel Media v. Clarion State College, 327A

(1974)
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learned of this report and of the Department's
intention to advertise for bids to complete the
work, and then ceased any further efforts to
complete the contract, leaving some of its
materials on the premises.
in November, the
Department invited bids from other contracts to complete the installation of the system, and Telesonic Assoc. Inc. (Telesonic) was awarded a $40,000
contract for that purpose on March 21, 1971.

Appel Media filed a complaint in assumpsion with
the Board of Arbitration of Claims (Board) to
recover payment in full of the orginal contract
price.
After preliminary objections were filed
and dismissed, a hearing was held on May 8-9, 1973.
On October 25, 1973, the Board entered an order in
favor of Appel Media in the amount of $24,139, a
figure arrived at by subtracting the cost of completing the work from the original contract price
and adding interest.
Appel Media filed a timely
appeal with this court, asserting that it is entitled
to the entire contract price plus interest.
Although Appel Media admits that the results of
its work were not up the requirements of its contract, it asserts that it expended the time, labor,
material and money called for in the contract and
Appel
in accompanying plans and specifications.
Media blames its failure to produce the proper
results on electrical grounding conditions which
were peculiar to the site at Clarion State College,
and which were known only by the defendant when
Because Appel
Appel Visual's bid was accepted.
Media did not adequately cope with the grounding
problems, there was a hum interference with the
signals received over the system, so that a darkened line would appear across the television monitor.
The hum interference exceeded that called for in the
contract's performance specifications.
Issue:

Is plaintiff entitled to receive the full

contract price?
Decision:

No.

Judgment Affirmed.

;

223
R ea s oning
(i) If one party knows
Qr has
d
reason to know of the unilateral
mistake of the other
o a contract, relief will be
P
y
granted to the
same extent as
the case of a mutual mistake.
Here, however, the appellant has not
shown that any
agents of the Department knew that the
appellant
was acting under a misapprehension.
(2) Cur courts
have oioarly held that a party to a contract
which
;

m

has been breached by the other party may
secure a
substitute to complete the contract when the
contract so provides. Appel Media here was clearly
given a reasonable time to complete its contract
by
correcting the deficiencies in its work. The
original completion date was in February of 1970
and complaints about the results of Appel Media's
work were voided from that time through to the
month of October.

Kramer

,

Judge (dissenting)

I respectfully dissent for the basic reason
that the majority opinion perforce must make
its own findings of fact in order to substantiate the result.
I would have little
difficulty concurring if the Board of
Arbitration Claims (Board) had made
findings or conclusions that somehow Appel
Media, Inc. had breached its contract with
the Commonwealth.
The problem is that no
such findings or conclusions were made
by the Board.

Jessen Associates v. Bullock was

a suit

involving

a petition for writ of mandamus to compel the respondent

Bob Bullock, Comptroller of Public Accounts, to issue
a

warrant on the State Treasury for $2,590.25 for

architectural services performed by Realtor, Jessen
Associates, Inc., for the University of Texas at
Th e basis for the controversy originated

Austin.
14 2

593

Jessen Associates v. Bullock, 531 S.W. 2d

(1975).
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in the senate bill.

The court ruled for colleges and universites
in this case that it held:

Legislature, by rejecting proposal that listing of various university construction
projects upon which Board of Regents could
spend funds appropriated elsewhere would
not constitute approval of such construction projects by legislature, and accepting
rider to general appropriations bill which
expressly empowered board to expend funds
appropriated elsewhere for various university
construction projects, indicated that listing
of such projects did constitute "legislative
approval" within constitutional provision
requiring such approval for university
construction projects.
Facts
Comptroller of public accounts refused
payment to architects for services performed on
university construction project entered into
pursuant to statute which comptroller alleged
was invalid. Architects brought original
petition for writ of mandamus against comptroller
seeking order warranting payment. The Supreme
Court, Greenhill, C.J., held that rider to
General Appropriations Act which empowered Board
of Regents to expend funds appropriated elsewhere
for certain construction project was not "item of
appropriation," and thus Governor's veto was ineffective; that rider did not contain "more than
one subject" within meaning of constitutional
prohibition against bills embracing various
subjects; that legislative intent was clearly
to approve expenditures of such funds on such
construction projects; and the duty of comptroller
to pay architects was clear, and thus writ of
mandamus would lie.
:

Issue

:

Decision

Should the warrant be issued?
Yes.

:

A rider to the latest General AppropriReasoning
ations Act was not subject to the veto of the
:
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Governor.
The Governor has the power
to veto an
entire appropriations bill; but
his power to
veto part of an appropriations
bill
to vetoing "items of appropriation." is limited
This rider
authorizing the construction of
certain enumerated
projects without the consent of the
Coordinating Board, was not intended College
by the
Legi sl a ture to appropriate funds,
and therefore
was not an item of appropriation"
which
subject to veto apart from the remainder was
of the
.

’

t

The University of Illinois was declared
not to be
a party to a contract which was in
dispute and had no

duty to indemnify the Illinois Building
Authority
for a possible adverse judgment in a breach
of contract

sult in Talandis Construction Corp. v. Illinois Building

Authority

141
.

Facts
Appeal by State Building Authority from an
order dismissing its second amended third party
complaint against the university for indemnification
for a possible judgment for the contractor who
allegedly was damaged due to delay and work stoppages caused by indecision on the part of the authority and university.
The Appellate Court held that
the authority could only prosecute a third party
action based on alleged tortious conduct on the part
of the university, in the court of claims.
That
authority was not entitled to indemnification by
university for judgments awarded against it because
of breach affecting construction company based on
lease agreement between authority and university;
and that since university was a stranger to contract
between authority and construction company the
university did not have a duly, express or implied,
to indemnify authority for possible adverse judgment
based upon alleged breach of contract.
:

143

Talandis Construction Corp. v. Illinois Building
Authority, 321 N.E. 2d 154 (1974).

.
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Issue:
Did the University have a duty to indemnify
the authority for possible adverse judgment based
on alleged breach of contract?

Decision

No

:

Reasoning
(1) A stranger to a contract between two
Parties cannot be compelled to indemnify one of the
parties for breach of contract absent the stranger's
express agreement to so indemnify.
(2) Where University was not a party to construction contract
between state building authority and plaintiff
contractor which was executed after lease agreement between building authority and University,
the University, being a stranger to the construction
contract, did not have a duty, express or implied,
to indemnify authority for possible adverse judgment
based upon alleged breach of contract on theory that
University was in reality a party in interest in
construction of animal clinic for use by the University under the lease.
;

The question of the power of the Board of Trustees of
the University of Connecticut to enter into a contract

which subjected classified state employees presently employed in the food service operation at the University to

elimination of their positions was the issue in Connecticut
State Employees Association et al. v. Board of Trustees of
the University of Connecticut et al

144
.

State employees association, a chartered
affiliate of the association consisting exclusively
of state employees at the University of Connecticut
and a group of individual food service employees at
the University brought action to enjoin Board of
Trustees of the University and various other state
officials from entering into a contract with an
Facts:

144

Connecticut State Employee Association v. Board of
Trustees of University of Connecticut, 345 A, 2d 36 (1974).
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independent food management contractor for
provision of food dispensing service at the
University
and from dismissing individual plaintiffs and
those
similarly situated, claiming that proposed agreement
violated state civil service law. The Superior
Court
County, Parskey, Jr, entered judgment for
plaintiffs, and defendants appealed. The Supreme
Court, MacDonald J., held that State Personnel Act
fa- reasons of economy and efficiency, did not pre—
elude Board of Trustees of University of Connecticut
from entering into a contract with an independent
food management contractor, thereby subjecting classified state employees presently employed in food
service operation at University to eliminination of
their positions.
Issue:
Does the State Personnel Act, chapter 67
of the General Statutes, preclude the Board of
Trustees of the University of Connecticut from
entering into a contract with an independent food
management contractor, thereby subjecting the 240
classified state employees presently employed in
food service operations at the University of
Connecticut to the elimination of their positions?

Decision:

No.

Reasoning
(1) State Personnel Act did not preclude
Board of Trustees of University of Connecticut from
for reasons of economy and efficiency, entering
into a contract with an independent food management
contractor, thereby subjecting classified state
employees presently employed in food service operation at university to elimination of their positions.
(2) Statute giving board of trustees of University
of Connecticut power to make rules for government of
university and to determine general policies of university was intended to clothe the board with sole
jurisdiction over the university in all phases.
(3) Statute giving board of trustees of University of
Connecticut power to make rules for government of
university and to determine general policies of
university was intended to grant to the board
authority to exercise complete direction and restraint over the actions of those connected with
university, including the teaching staff, employees
(4) Under statute giving board of
and students.
trustees of University of Connecticut power to make
:

^
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rules for government of university and to
determine
general policies of university, the board has
authority to make policy decisions regarding status
of food service system.
The issues of a waiver of contract or estoppel were
two of the legal issues in B oard of Regents of the Univer -

sity of Texas v,

S. &

G.

Construction Company.

^

Facts:
Builder brought action against the University
Board of Regents to receive additional compensation
after completing construction of married students'
apartments pursuant to contract with Board. The
126th District Court, Travis County, James R.
Meyers, J., awarded builder $837,674.90 in damages,
plus interest, and also awarded builder the $] 2,000
portion of contract price withheld as liquidated
damages for late completion of project, and Board
appealed.
The Court of Civil Appeals, Phillips,
C.J., held that failure of Board to provide builder
with "correct plans and specifications and additional
instructions and detail drawings as were necessary
to carry out the work" was a breach of contract
entitling builder to recover its additional costs,
that builder's decision to stay on the job despite
Board's breach of contract was not a waiver or
basis for an estoppel to assert builder's claim for
damages for such breach, that judgment permitting
builder to recover its additional costs did not
constitute "extra compensation for services rendered"
pursuant to a valid written contract or constitute
"a gift or donation" in violation of state constitutional provisions, that amending of a written charge
to jury by changing definition of certain phrases
was proper, that certain rule did not preclude
trial court from correcting an error in a charge after
oral argument, that builder could be awarded interest
on judgment from date project was completed and
that award to builder of the sum withheld as
liquidated damages was proper.
145

G,

Board of Regents of the University of Texas
Construction Co., 529 S.W. 2d 90 (1975).

v.

S.

&

.
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IjSsue:

Decision

Did Appellant breach the contract?
Yes

;

Reasoning
1
Builder's decision to stay on the
30 b despite breach of contract, in failing to prov ide builder with "correct plans and
specifications
and additional instructions and detail drawings
were necessary to carry out the work" as requiredas
by
contract was not a waiver or basis for an estoppel
to assert builder's claim for damages for such
breach
and (2) If a party breaches its contract, the other
party is put to an election of continuing or ceasing
performance; any action indicating an intention to
continue will operate as a conclusive choice, not
depriving injured party of his cause of action for
breach which has already taken place, but depriving
him only of any excuse for ceasing performance on his
own part.
:

(

)

A proposal to accept an offer which contains terms
differing from the offer is a rejection of the offer.

This

was the rule of law in Board of Governors, Etc, v. Buildings
Systems, Etc

146
.

Facts
In May of 1972 the board of governors of the
university authorized the construction of a 257-unit
apartment structure to be built on the campus. Bids
were solicited and received. The scheduled closing
time for receiving bids was 2 p.m., July 25, 1972.
The defendant Building Systems submitted the low bid
of $4,824,000.
In accordance with the plaintiff's
advertisements, Building Systems submitted a surety
bond executed by American Insurance Company in the
amount of five percent of the bid. On August 10,
1972, the board of governors passed a resolution
awarding the general contract to Building Systems
"subject to review and concurrence by the Department
and to the
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
day a letter
same
That
sale and delivery of bonds***."
:

,

146

Board of Governors v, Building Systems Housing Corporation, 233 N.W. 2d 195 (1975).
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- aS
nt to Build ing Systems informing it
of the
boerdf? s decision including the two
conditions.
The letter stated further:
.

As soon as the University receives approval
from the Department of Housing and Urban
Development in the award of this contract,
we will be in touch with you to make the
arrangements for executing the necessary

contract documents.

Although Building Systems advertised for the submission of subcontractor bids, it thereafter decided
not to continue with the project. By a letter dated
August 30 and received August 31, 1972, Building
Systems informed the board that it was withdrawing
its bid 'pursuant to the terms of the bid proposal
and the advertisement for bidders.' At that time,
the University had not received approval of defendant's
bid from HUD.
Thereafter, the plaintiff almost immediately informed
Building Systems that it considered the corporation's
conduct to be an anticipatory breach of the contract.
On September 8, 1972, the board awarded the general
contract to the second lowest bidder for $5,090,000.
Subsequently, the University demanded payment from
defendants of $266,000 damages measured by the difference between the defendant's bid and that of the
next lowest bidder.
Upon a refusal to pay, the
plaintiff instituted this suit. On April 19, 1974,
the trial court entered an order granting final
summary judgment in favor of the defendant surety,
American Insurance Company, and partial summary
judgment in favor of defendant Building Systems.
From this order, plaintiff appeals.
Issues

:

1.

2.

Decisions:

Was the bid an offer impliedly proposing
that the University make a conditional
promise as part of its acceptance?
Was the "withdrawal" of Building Systems
bid a breach of contract?
1.
2.

No.
No.

Reasoning:
(1) In order to establish a valid contract,
the offeree's acceptance must:

.

.
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ev ry r es Pect correspond substantially
f
with
identical
offer made
The acceptance must
be absolute and unconditional, and,
if
tions are attached or it differs from condithe offer,
the transaction amounts only to a
proposal
and a
counter proposal. 1 '*'
,,

,

.

7

(2) A proposal to accept an offer which
contains
varying from that of the offer is a rejection of terms
the
offer.
The surety contract provided for the termination of the surety's responsibility if the bid
should
be rejected or if the bid was accepted and a formal
contract was executed.
The offeree's acceptance was
conditioned upon, at the least, the sale and delivery
of financing bonds, constituted a counter— proposal
and thus a rejection.

The court held that an agreement by the Utah State

University to purchase common stock with public funds in its

possession and to pay

a

commission to

a

broker was ultra

vires and unenforceable, in First Equity Corp. of Florida v

.

Utah State University 14 8
.

Facts
Plaintiff is a stock broker who brought action
to recover commissions and other money lost as a
result of the refusal of state university to accept
and pay for common stock ordered by the Assistant
Vice President of Finance of Utah State University.
Lower courts granted summary judgment for the University.
Plaintiff appeals.
:

Does the University have the power to purchase
Issue
common stock with public funds in its possession?
:

Decision:

No.

^^Marshall Manufacturing
Co.

,

257 N.W.

148

714

Co. v. Berrien County Package

(1934)

First Equity Corp. of Florida v. Utah State University,

544 P 2d 887

(1975)

.

'
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Reasoning:
USU according to the court had no power
to enter into an agreement for the purchase
of common
stock.
It held that "the agreement to purchase and
pay commissions thereon are ultra vires agreements
and unenforceable,"
The court further pointed out that municipal corporaare not bound by contracts made without authority
or in excess of the power of the corporation.
'One
who deals with a municipal corporation does so at his
peril.

Action for damages to college campus allegedly loaned
under contract with City of New York for use by model cities

project could not be defeated on ground that executive order
of mayor which created model cities administration called

for approval of all contracts by mayor, in view of fact that

City, in its own suit papers, spoke of having "contracted"

with college was the holding in Barber-Scotia College, Inc
v.

City of New York

.

149
.

The plaintiff in this action, Barber-Scotia
Facts
College, Inc. ("Barber-Scotia") contracted with
Central Brooklyn Model Cities ("CBMC") to make
available Barber-Scotia s North Carolina campus for
Pursuant to
a summer educational program in 1972.
the agreement, CBMC sent more than 200 students and
faculty members to Barber-Scotia from June 28, 1972
This suit was begun to
until August 18, 1972.
recover the cost of repairs for damage allegedly
done to the college during the course of the summer
The defendant, City of New York, has moved
program.
The City argues that
to dismiss the complaint.
plaintiff's failure to file a notice of claim with
the Corporation Counsel within 90 days of the alleged
injury forecloses the action on the tort count of
:

'

149
F.

Barber-Scotia College, Inc.

Supp,

525

(1975)

v.

City of New York, 390

.

233

the complaint.
The plaintiff contends that its
failure to file a timely notice of claim is
no bar
to its action since the defendant is estopped,
by
reason of its settlement representations, from
asserting the failure. Moreover, plaintiff contends
that the purpose of the statute has been met since
the defendant received prompt actual notice of the
claim.

Issues

;

1
2

.

3.

Decisions

:

Is failure to file a timely notice of
claim a bar to plaintiff's action?
Was the purpose of the statute met?
Did Mayor have to approve contracts?
1.
2.
3.

No.
Yes.
No.

Reasoning
(1) It is clear from the communications
and actions that took place in August and September
1972 that representatives of the City were aware of
the claim.
Further, they indicated that they were
processing the claim.
Clearly the City had both
prompt notice of and an opportunity to investigate
the claim so that the legislative purpose of Section
50-e has been accomplished.
(2) Moreover, the
acknowledgment of the damage by CBMC's on-site representative and the September 14th letter from CMBM
were clearly relied upon by plaintiff as indications
For this
that the matter would in fact be settled.
reason, the plaintiff, which was unaware of any
claim-filing requirement, did not even engage an
attorney until much later when it became apparent
that the City was not going to pay for the damage.
Representations by City agents, on which plaintiff
relied, that the matter would be resolved, estop
the City from now asserting the plaintiff's failure
(3) The City
to file as a defense to the action.
on the ground
count
contract
also tried to defeat the
8 dated
Mayor
(No.
the
that the Executive Order of
Cities
Model
the
April 15, 1970), which created
Administration, calls for approval of all contracts
This argument was raised as an afterby the Mayor.
thought in a late addition to the City's reply memorThe argument fails since in its own papers
andum.
the City speaks of having "contracted" with the
plaintiff.
:

,

.
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In Curator of University of
Missouri v. Nebraska

Prestressed Concrete Co., the court defined
"quantum meruit"
as
as much as he has deserved
f^cts:
Quantum meruit action by plaintiff subcontractor against defendant subcontractor, general
contractor as principal on performance bond, and
surance company as surety, for work performed in inconstructing fieldhouse. The City of St. Louis
Circuit Court St. Louis City, Michael J. Scott, J,
entered judgment in favor of plaintiff subcontractor
for $67,000 and defendant subcontractor appealed.
The Court of Appeals, Gunn, J.
held that evidence
was sufficient to support finding that defendant subcontractor, which had contracted with plaintiff subcontractor for installation of precast concrete
exterior wall and seating units in fieldhouse and which
had obligation to provide suitable access work areas
for material and trucks, breached contract; that
plaintiff subcontractor was therefore entitled to
recover reasonable value of work and labor furnished;
but that award was excessive
,

Issue
Was plaintiff subcontractor entitled to
recover the reasonable value of work and labor
furnished for breach of his contract?
:

Decision
Yes.
Judgment for plaintiff on issue of
liability affirmed.
Issue on damages remanded.
;

Reasoning
(1) A quantum meruit action brought by
contractor, if contractor was prevented from completing
contract because of owner’s breach, contractor is
entitled to recover reasonable value of work and
labor furnished and in a quantum meruit action
brought by defaulting contractor, contractor's
recovery may be reduced, under proper pleading and
proof, by amount of damage his breach of contract may
have occasioned to owner; contractor may not recover
in excess of contract price in such a case.
(2) Merely walking off a job is not breach of contract
When owner, or someone standing in
as matter of law.
:
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Curator of University of Missouri v. Nebraska Prestressed Concrete Co., 526 S.W. 2d 903 (1975).
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his stead prevents contractor from completing performance/ contractor's failure to complete work is
excused, and he is not regarded as having breached
a contract; contractor, under such circumstances,
has right to sue on contract or in quantum meruit
for reasonable value of labor and work furnished.
,

The State University Construction Fund of New York

awarded a single rather than separate contracts for the

erection of a building at the State University campus at
Stony Brook.
v.

In Hvac and Sprinkler Contractors Ass'n,

The State University Construction Fund

,

Inc

the court upheld

the discretion of the Construction Fund to issue a single

contract.
.

.
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Facts
Plaintiff brought Article 78 proceeding challenging action of the State University Construction
Fund in seeking bids on entire building contract
rather than soliciting separate bids for each of the
specific subdivisions of work to be performed. The
Supreme Court held that the sections of the Education
law specifically permitting the Fund to award one
contract for all the work to be performed controlled
over the prior general statute which required the
state to solicit separate bids for each of the three
It also held that the
specific subdivisions of work.
Fund did not abuse its discretion in choosing to
award a single rather than separate contracts on the
theory that in a large size contract single contracting is prejudicial to small contractors.
:

Is Education Law 376 (7), L196 2c 251 void
Issue:
because it conflicts with State Finance Law Section

135?

Decision:

No.

Motion Dismissed.
Inc. v The
364 N.Y.S. 2d 422

^^Hvac and Sprinkler Contractors Ass'n.,
State University Construction Fund,
(1975)

.
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Reasoning
The court reasoned that it is a
matter
of hornbook statutory interpretation
that if two acts
cannot be read
harmony with each other, a prior
generai statute must yield to a later
specific one.
The legislature
approving Education Law section
J b (/) in 1962, certainly
was aware of State
Finance Law Section 135. By enacting the
Education
l e 9 islature created a specific
instance
which is controlling here.
;

m
m

.

!n

Green v

,

Richmond

,

the following concept of the law

of contract was held where there is disputed evidence
as to

the terms or performance of an orgal agreement, or meaning
of words used by the party, this matter should be left for

the jury.

Facts
An action in the nature of quantum meruit
against the personal representative of the estate
of decedent to recover for services rendered by the
plaintiff in reliance on the decedent's oral promise
to leave a will bequeathing his entire estate to her.
The Superior Court entered judgment for plaintiff and
defendant appeals.
:

Issue
Was the oral agreement illegal on the theory
that it included sexual intercourse or cohabitation
as part of the consideration?
:

Decision;

No.

Reasoning
The court indicated that the oral agreement involved a promise to make a will, and as such
was not binding.
However, if the oral agreement was
legal and not contrary to public policy, the plaintiff
could recover the fair value of her services. From
the totality of the evidence, the jury was warranted
in inferring that the illicit relations were not part
of the contract, and were not more than an incidental
part of the plaintiff’s performance.
:

152

Green v. Richmond, 337 N.E. 2d 691 (1975).
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In Board of Trustees of Howard
Community College v.

John

K.

Ruff,

Inc.

,

the court held that the Board of

Trustees of community college was agency of state
and
therefore doctrine of sovereign immunity applicable

to state

was also applicable to board; however, General Assembly

directly waived sovereign immunity of Board, but sovereign
immunity would still be defense, despite waiver, to suit

brought for money judgment in assumpsit under contract
against board unless funds were appropriated for that purpose or board could provide funds by taxation.'*' 5

'*

Facts
Early in April 1974 the Board invited general contractors to bid on the construction of a
Nurse Education Facility for the College under
designated terms, conditions and specifications.
Ruff was among those who responded to the invitation,
and its fixed-sum bid of $2,088,100 was accepted.
Thereupon, the Board and Ruff entered into a written
contract on 28 June 1974, using the American Institute of Architects standard form of agreement between
Owner and Contractor where the basis of payment
is a stipulated sum.
Included in the enumerated
documents was "Project Manual for General Construction Work for Nurse Education Facility, Howard
Community College, dated April 1, 1974, in its
entirety."
In establishing the fixed-price amount
of its bid, Ruff did not include any sums representing Maryland sales tax on the purchase of materials
for the construction of the facility, and the subcontractors who agreed with Ruff to perform part of
the work covered by Ruff’s contract with the Board,
Purdid not include any such sums in their bids.
Ruff
gave
Board
1.24.-02
the
Specification
to
suant
issued
been
had
It
08798.
No.
Certificate
Exemption
:

153

Board of Trustees of Howard Community College

John K. Ruff, Inc.,

366 A.

2d 360

(1976),

v.

.
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by the Comptroller of the Treasury on 13
April
and authorized exemption from payment of sales 1970
tax
on those purchases of taxable personal property
or
services purchased for use in carrying on the work
of the Board,
The construction of the facility
began.
Xt appeared thereafter that the facility construction
project was not exempt from Maryland sales tax. The
Comptroller of the Treasury so informed Ruff and its
subcontractors.
On 23 September 1975 the State filed
a tax lien against Ruff for sales tax due from
23 September through December 27, 1974, plus penalties
and interest, and the subcontractors, complaining
that they had bid on the basis of sales tax exemption,
demanded that Ruff adjust their contracts to include
additional sums for sales taxes paid and to be paid
by them.
The Board refused to increase the contract
sum to cover the sales tax paid and payable to complete the work under the contract. On 2 October 1975
Ruff instituted the declaratory judgment action against
the Board,
After Answer by the Board, Ruff moved
for summary judgment.
The court below granted the
motion and on 19 April 1976 made its declaration of
the rights of the parties.
The doctrine of sovereign
immunity was not considered.

Issues

;

Decisions

Was there a breach of contract?
Is money available to the Board in an
amount sufficient to satisfy a money
judgment for the sales tax?

1.
2.

:

1.

Yes.

2

Unknown

,

-

Remanded

Reasoning
(1) The agreement called for Ruff to
perform certain work for the Board at a stipulated
sum, arrived at by Ruff and accepted by the Board
on the Board's assurance written into the contract,
that no sales tax would be payable by Ruff on
materials purchased to perform the work, The charge
on Ruff to pay sales tax on such materials breached
Ruff was entitled to damages payable
the contract.
by the Board in the amount of the sales tax paid by
Ruff to the State or to its subcontractors for the
sales tax they were obliged to pay on such materials
of sovereign
(2) If funds are available, the waiver
a money
for
action
immunity is complete and an
:

,
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judgment for breach of the contract
would lie.
n the other hand, if funds are
not available,
such action would be precluded by
the application
t
d0< tr:Lne ° f sov ereign immunity.
As we are
°L ^?
:
not
able to
resolve the issue on the record before
us, we remand the case under Rule
871 a for
proceedings as if no appeal had been taken. further
1

Where plaintiffs contracted for right of first
refusal
for five years and vendors then accepted
offer from college
to purchase but, when college learned of agreement
with
plaintiffs, offer of sale and acceptance were withdrawn by

mutual consent and college then leased premises for term

which would extend until plaintiff's right of first refusal
had expired, and for $10,000 college was given exclusive

option to purchase, this $10,000 payment to be credited on

purchase price, there was contract denominated lease in
hope of circumventing plaintiff's right, and plaintiff's

right of first refusal was activated; specific performance
was appropriate remedy was the holding in Quigley v.
154
^
i
Capalongo
.

Facts
Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court
in favor of defendants, entered March 26, 1975 in
Tompkins County, upon a decision of the court at a
Trial Term, without a jury.
In July, 1967, the
defendant-owners sold to the plaintiffs certain
land in the City of Ithaca, and, pursuant to the
agreement, it was further provided with respect to
the property presently in dispute that if defendants
receive a bona fide written offer for the purchase of
this property during a period of five years, they
:
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Quigley v. Capalongo, 383 N.Y.S. 2d 935 (1976).
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would offer the property to plaintiffs on the same
terms and conditions.
In April, 1968, defendantowners accepted an offer from Defendant Ithaca
College to purchase the property in question for
$47,000.
However, when the College learned of the
agreement with plaintiffs, the offer of sale and
acceptance were withdrawn by mutual consent.

With the agreement with plaintiffs in mind, the
owners and the College entered into a lease of the
premises for a term running from July, 1968, to
June 30, 1973.
The term of the lease was thus to
run until after the plaintiffs' right of first
refusal expired.
Ithaca College was further given,
in consideration of the sum of $10,000 paid by them
upon execution of the lease, an exclusive option to
purchase the premises between January 1, 1973 and
the end of the lease for $47,000, against which the
The lease called
$10,000 payment would be credited.
for rental of $1,000 per year and contained a covenant that the owners would not sell or transfer the
premises to anyone other than the College during the
It is conceded that plaintiffs were
term of the lease.
never notified of any of these transactions. The
College exercised its option in June of 1973, but
prior to transfer of title, plaintiffs commenced this
action seeking specific performance of the agreement
to give them the right of first refusal.
Issues:

1.
2.

Decisions:

Was there a breach of contract?
Should specific performance be decreed
in favor of the plaintiff?
1.
2.

Yes.
Yes.

Reasoning:
(1) A right of first refusal is an option
to buy conditioned on the seller's willingness to
It is not an absolute agreement to sell to
sell.
the optionee, but merely an agreement that should the
owner receive a bona fide offer to purchase the
property during the term of the option, he will not
accept the offer without giving the optionee the
right of first refusal. There was a breach of
Defendant-owners, as the court found,
contract.
Ithaca
desired and intended to sell their property to
foreclosed
were
and
1968
College, a willing buyer, in
plaintiffs.
from doing so only by the contract with

'
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While plaintiffs' right to purchase the
property
1 ht neVer have ripened into
an absolute one,
5
?
J
defendant-owners owed them the obligation of
dealinq
in good faith.
Defendants breached that obligation
y entering into a contract, denominated a lease in
the hope of circumventing plaintiffs'
rights, but
which, upon examination of all the facts
and circumstances of this case actually reduced the
present intention of selling the property defendants'
to a contract under which the actual transfer of title
would
be postponed.
(2) In the circumstances of this case
it formalized defendant-owners' intention to
sell
the premises in response to the offer by defendant
Ithaca College, thus activating plaintiffs' right
first refusal.
Since the College participated in
these transactions with full knowledge of plaintiffs
rights, specific performance, upon tender by
plaintiffs of such amounts as have been paid and
would be required to be paid by the College, is an
appropriate remedy.
In

Trustees of Stigmatine Fathers, Inc

.

,

the court

ruled that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

denying motion for relief from judgment, declaring that
contract for purchase of plaintiff's land and building by
state for educational purposes was valid, and that neither
the Governor nor the Secretary of Administration and Finance

was authorized to decline, as matter of discretion, to allot

necessary funds, on ground that appraisal of property was
insufficient, when no issue was raised with respect to such

appraisal until a year after the trial and then was asserted
as an afterthought.

155

Plaintiff filed a bill in equity seeking
Facts
enforcement of a contract for purchase of his property
by the state for educational purposes, when the
;

155

Trustees of Stigmatine Fathers, Inc. v. Secretary of
Administration and Finance, 341 N.E, 2d 662 (1976).

.
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Secrecy of Administration and Finance refused
to
allot appropriated funds in
contravention of a
declarin 9 tha t the contract was valid
and that neither the Governor nor the
Secretary of
Administration and Finance was authorized
to decline
mat r
diSGretion
-Hot
the necessary
?und.
TH
he Su P e rior Court entered judgment
?
for the
_^
plaintiffs.
The defendant appealed raising for
the
first time the issue that the appraisal
report
was not acceptable on its face.
'

^

'

.

*

Issue:
May an issue be raised for the first time
before the Supreme Judicial Court?

Decision

No

:

Reasoning
The court held that an issue may not be
raised for the first time before the Supreme Judicial
Court,
The appraisal in the present case was required by statute in connection with a voluntary
purchase rather than a taking by eminent domain,
and rules of evidence and damages are not directly
applicable to it. The purpose was to provide a
check on the judgment of the acquiring agency to
verify the reasonableness of a negotiated value.
We think it was sufficient if the appraisal provided the kind of evidence on which reasonable persons are accustomed to rely in the conduct of
serious affairs.
:

The Refrigeration Company which assertedly had not

been paid for air-conditioning unit which it installed on

premises of college was not entitled to punitive damages in
absence of evidence sufficient to establish that persons
who purported to act for the college had actual or apparent

authority to contract for the college was the holding in
Tuskegee Institute v. May Refrigeration Company, Inc.
156

156

Tuskegee Institute v. May Refrigeration Co., Inc.,

344 So.

2d 156

(1977)

.
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Refrl 9 eratlon Company installed
an
fffzf’
air conditioning unit at
Tuskegee Institute but
was never paid for it.
Nevertheless, Tuskegee
" ae
lfc
May filed suit against
usKegee and its
Tuskegee
i?^ agents.
?
A jury awarded $2 975
compensatory damages, and $3 500
damaaes
Tuskegee appealed, and the Court punitive
of Civil Appeals'
V
ldin9 th
thS eVldenCe was insufficient
to sh^
show that
; h a? any employee of
Tuskegee had actual
h° rity t0 bind ita
P e
Plaintiff con?end? h
lt U
1Shed an air ” cond itioning system
fof?hp
for the ff
defendant, Tuskegee Institute, said
conditioning system having been contracted airfor in
writing by and between plaintiff and defendant,
hel1 an employee of Tuskegee Institute;
^
that the defendant,
Tuskegee Institute ratified the
action of the defendant, Wiliam B. Shell,
in
ora conversations between representatives of various
the
plaintiff and representatives of the defendant,
Tuskegee Instiute, including but not limited to,
the
defendants, William B. Shell and T. J. Pinnock.
Plaintiff further contends that all work, labor
and materials agreed to be furnished or performed
by the plaintiff have been furnished or performed
in full.
Plaintiff contends that the defendants,
William B. Shell, T. J. Pinnock and Tuskegee Institute,
have conspired to defraud the plaintiff; and in
fact the defendants, Shell, Pinnock and Tuskegee
Institute, never intended to pay the plaintiff for
the air-conditioning system provided by it.
*

f

^ f-^
/^
'

.

Issue
Could plaintiff ratify Pinnock and Shell's
acts even though the evidence was 'insufficient to
show' that they had "actual or apparent authority to
bind him"?
;

Decision

Yes.

:

Reasoning
It is apparent that this Court, In City
Stores recognized that if a principal has knowledge
of acts performed on its behalf, even though unauthorized, then the principal can ratify those
acts, was the reasoning of the court.
Where a person
acts for another who accepts or retains the benefits
or proceeds of his efforts with knowledge of the
material facts surrounding the transaction, such other
:

,
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de

arh f

emploved

.

t ° haVS ratified the
raethods

eVen though innocent,

L”°v'

the
tim^disclaim^responsibility^or" "the^ #t
e

he

applies
r rected
effected

Were acquired

f
,

-

S

^

T his generaT principle

eXan S
t0 an unauthorized^ contract
an unauthorized
l vif '•
sale or lease of nroDerf-v
n aUth0riZed l0an procured on

behalf
Sft the
the°princiD
principle
i
or purported principal.
if
the
agent procures a contract by
fraudulent or corrupt
practices, although the principal
privy in any way to such conduct has not been
of his agent, yet
6 benefit of the contract, he
must
take it tamed as it may be with
such practices.

^

Where court annulled award of contract
for amusement
games for Community College, award of
the contract
to

petitioner as the only other bidder would have
been an
improper usurpation of administrative role by
prohibiting
Community College and Faculty Student Association
from

exercising their discretionary power of rejecting all
bids
and readvertising was the holding in DeBonis v. Hudson
Valiev

Community College

1

c

7

.

Facts:
The Faculty Student Association of Hudson
Valley Community College (hereinafter FS A
advertised
for bids on "skill and amusement games."
The "Information for Bidders" with respect thereto provided
that bids would be received by the Board of Trustees
of the Hudson Valley Community College (hereinafter
that bids should be addressed to James J.
HVCC)
Fitzgibbons, President of HVCC, and that no contractor to whom the contract was awarded could assign, transfer or otherwise dispose of his right,
title or interest therein without the previous
consent in writing of HVCC. Both the "Information
for Bidders" and the advertisement for bids provided
that the Board of Trustees reserved the right to reject
)

;

DeBonis v. Hudson Valley Communtiy College,
389 N.Y.S.

2d 647

(1976)

.
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anY a d a11 bids

and to waive all formalities
f ° rm to be ut ilized
theVdrf*
he bidders to fill in the percentage required
of
revenues from the amusement games which the
they would
r eb ln
Petitioner filled in 39 percent while
.
T
^
C
eW1
ing business as Lewis Amusements,
+-K
S-??
the only other
bidder, filled in 50 percent and
added at the bottom of its bid that it would
guarantee FSA a minimum of $14,000 per year.
The
contract was awarded to Lewis and petitioner began
this proceeding to have the award of the
contract
annulled and to have itself declared to be the
lowest responsible bidder within the meaning of
section 103 of the General Municipal Law and, therethe successful bidder.
Special Term annulled
the award of the contract and remanded the matter
to HVCC and James Fitzgibbons as president of FSA.
w

^

J

'

*

‘

>

Issue
Is the award of the contract governed by
section 103 of the General Municipal Law?
:

Decision

Yes.

;

Reasoning
HVCC so united itself with the FSA in the
advertising for bids and awarding of the contract that
section 103 applies. While section 103 mandates
the contract being awarded to the lowest responsible
bidder, where a bidder substantially varies his bid
from the specifications it cannot be considered in
determining the lowest responsible bid. While General
Municipal Law section relating to award of public work
contracts mandates the contract being awarded to lowest responsible bidder, where bidder substantially
varies his bid from specification it cannot be considered in determining lowest responsible bid.
;

In conclusion, eighteen of the 100 cases were in

the area of institution related cases.

These cases in-

volved issues in six out of the eight areas of contract.
Thus, the related area with the fewest cases

(having four

cases less than the student related cases) covered the

largest number of areas in relation to the areas of the law
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of contract in issue.

it involved one more
area than the

student related ones, leaving
the areas of Fraud,
Mistake
and Duress, and the Statute
of Frauds as the only
ones
not so treated (Re:
Table 3, page 247).
A graphic representation
of the distribution of the
percentage of student issues, in
the 100 cases in higher
education as briefed in this chapter,
to the areas of
contract is found in Figure
3, page 243.

Massachusetts General Laws
Public Higher Education
Public higher education as one segment of
the

governmental system in the Commonwealth is
of statute.

a

creature

As such, the financial basis for its

operation is found in the Massachusetts Constitution,
Article 63, sec.

1.

All revenue collected through an in-

stitution of public higher education with the exception
of its trust funds are paid into the general fund.

Restrictions on administrative officers in government
and institutions of public higher education in making a

permanent contract are set forth in Ch. 29, sec. 27.
M.G.L.A., Ch. 29, sec. 29 provides for Interchanging
Funds.

Section 29A provides for:

Rules and regulations

regarding employment and compensation of consultants; forms;
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TABLE

3

ANALYSIS OP 18 INSTITUTION-RELATED
CASES ACCORDING TO
THE AREAS OF THE LAW OF CONTRACT
IN ISSUE

Source:

100 Cases

:
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Figure 3.
Distribution of the percentage of
institutional issues in the 100 cases.

Legend

2.

Expressed or Implied
Offer and Acceptance

3.

Consideration

4.

Capacity

5.

Fraud, Mistake, Duress

6.

Illegality

7.

Statute of Frauds

8

Performance and Breach

1.

.
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contracts; payments; and restrictions.

The payment of

faculty salaries and annuity contracts as part
of the
employment contract are set forth in section 31 of

Chapter 29.

Department of Education
M.G.L.A.

,

Ch.

15,

—Board
sec.

1

of Higher Education

establishes the Depart-

ment of Education in the Commonwealth.

in this depart-

ment, section 1A of this Chapter establishes the Board of

Higher Education while section ID defines its purpose,
powers and duties.

Subsequent sections of Chapter 15 set

forth the organizational structure of public higher
education.

Universities
University of Massachusetts

.

Chapter 75, sec.

1,

of the M.G.L. sets forth the status and governing body
of the University of Massachusetts.

This section creates

autonomous authority in the University.

The power of the

trustees of the University of Massachusetts are set forth
in section 2.

The administrative functions of the Board

of Trustees are set forth in sections

3

and 3A.

Section

3A provides for the delegation of the trustees' authority
or of any portion of it to the president or other officers

of the University.

This signatory power to contract may

be delegated by the trustees to the president or other

officers of the University whenever in their judgment such

.
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delegation may be necessary or
desirable.
So utheastern M ass achusetts
University
7

5B

*

'

sec

*

1

.

Chapter

of the M.G.L. sets forth the
educational

programs; degrees; status; and governing
body of the
university.
Section 3 provides for the delegation of

authority by the trustees to the president or
any
officer of the university whenever in their
judgment such
a delegation may be necessary or desirable.
Thus, the
trustees have the statutory power to delegate the

contractural right to the president or other officer of
the university.

University of Lowell.

Chapter 75A.

,

sec.

1

of the

M.G.L. sets forth the purposes; status; and governing

body of the University of Lowell.

Section 1A provides

for the delegation of authority of the Board of Trustees.

This section provides for the general delegation of their

authority to the president or any officer of the university whenever in their judgment such delegation may be
necessary.

Therefore, their contractual rights may be

delegated
State Colleges

Chapter 73 of the M.G.L. provides for the State
Colleges.

Section

1

of this Chapter defines the manage-

ment; administration of the State College System.

It pro-

.
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vides for the delegation of
contractural authority to
the Director of the Division of
State Colleges or to the
officers of the State Colleges whenever
in their judgment
such delegation may be necessary or
desirable.
Section
14 defines the contractural power of
the Board of

Trustees
Regional Community

Colleges

Chapter 15, sec. 27 of the M.G.L. provides for
the establishment of the Massachusetts Board of Regional

Community Colleges in the Department of

Education.

At the same time, it removes the Board from the control of
the Department of Education.

Section 29 delineates the

duties of the Board and vests contractural power within
it as this section provides for self-governance by the

Board of Regional Community Colleges and the exercise
of such authority customarily and traditionally exercised

by governing boards of institutions of higher learning.

"

.

.

.

.

.
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Law of Contract

A contract may be defined to be a
transaction between
two or more persons, in which each party
comes under an obli-

gation to the other and each reciprocally acquires
to whatever is promised by the other. 158

a

right

it is a promise

or a set of promises to which the law attaches a legal
obli159
gation
The "requirements of a bargain" under section 19
.

of the Restatement, Contract now provide that "the formation
of a contract requires a bargain in which there is a mani-

festation of mutual assent to the exchange and
tion
.

.

.

a

considera-

,,160

The essential elements of a contract are a(n):
(1)

offer and acceptance

(mutual assent);

the parties to contract;
tion;

(4)

capacity of

valid (sufficient) considera-

(3)

legal agreement (not declared void by statute or

common law);
,
„
Frauds

(2)

writing, if required by the Statute of

(5)

161

Contracts, traditionally, have been classified as:
(1)

"formal" and
158
159
16 0

161
162

(2)

"informal."

Dartmouth College

v.

Ibid

Ibid

.

,

sec

.

7-11

,

"Formal" contracts are:

Woodward

Restatement, Contracts
Ibid., Restatement

162

,

sec.

sec.
19.

4

1

Wheat

518

(1819)

.

.
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(1)

contracts under seal;

(2)

recognizances (certain under-

takings such as bail bonds); and
ments.

16 3

(3)

negotiable instru-

All other contracts are "informal"
contracts. 164

The intent of the parties to a contract
must be determined from the fair construction of the
contract as a whole.
Justice, common sense and the probable
intent of the parties
are guides in the court's construction of
a written agreement.
If the words of a contract are plain and
free from

ambiguity, they must be construed in accordance
with the

ordinary and usual meaning. 165
The construction of words in a carefully drawn docu-

ment may be affected by various use of words in another part
of the document.

If there is a question in ambiguous

language, it is a question of law for the court to deter-

If general words come after specific words in enumera-

tions describing a legal subject, the general words will be

construed to include only the subjects similar in nature to
those objects listed by the specific words. 16 7
163
164

165

The literal

Ibid
Ibid

Fried v. Fried, 368 N.E. 2d 1222.

(1977),

166

Fried v. Fried.

167

Dickinson v. Riverside Iron Works, Inc., 372 N.E

2d 1302

(1978)

.

.
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interpretation of any word or phrase in

a

contract may be

qualified by the context in which it
appears.

This includes

the general purpose manifested by the
entire contract and by
the circumstance existing at the time
the contract was
168
executed.
when a provision with a well-established meaning is contained in a contract, that clause,
rather than any

supposed intentions of the parties gleaned from an
analysis
of the other provisions, determines the obligations
of the
169

parties

Generally, the law existing at the time an agreement
is made enters into and becomes part of the agreement.

Laws

enacted after the execution of the agreement are not commonly considered to be a part of the agreement unless its pro-

visions clearly establish that the parties intended to in-

corporate subsequent enactments into their agreement. 170
When the words of a contract are clear, they alone de-

termine the meaning of the contract.
is ambiguous,

When the contract term

the meaning of the contract is ascertained from

the intent of the parties as manifested by the contract's

terms and the circumstances surrounding its creation.
16 8

109
(1978)

Dickenson v. Riverside Iron Works, Inc.
Erhard v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 372 N.E. 2d 1277

.

17

°Feakes v. Bozyczko, 369 N.E. 2d 978

171
2d 688

171

Merrimack Valley National Bank

(1977)

.

v.

(1977).

Baird, 363 N.E.
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Generally, a writing is construed
against the author of the
doubtful language if the circumstances
surrounding its use
and the ordinary meaning of the words
do not indicate the
intended meaning of the language. The
author of the am-

biguous terms is generally held to any
reasonable interpretation which is attributed to the term which is
relied upon
by the other party. 172

Rules of construction of a contract are designed to

elucidate the intent of the parties to the written instrument.
at,

173

Where the contracts are openly and fairly arrived

the enforcement of them will not be denied because of

hardship to one of the parties. 174

Expressed and Implied Contracts
An expressed contract is a contract which results from
the words expressed either orally or in writing by the par175
ties.
It is an agreement between two or more competent

parties for a consideration to do or not to do
thing.

17 6

172
171
174

175
176

106

a

lawful

Common law has repeatedly held that an express

Merrimack Valley National Bank

v.

Baird.

Emery v. Crowley, 359 N.E. 2d 1256 (1976).
Lydon v. Allstate Ins. Co., 359 N.E. 2d 316 (1977).
M.G.L. Ch. 259, sec.

1.

Segal v. Allied Mutual Insurance Co., 285 Mass.

(1934).
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contract results from the "meeting of
the minds" of the
parties, i.e., it must appear that the
parties have agreed
177
to do some specific thing.
However, it should be noted
that a person who signs a written agreement,
which he

has not

read, and, therefore, who is ignorant of the
contents, may
in the absence of mutual mistake or fraud, be
held liable

according to the terms of the writing.

The acceptor of a

negotiable bill of exchange may be held to pay the bill by
the nolder who negotiated the bill before it was accepted.17 ^

Contracts which the law requires to be in writing are:
(1)

checks,

(4)

deeds,

bills of exchange,

(2)
(5)

bills of lading,

(3)

(6)

ceipts and similar instruments.
sec.

5,

negotiable notes,

negotiable warehouse reUnder M.G.L.A. ch. 259

the promise part of the will agreement is required to

be in writing.
In an expressed contract,

the mutual assent is demon-

strated in words, oral or written,

monly referred to as
to the contract.

a

"Mutual assent" is com-

"meeting of the minds" of the parties

In other words,

the parties to the contract

are both agreeing to the same thing at the same time.
177
17

(1908)

Lydon v. Allstate Ins. Co.

^McNamara v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 83 N.E. 878

.

17

^Arpin v. Owens,

3

N.E. 25

(1885).

2

.

.
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By

meeting of the minds" of the parties to the
con-

tract, it is meant that usually one party has
made an offer,

sufficiently definite to be understandable and performable,
intending contractual responsibility. 180
s *-iH

outstanding

,

This offer, while

has been accepted in all substantial par-

ticulars by the offeree within a proper time. 181
Implied contracts arise from the conduct of the
parties.
(1)

There are two types of implied contracts:

implied in law and

(2)

implied in fact. 182

There are

legal duties created or fixed by law which one person may

owe to another

for

the violation of which the plaintiff's

remedy is by an action of contract.
in law contracts, e.g.,

These are the implied

if a person supplies to a minor

child necessaries, which the parent being able has refused
or neglected to supply to the child, he may recover from
the parent the fair value of the necessaries in an action
of contract.

18 3

The reason here being that the law imposes

the duty on the parent to pay for the necessaries, regardless of the parent's will or intention.

184

180

M.G.L. cc. 105, 106 and 108.

181

Kelley v. Weiss, 102 N.E. 2d 93 (1951)

18

2d 18

National Shawmut Bank

v.

There are other

Fidelity Ins. Co., 61 N.E.

(1945)

188

Stinson v. Meegan, 67 N.E. 465 (1946).

184

Broman et al. v. Byrne, 78 N.E. 2d 616 (1948).

.
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certain circumstances under which,
either to prevent the
unjust enrichment of a person at the
expense of another or
as a matter of policy, the law
implies a contract.
Such

instances in which a contract has been held
to be implied
law are:
(1) a situation in which there was a
voluntary
185
payment of money;
(2) where an agreed purchaser has been
allowed to enter and occupy the premises pending the
execu-

m

tion of a deed and the real property is destroyed
without
the fault of either party so that the contract is discharged; 18 6
*

,

,

_

(3)

a

situation in which the person waived the

tort and sued in contract; 18 7 and

(4)

a

situation in which

there was liability for the value of property conveyed or
services rendered under unenforceable contracts. 188
ch.

sec.

198,

1

M.G.L.

charges the expense of funeral and last

sickness against the estate of the deceased person. 189
"Implied in law" contracts are sometimes called quasi

contracts

.

They are referred to as quasi contracts because

there is no "mutual assent" but to avoid inequities and

unjust enrichment, the law implies
18

promise to pay for the

^Sciaraffa v. Debler, 23 N.E. 2d 111 (1939).

186
18

a

Butterf ield v. Byron, 27 N.E. 13

^Welsch v. Palumbo, 73 N.E. 2d 844

(1891).
(1947).

188

Cromwell v. Norton, 79 N.E. 433 (1906).

189

Counelis v. Counelis, 54 N.E. 2d 177

(1944).

.
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benefits or services rendered even though
no such promise
was ever made. 190
"Implied in fact" contracts

are real con-

tracts.

The promises of the parties are inferred
from their

acts or conduct alone, not in the spoken or
written word.
The "mutual assent" is based on conduct rather
than words. 191

The plaintiff who seeks to be paid for a benefit
conferred
on the defendant under an "implied in fact" contract has
the

burden of proving that at the time of conferring the benefit
he expected to be paid for it and that the defendant expected
to pay, or, as a reasonable person, ought to have expected to
pay 192
If a party supplied to another party labor and ma-

terials under a supposed express contract which does not

exist because of mutual mistake, an action of contract may
be maintained to recover the fair value of such labor and

materials. 193

Cooper v. Cooper (17 N.E. 892) is a case

where a woman went through
thought was legal.

a

marriage ceremony which she

She cohabitated with her spouse and

performed the duties of her relation.

On his death, she

learned that he had a wife at the time of their marriage.
l

90

191

Butterfield v. Byron,
Ibid., Restatement

,

27 N.E.

sec.

667

(1891).

5.

l92

Hobbs v. Massasoit Whip Co., 33 N.E. 495

l91

Lonquist

v.

Lammi, 134 N.E. 255

(1922)

(1893).

.
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The court held that she could not recover
the fair value
of her services.

Offer and Acceptance
The primary requirement of a contract is that
the

parties to it show their mutual assent to the same
bargain
at the same time to each other.

This manifestation is

usually in the form of an offer and an acceptance

.

^

An

offer may be defined as a proposal by one party to the other

thereby demonstrating an intention to enter into a valid
contract, and creating a power in the offeree to create

a

contract between the parties by an appropriate acceptance.' 95
'

1

There are three essential elements of a legally sufficient
offer.

They are:

tual intent;
(3)

(1)

manifestation of

a

present contrac-

certainty and definiteness in terms; and

(2)

communication of the offer to the offeree. 196

son who makes the offer is known as the offeror.

The perThe person

to whom the offer is made is termed the offeree.

The conduct or words used in the offer must be words
of offer rather than mere words of preliminary negotiations,
194

Ibid., Restatement

^^Vickery
196

v.

,

sec.

22.

Ritchie, 88 N.E. 835

(1909).

Michael Chevrolet Inc. v. Institution For Savings,

72 N.E.

2d 514

(1947)

9
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i.e.,

invitations to the second party to make an
offer.
The words themselves must evidence a
present intent to
197
contract.
The offer must be more than an advertisement
or an offer to negotiate.
It must be outstanding and unrevoked when the acceptance is attempted. 198
If the offer does not state a time in which
it can be

accepted, it will remain open for a reasonable time. 199

What is a reasonable time is relative to the nature of the

contract and the circumstances

9

The surrounding circum-

stances may indicate that the words used did not manifest
an intent to contract, e.g., extravagant proposals made in

fun or in a state of emotion obvious to the recipient of
the proposal do not manifest a contractual intent even if

the words used would otherwise be sufficient words of an
201
offer.
The more definite the proposal, the more likely
it will be construed to be an offer.

The terms of the offer

must be sufficiently clear and complete so that the court
may determine what the parties were intending and can fix
197
198

(1953)

199

Kerwin v. Donaghy, 59 N.E. 2d 299

Kuzmeskus v. Pickup Motor Co., Inc., 115 N.E. 2d 461
.

Boston

^"Loring
^ 91

(1945).

&

v.

M.

R.

Co. v. Bartlett,

City of Boston,

Thurston v. Tornton,

1

7

3

Mete.

Cush. 89

Cush. 224
409

(1843)

(1854).

(1849).
.
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damages in the event of

a

non-performance. 202

four essential terms to a valid offer:

contract;
price.

(4)

(2)

subject matter;

(1)

There are

parties to the

time for performance; and

(3)

These essential terms must appear either in
the

express agreements of the parties or by reasonable implication

.

An offer is enforceable even if it doesn't spell out
the essential terms, if it makes reference to some objec-

tive standard to fill in the missing terms. 202

This is

said to be an offer capable of being made certain.
The offer must be communicated to the offeree.

It

is the communication of the offer which generates the power

of acceptance in the offeree. 204

The offer may be revoked at any time prior to acceptance.

The revocation must be communicated to the offeree. 2 05

If the offer states a time in which the offer will remain

open, it may still be revoked as long as the revocation is

communicated to the offeree.

206

If the offer is under seal,

it may not be revoked in violation of such an agreement.

Ibid., Restatement
203
20

,

sec.

32.

,

sec.

23.

U.C.C. sec. 1-203.

^Ibid., Restatement

202

Brauer v. Shaw, 46 N.E. 617

206

Sears v. Eastern R. Co., 14 Allen 433

(1897).
(1867).
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This is also true

if,

instead of a contract under seal, the

offeror has agreed to keep the offer open
for a considera.

.

tion.

207

Acc_ept ance may be defined as a voluntary
act on the

part of the one to whom the offer is made, through
the

medium of which the offeree exercises the power to create
contract which was conferred upon him by the offeror.

a

208

An offer may be accepted only by the offeree (the person to

whom the offer is made)

Offers made to specified persons

.

are personal to the offeree and may not be transferred to

third person. 209
by anyone.

An offer made to the public may be accepted

Two exceptions to the requirements for

acceptance are:

a

(1)

options, and

(2)

a

valid

undisclosed principles.

An offer is revocable until accepted, but a paid-for option
is not.

A paid-for option is treated as a completed contract
in which the offeror has bound himself not to revoke for a

given period.
for the offer

If the offeree has given any consideration

(normal value), it becomes an option.

This

option is a completed contract in which the offeror has
?D7
2

08

O'Brien

v.

Boland, 44 N.E. 602

Ibid., Restatement

,

sec.

(1896).

52.

2°°Putnam v. Grace, 37 N.E. 166 (1894).

.
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bound himself not to revoke the offer and this effectively

destroys his right and power to do so. 210

Such a contract

is not terminated by the death of the offeror.

A gratuitous

option (no consideration paid or recited) is treated as an

ordinary offer, revocable by the offeror at any time, even
though he expressly promises not to revoke.
A recital of consideration is not conclusive, however,
the modern tendency is to construe the recital as a promise
to pay the sum stated, e.g.,

"in consideration of $5.00 in

hand paid, receipt of which is acknowledged." 211
The acceptance must conform to the terms of the
offer.

212

If the acceptance varies substantially from the

terms of the offer, it will fail as an acceptance and serve
as a rejection of the offer.

213

This attempted acceptance

may serve as a new offer (counteroffer)

214
.

The offer once

rejected cannot be revived by an attempted acceptance.

215

An acceptance will not be insufficient because it adds some

addition to or modification in the offer, if it appears
210
2

Ibid., Restatement

^ Ibid

212

.

,

Restatement

,

sec.

47.

,

sec.

89B(1).

Putnam v. Grace.

213

Moss v. Old Colony Trust Co., 140 N.E. 803
214

Champlin v. Jackson, 58 N.E. 2d 757
215

Peretz v. Watson, 324 N.E. 2d 908

(1945)

(1975).

(1923).

:
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from the acceptance that the offeree
intends unequivocally
to accept the offer according to the
terms of it, whether
his suggestions are acceded to or not by the
offeror. 21 ^
Mc Cullough v. Eagle Ins. Co. in 1822 held that
when an

offer was sent by mail, and an acceptance was mailed
by the
offeree, the contract was not formed until the acceptance
was received by the offeror. 217

Subsequently the issue of when an acceptance is effective arose

m

Brauer v. Shaw

.

°

In this case,

it was

unnecessary for the court to decide on the facts, whether
or not the acceptance took effect when sent.

However, the

court said it took the view of the Supreme Court in Taylor
v.

Merchants' Fire Ins. Co 219
.

In this case, the court

stated
The unqualified acceptance by' one of the terms
proposed by the other, transmitted by due course
of mail, is regarded as closing the bargain acceptance .220
It is believed that this dictum has generally represented

21

^Nelson v. Hamlin, 155 N.E. 18

217

McCullough v. Eagle Ins. Co.,

218

Brauer v. Shaw.

21

(1927).
1

Pick. 278

(1822).

^Taylor v. Merchants' Fire Ins. Co., 13 L. Ed. 187

(1850).

220

Taylor v. Merchants Fire Ins. Co.

^
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the law of the Commonwealth. 221

clear.

In Lenox v. Murphy

,

However, the issue is not

the court said:

There is no universal doctrine of the
common
as understood in this Commonwealth,
that
acceptance of an offer must be communicated in
order to make a valid simple contract.
law,

Parties in some instances may agree on the essential
terms
of the contract but also agree that the binding
contract

shall await the subsequent formal written expression of

their agreement.

The language used by them and their inher-

ent intent will determine whether they are instantly bound
or whether they have post-enforceable rights and obligations

until a formal contract is drawn up and executed by them.

^3

The doctrine of substantial performance applies only
to bilateral contracts in which the parties have agreed to

exchange performances without making either performance

expressly conditional upon the other or in the occurrence
_

.

of a particular event.

?

94

The act of acceptance which is called for by the offer

may be either an overt act on the part of the offeree, or
the giving of a promise to perform.
9 91x

Bishop v. Eaton,

^^Lenox

v.

Murphy,

Historically, contracts

37 N.E.

665

(1894).

50 N.E.

644

(1898).

223

Louis M. Herman Co. Inc. v. Gallagher Electrical Co.
Inc.,

138 N.E.

^^Creed

v.

2d 120

Apog,

(1956).
376 N.E.

2d 154

(1978)

.
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have been defined as:
e s -t a ten\ent

fe-

.

,

Second

,

(1)

"unilateral" and

(2)

"bilateral."

abolishes this categorization but most

courts still utilize the terms.

A unilateral contract may

be defined as a contract in which the offer requires the
P®^ f omittance of an act as the bargained— f or consideration.

Such an offer can usually be accepted only by doing the act.
In an unilateral contract, once the offeree accepts, all

the executory duties are on one side

(the offeror's)

.

After

an acceptance, if there are executory duties on both sides,

then the contract is what is termed a bilateral contract.

A bilateral contract is where the offer calls for the giving
of a promise as the bargained-f or consideration.

A bilateral

contract gives immediate rights as well as complete protection to both parties, since a contract arises as soon as
the offeree gives the counter promise.

The offer for an

unilateral contract does not mature into
the requested act is completed.

a

contract until

Until then, there is no

binding contract to protect the parties' rights.
tion by the offeree terminates the offer.

A rejec-

The offeree's

power of acceptance is at an end when he rejects the offer.
If the offeree attempts to accept following his prior rejec-

tion, his "acceptance" is a mere counteroffer.

A rejection

must be communicated to the offeror.

It is ordinarily only

effective upon receipt by the offeror.

2 25

225

Ibid., Restatement, sec. 39.

.

.
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Consideration
Consideration may be defined as an agreed— for exchange

which the law holds sufficient to support contractual rights
and obligations.

This agreed-for exchange may consist of an

act, a promise to act or a mere forbearance to act.

In the

common law it has been held that consideration consists in
a

detriment to the promisor or

a

benefit to the promisee. 226

Recent case law has defined consideration in terms of
legal right

legal right.

.

.

2 27

.

a

the giving up or agreement to give up a

Therefore, when issues of consideration

arise, two essential elements must appear:

(1)

that some-

thing must have been bargained for between the parties; and
(2)

that something must have a legal value.

It must appear

that both parties were intending to enter into a contract.

They both were willing to incur legal rights and liabilities.

2

28

There is no consideration if either party

intended to confer a gift.

2 29

In doubtful cases, the courts

tend to find a bargain intended, rather than a gift.

The

policy being to uphold the contractual expectancies wherever

possible
226

22

Torrey v. Adams, 149 N.E. 618 (1925).

^Wit

v.

Commercial Hotel Co., 149 N.E. 609

228

Peck v. Requa, 13 Gray 407

229

Ibid., Restatement, sec. 75.

(1859)

(1925).

.
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Mere non-payment of the dollar agreed upon
for consideration would not show conclusively that
there was no

consideration.

It would be sufficient if it could be shown

that the dollar was bargained for and that the
parties in-

tended that it would be paid in the future or there was
some

other valuable consideration transferred. 230

Promises made out of a sense of moral responsibility
or honor are not enforceable in the Commonwealth and in most
231
states.
This is because the court reasons that the test

of moral responsibility varies with the individual.

consideration is not sufficient.

Past

Gratuitous promises or

those promises based entirely on moral or past considera-

tion may be enforceable if the promisee has materially

changed his position, in detrimental reliance on it.

Within

limits, detrimental action or forbearance by the promisee,
in reliance on a promise, has been held to constitute a sub-

stitute for consideration and renders the promise enforceable.
The promisee's detrimental reliance is held to be sufficient

reason to estop the promisor from asserting the lack of consideration.
23 0

The promisee's detrimental reliance also

Johnson v. Norton Housing Authority, 375 N.E, 2d 1209

(1978)
7 31
777

Conant v. Evans, 88 N.E. 438 (1909).
Mills v. Wyman,

3

Pick. 207

(1825).

.
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operates as a substitute for "mutual
assent" (in a gift
promise, there is no offer and
acceptance). This is known
233
as the doctrine of promissory
estoppel
.

A promisor will be estopped from
denying the enforceability of his promise if the following
elements are present
(1)

the promisor made a promise which, though
gratuitous,

was the type of a promise which might
forseeably induce the
promisee to rely on it or to take some action on
it;

(2)

the

promisee did in fact rely on it, and his reliance was

reasonable under the circumstances;
reliance the promisee has suffered

detriment and
the promise.

(4)

234

(3)

a

as a result of his

substantial economic

injustice can be avoided only by enforcing

Consideration must be legally sufficient.

Insufficient consideration is no consideration.

Doing what

one is already bound to the other party to do, or promising
to do it,

is not a valid consideration for a promise. 235

However, if that which is promised or done was required

under the contract with a third person, there is considera-

tion for the defendant's promise and the contract is valid
and enforceable.
233
234

235
(1902)
236

Ibid

.

,

236

Cases of contingent consideration have

Restatement

,

sec. 90.

Ibid

Burgess Sulphite Fibre Co. v. Broomfield, 62 N.E. 367
Pool v. City of Boston,

5

Cush.

219

(1849)

.

.

.
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been held to be sufficient consideration
If a party to a contract is no longer
bound to ful-

fill it because of the default of the other
party either a

promise by the injured party to resume performance
of the

contract or the actual completion by that party is sufficient consideration to support
...

,

third party.

a

promise to pay made by

a

238

Forbearance to sue (if one has

a

valid claim against

another) is valid consideration for a promise by such other

person.

239

In a situation where parties to a disputed claim

have agreed to settle, their promises are consideration for

each other and the compromise settlement is a valid consideration.

240

Mellen v. Whipple held that there must be

privity of contract and that

a

stranger to the consideration

could not recover on the contract though it was made for
.

.

.

his benefit.

241

Consideration need not be adequate. 24 2
that the consideration is valuable.
237
23 8

Abbott v. Doane, 40 N.E. 197

Sheraton Service Corp.

2^0'Connor

v.

v.

24-*-Mellen v.

Gross inadequacy may

(1895)

Kanavan, 357 N.E. 2d 20

National Metals Co.,

24® Bar low v. Ocean Ins. Co.,

Whipple,

24 ^wither ington v.

1

It is enough

4

58 N.E.

Mete. 270

Gray 317

2d 153

(1842).

(1854).

Eldredge, 162 N.E. 300

(1928)

(1976).

(1944)

,
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be evidence of fraud. 243

Inadequacy of consideration may

be the reason for the failure of a bid
for specific per-

formance under the rule that such bills are addressed
to
the discretion of the court. 244 No consideration
is necessary to make a sealed option agreement binding on the

parties.

245

Capacity
In order to have a valid contract, the parties to the

contract must have capacity to contract.

A contract, in

other words, cannot be made by nor can it be enforced
against, a person who does not have the capacity to contract.

246

Thus, certain persons are under a disability to

make a valid contract.

This disability may be total or it

may be only partial.

Classifications:

Contracts

Contracts may be classified according to the contractual capacity of the parties.

classified as:
(3)

(1)

Contracts, therefore, may be

valid and enforceable,

(2)

A void contract means a contract to which

voidable.
243

Nickerson

244

Forman v. Gadouas, 142 N.E. 87

245

Johnson v. Norton Housing Authority.

246

Ibid.

void, and

,

v.

Bridges, 103 N.E. 939

Restatement

sec.

13.

(1914).

(1891).

.
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there is a total absence of legal effect.

A void contract

imposes no liability on the parties thereto.

A contract

made by a person who has been judicially declared insane
is
no contract,

just an event to the party.

voidable contract" may be defined as

a

It is void.

A

contract as to

which one or more of the parties to it has the power either
to
a

(1)

avoid the legal relation created by the contract by

manifestation of an election to do so or

the power of avoidance by ratification. 247

(2)

extinguish

A "voidable

contract" is valid and enforceable until and unless it is

legally disaffirmed or the liability thereon is legally
avoided, e.g., a contract made by an insane person, an infant or a drunk person is prima facie valid and enforceable.

Disaffirmance and avoidance are matters of defense.
A party to a contract which is voidable, having

avoided it, may still be liable in quasi contract for the

reasonable value of the goods or services if the goods or
services are necessaries.

A "voidable contract" may not be

set aside when it is inherently fair to both parties and it
has been executed so far that the other party cannot be put

back in a statu quo ante.

A void contract cannot.

ratified.
247

Ibid

A "voidable contract" may be

.

,

sec

.

13
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Thus, no one can be bound by
a contract who does not
have the legal capacity to incur
at least voidable contractual duties.
The capacity to contract may be
partial and
its existence in respect of a
particular transaction may
depend upon the nature of the transaction,
or upon other
circumstances. 248 a natural person who manifests
assent to
a transaction has full legal capacity
to incur contractual

duties unless he is:
infant;

(3)

(1)

mentally ill or defective;

under guardianship and

(4)

(2)

an

intoxicated. 249

Insanity
A person who has judicially been declared insane or

bereft of reason because of idiocy may not make a contract

which will bind them or their property.
total disability to contract.

declared insane cannot make

a

They are under a

Thus, a person who has been

contract and a contract so

made by such a party cannot be enforced against the party.
The contract is voidable.

The right to disaffirm the con-

tract does not depend on knowledge or nature of the insanlty by the other party to the contract. 250
248

249
2

Ibid., Restatement

,

sec.

18.

Ibid., Restatement

,

sec.

18.

^Sutcliffe

v.

Heatley, 122 N.E. 317

(1919).

.

.
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Insane persons are liable for necessaries
purchased
by or furnished to them.

This liability is based on an

implied contract for the fair value of the
necessaries, not
on an express agreement to pay. 251 in Krasner
v. Berk,

the

Supreme Judicial Court agreed in substance with the
rule

stated in Restatement Second, Contracts

,

s.

18c(l)(a).

The

court held:
A person incurs only voidable
by entering into a transaction if
mental illness or defect ... he
understand in a reasonable manner
consequence of the transaction

contractual duties
by reason of
is unable to
the nature and

Even where there is sufficient understanding
contract may in some circumstances be voidable
by reason of failure of will or judgment, where a
person contracting by reason of mental illness or
defect, is unable to act in a reasonable manner in
relation to the transaction and the other party
has reason to know of his condition.
a

A contract made by a person having legal capacity to

contract is valid, even though such
to disaffirm or avoid the agreement.

a

person has

a

power

An insane person who

has not been judicially declared to be insane may thus dis-

affirm or avoid the contract.

2

Foss,

(1923).

138

N.E.

551

Krasner v. Berk, 319

N.E.

2d 897

^‘*'Belluci v.

252
253

Krasner v. Berk.

(1974)

:
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Minority
A minor's express contracts are
voidable by him or
his guardian subject to certain
exceptions. The disability
of a minor to contract is for the
protection of the minor
against improvidence.
It is in the nature of a privilege
personal to him or his guardian. This is true even
as to
an expressed contract for necessaries.

The liability for

the expressed contract for necessaries is on an implied

contract for the fair value of the necessaries

The

.

researcher points out that an adult dealing with

a

minor

may be held to his contract though the minor may disaffirm
it.

255

Massachusetts General Law, Chapter 231, Section 85P

provides

Except as otherwise specifically provided by
law, any person domiciled in the Commonwealth
who has reached the age of eighteen shall for all
purposes, and any other person who has reached
the age of 18 shall with respect to any transaction governed by the law of the Commonwealth, be
deemed of full legal capacity unless legally
incapacitated for some reason other than insufficient age.
A minor may not have specific performance of a contract to
nr r

sell his real property against an adult purchaser.

254

255

Drude v. Curtis, 67

N.E.

Dellamano v. Francis, 33

^^Freeman

v.

Fishman, 139

317

N.E.

N.E,

(1903).
2d

846

(327).

(1923).

.
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Among the exceptions to the rule of
avoidance of
his contract by a minor are:
(

1

)

(

2

)

Statute provides that a minor over
years of
age is bound by a contract, for life15
insurance
or an endorsement plan, of which a
husband,
wife, children, mother, father, brother,
or
sister is the beneficiary
An executory contract to form a partnership
is voidable by a minor.
However, if he
becomes a partner, his right in firm assets
is to share in the net balance after all
obligations are paid. The minor may
not disaffirm to the extent of depriving
firm creditors of that part of firm capital
contributed by the minor; oco
258

(3)

Statute provides a "female minor who has become eighteen may join with her guardian in
making certain ante-nuptial contracts" and
for this purpose "the guardian and the ward
may convey her real and personal property to
the trustees approved by the probate court,"
and "such conveyances shall have like effects
as if said never were of full age",- __
25 9

(4)

By statute "the signature of a married woman
who is a minor affixed by her to any instrument relating to the conveyance of land of
her husband shall have the same effect as if
she were of full age";
26Q

(5)

257
2

58

259
2

sec.

fi

D

U.C.C. Article 2 provided that a minor may
not disaffirm a sale of his goods as against
an innocent purchaser for value from the
minor's vendee;

M.G.L.A., Ch

.

175,

sec.

128.

Pettelier v. Couture, 19

N.E.

400

(1889).

M.G.L.A., Ch. 209, sec. 27.
Ibid., Ch. 189, sec.

65.

6

as amended by St.

1973 Ch. 925,

278
(

6

By statute, any minor sixteen
years of aqe or
r
shall be deemed competent to
r^
contract
for a mot ° r v ehlc ie liability
policy or bond
or for a policy of motor
vehicle liability
insurance to the same extent and to
effect as though he had attained his the same
full
age;
261

)

'

By statute, "Residents of this
Commonwealth
who are veterans of World War II and are
entitled to the benefits provided by the
federal law known as the Servicemen's
Readjustment Act of 1944, and also called
the G.I. Bill of Rights, may participate
in such benefits notwithstanding that they
are under twenty-one years of age, and for
said purpose such minors shall have full legal
capacity to act in their own behalf in the
matter of contracts, conveyances, mortgages
and other transactions, and with respect to
such acts done by them they shall have all
of the rights, powers and privileges and be
subject to the obligations of persons of
f uil age."

(7)

262

(

8

A person who has attained the age of
eighteen shall have full legal capacity
to act in his own behalf in the matter of
contracts and shall be liable in any civil
action for breach thereof.

)

263

A minor may disaffirm his contract while still
°f after he becomes of age.

disaffirmance is not conditioned upon

.

262 St.

,

The right of
a

return or tender of

113K as amended by St. 1973,

1945, Ch. 408.

263 Ibid., M.G.L.A., Ch.
1973, Ch. 925, sec. 74.

^^Chandler v

.

minor

The right of disaffirmance is

personal to the minor or his guardian.

261 Ibid
Ch. 175, sec.
Ch. 925, sec. 59.

a

231,

sec.

850.

Simmons, 97 Mass. 508

Added by St.

(1867)

.

.
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what the minor got under the
contract.

The party to the

contract may recover back what
property the minor did
acquire and still holds under the
265
contract.

if the

minor sues to rescind a contract it
is an unequivocal re266
pudiation of the contract.
A minor may ratify his contract when
he becomes of
age.

Ratification has been defined as an act(s)
or conduct
of the minor which demonstrates an
intention to be

bound by

the contract, e.g., treating property as his
own, using it,

selling it or otherwise dealing with it, constitutes
suffi-

cient evidence on which ratification may be found. 267

Intoxication
Drunkenness and insanity involve degrees of mental
aberration.

If the mental derangement reached such a point

that the person obviously does not understand the nature of

what he is doing when making a contract, then he does not
have capacity to contract and there is no contract.

If

such a condition exists the person should be treated as

though he has been judicially declared insane.
265
266
267

Tracy v. Brown, 163 N.E. 885 (1928).
Stanley

v.

Chamberlain

194 N.E.
268

A contract

310

Westwood Auto Inc., 322 N.E. 2d 768 (1975).
v.

Employer Liability Assur., Corp.,

(1935)

Ibid., Restatement, sec. 18.

.
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made by a person while he
is so drunk as to be
incapable
of understanding its
nature and effect is voidable
by that
person at his option.

Spendthrifts
Spendthrifts were capable of entering
into valid
2 Q
contracts at the common law.
if a guardian has been
appointed for a spendthrift or a person
of advanced age who
is incapable of managing his
property, such persons are deprived of the capacity to contract except
for necessaries.
Their liability for necessaries stands on
the same footing
27
0
as that of minors and insane persons.
fi

Necessaries
The liability for necessaries is a question of fact,

depending upon the condition in the life of the person, his
habits, what people in like circumstances are accustomed
to as well as upon the nature of the articles furnished.
As a general rule,

food, clothing,

shelter, education and

medical expenses have been held to be necessaries. 271
•

269

O'Donnell v. Smith,

8

N.E.

350

(1886)

270

M.G.L.A., Ch. 201, sec.

271

Moskew

v.

1

-

10.

Marshall, 171 N.E. 477

(1930)

.
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Married Women
At common law, a married woman
could not make a contract.
Today, a married woman may contract
with her
husband.
She may make contracts (oral and
written— sealed
and unsealed) as if she were sole.
A married woman may
also sue in the contract made with her
husband. 272
Fraud, Mistake and Duress

Fraud
Fraud as used in the law of contracts means:

misrepresentation known to be such;
(3)

a

(2)

non-disclosure where there is not

withhold the information.

(1)

a

a

concealment; or

a

privilege to

Since a valid express contract

results from the voluntary agreement of the parties, if
there is fraud practiced by one party which induces the

other party to contract, no valid contract results.

Fraud

may consist of fraudulent misrepresentation of fact which
induces a person to make a contract, the nature of which he

understands and which he intends to make.

This is termed

"fraud in the inducement" or "antecedent fraud."

If the

fraud consists of a fraudulent misrepresentation as to what
272

M.G.L.A., Ch. 209, sec.

2,

6,

1963, Ch. 765.
273

Ibid., Restatement, sec. 471.

882.

as amended by St.

282

the instrument is, i.e., that the
instrument is something
other than what it really is, it is
called fraud in the
essence of the contract or fraud in the
nature or being of
274
the contract.

One kind of fraud is as fatal as the other
to the

validity of the contract induced by it.

The exception to

this rule is the cases in which the question
is whether a

defense of fraud is available in an action on
instrument brought by

a

Uniform Commercial Code.

negotiable

a

holder in due course under the
Under the Uniform Commercial Code,

fraud in the execution is a real defense but fraud in the

inducement is not, e.g., when

a

literate person has had

full opportunity to read a negotiable instrument and does
not, he cannot successfully assert the defense of fraud in

the execution against the holder in due course.

There-

if one party defrauds the other into executing the

fore,

contract there is no real consent, and the contract is
voidable by the innocent party. 276
274

275

(1964)
27

Bates v. Southgate, 31 N.E. 2d 551 (1941).

Bruchett v. Allied Concord Fin. Corp., 396

P.

2d 186

.

^Long v. Inhabitants of Athol, 82, N.E. 665 (1907).
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When due to fraud, a contract or
conveyance fails
to express the agreement that the
parties intended that
it express,

the defrauded party may seek a decree
of

reformation (equity).

A decree of reformation is:

(1)

available only with respect to written instruments
and
contracts; (2) an alternative remedy to recission
and

(3)

limited by the State of Frauds. 277

Mistake
Mistake may be a defense to the formation of
contract.

Mistake may be:

Mutual Mistake

.

(1)

mutual or

(2)

a

unilateral.

There is no contract, if both

P ar"ties enter into an agreement based upon mutual mistake

as to the existence or identity of the subject matter, or

material or essential facts, or as to the nature of the
contract itself.

If both parties are mistaken as to

the terms of a contract because of ambiguous language

innocently used, then no contract is formed because there
has been no mutual assent.

279

However, one is bound by

the language used if a mistake exists as to only one party.

28 0

Mutual mistake may be pleaded as
277
27

27
2

Ibid., Restatement

,

sec.

a

defense to an

491.

^Neel v. Lang, 127 N.E. 512

(1920).

^Vickery v. Ritchie, 202 Mass 247

(1909).

Darcy, 201Mass 312

(1909).

^Goldstein v

.
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action at law brought to
enforce the contract or in
an
action in equity in which the
legal remedy is not plain,
complete and adequate. 281 if
each party makes a different
Ei£take as to the true facts, it does
not detract from
the fact that they were both
mistakes. 282
U nilateral Mistake .

if one party is mistaken,

and the other party is not chargeable
with knowledge of
the mistake, there is an enforceable
contract.
The mistake is no defense.

Duress
Duress consists of any act which overcomes the
will
of the other party and coerces the party to enter
into

the contract.

Stevens v. Thissell in treating of

duress held that "it is of no consequence how the domination over the mind was acquired; it is enough that it
was acquired." 2 83

Duress of goods is sufficient grounds

for avoiding the contract.

8^

Neither party can compel

the consent of the other for the purpose of contracting.

Duress may be shown as a defense or grounds for recission.
2

81

282

283

284

Martin v. Jablinski, 149 N.E. 156 (1925).
Ibid., Restatement

,

sec.

503.

Stevens v. Thissell, 134 N.E. 398

Freeman v. Teeling, 194 N.E. 677

(1922).
(1935).

,
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This is also true in reference to contracts
induced by

threats of blackmail or extortion

Economic Duress

^5
.

Economic duress may be a

.

defense where A is in some way responsible for the bad
economic situation in which B is placed.

Economic

duress has been held to be a valid defense to the en—

forcement of a contract where the following elements
appear:
(2)

(1)

a

wrongful or illegal act by one party;

placing the other party in

a

position in which his

property or finances are seriously jeopardized or impaired;

(3)

no othe adequate means available to avoid or pre-

vent the threatened loss other than entering into the
contract; and

(4)

the duressed person was acting as a

reasonable prudent person under the circumstances. 2 8 6
Undue Influence

.

Undue influence as a defense has

been limited by the courts to cases involving contracts

between persons in fiduciary or confidential relationships
(trustee-beneficiary, husband-wife) whereby one has taken
Ordinarily two

unreasonable advantage of the other.
elements must appear:

(1)

promisor was vulnerable to the

influence of the promisee and

(2)

the promisee used ex-

ooc

Ibid., Restatement

^^Ibid.

,

Restatement

,

sec.

495.

sec.

493

.

.

.
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cessive pressure in overcoming
the will of the
287
promissor

Illegality

A contract is illegal if its formation
or performance is:

(

1)

criminal,

to public policy.

(2)

tortious or

(3)

contrary

A contract may be illegal either

because it has been made so by statute, or
because it
is against public policy as declared
288
by the
courts.

A contract based on illegal consideration
is also illegal
and not enforceable. 239 The reason that illegal
contracts

are not enforceable is not for the protection of
the

interests of the defendant who is often

a

party to the

illegal agreement, but is that the law will not lend its
aid to one who seeks to enforce alleged rights based upon
his own illegal conduct. 290 Where the acts required by
the contract are not morally wrong but are merely pro-

hibited by law, either party may disaffirm the contract
while it is still executory and may recover back any
money paid or property delivered under the contract.
a

Where

contract is partly legal and partly illegal and the ille287 T
Ibid.

,

sec

.

„ n
497

288.,.,
Ibid

,

sec

.

cin
512

,

289

290
816

.

_

Love v. Harvey, 114 Mass. 80

(1873).

Slocum v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 139 N.E.

(1923).

.

.
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gal part has been disaffirmed by
the Plaintiff, he

may recover for labor and materials
furnished under the
legal part of the contract. 291 Where
the facts regarding
the illegality of the conduct of the
contracting parties
were substantially beyond dispute, the
consequence

was to

be decided as a matter of law. 292
If the legal contract has been executed,
neither

party may recover back money paid or property delivered
under the illegal agreement. 92

A contract to commit a

crime will not be enforced in Massachusetts even indirectly

through an action in quantum meruit.

Massachusetts has a

strong public interest in ensuring that its rules governing

marriage are not subverted.

Then, even if, at the time of

the contract, the parties to the contract did not mean the

services to be rendered included illegal conduct, there
can be no recovery if that performance was in fact illegal,

and the illegality was serious and not merely an incidental

part of the performance of the agreement. 294
291
81 N.E.

292
Inc.

,

Eastern Expanded Metal Co. v. Webb Granite Co.,

251

(1907)

Harness Tracks Sec., Inc. v. Baystate Raceway,

373 N.E.

292
29

.

2d 353

(1978)

Buccella v. Schuster, 164 N.E. 2d 141 (1960).

^Green v. Richmond, 337 N.E. 2d 902

(1975)

,
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There are a variety of common
types of bargains
which have been held to be illegal.
They are (1) bargains in restraint of trade if the
restraint is unrea295
sonable,
(2) gambling or wagering bargains
(merely because a contract such as one for the
purchase of securities or commodities on margin, is highly
speculative,
,

it

does not make it a wagering contract); 296

(3)

bargain und-

er the terms of which one party gains a
profit greater

than that which is permitted by law is paid, or
is agreed
to be paid by, or on behalf of a debtor, for a
loan of

money, or for extending the maturity of a debt is usurious;

usury

is

illegal.

The illegality exists in either paying

the interest or promising to do so; 297

(4)

bargain tending

to obstruct the administration of justice are illegal; 298
[to

constitute

a

champertous act, it is not enough that an

attorney is to look to the thing recovered for his compensation but there must appear the future element that the

claim of the attorney for his services shall not constitute
295
296

297
298

Ibid.

Restatement, sec. 513-19.

Ibid

.

sec.

520-525

Ibid.

sec.

526-537.

Ibid.

sec.

540-558,

.

;

289
a debt owed to him by the
client,

if no debt is created

and the attorney is to be compensated
by a share in what
is recovered, and he is to look
to that alone for his

compensation, the agreement is "champertous"

299
]

(

5

)

contracts which violate a public or private
fiduciary duty
are illegal, e.g., except statutory arbitrations,
contracts
to submit an entire dispute to arbitrators,
without restrictions and indicating that the findings of the arbitrators shall be binding on the parties and final, is illegal as an agreement to oust the courts of jurisdiction; 300
(6)

contracts in restraint of trade or restricting the in-

dividual to do business, earn

a

livelihood or enjoy the

fruits of his incentive, industry and abilities; 301

(7)

contracts to use influence or pressure upon the conduct of
public officers or for fees procuring legislation when the
party does not have a valid claim against the government; 10 2
299

Gill v. Richmond Co-op Ass'n, 34 N.E. 2d 509

(1941).
3

°°Sanford v. Boston Edison Co., 56 N.E. 2d (1944).

301

United Shoe Marline So. v. Kimball, 79 N.E. 790

(1907)

302

M.G.L.A. Ch.

3,

sec.

39-50.
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bargain to pay a person to
influence another person
to let alone a will which
the other person had made
(8)

and

not to execute a new will; 303

bargain between a

(9)

creditor and a debtor that the creditor
shall receive
more than other creditors— all creditors
being party to
the composition agreement; 304

(10)

contracts to pay a

witness compensation in excess of the legal
fee for testifying in a case so that the party may
prevail.

Party to a sham contract runs the risk that
the
court may accept the contract at its face value and
decline
to believe that it was intended by all parties
as a sham.

3(^ 3

Sunday Contracts
The Lord's Day Act (M.G.L.A. ch

.

136)

provides that

contracts made on Sunday are illegal.

Contracts for nec-

essaries or for charity are excepted.

Contracts for activ-

ities which have been legalized by the granting of licenses
are also excepted.

In terms of a contract made on a Sunday

in the Commonwealth:

(1)

if goods were sold on Sunday and

delivered the same day, the seller may recover the goods
back, since the buyer may not rely on an illegal contract
303
304
30 5

(1978)

.

Pike v. Pike, 165 N.E.

5

(1929).

Brown v. Nealley, 36 N.E. 464

Anderson

v.

K.

G. Moore,

Inc.,

(1894).
376 N.E.

2d 1238

291

to sustain a claim of title; 306

if goods are delivered

(2)

on a day other than Sunday, the seller may
recover the

fair value of them on the theory of a contract
implied in
fact.
He may not recover the contract price unless
it is

synonomous with the fair value.

307
(3)

negotiable instrument was given on

a

if a check or

Sunday in satisfac-

tion of a debt, such an instrument would be illegal.

If

the creditor negotiated the instrument and received the
cash, the receipt of the money constitutes a payment. 308

Conclusion
As a general rule the law does not aid any party to
an illegal contract.

In the Commonwealth it is now gener-

ally settled that a defendant may not rely on the illegality of a contract sued on unless he has pleaded the illegal-

lty specially in his answer.

309

If the plaintiff's declar-

ation shows that he relied upon an illegal contract, or

where the evidence upon which he must rely shows
o

r\

(1879)
30

v.

Inhabitants of Blackstone

,

128 Mass.

.

^Mayer v. Haycock, 18 N.E. 2d 348

308
30

contract

c

Aldrich
148

a

(1938).

Gorden v, Levine, 83 N.E. 861 (1908).

^Adamsky v. Mendes

,

96 N.E.

2d 236

(1950).

.
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which is inherently wrongful or
against public policy objection to a recovery may be entertained,
though the il,
.
310
legality is not specially pleaded.
.

.

The Statute of Frauds

Oral contracts are valid in the majority
of cases.
The law does not generally require
formality.
By statute,
a few types of contracts are required
to be in writing or
to be evidenced by a signed, written memorandum.

The

Statute of Frauds enumerates the contracts which, are
not
enforceable, if the issue is properly raised, unless the

contract or
contract.

a

memorandum of it is produced to prove the

These statutory requirements stem from the Eng-

lish Statute of Frauds in 1677.

The purpose of the Statute

of Frauds is basically to prevent fraud and perjury.

It

also serves to provide evidence of the actual terms of the

agreement
M.G.L.A. ch. 259, sec.

shall be brought:

(1)

1

provides that no action

to charge an executor or administrat-

or upon a promise to answer damages out of his own estate

for a debt of the deceased person;

upon a consideration of marriage;

^^National Vinegar

Co.

v.

(2)

(3)

upon an agreement

upon an agreement

Jaffe, 58 N.E. 342

(1900).
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that is not to be performed
with a year;
person upon a promise to answer

(4)

to charge a

for the debt, default or

misdoing of another; and

(5)

upon a contract for the sale

of lands,

tenements or hereditaments or of
any interests
in or concerning them-unless
the contract or a memorandum thereby is executed by the party
to be charged thereto
by his duly authorized agent.

M.G.L.A. ch

.

259, sec.

2

provides:

—

Consideration need not be in writing the
consideration of such promise, contract or agreement need not be set forth or expressed in the
writing signed by the party to be charged therewith, but may be proved by any legal evidence.
The consideration which by this statute may be proved
by

parol is the consideration of the promise sued on.^^

Promises of Executors or Administrators
M.G.L.A. ch. 259, sec. 1(1), applies to a promise
by an administrator to pay the amount of the distributive

share of an heir

,

out of his own estate

purchased the share.

,

to one who had

It does not apply to a promise by

an executor to pay the plaintiff to forbear to contest the

will under which the executor secured the undisputed title
311
(1956)

312
(1907)

Growers Outlet, Inc.

v.

Stone, 131 N.E. 2d 210

.

Bogigian v. Booklovers Library, 193 Mass. 444

.

^^Hay

v.

Green, 12 Cush. 282

(1853)

.
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to real estate which was denied to him. 314

Contracts Upon Consideration of Marriage
The statute applies to promises to make a
payment of

money

or a settlement of property, in consideration of
marriage. 315 It refers to marriage settlement contracts
,

.

and pre— nuptial contracts

.

It does not apply to mutual

promises to marry between prospective spouses.

The breach

of a contract to marry was actionable at common law in

Massachusetts.

The "Heart Balm" law provides that:

"Breach of the contract to marry shall not constitute an

injury or wrong recognized by law, and no action, suit or
O

I

proceeding shall be maintained therefor."

C

Contracts Not to be Performed Within a Year
This refers only to contracts which, by their term,

cannot by any possibility be performed within one year
from the making thereof.

The one year period begins from

the date the contract is made, not when performance is

promised.

If the contract may be fully performed within a

year it is not within the statute, though it is possible,
and even probable, that full performance will not be had

3^4

Mackin

v.

Dwyer, 91 N.E. 893

(1910),

315

White v. Bigelow, 28 N.E. 904

316

Ibid., M.G.L.A. ch. 207, sec. 47A.

(1891).

.
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within the year, i.e.:
Agreements without specific duration which
in
their nature are capable of performance
within

1.

a year by the

happening of an event,

ment contracts);

's

i

Agreement to perform upon

2.

(employ-

7

a

condition which

may happen within a year 318 and
;

Agreement for alternative performance, one of

3.

which is capable of full performance within one
year 319
.

Contracts to Answer for the Debt of Another
Promises to answer for of discharge the debts of a-

nother must be in writing to be enforceable.
termed guarantee contracts.

These are

The contract to which the

statute applies is to the guarantee promise made:
one who is not presently liable for the debt,

creditor or obligee and

(3)

2

)

1

)

to a

to discharge the present or

future obligation of a third person.

It is an idemnity

320

contract
.

.

(

(

The primary purpose of the idemnity or guarantee
•2

1

7

'Roberts v. Rochbottom Co.,

7.

Met.

318

Carnig v. Carr, 167 Mass. 544

319

Worthy v. Jones, 11 Gray 168

339

Schultz v. Frary, 109 N.E. 2d 134

46

(1843).

(1897).

(1858).
(1952).

by

—

;
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contract is to secure to the
promisee the performance of
another's obligation to the promisee.
The statute is
said to apply only to "collateral"
promises
and not to

primary" promises.

if the real contracting was
between

the promisor and the creditor, the
promise is enforceable

although oral.

if the promise is "collateral,"
when

it appears that the promisor's main
purpose in guarantee-

ing the obligation of another was to secure
an advantage
or pecuniary benefit for himself

,

his promise is enforce-

able even though it is not in writing. 322

This is an ex-

ception to the statute.
The statute does not apply
(1)

when the consideration for the promise is

furnished to a third person at the promisor's
request, and credit is given to the promisor.
In this case, the debt is that of the promi-

sor
(2)

323

where the contract is to idemnify the promisee for an obligation assumed by him; 324

321
322
323
324

Duca v. Lord, 117 N.E. 2d 145
Ibid., Restatement

,

sec.

184.

Ribock v. Canner, 105 N.E. 462

Aldrich

v.

Ames,

9

(1954).

Gray 76

(1914).

(1857).
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(3)

where the promise is to
reimburse the promisee
for paying the promisor's
debt; 323

(4)

where the promise is to pay

a

debt the promisor

owes the promisee; 326
(5)

where the promisee releases or
discharges the
debtor, in consequence of the promise
of the

(6)

promisor to pay the promisee's debt; 327
and
where the basic purpose of the promise
to pay
the debt of another is the promisor's
acquisition of some title, lien, or interest to
himself.

328

Contract for the Sale of Land
A contract for the sale of land or any interest

therein must be in writing.

There is often difficulty in

determining what is an "interest" in the sale of land within the mean of the statute.
b er

r

Liens, fixtures, growing tim-

future interests have been held by case law to be

within the meaning of the statute.
held to apply to:

(1)

The statute has been

an agreement of a mortgage at a

foreclosure, that the mortgagee would hold the property and
325
32

Hill v. Grat, 141 N.E. 593

(1923).

^Hill v. Grat.

327
328

Curran v. O'Donnell, 128 N.E. 408

MacDonald

v.

Stack, 189 N.E. 2d 21

(1920).

(1963).

3

298

reconvey it to the mortgagor when the
mortgagor paid the
sum secured by the mortgage 3 2 9 (2) an
oral agreement by a
mortgagee to relinquish his interest in the
mortgage in
330
favor of another;
(3) an oral agreement to give a mortgage or to enlarge one; 3 31 (4) an oral executory
agreement
;

to let real estate, or to give, take or assign
a lease of
realty; 332 (5) an oral agreement to create an easement. 333

Within the Commonwealth, the statute has been held
not to apply to:
(2)

(1)

a

contract for board and room;

3

^

an agreement by which plaintiff was to buy land for mu-

tual benefit, take title in his own name, advance money for

repairs and to sell the property and divide the profits

equally with the defendant; 333

(3)

a contract which ere-

O O C

ates a license to use land.
329
330

331
332
333
33

Downing v. Brennan, 122 N.E. 729 (1919).

Montuon

v.

Barlen, 194 N.E. 714

Lane v. Flint, 104 N.E. 570

(1914).

Chase v. Aetna Rubber Co., 75 N.E. 2d 637

Estabrook v. Wilcox, 115 N.E. 233 (1917).

^White v. Maynard, 111 Mass. 250

333

(1935).

Fencer

v.

Wills, 156 N.E. 841

O O C

Montuori

v.

Barlen.

(1872).

(1927).

(1947).

,
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The Memorandum
A memorandum of the essential
terms of the contract
e.g., telegrams, letters,
or notations (in one's private
ledgers— books, never communicated
to the other) is sufficient to satisfy the statute as
long as it contains the
essential terms of the oral contract. 337
The consideration
of this type of a contract need
not be set forth or expressed in the writing signed by the party
to be charged
but may be proved by a legal evidence.

—

A memorandum of essential terms will be
sufficient to
satisfy the statute if it contains:
(1) the identity of
the contracting parties;

matter of the contract;
agreement;
ed

(4)

(2)
(3)

description of the subject
terms and conditions of the

signature of the party sought to be charg-

339
.

If it fails in anyone of these particular, the con-

tract is unenforceable.

The signature may appear anywhere

in the memorandum, not necessarily at the end.

The signa-

ture may consist of the person's seal, initials or even his
mark.

It may be affixed by an authorized intermediary or

337

Shayet v. Holland, 73 N E
.

338

339

Ibid., Restatement

Ibid., Restatement.

sec.

.

2d 731

207.

(1947).

.

.
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an agent.

Only the signature of the
party sought to be
held liable need appear.
The fact that the party
seeking
to enforce it has not
signed it is immaterial.
Where one of the parties to the
contract is acting
by an agent and the memorandum
is signed by the agent as
party without disclosing his
principals, there is a sufficient designation of the parties,
and the principal may
sue or be sued upon the contract. 340
The doctrine of undisclosed principal applies to all contracts
except those
under seal and negotiable instruments.
One party to the contract cannot be the
agent of the

other party for the purpose of signing the
memorandum to
satisfy the Statute of Frauds. A third person may

act as

agent for both parties. 341

The memorandum may be made at

the time of the agreement or at any subsequent time. 343
The Statute of Frauds must be specially pleaded in
the defendant's answer.
as a defense. 343

340

341
342
343

Otherwise, it cannot be relied on

When the Statute of Frauds has been

Tobin v. Larkin, 183 Mass. 389

Fessender

v.

(1903).

Mussey, 11 Cush. 127

(1853)

Sanborn v. Chamberlain, 101 Mass. 409 (1869)

Middlesex Co. v. Osgood,
.

4

Gray 447

(1855).

,

.

.
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pleaded, the burden of proving compliance
with its terms
rests upon the plaintiff. 344 The Statute
of Frauds

is a

defense

which is personal to the maker of the contract

and cannot be set up by a third person who is not
a party
to it.

able.

346

The contract is not void but merely unenforce-

If the Statute of Frauds is not set up as a
defense,

the contract may be enforced.

As against third persons

such a contract is binding even though the statute is not

satisfied

Substituted Performance
A written contract and a contract under seal may be

modified by a parol agreement made subsequent to the execution of the contract.

The parol evidence rule has no ap-

plication to such subsequent agreements.
Where written contract concerning

34 "^
a

subject matter

within the Statute of Frauds has been subsequently modified
by an oral agreement, the contract, partly oral and partly

344

345

Weiner v. Slovin, 270 Mass. 392 (1930)
Weiner v. Slovin

346 0 ,,
Hoffman v
347

.

Charlestown Bank

Hastings v. Lovejoy,

2

,

231 Mass.

N.E. 776

(1885)

324

.

(1918)

.
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written

,

is within the statute, and the
writing is not a

su ^^-*- c ^- en t memorandum under the statute."^ 3

subsequent agreement is not

Where the

modification of the original

a

contract otherwise than as to the mode of performance,
the
case is not within the statute, and an action may
be maintained, but it must be brought on the original contract
in

writing. 349
.

.

New Promise by Insolvent Debtor
M.G.L.A. ch. 259, sec.

3

provides "no promise made

by a debtor who has been discharged in bankruptcy, shall
be evidence of a continuing contract so as to deprive the

debtor of the defense of the discharge in bankruptcy, unless such promise is made by or is contained in a writing

signed by the debtor or his authorized agent."
The statute only requires evidence of a continuing

promise in some writing signed by the debtor.

No precise

The intention and the obligation of

form is necessary.

the debtor must be interpreted from the phraseology he

chose to use.

If the promise is sufficient, no considera-

tion other than the discharged debt is necessary to bind
.u
j v.4.
debtor.
the

350

^^Ryan

v.

Gilbert, 71 N.E. 2d 219

^^Cummings v

.

Arnold,

3

Mete. 486

^~^Howard v. Zilch, 190 N.E. 2d 77

(1947).
(1842).
(1963)

,
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Performance and Breach

Performance
Once it has been determined that there
is a valid
contract in effect and the questions of third
party rights
and duties under the contract has been
considered,
the

scope of each party's duty to perform is next
to be determined.

Performance is the usual and normal way by which
parties discharge their contractual obligations.

There

are nine methods of discharging contractual obligations,
i.e.f
pel,

(1)

agreement,

(2)

merger,

accord and satisfaction,

(5)

(6)

tentional destruction or surrender,
nant not to sue,

(8)

novation,

(3)

(4)

estop-

cancellation, in-

(7)

release or cove-

discharge by avoidance of voidable

duties and occurrence of

a

condition subsequent. 351

A

simple contract may be discharged orally or by a writing
even though the original written contract is within the

Statute of Frauds.

If the discharge of a contract within

the Statute of Frauds is by a substituted contract as op-

posed to an absolute discharge by recession a writing is
required.

3

51

35

352

Ibid., Restatement

^Ibid.

,

Restatement

,

sec.

385.

sec.

406.

.
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It is essential that
each promise and provision
of

the contract be analyzed
_separately to determine whether
it creates or conditions
the duties or obligations
of
either party. Once the contractual
provisions have been
construed, the issue is whether the
duties created under
the contract have been performed.
if not, whether there
is some legal justification or
excuse for their new per-

formance

Problems of performance of a contract are
concerned
with determining which party is in breach
of the

contract.

In order to find a person in breach of
a contract,

it must

appear that he was under an obligation (absolute
duty) to
perform, and that he failed to do so.
The problem
is to

determine when a promisor'
lute.

s

duty to perform has become abso-

This demands consideration of the type and legal

effects of conditions in a contract.
a

If the duty was only

conditional one, the promisor is bound to perform only

sfter the condition occurs
rent)

,

(condition precedent or concur-

or only until it occurs

(condition subsequent). 353

One who prevents the performance of a contract cannot take

advantage of its non-performance. 35 ^
353
354

310 N.E.

Ibid., Restatement

,

sec.

In approaching the

257.

Frank Fitzgerald, Inc. v. Pacella Brothers, Inc.,
2d

3

(1974)

.

,

305

problem of performance of

contract, the provisions of

a

the contract must be examined to
determine whether it is
a condition or a covenant.
It is possible that a given

provision may be both

a

condition and a covenant.

Breach of contract is the violation of

a

contrac-

tural duty which one person owes to another.

it is

the failure to perform for which a legal excuse
is lack356

doing.

Breach of Contract" is confined to

a

wrongful

Non-performance of a contract is failure to per-

form the whole or a material part of a contract, whether
or not the party failing to perform was, under the cir-

cumstances existing at the time, legally bound to render
performance.

Non-performance of a contract by a party to

it may not constitute a breach of the contract by him,

because under the circumstances, the party is not bound
or has ceased to be bound to perform it.

A party to

a

3

57

contract is not bound to perform it

if he was led into it by fraud, mistake or duress of the

other party, or where the contract is illegal or unlawful.
355
3

3

56

Andre v. Maguire, 26 N.E. 2d 347
Ibid., Restatement

57

,

sec.

(1940).

312.

Realty Developing Co. v. Wakefield Ready-Mixed
Concrete Co
100 N.E. 2d 2 (1951)
.

f

.
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An insane person or a minor is
not bound to perform his
contract.
358
He is entitled to disaffirm
it.

Excuse for Non-Performance.

The general rule is that

where a contract calls for the performance
of an act not in
itself unlawful, the party who is to
perform
is not re-

leased from his obligation by the fact that
in consequence
of unforeseen accidents, the performance of
his contract

has become unexpectedly burdensome or even impossible.

Unless provided against in the in the contract, unforeseen

difficulties
formance

3

,

no matter how great, will not excuse per —

59

Destruction of Subject Matter

.

Where there is a val-

id written agreement to convey real estate and there is no

stipulation in such an agreement where the risk of the loss
shall lie, a substantial destruction of the realty, without
the fault of either party

,

between the time of the agree-

ment and the time of performance will terminate the contract and neither party can enforce it.

Under such circum-

stances since the parties to the contract did not provide
for the emergency, there is an implied condition that the

building shall continue in existance until the conveyance
and the destruction of it without the fault of either party
338
3

Butler v. Prussian, 147 N.E. 892

(1925).

~^Hawkes v. Kehoe, 193 Mass. 419 (1907).
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will excuse performance of the
contract, and leave no
right of recovery in favor of either
party against the
3 60
other.
if, however, the destruction of
the property
is slight, that is, there is no
substantial destruction,
then the contract is not terminated and the
vendor may
compel the vendee to accept the conveyance or the
vendee

may compel the vendor to perform specific performance
in
equity or damage at law. 361
In Massachusetts,

if the realty is destroyed with-

out the fault of either party between the time of the

agreement to convey and the time of performance, the loss
falls on the party who is the legal owner, i.e., the a-

greed vendor.

The loss in other states falls on the a-

greed vendee for the reason that when there is

a

valid

written agreement to convey real estate, the agreed vendor, between the time of the agreement and the time of

performance, holds the property merely as
trustee for the agreed vendee.

a

constructive

The agreed vendee is there-

fore, the beneficial owner and should suffer the loss.

Massachusetts recognizes the agreed vendor as holding the
realty as constructive trustee for some purposes but holds

36

^Allyn v. Allyn, 154 Mass. 570

361

(1891).

Wells v. Callman, 107 Mass. 514

(1871).

.
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that the losses resulting
to the realty pending
such
agreement falls upon the party
having the legal title,
the agreed vendor. 362 where
the destruction of the
realty
is caused by the fault of
one of the parties, the
party at
fault has no rights but the
party not at fault may sue for
damages at law or compel specific
performance in equity.
De struction of Subject Matter
(Contractor Contract).
Where a party agrees to do work on
a certain chattel or
building already in existence, there
is an implied condition that the chattels or buildings
shall continue in ex-

istence and a destruction of it without
the fault of
either party will excuse performance. Under
such circumstances, if the party who was to do the work
had
not as

yet done anything, the destruction of the subject
matter

terminates the contract and leaves no right of recovery
of

damages in favor of either party against the other 363
.

if,

however, the party who was to do the work has partly per-

formed work and the chattel or building then is destroyed

without the fault of either party, the party partly performing cannot recover on the contract but may recover in
362 t

Libman v. Levenson, 236 Mass. 221 (1920).

O C O

Lord v. Wheeler,

1

Gray 282

(1854)

„

.

,

6

.
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quasi-contract for work, labor
and materials up to the
time of its destruction. 364
A person who agrees to build
a house on the land of
another is not discharged by the
destruction of the house
by fire before its completion;
but where one agrees to
repair another's house already built,
such destruction of
the house puts an end to the contract
and the contractor
may recover in quasi-contract for his
work, labor and

materials 365
Impossibility Caused by the Act of One of the Parties.

Where

a

party agrees to work on certain chattel or

building already in existence and it is destroyed through
the fault of one of the parties, the party at fault is

liable to the other for damages. 366

Death or Disability

.

Where a contract depends on

one's own personal services, the death or disability of
such a person will excuse non-perf ormance
364

365
3(

3

34

.

v.

Schier.

^Hawkes

v.

Kehoe.

(1931).

^

Cleary v. Schier, 120 Mass. 210 (1876).
Cleary

67

3

,

.

Cutler v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 274 Mass.
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Im possibility Created by Law

if the non-performance

.

of a contract is caused by an
act of the law, this furnishes a valid excuse for non-performance. 368
Co venant

A covenant may be defined as an
absolute,

.

unconditioned promise to perform.

No conditions are at-

tached to this contractural promise.

A failure to perform

a covenant is a breach of the contract
per se.

Conditions

.

A condition may be defined as a fact or

event, the happening or non-happening of which creates
or

extinguishes an absolute duty to perform on the part of
the promisor.

Failure of that which is merely a condition

is not a breach of the contract.

in bilateral contracts.

Conditions are important

The performance of the bargained

for act in a unilateral contract leaves all the executory

duties on the promisor (offeror)

absolute because the offeror

generally a covenant.

'

s

.

These duties are usually

promise of performance is

In a unilateral contract, after per-

formance on the part of the offeree, it is possible that
the offeror's duty to perform could be conditional.

The determination of whether a given contractual pro-

vision is

a

condition or a covenant (or both) may decide

whether the promisor is in breach of contract.

It will al-

so fix the right and duties of the factors to the contract.

368

Hughes v. Wamsutta Mills, 11 Allen 201 (1865).
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Whether a particular provision
is

a

covenant or

a

condi-

tion is dependant on the intent
of the parties.
Generally,
doubtful provisions will be construed
as covenants, rather
than conditions. 369

Conditions create or extinguish the absolute
duty to
perform the contract depending on the time
of their oc-

currence

.

^ condition precedent is a condition which
must oc-

cur in order to create an absolute duty of performance.

There is no enforceable duty owed until the fact or event
happens.

The burden of proof as to the occurrence of con-

ditions precedent is always on the plaintiff.

Within the Commonwealth, contracts to be performed
to the satisfaction of another may be divided into three

classes:

(1)

where the questions of operation, fitness

or mechanical fitness is involved;

(2)

where the con-

tract does not in any form of words require that the per-

formance of the work to be done or the services to be

rendered shall be to the personal satisfaction of the
promisor,
369

N.E.

371

and

(3)

Ibid., Restatement

3

^Weinstein

3

71

420

where fancy taste, sensibility or

v.

.

sec.

261.

Miller, 144 N.E. 287

Lockwood Mfg. Co.
(1903)

,

v.

(1924).

Mason Regulator Co., 66

.
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opinion is involved.
If the contract is subject to
the personal satis-

faction of the promisor, if the work was
performed in a
manner that would be satisfactory to a
reasonable man in
view of all the circumstances, the mere fact
that
the

promisor was not satisfied is not conclusive against
right of recovery. There is read into the

a

contract, the

rule that, that which the law says a party ought to be

satisfied with, the law will say he is satisfied with
373

personal taste or other elements are not of the

essence of the contract, if a promisor has agreed to perform to the personal satisfaction of the other party, he

will be held to his agreement

Conditions concurrent are conditions which are mutually dependent performances capable of near simultaneous

execution and which exist only when parties to the contract are bound to under performance at the same time.
372
37 3

N.E.

446
374

Freid v. Singer, 136 N.E. 609 (1922).
W. Hunt Co. v.
(1949)

C.

Boston Elevated

.

Weinstein v. Miller.

R.

Co., 85

.

,
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The legal effects of a condition
concurrent is that if the
condition occurs, the other party's duty to
perform be-

comes absolute.

If it doesn't, the other party's duty

never arises.

A condi tion subsequent is one in which the occurence
of the condition subsequent cuts off and extinguishes
the

legal obligation of the promisor.

The burden of allegation

and proof of the happening of all the conditions subsequent
is upon the defendant-promisor.

An expressed condition is a condition manifested or

expressed in so many words by the parties.
can,

The parties

subject to the limitations of the statute and public

policy, make their obligations as dependent or independent
as they choose and can spell out as many or as few condi-

tions as they wish and they will be given effect by the

courts

Implied - in - f act conditions refers to the "necessary"

conditions or "conditions of good faith and cooperation."
These are the conditions that the parties would probably
have agreed to had they thought about it.

The law implies

whatever conditions are inherent in the promise given and
necessary to the performance of the contract.
37

5

Ibid., Restatement

sec.

262.

375
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The test for an implied-in fact
condition is:

would a

reasonable man have felt that the
parties were contracting with the understanding, though
not expressly stated,
that certain facts would exist? The
existence of these
facts will be an implied condition to
the promisor's duty
to perform.
The contract may have been entered into
upon the im-

plied understanding that, upon the happening of

a

certain

contingency, the contract is to cease and both parties
are

relieved of their obligations under it. 376

if the con-

tract is not upon an implied condition of the continued

possibility of performance, the promisor is not relieved
of the contract nor excused from performing it because it

was originally or had subsequently become impossible to

perform it. 377
Implied-in
tions"

— are

lav;

conditions

They are not of a type which the

parties would have agreed upon.

377

condi-

certain conditions which are not expressly pro-

vided by the parties.

376

— "constructive

However, they may be

Goldstein v. Katz, 91 N.E. 2d 237 (1950).
Conner v. Tewksbury, 63 N.E. 609 (1945).

,
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implied by the courts in
the interests of fairness
and
justice 378
.

The legal effect of occurrence
or non-occurrence of
a constructive condition is
usually the same as an express
or implied-in fact condition.
it is subject to the possible exception of the doctrine of
substantial performance

which is generally held to imply
only to constructive conditions.
There may be one or more conditions
in a given
contract.
Dependent and Independent Promises

Dependent promises operate the same way
current conditions.

as do con-

One has no right to performance on

the part of the other until and unless he has
offered or

tendered performance.
Independent promises are those which must be performed by the promisor without getting any performance in

return for it.

The issue of whether specific words in a

contract create a condition or
effect in the contract, is

a

a

promise, and what is their

question of interpretation.

Whether a particular breach is or is not material depends
on the circumstances of the given case.

If the contract

deals with live subject matter, which fails to come into
37 8

Ibid., Restatement

sec.

253.

316

or which dies, or is seriously
impaired before the date of

performance, neither party is liable on the
contract.

principle also applies to

This

party who agrees to perform

a

personal services.

Aleatory Promise
An aleatory promise is a conditional promise based on
the happening of a fortuitous event or an event considered

by the parties to be fortuitous.

that is dependent on chance.

A fortuitous event is one

Wagering agreements fall

within the scope of aleatory contracts and unenforceable
because they are illegal.
tracts are aleatory.

Insurance and suretyship con-

They are not illegal.

Insuring and

carrying others' risks are established businesses and such
contracts are enforceable.

Both promises may be condition-

al on the same fortuitous event.

Although aleatory, the

performances are regarded as the exchange for one another
and are enforceable.

000

Divisible Contracts
A contract is termed divisible where:

(1)

perform-

ance of each party is divided into two or more parts;
379

Ibid., Restatement
380

ibid

.

,

sec

.

292.

,

sec.

291.

,

:
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the number of parts due from
each party is the same,
and (3) the performance of each
part by one party is the
(2)

agreed exchange for a corresponding
part by the other
3 81
party.
A contract for the delivery of
goods in specific installments is a typical example
of a divisible contract.
This type of a contract generally sets
forth the
price to be paid for each installment when
delivered.
Excuse of Conditions

Where either party's duty to perform is subject to
a

condition precedent or concurrent, that party cannot be

held in

breach of contract" until the conditions occur

or are legally excused.

The party seeking to enforce the

contract always has the burden of pleading and proving the
occurrence, or excuse of each condition upon which the

other party's duty was dependent.
If the condition was only a condition, and not a

covenant, the failure of the condition is not a breach of
contract.

It prevents the duty to perform from arising.

If the condition was a covenant then its non-performance

constitutes a breach of contract per se.

The following

have been held to be an excuse for non-performance of a

condition

3

81

Ibid,, Restatement

sec.

266.
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impossibility to perform personal
service; 382
impossibility of performance caused
by other
383
party;

(1)
(2)

(3)

prevention or hindrance of performance
by the
other party in wrongful manner. 384

(4)

receipt of part performance as full
performance

;

(5)

substituted contract;

(6)

waiver of performance of conditions; and

(7)

retaining benefits knowing of non-performance;

(8)

destruction of subject matter. 385

Breach
Def in it ion- Introduction

A breach of contract is an unjustifiable failure to

perform all or some part of a contractual duty;
repudiation or

(3)

one party's hindering or preventing

performance by the other party.
may be total or partial.
382

34

(2)

A breach of a contract

Failure of one party to perform

Culter v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 274 Mass.

(1931).
383
384

385
(1929)

.

Wills v. Calnan, 107 Mass. 514

(1871).

Hills v. Wamsutta Mills, 11 Allen 201 (1865).
J.

J.

Newbury Co.

v.

Shannon, 268 Mass. 116

:

319

at a time expressly or
impliedly promised may
constitute
a substantial breach and
thereby discharge the other
party from his contractual
duty.
The party so discharged

from the contract may be
entitled to damages for total
breach.

Anticipatory Breach.

The general rule is that if

one of the parties to a bilateral
contract repudiates
it before the day of performance,
the other party may
institute an action for breach of
contract, without
waiting for the time of performance to
arrive.
This is
known as the doctrine of "anticipatory
breach." This
rule is followed in most states in the
Union and in the

Federal Courts.

However, the doctrine of "anticipatory

breach- is not recognized in Massachusetts, and
no action
on the executory

(bilateral) contract can be maintained

until the date specified for its performance has gone
.

by.

386

There are two exceptions to the Massachusetts
rule on "Anticipatory breach"
(1)

At common law in a contract to marry, there

was an implied condition that in the time before
the date set forth for the marriage, neither
386

(1974)

.

Daniels v. Newton, 144 Mass. 530
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party should become engaged
or married to
another, there was a present
breach of the
implied condition and suit might
be brought
at once.

Today, by statute breach of
contract

to marry does not constitute an
injury or

wrong recognized by law, and no action,
suit or
proceeding can be maintained therefore 387
and

(2)

where a vendor has been deprived through the
exercise of eminent domain of power to perform
his contract the vendee need not wait until the

time for performance arrives but the vendee may
seek relief at once.

The reason being that the

taking by eminent domain placed the title en-

tirely beyond the control of the vendor and it

would be impossible for him to get it back at
the date set forth for performance. 388

Anticipatory Repudiation

.

Anticipatory repudiation

of a contract may be defined as an announcement of an

intention by a promisor that he will not render his future

promised performance.

It is restricted to executory bi-

lateral contracts involving mutual and dependent condiIt may be committed by:

tions.
o o

(1)

a

positive statement

7

Ibid., M.G.L.A., Ch. 207, sec. 47A.
by Acts 1938, Ch. 308, sec. 1.
388

,

inserted

Gillis v. Bonelli-Adams Co., 284 Mass 176 (1933).
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by the promisor to the
promisee that he will not or

cannot substantially perform the
contract or (2) any
voluntary act that makes it impossible
or apparently
impossible for the promisor to perform
his contract. 389

Anticipatory repudiation of a contract
may be
nullified by retraction of it and communication
of

same to the promisee before the promisee
sues or changes
his position in reliance on the repudiation. 399
The

legal rights of the promisee after the promisor's
antici-

patory repudiation are:
(1)

promisee may ignore the promisor's repudiation
and urge him to perform;

(2)

promisee may sue immediately to recover damages
for the value of the promisor's performance;

(3)

promisee may treat the repudiation as an excuse
for not rendering his own promised performance

and wait until the due date of the promisor's

performance to sue and
(4)

promisee may treat the promissor's repudiation
as an offer of mutual recission and accept it

in discharge of his contractural obligation--

at the same time he may recover for his own

performance in restitution.
339
390

Ibid., U.C.C., Ch. 2, sec.

610.

Ibid., U.C.C., Ch. 2, sec. 611.

.
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Under the Uniform Commercial Code,
either party
to a contract for the sale of
goods has the right to
demand "adequate assurances of performance"
from the
other party if reasonable grounds exist
for believing
the other party's performance may not
be received (insolvency).

Until such assurances are given the first

party has the right to suspend any performance due
by him.
An unjustified failure to comply with the demand
for
such

assurances for a period in excess of 30 days constitutes
a repudiation of the contract as a matter of law. 391

When either party repudiates the contract with

respect to a performance not yet due the loss of which will
substantially impair the value of the contract to the
other, the aggrieved party may:
(1)

for a commercially reasonable time await per-

formance by the repudiating party; or
(2)

resort to any remedy for breach even though he
has notified the repudiating party that he would

await the latter's performance and has urged

retraction
39

‘*'Ibid.

392

,

sec.

392

2-609.

Ibid., U.C.C., sec. 2-610.

9
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After repudiation with respect to

a

performance not yet

due, the aggrieved party in a sales
contract may imme-

diately resort to any remedy he chooses, provided
he
moves in good faith.

Dependent and Independent Promises
Where the stipulations of the contract are dependent,
the failure or refusal of one party to perform the acts
so promised, without excuse, will relieve the other party

from the obligations of the contract. 393

In the case of

independent promises, the promisor has to perform his
promise, and if he does not get what he pays for, his

remedy is by a crossaction. 394

The general rule is

that when performance under a contract is concurrent one

party cannot put the other party in default unless he
is ready,

able and willing to perform and has demonstrated

this by some offer of performance. 395

The law does

not require a party to tender performance if the other

party has shown that he cannot or will not perform.

If

the promises or terms of the contract to be performed by

each party are independent of those to be performed by
393

241

(1903).
3
^

469

International Textbook Co. v. Martin, 108 N.E.

(1915).
395

901

Dale System, Inc, v. Wichroski, 69 N.E. 2d

Vander Realty Co., Inc. v. Gabriel, 134 N.E. 2d

(1956).
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the other, the failure or refusal 396
of one party,

without excuse to perform the promise
to be performed
by him, will not relieve the other
party of the obligation to perform his agreement.
His remedy is an action
of contract against the party breaking
397
the
contract.

Entire and Divisible Contracts
In an entire contract, a breach by one party as
to
a

part performance will constitute a breach of the entire

contract excusing performance by the other party and

entitling him to an immediate right of action. 398
If the contract is divisible,

the breach of a part

will not constitute a breach of the entire contract. 399
In this situation,

the other party may have a right of

action for the breach but not for breach of the entire
contract.

He will not be excused from further performance

of his part of the contract.
396
397
2d 831

In this situation,

it may

Leigh v. Rule, 121 N.E. 2d 85 (1954).
Boston Housing Authority

(1976)
1QQ

v.

Hemingway, 293 N.E.

.

Barrie v. Quimby, 92 N.E. 451 (1910).
399
50 N.E.

Lander v. Samuel Heller Leather Co., Inc.,

2d 962

(1943)

.

^"National Machine and Tool
Machine Co., 63 N.E. 900 (1902).

Co.

v.

Standard Shoe

.

,

.
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appear that from the contract, a failure to perform as
to a part was held to be of such importance as to go to

the root of the contract so as to excuse the other party

from full performance, he is still not excused. 401

Exculpatory Clause
A general clause in a contract which purports to

exonerate a person from all liability for breach may be
invalid, because of repugnancy, or as depriving the

agreement of mutuality of obligation.

However, a stipu-

lation to that effect, as to some particular term in an
_
agreement, has been sustained.
.

,

402

Commenced Contract
Where the contract is not executory but is a contract that has already commenced, an action for wrongful breach may be maintained at once for both past
403

J
and future damages.

Termination of Contract
treating a
A party to a contract is justified in

contract as broken and terminated:
401

Lander

402

Barrett v

403

105

Samuel Heller Leather Co

v.
.

Carney, 150 N.E. 2d 276

Dalton v. American Ammonia Co

(1920).

where the other

(1)

.

(1958)

236 Mass

.
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party's breach goes to the essence of the contract 4
or

(2)

^*

4

where the other party's breach is willfull. 405

If the breach goes to the essence of the contract,

it makes

no difference whether or not it is willful,
if the breach is willful,

it makes no difference

whether or not it went to the essence of the contract.
If the breach is not willful and does not go to the

essence of the contract, the other party is not justified
in treating the contract as broken and terminated. 406

Substantial Performance (Building Contracts)
In Massachusetts, the rule is that in order for a

party to recover on a building contract, there must be

complete performance of it.

The contractor who has failed

to fully perform a contract to erect a building does not

have a right of action upon the contract itself.

407

If,

however, the contractor has attempted in good faith to

perform and has fallen short of complete performance but
has substantially performed

,

he may recover on an implied

contract, in no case more than the contract price less

damages

,

4^4

count in quantum menut)
.

.

(a

408

,

.

Johnson v. Walker, 115 Mass. 253 (1892).

405

Homer v. Shaw, 171 Mass.

406

Douglas v. Lowell, 194 Mass. 268

4
4

^Divito

^Bowen

v.
v.

Uto

,

253 Mass.

1

(1900)

239

(1907).

(1925)

Kimball, 203 Mass. 364

.

(1909).

.

.

.
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The contractor must act in good faith and
sub-

stantially perform the contract.

Lack of good faith even

though there is a substantial performance will bar
his
right to recover even in implied contract. 409

Substituted Agreement or Performance
Parties may agree subsequent to the making of the

contract substituting new terms or

a

new contract or

a

new

or different performance or the contract may have been

waived by an agreement of the parties.

In these situa-

tions, non-performance of the terms of the original con-

tract would not constitute breach of it. 410
a written contract,

Ordinarily,

before breach, may be varied by

a

subsequent oral agreement, may enlarge the time of performance, or may vary any other term of the contract, or

may discharge it altogether.

This rule applies to both

sealed instruments and simple contracts.

411

An oral modification of a purchase and sale

contract governed by the provision of M.G.L.A. Ch. 106,
Article

2,

is valid and binding regardless of whether it

is supported by consideration.

2d 25

409

Hayward v. Leonard,

410

Dean v. Skiff, 128 Mass. 174

411

Costonis v. Medford Housing Authority 176 N.E.

7

Pick.

180

(1828)

(1880).

(1961)

412
2d 669

412

Skinner v.

(1963)

Toben

Foreign Motors, Inc., 187, N.E.
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Excuse for Non-Performance

A party to a contract, in some circumstances,
is
not bound to perform it because the other party
has broken
410
the contract.

Accord and Satisfaction
When the contract has been broken by one of the parties and there is an effort to settle their differences,
the parties enter into a new and valid agreement in which
the party in default is to do some other act in lieu of

performance of the contract.
still executory is an accord.

This new agreement, though

When the agreement is

performed there is an accord and satisfaction, 414
An accord followed by a satisfaction may be pleaded
in discharge in an action on the original contract, and
.

if proven, will bar such an action.

415

An unexpected

accord will not operate to discharge liability in an

action on the original contract, if it appears that the
parties intended that the new agreement shall have that
effect

— the
4

4
4
4

.

^^Dale System v.
‘*"

4

.

accord will discharge the liability.

Coragulain

v.

Wichroski

,

^^Marr v. Heggie, 58 N.E. 2d

^Sherman

v.

2d 241

69 N.E.

Rudd, 184 N.E. 717
1

(1933).

(1944

Sidman, 14 N.E. 2d 145

416

)

.

(1938)

.

(1903).

.

,

.
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Remedies
There are three basic remedies for breach of contract, namely:

(1)

fic performance.

damages;

(2)

restitution and

(3)

speci-

Damages has been held to mean a sum of

money, awarded as a compensation for injury caused by a

breach of contract.

It is a remedy aimed at placing the

injured party in as good a position financially as he would
have been if the other party had performed the contract.

Restitution means recovery of a specific thing, which has
been delivered in performance, or recovery of the value,
in money, or a performance rendered by one party and re-

ceived by another.

The purpose of this remedy is to

restore the injured party to the postion he occupied before he entered into the contract.

The measure of recovery

is the reasonable value of the plaintiff's performance.

Restitution is available only when there has been

breach by the defaulting party.

417

a total

If there is only a

partial breach, the remedy is in damages.

418

.

.

Specific

performance may be defined as the rendering as nearly as
is practicable of a promised performance.

This is a dis-

cretionary remedy available only where the remedy of
damages would be inadequate.
417

418

419

Ibid.

Restatement

Ibid.

sec

Ibid

.

,

347-357

419

327-346.

,,
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In addition to the requirement of
inadequacy of

damages, the following limitations also
exist so that
specific performance will be refused is:
(1)

the

terms of the agreement are unfair, if the
agreement was

induced by some sharp practice, misrepresentation
or mis
take or if enforcement will cause unreasonable or
dis-

proportionate hardship or loss;

(2)

the performance is

impossible, tortious, criminal, or a violation of the
rights of third parties which are superior to the rights
of the plaintiff;

service;
and

(5)

breach.

(3)

the performance sought in personal

the court cannot supervise the performance;

(4)

the plaintiff himself is guilty of a material
420

If the plaintiff,

in a mistaken but good faith

effort, pursues a remedy which is not available, it is not
a bar to a suit for a

different remedy.

Damages and

restitution are alternative remedies. 421

Only one of them

will be given as a remedy for any given breach of con-

Damages
The aggrieved party is entitled to sue for damages
for breach of contract.

Plaintiff is entitled to be placed

in as good a position as he would have occupied if the

420 T
,
Ibid.

Restatement

,
421 T
Ibid

.

sec.

383.

422 T
,
Ibid.

sec.

384.

,

.

,

.

•

.

367-379.

2

.
.

:
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defendant had fulfilled his contractual
obligation.
This result is achieved by an award of
compensatory dam-

—

423

A plaintiff, in an action for damages for

breach of contract, cannot recover damages which after
notice of breach, he could have avoided. 424

The general

rule regarding the quantum of damages is

Upon any breach of contract, whether of warranty
or otherwise, the defendant is liable for whatever damages follow as a natural consequence and
the proximate result of his conduct, of which
may be reasonably supposed to have been within the
contemplation of the parties at the time the contract was made as a probable result of a breach of
lt

*

425

Liquidated damages

,

when provided for in a contract

for its breach, may be recovered if the amount is rea-

sonable and bears

reasonable relationship to the actual

a

damages caused by the breach.

If the plaintiff has not

suffered a pecuniary loss or his injury is too speculative, nominal damges are recoverable for invasion of the

plaintiff's legally protected interests.

Punitive or ex -

emplary damages are generally not recoverable in

a

breach

of contract action.

Damages for breach of contract are limited to those

which the defendant could reasonably foresee at the time
ao'k
424
4

Ibid

.

,

sec

.
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Ibid

.

,

sec

.

336

^Leavitt

v.

Fiberloid Co., 82 N/E. 682

(1907).

—
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Of the making of the contract
as the probable result of
such a breach.
Unusual or consequential damages
can be

recovered only when the defendant
has been made aware
of the probable occurrence of
them.
In the absence of
a specific contract provision
to the contrary, a
party

to the contract may recover damages
caused by delay in
the commencement of completion of
performance, if it can
be shown that the delay was a breach of
the contract. 426

Assignment
An assignment of what is due, or is to become
due,

under a contract, is not an assignment of both the
duty
of performing the contract and receiving payment
for it
is the law in this Commonwealth.

If the contract as a

whole is assigned, there is no separation between the

benefits and the burdens. 427
Summary

Faculty and administrative personnel in public higher education do not have the legal authority to enter into
a

contract on behalf of their respective institutions

unless delegated the right by the statutory authority.
426

St. Germain and Son
Inc. v. Taunton Redevelopment
Authority, 340 N.E. 2d 916 (1974).
,

427
Co.,

Chatham Pharmaceuticals, Inc.

Inc.,

196 N.E.

2d 852

(1974).

v.

Angier Chemical
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Basic concepts of the law of contract were
identified
and synthesized in pages

252-332

.

This study presents

basic concepts from the law of contract relevant to

faculty and administrative personnel in public higher

education using the technique of school law research.
This content is a reference for faculty and administra-

tive personnel in public higher education for use in

negotiating contracts and the substance for the content
in the cognitive domain of needed auasi-legal training

in the education program.

An analysis of case law in the 1966-1977 period

which relates to higher education and the law of contract may be categorized into three areas:
(2)

faculty, and

(3)

institutional.

(1)

These cases included

decisions from both state and federal courts.
is voluminous.

student,

Litigation

For the purpose of this research one

hundred cases were briefed and presented herewith.

The

legal reasoning and basic legal concepts set forth in the

three nineteenth centruy cases are commensurate with those
of the present court's decisions in the seventy-eighth

year of the twentieth century.
In selecting the one hundred cases for briefing,

preference was given to the most recent decisions, as well
as those which relate to issues in higher education in the
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Commonwealth

This additional research was
undertaken

.

to identify the major areas of the
law of contract which

were in issue and to determine the most
frequently litigated
areas of contract law, thereby identifying
primary domains
of needed quasi-legal training for the
education profession.
Appendix II lists the case citations according
to

the major law of contract area in issue in each case.

Many cases have multiple issues, which necessarily include
one or more of the other areas of the law of contract, but
for the purpose of this inquiry only the major issue was

classified.

Table

4,

page 335, shows a comparison of

the analysis of 100 cases in higher education by related

constituents to the area of the law of contract which is
in issue.

Figure

4,

page 336, shows a comparison of the per-

centage of issues in relation to the Area of Expressed or
Implied Contract between student, faculty and institution

related constituencies in the 100 cases in higher education.
This figure demonstrates that in this area, there were

twenty-two percent of the student issues, nine percent of
the faculty issues and twenty-eight percent of the institu-

tional issues while Figure

5,

page 337, shows that in the

area of Offer and Acceptance, there were twenty-eight

percent of the student issues, twelve percent of the faculty

335

TABLE

4

ANALYSIS OF 100 CASES BY RELATED CONSTITUENTS ACCORDING
TO THE AREA OF THE LAW OF CONTRACT IN ISSUE

Source

100 Cases

336

Figure 4.
Comparison of the percentage of issues
in relation to the area of Expressed or Implied Contract

between student, faculty and institution related constituencies in the 100 cases.

Legend:

Student

Faculty
Institution

337

Figure 5.
Comparison of the percentage of issues
in relation to the Area of Offer and Acceptance in the
law
of contract between student, faculty, and institution
related constituencies in the 100 cases.

Legend:

Student

Faculty
Institutions

.
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issues, and seventeen percent of the institutional

issues
In the area of Consideration, there were no
issues

involved in the student and faculty areas, while five

percent of the institutional issues were in this area
(Re;

Figure

6,

page 339).

Issues as to the Capacity of the parties to con-

tract arose in five percent of the student issues, zero percent of the faculty issues and eleven percent of the

institutional issues (Re:
Figure

8,

page

of the student issues,

Figure

7,

page 340

).

341/ indicates that zero percent

five percent of the faculty issues

and zero percent of the institutional issues were in

relation to the area of Fraud, Mistake and Duress while
Figure

9,

page

342/ demonstrates that five percent of

the student issues

,

zero percent of the faculty issues and

eleven percent of the institutional issues relate to the
area of illegality.
The Statute of Frauds was not an issue in any area
as shown by Figure 10, page 343

.

Figure 11, page 344, in comparing the percentage of
issues in relation to the area of Performance and Breach
of Contract identifies that forty percent of the student

related issues were in this area while the faculty had

339

Figure 6.
Comparison of the percentage of issues
in relation to the area of Consideration in the law of
contract between student, faculty, and institution related
constituencies in the 100 cases.

Legend:

Student

Faculty
Institution

EM

340

Figure 7. Comparison of the percentage of issues
in relation to the area of capacity in the law of contract
between student, faculty and institution related constituencies in the 100 cases.

Legend:

Student

Faculty
Institution
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Figure 8. Comparison of the percentage of issues
in relation to the area of Fraud, Mistake and Duress in
the law of contract between student, faculty and institution
related constituencies in the 100 cases.

Legend:

Student

Faculty
Institution

:

342

Figure

Comparison of the percentage of issues
of Illegality in the law of
contract between student, faculty and institution related
constituencies in the 100 cases.
9.

in relation to the area

Legend

Student

Faculty
Institution
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Figure 10. Comparison of the percentage of issues
in relation to the area of the Statute of Fraud between

student, faculty and institution related constituencies in
the 100 cases.

Legend:

Student

Faculty
Institution

344

Figure 11. Comparison of the percentage of issues
in relation to the area of Performance and Breach in the
law of contract between student, faculty and institution
related constituencies in the 100 cases.

Legend:

Student

Faculty
Institution

m3
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seventy-four percent and institutions twenty-eight
percent.

Figure 12, page 346, shows a comparison of the

distribution of the percentages of student, faculty and
institutional issues, in the 100 cases in higher education to the areas of the law of contract.

A reinforcement to the analysis of the case law
is the survey of the literature in higher education, which

shows that in studying the college's response to student

litigations, college administrators and attorneys have

been unprepared to answer issues raised by students.

The

organizational behavior of the institutions of public
higher education became that of crisis management with

minimum knowledge of legal parameters.
As the promotion of health through health education

may in essence prevent disease, the investigator conducted
this research in order to provide the informational base

which could serve to promote the health of our educational
institutions and consequently prevent the incidence of
so much litigation in public higher education, i.e., the

"instances of erroneous and unwise misuses of power by
those invested with powers of management and teaching in
the academic community, as in the case of all human

fallible institutions.
428

,,428

United States District Court for the Western
District of Missouri, 45 R.R.D. 133.

.

346

Figure 12.
Comparison of the distribution of the
percentages of student, faculty and institutional issues
in the 100 cases to the area of the law of contract.

Legend:

Areas of the Law of Contract According to

Issue
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Expressed or Implied
Offer and Acceptance
Consideration
Capacity
Fraud, Mistake, Duress
Illegality
Statute of Frauds
Performance and Breach

Student

Faculty

Institution

1

347

We are indeed in a period of
time in the Commonwealth
in which educators must be
knowledgeable about basic concepts of the law in order to formulate
sound educational
decisions which not only respect the dignity
of the
human person, but protects and inculcates
his legal rights.
Prophylaxis negates the inconveniences and stigma
of the
,

litigation process.
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CHAPTER

V

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Restatement of the Problem
The premise or implicit hypothesis of this study is

that faculty and administrative personnel in public higher

education need to know basic concepts of the law, but the

majority of them have not had formal educational preparation in the field of the law.

Thus, a marked dichotomy

exists between what is and what should be.

This is the

problem that this research has addressed.
Current trends in the Commonwealth bring into sharp
relief the need for faculty and administrative personnel
to possess a working knowledge of the law of contract.

The evolution of institutions of higher education into

massive business enterprises, while at the same time retaining the practice of selecting administrators from the
academic ranks, has exacerbated the problem.
tive mode

— recruiting

trained for management

widespread use.

The alterna-

as institutional managers individuals

— is

not for one reason or another in

In view of prevailing conditions, which

are characterized by the juxtaposition of accountable man-

agers without legal training and an upsurge of dependence
task
on court ruling as the measure of accountability, the
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of equipping administrators with a basic
understanding of

law is inescapable.
The observation of this need is the essence of the

implicit hypothesis of this study.
is judgmental,

tional means.

Yet, since the propo-

it could not be validated by conven -

The only recourse was to determine whether

or not the literature contained authoritative corroboration
of the researcher's thesis, which indeed it did.

Having dismissed the most obvious recourse to legal
training

— enrolling

in law school--as impracticable, the

researcher searched the literature for clues to what the
substance of a quasi-legal education for administrators
should be.

The preponderance of contract litigation in

higher education suggested that the bare bones of quasilegal education lay in this domain.

The substantive por-

tion of this study is an analysis of 100 cases drawn from
the voluminous contract litigation in higher education.

The purpose was to inform the selection of content for the

quasi-legal education of faculty and administrative personnel in higher education.

Summary of Findings
The source of data for the purpose of this research

was the "conscious testimony" or the primary source of the
law.

This historical research applied the scientific

.
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method to the description and analysis of past
court litigated issues in actions in contract.
Thus, the data were
drawn from the observations and experiences of others.

The

investigator used logical inferences to supplement this
type of research.

The case analysis is compatible with the

consequences of the implicit hypothesis and the implicit
hypothesis is confirmed.

Contract litigation in higher education and the
law of contract goes back to the early nineteenth
century (1819)

1.

Discussion

York Law School
gan

.

Three nineteenth century cases, namely

Middlebury College

(1)

431
,

Major findings of the study are:

430
,

Chandler

v.

and

(

3

)

429
,

(2)

People v. New

Sterling v. University of Michi -

bear out that various issues relative to the law of

contract and higher education have been litigated since the

nineteenth century in the United States.
In Sterling v. University of Michigan

with an issue relevant today:

,

the court dealt

Did the legislature have the

constitutional right to interfere with or dictate the management of the University?
429

4

431
(1896)

This case indicates that issues

Middlebury College

v.

Chandler, 16 Vermont 683

(1844)

People v. New York Law School, 22 N.Y.S. 663 (1893)

Sterling v. University of Michigan,

68 N.W.

253
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relative to the fiscal autonomy are not new.

It refers

to the State College in Massachusetts,
which had been a

failure under management by the state, and
cited the need
for an organizational structure in public higher
education

which would utilize a board of regents to control the
management system. 432

Middlebury College v. Chandler held that

ucation was not a "necessary" under the law.

a

college ed-

Therefore, a

minor student was not responsible for his tuition bills under the theory of an implied contract. 433

Table

1,

page

95,

indicates that twenty-three percent of the issue emanences
in the student-litigated cases were in the area of "Express-

ed or Implied" contracts.

It would seem that students are

still raising issues of implied contract.
The academic freedom of faculty, which in 1978 is under attack in the current focus on the "tenure system," was

litigated back in 1893.

In People v. New York Law School

,

the court determined that it was within the academic prerog-

ative of the faculty to make academic decisions, e.g., rec-

commend candidates for a degree.

434

432

Sterling v. University of Michigan.

433

Middlebury College v. Chandler, 16 Vermont 683

.

•

,

•

(1844).
4j)4

People v. New York Law School, 22 N.Y.S. 663 (1893).

.
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2.

There are some recurrent issues within the law of
contract that have deep historical roots.

Discussion

Chapter II shows the historical develop-

.

ment of the Law of Contract in the United States.

It veri-

fies the sequential theory of the layering of case law and

contributes to a longitudinal perspective of the development
of the law of contract over two centuries.

The definition of a contract, as in the Dartmouth College Case (1819), still controls in the Commonwealth in 1978.

Case law presently, as well as over the years, consistently
upholds the separation of the academic decisions and the
courts, when the faculty are not arbitrary or capricious in

their judgment
3.

(

People v. New York Law School

435
)

Sixty percent of contract litigation according to
The other forthis sample, emanate from faculty.
ty percent are almost evenly divided between students (twenty-two percent) and institution-initiated (eighteen percent) actions.

Discussion

.

The analysis of the 100 cases in higher

education showed that sixty percent of the cases were faculty
related (Figure 13, page 353).

This sixty-to-f orty ratio may

reflect the advent of collective bargaining and has served as
an awareness exercise, and it is consequently reasonable to

assume that more and more educational issues will go to the

courts for a judication.

4 ^5

People v. New York Law School, 22 N.Y.S. 663 (1893)

.
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Figure 13.
Ratio of issue emanence constituent
category by percentage, in 100 cases in higher education
which involve legal issues relative to the law of
contract

"

.
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The sixty-to-f orty ratio is important for faculty be-

cause they are twice as likely as students or institutions
to be participants in litigation.

It is important for ad-

ministrators because they are likely to have to oppose faculty in contract litigation.

This research informs the task

of quasi-legal education.
4.

Fifty-eight percent of the cases involved "Performance and Breach." Of these, fifty-five percent were in a combination of two categories (of
eight)
"Expressed or Implied" and "Offer and
Acceptance

—

.

Discussion

.

Table

5,

page 355

,

indicates that fifty-

eight percent of the litigations in the 100 cases were based
on issues of "Performance and Breach."

This reiterates the

need for substantive information for educational personnel.
The high issue emanence in this category reflects the void
of information relative to accountability for terms previ-

ously agreed upon.

vented if there were

A great deal of litigation could be prea

clear understanding that indeed a

contract existed when it was made.

The need for this infor-

mation is further reflected in the predominant issue emanence in the area of "Offer and Acceptance" and "Expressed or

Implied" contracts.

Fifty-five percent of the fifty-eight percent of suits
were in the area of "Expressed or Implied" and "Offer and

Acceptance

"

The increase in these two areas of issue

TABLE

5

ANALYSIS OF 100 CASES ACCORDING TO
AREAS OF LAW OF CONTRACT IN ISSUE

Source

100 Cases

356

emanence demonstrates

a

ings or misinformation.
red.

Since

higher incidence of misunderstandIgnorance of the law may be infer-

'Ignorance of the Law is no Excuse"

sic maxim of law

is a ba-

education in this area is pertinent.

Conclusions
Six major conclusions are derived from this study:
1.

Legal history informs on pertinent issues relative to contract law and public higher education.

Discussion

An understanding of the law of contract

.

is pertinent in the educational preparation of faculty and

administrative personnel in higher education.

This inform-

ational base (quasi-legal) will help them understand the how
and why of the "legalism" of today's society and its educa-

tional movement, which is beginning to be noticeable.

In

some instances, the "legalism" of today's society is pro-

liferating critical issues in public higher education.

This

knowledge will also assist the educator to evaluate not only
the law, but also the fallacies being presented.
2.

The cognitive content of quasi-legal training for
faculty and administrative personnel in higher ed(1)
ucation should be primarily in seven areas:
Performance and Breach, (2) Offer and Acceptance,
Fraud,
(3) Expressed or Implied, (4) Capacity, (5)
Mistake and Duress, (6) Illegality and (7) Consideration
.

Discussion

.

Analysis of the 100 cases in relation to

study
the area of the law of contract, as delimited for this

(Table

5,

page

355),

indicates that issues relative to seven

.
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of the major areas of contract law out of
eight were in issue.

Fifty-eight percent of the issues in litigation re-

lated to "Performance and Breach" of the contract, while

forty-two percent involved all other areas of the law of

contract (Re:

Figure 14, page 358)

.

relation to the "Statute of Frauds."

Not one issue arose in
Therefore, the identi-

fication of the issue emanence, with the exception of the
Statute of Frauds, seem to be somewhat directive in the de-

terminant of content of the legal training to which participants in higher education should be subjected.

The fact

that not one issue was litigated in relation to the "Statute
of Frauds" would seem to indicate that this area of the law
of contract need not be included in the quasi-legal training
of educators.

The cognitive content for the quasi-legal training of

faculty and administrative personnel in higher education in
the Commonwealth has been synthesized on pages 252-332.

This research is organized according to the area of the law
of contract delimited for this study and derived from the

researcher's analysis of 550 cases which were actions in con
tract
3.

Quasi-legal education is needed for all profession
al personnel in public higher education.

Discussion.

Ordinarily institutions of higher educa-

tion have litigations as do business or industry.

358

Ratio of litigation due to issues
Figure 14.
relative to the performance and breach of contracts
as compared to the other six areas reported in Table 1.

.
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inherent in the

'modus operande."

However, by virtue of

their production, institutions of higher education have
lit-

igation in the law of contract which infringe on the professional personnel and the student body.

This is where the

contract litigation in higher education differs from general
business management.
In the faculty-emanated suits in this study, thirty-

eight percent of 4the judgments were in favor of the plaintiff faculty while sixty-two percent were against the faculty.

Faculty-based suits may be inferred to be on the in-

crease.

To the extent that the sample is representative,

the facts indicate that fifteen percent of the faculty-ini-

tiated suits were in the year 1974, as compared to thirtytwo percent in the year 1975 and forty-six percent in the

The 1977 data are combined, since this

1976-1977 period.

research was done early in the spring of 1977.

The 1977

figures are not representative of total litigation in 1977.
Iowa Community College

In Barrett v.

was a librarian

Feldman

v.

^^

,

the plaintiff

The football coach was the litigant in

Regents of New Mexico

4
.

~^

On the basis of this

finding, the researcher modifies the thesis from faculty and

4^6

Barrett v. Iowa Community College, 221 N.W. 2d 781

(1974).
4

(1975).

Feldman v

.

Regents of New Mexico, 540 P. 2d 872
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administrative personnel to all professional
personnel.
4.

Preventive quasi-legal education for all professional personnel, those who contract with professional personnel (administrators) and to a lesser
degree, students, would enhance the internal harmony of institutions of higher education.

Discussion

.

Quasi-legal information should begin to

forewarn institutions of the legal consequences of proce—

dural error and misfeasance.

It is patently clear that the

misunderstandings leading to the faculty-emanated suits were
due to misfeasance rather than malfeasance.

If faculty bet-

ter understood the nature of a contract, its conditions and

relationships, there is

a

strong chance that at least one-

half of the cases in the area of "Performance and Breach"

would be eliminated.
5.

Quasi-legal education programs should begin to focus on student-initiated litigation.

Discussion

.

With the increase in consumer concern, it

is also reasonable to assume that there will be an increase

in the emanence of issues in the courts by students in pub-

lic higher education.

To the extent that the sample is rep-

resentative, the research indicates that eight of the twentytwo student-litigated suits were in 1976.

were in the early 1977 term.

Thirteen percent

Therefore, in the 1976 and

1977 studied period, fifty-one percent of the student-initi-

ated cases were litigated as compared to a total of thirteen

percent in 1975 and thirty-seven percent in the 1966-1974
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period.

It is logical to assume that a complete study of

the 1977 litigations would demonstrate an increase in liti-

gations over 1976.
Colleges and universities today are continually offering students accessiblity to legal services to wade

through the multiple issues they are presenting within the
educational institutions.

An analysis of the court deci-

sions in the student-litigated cases indicates that the

students won decisions in sixty percent of the cases and
lost only forty percent, almost a reversal of the faculty

judgments.

Student related suits also covered

a

broader

spectrum in terms of the areas of contract law (issue emanance)

involved in litigated issues.

Therefore, planners

of quasi-legal education programs need not only to prepare

institutions for a surge of student-initiated litigation
but educate professional personnel for survival in our legal society.

Students are now winning twice as often as

faculty.
6.

Elimination of misunderstandings of contractural
relationships would reduce both monetary and human costs.

Discussion

.

The determination of legal rights or is

sues in the judicial system involves diverse monetary ex-

penditures.

Depending on the outcome of the suit the mone

tary expenditures swing from a complete reimbursement for

.

.
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the damages to the other end of the pendulum,
a complete
loss

There is no way to calculate the toll in human relations.

It suffices to say that the human relations between

the two litigants are never again as good.

In some cases,

the winner carries for life the stigma of having contended.

Recommendations for Future Research
On the basis of the principal findings arrived at as
a result of this research,

the investigator recommends that

further studies be initiated in two areas:

bargaining, and

(2)

(1)

collective

student-initiated litigation.

At a time when collective bargaining rights are being

legislated for faculty in higher education, there is concurrently a trend toward multicampus systems centrally controlled.

Moreover, the educational delivery system must educate

increasing numbers of students from increasingly diverse
Consumers with diverse needs

segments of the population.

are, therefore, increasing in institutions in which there

will be increased demands for educational reform, thus, in-

creasing the potential for increased litigation in the contract areas singled out for future study.
88

Eugene C. Lee and Frank M. Bowen, "The Multicampus
University: A Study of Academic Governance, " The Carnegie
Commission on Higher Education edited by Lewis Mayhew,
^

,

p.

263

.
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While it was outside the purpose of this study to investigate, it is unmistakably apparent that inquiry into the

most predominant area of litigation in higher education-faculty contracts must be expanded to incorporate the legal

concepts relating to collective bargaining, since the trend
is toward collective negotiations in regard to faculty con-

tracts.

This is in the nature of a concomitant discovery,

since the study excluded collective bargaining from consideration.

Future research should also monitor student-initiated

litigation as a means of determining what proportion of

quasi-legal education it should occupy and to determine what
aspects of the institution-student relationships are at
issue

.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Higher Education
Astin, A. W.

The College Environment
Washington, D.C.:
American Council on Education, 1968.
.

Atwell, C. A., and Sullins, R. B.
"Cooperative Faculty
Development." Community and Junior College Journal
vol. 44 (November 1973),

Bachrach, P. The Theory of Democratic Elitism:
Boston:
Little, Brown and Company, 1967.

Baldridge, J. V. Academic Governance
McCutchan, 1971.

,

A Critique

Berkeley:

.

Baldridge, J. V.
Power and Conflict in the University
New York: Wiley, 1971.

.

Baldridge, J. V., and Deal, T. E. Managing Change in Edu Berkeley: McCutchan, 1975.
cational Organizations
.

Political Influence
Banfield, E.
Press, 1961.

New York:

The Free

How It Runs--Where
The American University:
New York: Harper and Row, 1968.

Barzun, J.

It Is Going

Beckhard, R.
Models
Beer, S.

.

.

.

Organizational Development Strategies and
Addison-Wesley 1969.
Reading, MA:
,

Decision and Control

.

New York:

Wiley, 1966.

The
Bennis, W. G.; Benne, K. D.; and Chin, R. (eds.).
Holt,
New York:
(2nd ed.)
Planning of Change
Rinehart, and Winston, 1969.
.

The Leaning Ivory Tower
Bennis, W. G.
Jossey-Bass, 1973.
Best, J. W.
Hall,

Research in Educatio n.
Inc.,

1970.

364

.

San Francisco:

New Jersey:

Prentice

.

.

365

Birenbaum, W. M.
"From Class to Mass— Sociology and the
Science of Education." Sixth Congress of the Inter national Association of Science and Edu cation. Paris
~
(September 3-7, 1973)
'

.

Boyer, R., and Crockett, C.
in Higher Education."
(May, 1973).

"Organizational Development
of Higher Ed., vol. 44

J.

Bushnell D. S. Organizing for Change: New Priorities for
Community Colleges
New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973.
,

.

Carnegie Commission on Higher Education.
"Governance of
Higher Education:
Six Priority Problems." April,
1973

.

Carnegie

Commission on Higher Education.
"The More Effective Use of Resources." June, 1972.

Carnegie Commission on Higher Education.
Action." October, 1973.

"Priorities in

Cheit, E.
The Management Systems Challenge: How to Be
Academic Though Systematic
Washington, D.C.:
American Council on Education, 1973.
.

Commission on Academic Tenure in Higher Education.
Tenure." March, 1973.

"Faculty

Commission on Human Resources and Advanced Training.
"America's Resources of Specialized Talent." 1954.
Committee on Non-Tenured Faculty of the Tufts Chapter of
the American Association of University Professors.
Path to Mediocrity."
"Tenure Quotas at Tufts:
January, 1973.
Beyond the Open Door: New Students to Higher
Cross, K. P.
Jossey-Bass, 1971.
San Francisco:
Education
.

Modern Political Analysis
Dahl, R.
1976
Hall Inc
.

.

New Jersey:

Prentice

,

"The Master Contract in Public Education."
Ellman, E. B.
14th Annual Meeting, National
Conference Proceedings:
Kansas:
of Education.
Problems
Legal
Organization on
Education,
of
Problems
Legal
on
National Organization
1968
.

,

—

.

366

Emerging Pro blems in School Law
Kansas:
National Organization on Legal Problems in Education, 1972.
.

Fischer, L., and Schimmel, D. The Civil Rights of Teachers.
New York: Harper and Row"^ 197 3
.

Folger

J., and Nam, C. B.
Education of the American Population.
U.S. Department of Commerce, 1967
,

Garbarino, J., and Aussieker. Faculty Bargaining.
York:
McGraw-Hill, 1975.

New

Gerwin, A.
"Political Justice." Social Justice Review.
New Jersey: Central Bureau Catholic Union of America,
1962
.

Gross, E., and Grambsch, P.
Changes in University Organi zation
Washington, D.C.: American Council on
Education, 1974.
.

Hershey, P., and Blanchard, K. H. Management of Organiza tional Behavior:
Utilizing Human Resources
New
Jersey:
Prentice Hall, Inc., 1977.
.

Power and Authority
Hodgkinson, H., and Meeth, L. (eds.).
Jossey-Bass,
1971.
San Francisco:

.

"Interesting Times for School Administrators." Kansas:
National Organization on Legal Problems in Education,
vol 4, 1974.
.

"The Multicampus University
Lee, E. C., and Bowen, F. M.
A Study of Academic Governance." L. Mathew (ed.).
San
The Carnegie Commission on Higher Education
1973.
Jossey-Bass,
Francisco:
.

200 Years of American
Liberman, Jethro K. Milestones:
St. Paul:
History
Legal
Law Milestones in Our
West Publishing Co., 1976.

—

.

The Impact
Light, D. W.; Marsden, L. R.; and Corl, T. C.
Careers.
Faculty
on
of the Academic Revolution
American Association of Higher
Washington, D.C.:
Education, 1972.

Lipset, S. M.
(ed)

"The Politics of Academia." In D. E. Nichols
Washington,
Perspectives on Campus Tensions
1970.
Education,
American Council on
.

.

D.C.:

,

367

Petit

,

T.
"Alternative Approaches to Power, Influence,
and Authority."
In J. M. McGuire (ed.)
Contemporary
Management
Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1974.
,

.

Schimmel, D.
"The Bill of Rights and The Public Schools:
Change and Challenge." Social Education
Virginia:
National Council for Social Studies, 1975.
.

Schimmel, D., and Fischer, L. The Civil Rights of Students
New York: Harper and Row, 1975.

.

Trow, M.
and Lipset, S.
National Surveys of Faculty and
Students in American Higher Education
Berkeley,
Calif.:
Center for Research and Development in Higher
Education, 1969.
,

.

"The Rights of Teachers and Professors."
Van Alstyne, W. W.
What They Are What They
The Rights of Americans:
Should Be. N. Dorsen (ed.). New York: Vintage
Books, 1971.

—

Encyclopedia of Business Information
Wasserman, P. et al
Gale Research Co., 1976.
Detroit:
Source.
.

Young, Honorable Don J.

Administrators."
(#2)

"Interesting Times for School
NOLPE School Law Journal vol.

178-179, 1974.

,

4

368

Case Citations

Higher Education/Contract

Abrams v. New School for Social Research, 390 N.Y.S. 2d
818

(1976)

Alberti v. County of Erie, 360 N.Y.S. 2d 343 (1974)

American Association of University Professors, Bloomfield
College Chapter v. Bloomfield College, 322 A. 2d 846
(1974)

American Training Services, Inc.
415 F. Supp. 1101

v.

Commerce Union Bank,

(1976)

Anapol v. University of Delaware, 412

F.

Supp. 675

(1976)

Appel Media v. Clarion State College, 327 A. 2d 420 (1974)
Bagby v. Trustees of Claremore Junior College Authority,
525 P.

2d 1355

(1974)

Barker-Scotia College, Inc.
525

Supp.

v.

City of New York, 390 F.

(1975)

Barszcz v. Board of Trustees of Community College Dist. No.
504, Illinois, 400 F. Supp. 675 (1975)

Barrett v. Eastern Iowa Community College District, 221 N.W.
2d 781

(1974)

Basch v. George Washington University, 370 A. 2d 1364 (1977)
Beck v. Board of Trustees of State Colleges, 344 A. 2d 273
(1975)

Begley v. The Corporation of Mercer University, 367
908

F.

Supp.

(1973)

of ChariBillmeyre v. Sacred Heart Hospital of the Sisters
ty,

Inc.

,

331 A.

2d 313

(1975)

369

Blouin

v.

Loyola University, 506 P. 2d 20 (1975)

Board of Governors v. Building Systems Housing Corp.,
233 N.W. 2d 195 (1975)

Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564

(1972)

Board of Regents of State University, State of Wisconsin
v. Davis, 120 Cal. Reptr. 407 (1975)
Board of Regents of the University of Texas
struction Co., 592 S.W. 2d 90 (1975)

v.

S

&

G Con-

Board of Trustees of Howard Community College v. John
Ruff, Inc., 366 A. 2d 360 (1976)

K.

Brady v. Board of Trustees of Nebraska State Colleges,
242 N.W. 2d 616

(1976)

Board of Trustees of the State College of Maryland v.
Sherman, 373 A. 2d 626 (1977)
Brown v. Wichita State University, 540 P. 2d 66

(1975)

Bruce v. Board of Regents for North West Missouri State
University, 414 F. Supp. 559 (1976)

Burdeau v. Trustees of California State College, 507
2d 770

F.

(1974)

Busbee v. Georgia Conference A. A. U. P., 221 S.E. 2d
437

(1975)

Cannon v. Stevens School of Business, Inc., 560
1383

P.

(1977)

Cardo v. Boyer, 374 N.Y.S. 2d 360

(1975)

Carrol v. Onodaga Community College, 384 N.Y.S 323

Casumano

2d

v.

Ratchford, 507 F. 2d 980

(1976)

(1974)

N.W.S.
Cherinsky v. New York City Community College, 377
2d 97

(1975)

Chung v. Park, 337 F. Supp. 524

(1974)

370

City

v

*

Univer sity Cellar, Inc., 237 N.W. 2d

Civil Service Employees Association, Inc. v. State University of Stonybrook, 368 N.Y.S. 2d 927 (1974)

Cohen v. Illinois Institute of Technology, 524

F.

2d 818

(1975)

Collins v. Wolf son

,

498 F.

2d 1100

(1975)

Commonwealth v. Howell, 181 A. 2d 903 (1962)
Connecticut State Employees Association v. Board of Trustees of University of Connecticut, 345 A. 2d 36 (1974)
Curator of University of Missouri v. Nebraska Prestressed
Concrete Co., 526 S.W. 2d 903 (1975)
Daly v. Board of Trustees, 524 S.W. 2d 410 (1975)

DeBonis v. Hudson Valley Community College, 389 N.Y.S. 2d
647

(1976)

Decker v. Worcester Junior College, 336 N.E. 2d 909 (1975)

Delaware Technical and Community College v.
tractors, Inc., 338 A. 2d 528 (1975)

C.

&

D.

Con-

DeMarco v. University of Health Sciences, 352 N.E. 2d 356
(1976)

Ducorbier v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State Univer
sity, 386 F. Supp. 202

(1974)

Eden v. Board of Trustees of State University, 374 N.Y.S.
2d 686

(1975)

Embry-Kiddle Aeronautical University v. Ross Aviation, Inc.
504 F.

2d 896

(1974)

Endress v. Brookdale Community College, 364 A. 2d 1080
(1976)

Feldman v. Regents of New Mexico, 540 P. 2d 872 (1975)

Ferner v. Harris, 119 Cal. Rptr

.

385

(1975)

371

First Equity Corp. of Florida v. Utah State University,
544 P.

2d 887

(1975)

Franklin v. Atkins, 409

F.

Supp. 439

(1976)

Georgia Association of Education v. Harris 403
961

F.

Supp.

(1975)

Giles v. Howard University, 428 F. Supp. 603 (1977)

Goodman v. New York University, 369 N.Y.S. 2d 501 (1975)

Goodyear v. Junior College District St. Louis, 540 S.W.
2d 621

(1976)

Gorman v. University of Miami, 340 So. 2d 1180 (1977)
Gras v. Clark, 361 N.E. 2d 316

Green v. Howard University, 271

(1977)
F.

Supp.

609

(1967)

Green v. Richmond, 337 N.E. 2d 691 (1975)

Grimm v. Cates, 532

F.

1034

(1976)

Guillot v. Board of Trustees of Mississippi Gulf Coast
Jr. College, 317 So. 2d 920 (1975)
Gupta v. Boyer, 391 N.Y.S. 2d 255 (1977)
Healy v. Larson, 323 N.Y.S. 2d 625 (1971)
Hill v. North Central Area Vocational-Technical School,
310 So.

2d 104

(1975)

Holstrop v. Board of Junior Colleges, 523

F.

2d 569

(1975)

Hvac and Sprinkler Contractor Association, Inc. v. The State
University Construction Fund, 364 N.Y.S. 2d 422 (1975)
United
Iowa State University of Sciences and Technology v.
States, 500 F. 2d 508 (1974)

Jacobsen v. Leonard, 406 F. Supp. 515 (1976)
Jessen Associates v. Bullock, 531 S.W. 2d 593 (1975)

372

Jones v. Vassar College, 299 N.Y.S. 2d 283 (1969)

Kalme

v. West Virginia Board of Regents,
(1976)

Kilcoyne v. Morgan, 405

F.

Supp. 828

Kiley v. Lavine, 358 N.Y.S. 2d 331

539 F. 2d 1346

(1975)

(1974)

King v. Conservatorio de Musica de Puerto Rico, 378 Supp.
746

(1974)

Krawez v. Stans, 306

F.

Supp. 1230

La Temple v. Wamsley, 549 F. 2d 185

(1969)
(1977)

Lewis v. Salem Academy and College, 208 S.E. 2d 404

Lyman v. Swartley, 385 F. Supp. 661

(1974)

(1974)

Lyons v. Salve Regina College, 422 F. Supp. 1354

Mahavougsana v. Hall, 401

F.

Supp. 381

Mahavougsana v. Hall, 529

F.

2d 448

(1976)

(1975)

(1976)

McClanahan v. Cochise College, 540 P. 2d 744 (1975)
al., v. Tacoma Community College District
P. 2d 1010 (1975)
541
22,

McLachlan, et
No.

.

Michigan College Federation of Teachers v. Lake Michigan
Community College, 518 F. 2d 1091 (1975)

Middlebury College v. Chandler, 16 Vermont 683(1844)
Miller v. Long Island University, 380 N.Y.S. 2d 917 (1976)
Moore v. Kibbee, 385

F.

Supp. 765

(1974)

Nace v. Oregon State System of Higher Education, 543
P.

2d 687

(1975)

Neal v. Junior College District of East Central Missouri,
556 S.W. 2d 580

(1977)

Orr v. Koefood, 377 F. Supp. 673 (1974)

373

Pace College v. Commission on Human Rights of the City of
New York, 339 N.E. 2d 2 (1975)

Papadopoulous v. Board of Higher Education, 511

P.

2d 854

(1973)

People v. New York Law School, 22 N.Y.S. 663 (1893)

Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 600 (1972)

Phillips v. Puryear, 403 F. Supp. 80 (1975)

Phillips v. Santa Fe Community College, 342 So. 2d 108
(1977)

Phillips v. State Board of Higher Education, 490 P. 2d
1005 (1971)
Powe v. Miles, 407 U.S. 2d 73

(1968)

President and Trustees of Colby College v. Colby College,
New Hampshire 508 F. 2d 804 (1975)
Pryles v. State, 380 N.Y.S. 2d 628 (1975)

Quigley v. Capalonga, 383 N.Y.S. 2d 935 (1976)
Rehor v. Case Western Reserve University, 331 N.E. 2d 446
(1975)

Robertson v. District of Columbia Board of Higher Education,
359 A. 2d 28

(1976)

Runyon v. McCrary, 96 S. Ct. 2596

(1976)

Saunders v. Reorganized School District No.
County, 520 S.W. 2d 29 (1975)

Schlecting v. Bergstrom, 511

P.

2d 846

2

of Osage

(1973)

Scott v. University of Delaware, 385 F. Supp. 937

(1974)

Shaw v. Board of Trustees of Frederick Community College,
549 F.

v.
(1974)

Shepphard
4

2d 929

(1976)

West Virginia Board of Regents, 378

F.

Supp.

,

374

Simon v. Boyer, 380 N.Y.S. 2d 178 (1976)
Skehan v. Board of Trustees of Bloomsberg State Colleqe
9
538 F.

2d 53

'

(1976)

Smith v. Greene, 545 P. 2d 550

(1976)

Soni v. Board of Trustees of University of Tennessee, 513
F. 2d 347 (1975)

State ex rel. Chapdelaine v. Torrence, 532 S.W. 2d 542
(1975)

State ex. rel. Sigall, et. al., v. Aetna Cleaning Contractors of Cleveland, Inc., et. al., 353 N.E. 2d 913
(1974)

Steinberg v. Chicago Medical School, 354 N.E. 2d 586
(1976)

Sterling v. University of Michigan, 68 N.W. 253 (1896)
Stewart v. Bailey, 396

F.

Supp. 1381

(1975)

Swatek v. Board of Regents of Oklahoma College, 535
295

P.

2d

(1975)

Talandi Construction Corp. v. Illinois Building Authority,
321 N.E. 2d 154

(1974)

Thompson v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board, 303 So.
2d 855

(1974)

Tobin v. Louisiana State Board of Education, 319 So. 2d
822

(1975)

Tuskega Inst. v. May Refrigeration Co., Inc., 344 So. 2d
156

(1977)

Trivier v. Atlanta University, Inc., 234 S.E. 2d 342 (1977)
Trustees of Stigmatine Fathers, Inc. v. Secretary of Administration and Finance, 341 N.E. 2d 662 (1976)

Turner v. State, 374 N.Y.S. 2d 731 (1975)

375

Tyler v. College of William and Mary, 429

F.

Supp.

29

(1977)

Tyler v. Jefferson City-Dubois Area Vocational-Technical
School, 341 A. 2d 235 (1975)

University of Colorado v. Silverman, 555 P. 2d 115 (1976)

University of Texas System v. Robert
521 S.W. 2d 944

E.

McKee, Inc.,

(1975)

Vallejo v. Jamestown College, 244 N.W. 2d 753 (1976)
Van Buren v. Pima Community College, 540 P. 2d 763

(1975)

Van de Vati v. Boling, 379 F. Supp. 925 (1974)

Wilkinson v. Louisiana State University, 316 So. 2d 412
(1975)

376

Contracts

Abbott v. Doane, 40 N.E. 197

(1895)

Abrams v. Factory Mutual Liability Ins. Co., 10 N.E. 2d 82
(1937)

Adamouski v. Curtis Wright Flying Service, Inc,, 15 N.E.
2d 467

(1938)

Adams v. Nichols, 19 Pick. 279 (1823)

Adamsky v. Mendes, 96 N.

E.

2d 236

(1950)

Aiken v. Hyde, 93 Mass. 183 (1865)

Aldrich v. Ames,

9

Gray 76 (1857)

Aldrich v. Inhabitants of Blackstone, 128 Mass. 148 (1879)
Alevy v. Downstate Medical Center of New York, 359 N.Y.S.
2d 426

(1974)

Allyn v. Allyn 28 N.E. 779 (1891)

Analogic Corp.

v.

Data Translation Inc., 358 N.E. 2d 804

G.

Moore Inc., 376 N.E. 2d 1238

(1976)

Anderson v.
Andre

v.

Antonelli

K.

Maguire, 26 N.E. 2d 347
v.

(1978)

(1940)

Hammond, 308 F. Supp. 1329

(1970)

Arizona Commercial Mining Co., v. Iron Cap Copper Co., 128
N.E.

4

(1920)

Arnold v. Richmond Iron Works,
Arpin v. Owens,

Ashcroft

v.

3

N.E.

25

1

Gray 439

(1854)

(1885)

Butterworth, 136 Mass. 511 (1884)

Audette v. L'Union St. Joseph, 59 N.E. 668 (1901)

377

Bacon v. Parker, 137 Mass. 309 (1884)

Baetjer v. New England Alcohol Co., 66 N.E. 2d 798
(1946)
Barker v. Rathvon, 145 N.E. 866

Barlow v. Ocean Ins. Co.,

4

(1942)

Mete. 270

(1842)

Barnett v. Rosen, 126 N.E. 386 (1920)
Barrell v. Paine, 128 N.E. 17

(1920)

Barrett v. Carney, 150 N.E. 2d 276 (1958)
Barrie v. Quimby, 92 N.E. 451 (1910)
Bates v. Southgate, 31 N.E. 2d 551

(1941)

Battaglis v. General Motors Corp., 169

F.

2d 254

(1948)

Bauer v. Bond and Goodwin Inc., 188 N.E. 708 (1934)

Beaner v. Raytheon Manufacturing Co., 12 N.E. 2d 807 (1938)
Bell v. City of Boston, 101 Mass. 506

(1869)

Belluci v. Foss, 138 N.E. 551 (1923)

Bennett v. Aetna Inc. Co., 88 N.E. 335 (1909)
Beury Jefferson Corp. v. Gross, 358 N.E. 2d 757 (1977)
Bigby v. U.S., 188 U.S. 400 (1902)

Bishop v. Eaton, 37 N.E. 665 (1894)

Blackwell v. E. M. Helides, Jr., Inc., 331 N.E. 2d 54 (1975)
Blount v. Dillaway et. al., 85 N.E. 477 (1908)

Bogigian v. Booklovers Library, 79 N.E
Boles v. Katz, 164 N.E. 323

769

(1907)

(1960)

Boston Housing Authority v. Consolidated Electric Co., 358
N.E.

2d 246

(1976)

Boston Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25 (1877)

378

Boston Plate and Window Glass Co.
N.E. 2d 715

Boston and Maine
Boyden v. Boyden

John Bowen Co., 141

v.

(1957)
R.
,

9

Barttett,

Co. v.

R.

Mete.

519

Brady v. Rea, 14 Allen 20

3

Cush. 224

(1849)

(1845)

(1867)

Braeur v. Shaw, 46 N.E. 617 (1897)
Breen v. Burns, 182 N.E. 294

Brewer v. Dyer,

7

Cush.

337

(1932)
(1851)

Brewster v. Weston, 126 N.E. 271 (1920)
Broman et. al., v. Byrne, 78 N.E. 2d 616 (1948)

Bronson v. Kinzie,

1

How.

31

(1843)

Brown v. Foster, 113 Mass. 136 (1873)
Brown v. Nealley, 36 N.E. 464

(1894)

Bruchett v. Allied Concord Fin. Corp.

,

396 P.

2d 186

(1967)

Bryant v. Rich, 106 Mass. 180 (1970)

Buccella v. Schuster, 164 N.E. 2d 141 (1960)
Burgess Sulphite Fibre Co. v. Broomfield, 62 N.E. 367 (1902)

Butterfield

v.

Byron, 27 N.E. 667

(1891)

Ill
Butchers Union, etc., Co. v. Crescent City, etc., Co.,

U.S. 746

(1884)

Butler v. Butler, 113 N.E. 577

(1916)

Butler v. Prussian, 147 N.E. 892 (1925)

Caggiano

v.

Marchegriano

,

99 N.E.

2d 861

(1951)

Regional
Cardarelli Construction Co. v. Groton-Dunstable
(1976)
383
2d
School District, 349 N.E.

Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620 (1885)

379

Carnig v. Carr, 46 N.E. 117 (1897)
Carnen v. Forrest, 307 N.E. 864 (1974)

Carpenter v. Grow, 141 N.E. 859 (1923)
Carton v. Shea, 45 N.E. 2d 826 (1942)

Casella v. Sneierson, 89 N.E. 2d

(1949)

8

Cazenovia College v. Patterson, 360 N.Y.S. 2d 84 (1974)
C.

Hunt Co. v. Boston Elevated

W.

Chamberlin

v.

R.

Co., 85 N.E. 446

(1908)

Employer Liability Assur. Corp., 194 N.E. 310

(1935)

Champlin v. Jackson, 58 N.E. 2d 757 (1945)

Chander v. Simmons, 97 Mass. 508 (1867)
Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of the Warren Bridge,
11 P.

420

(1837)

Chase v. Aetna Rubber Co., 75 N.E. 2d 637 (1947)
Chase v. Fitz, 132 Mass. 359 (1882)
Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304

Chatam Pharmaceutical, Inc.,
196 N.E.

2d 852

Chung v. Park, 377

F.

v.

(1945)

Angier Chemical Co., Inc.,

(1974)

Suppl.

524

(1974)

Church of God in Christ, Inc. v. Congregation Kehilbath
Jacob, 353 N.E. 2d 669 (1976)
City of El Paso v. Simmons, 337 U.S. 902

Clark v. Gulesian, 84 N.E. 94 (1908)
Clark v. Roberts, 62 N.E. 253 (1902)

Cleary v. Schier, 120 Mass. 210 (1876)
Close

v.

Lederle, 424

F.

2d 988

(1970)

(1965)

380

Cochrane v. Forbes, 153 N.E. 566 (1926)
Codman v. Dumaine, 144 N.E. 408

Colonial Development Corp

.

v.

(1924)

Bragdon

106 N.E. 633

,

(1914)

Collins v. Wolfson, 498 F. 2d 1100 (1975)

Columbia Ry

Gas and Electric Co. v. State of So. Carolina,
261 U.S. 236 (1923)
.

,

Conant v. Evans, 88 N.E. 438

(1909)

Conner v. Tewksbury, 63 N.E. 2d 348 (1945)
Cooper v. Cooper, 17 N.E. 892

(1888)

Continental 111. National Bank and Trust Co. v. Chicago,
R. I. and P. Ry. Co., 294 U.S. 648 (1935)

Coragulian

v.

Rudd, 184 N.E. 717

(1933)

Costonis v. Medford Housing Authority, 176 N.E. 2d 25 (1961)
Cottage St. M. E. Church v. Kendall, 121 Mass. 528
Council v. Cohen, 21 N.E. 2d 967

(1939)

Counelis v. Counelis, 54 N.E. 2d 177
Creed v. Apog, 376 N.E. 2d 154

(1877)

(1944)

(1978)

Cromwell v. Norton, 79 N.E. 433 (1906)
Crumer Mfg. Co. v. Rousseau, 132 N.E. 723 (1921)

Cummings v. Arnold,

3

Mete. 486

(1842)

Curran v. O'Donnell, 128 N.E. 408

(1920)

Cutler v. United Show Machinery Corp., 174 N.E. 507

(1931)

Cygan v. Megathlin, 96 N.E. 2d 702 (1951)
Dale System, Inc., v. Wichroski, 69 N.E. 2d 241 (1903)

Daniels v. Newton, 144 Mass. 530

(1874)

,

381

Davis v. H.

S.

and M. W. Snyder, Inc., 147 N.E. 30

Day v. Canton, 119 Mass. 513

(1876)

Dean v. Skiff, 128 Mass. 174

(1880)

De Ciccio v. Barker, 159 N.E.

534

(1925)

(1959)

Dedham Lumber Co. v. Harting, 180 N.E. 296 (1932)
Delano v. Montague,

4

Cush. 42

(1849)

Dellamano v. Francis, 33 N.E. 2d 327

(1941)

Deloranf ano v. Delafano, 132 N.E. 668 (1956)
Derenzo Co. v. Taylor, Woodrow, Blitman Construction Corp.
et.

al., 334 N.E. 2d 636

(1975)

Devlin v. Mayor and Aldermen of New York, 63 N.Y.

8

(1875)

Dickinson v. Riverside Iron Works, Inc., 372 N.E. 2d 1302
(1978)

Diebold Safe and Lock Co. v. Morse, 115 N.E. 431 (1917)
Domenicus v. Fleisker, 81 N.E. 191 (1907)
Donohue v. Woodburg,

6

Cush. 148

(1850)

Donovan v. Eastern Racing Assoc., 86 N.E. 903 (1949)
Dorel Steel Corp. v. Modular Constructors, Inc., 334 N.E.
2d 76

(1975)

Douglas v. Holyoke Machine Co., 124 N.E. 478

(1919)

Douglas v. Lowell, 80 N.E. 510 (1907)

Douillette v. Parmeter, 139 N.E. 526 (1957)
Downey v. Union Trust, 45 N.E. 373 (1942)

Downing v. Brennan, 122 N.E. 729 (1919)
Drude v. Curtis, 67 N.E. 317
Duca v. Lord, 117 N.E. 2d 145

Dwight

R.

Woodford Co.,

v.

(1903)
(1954)

Johnson, 183 N.E. 710

(1933)

382

Earle v. Coburn, 130 Mass. 596 (1881)
East N.Y. Savings Bank v. Haha

Eastern Expanded Metal Co.
251

326 U.S.

,

230

(1945)

Webb Granite Co., 81 N E

v.

(1907)

Eastman v. Allen, 31 N.E. 2d 547

(1941)

Edler v. Frazier, 156 N.W. 182 (1916)

Ellery v. Cunningham,

1

Mete.

112

(1840)

Emery v. Crowley, 359 N.E. 2d 1256

(1976)

Epder Corp. v. Richmond, 75 N.E. 2d 238

(1947)

Erhard v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 372 N.E. 2d 1277 (1978)

Estabrook v. Wilcox, 115 N.E. 233 (1917)
Exchange Bank v. Rice, 107 Mass. 37

(1871)

Faitoute Iron and Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316
U.S.

502

(1942)

Feakes v. Bozyczko, 369 N.E. 2d 978

(1977)

Fencer v. Wills, 156 N.E. 841 (1927)

Fennell v. Russell, 184 N.E. 675 (1933)

Fessenden

v.

Mussey, 11 Cush. 127

(1853)

Fischer v. Drew, 141 N.E. 875 (1924)

Fischera v. City of Laurence, 44 N.E. 2d 779 (1942)
Fiske v. Doucette, 92 N.E. 455

(1910)

Cranch. 87

(1810)

Fletcher v. Peck,

Fonesca

v.

6

Cunard, S. S. Co., 27 N.E. 665

Forman v. Gadonas, 142 N.E. 87
Foss v. Hildreth, 10 Allen 78

(1891)
(1865)

(1891)

383

Foster v. Shubert Holding Co., 55 N.E. 2d 772 (1944)
Frank Fitzgerald, Inc. v. Pacella Brs., Inc., 310 N.E.
2d 329

(1974)

Freeman v. Fishman, 139 N.E. 846 (1923)
Freeman v. Teeling, 194 N.E. 677

(1935)

Fried v. Fried, 368 N.E. 2d 1222

(1977)

Freid v. Singer, 136 N.E. 609 (1922)

Friend Brothers, Inc. v. Seaboard Surety Co., 56 N.E. 2d
6

(1944)

Gaffney v. Hayden, 110 Mass. 137

(1872)

Gallop v. Fox, 30 A. 756 (1894)
Galvin v. Cavanaugh, 82 N.E. 2d 593 (1948)

Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque,

Wall 75 (1863)

1

Gill v. Gibson, 114 N.E. 198

(1916)

Gill v. Richmond, 337 N.E. 2d 902

(1975)

Gill v. Richmond Co-op Ass'n., 34 N.E. 2d 509

(1941)

Gillis v. Bonnelli-Adams Co., 187 N.E. 535 (1933)

Gladstone v. Murray Co., 50 N.E. 2d 958 (1943)
Goldstein v. D’Arcy, 87 N.E. 584 (1909)

Goldstein v. Katz, 91 N.E. 2d 237

(1950)

Gordon v. Levine, 83 N.E. 861 (1908)
Gould v. Thompson,

4

Mete.

(1842)

224

Grace v. Adams, 100 Mass. 505 (1868)
N.E.

Graffen v. Pierce,

9

Graham v. Stanton,

58 N.E.

819

(1887)

1023

(1901)

384

Grange Lumber v. Rowley, 326 U.S. 295 (1945)
Grant v. Carlisle, 101 N.E. 376 (1957)
Graves v. Adams Express Co., 57 N.E. 462

(1900)

Greaney v. McCormick, 173 N.E. 411 (1930)
Green v. Green,

9

N.E. 2d 413

(1937)

Green v. Richmond, 337 N.E. 2d 691 (1975)

Growers Outlet, Inc. v. Stone, 131 N.E. 2d 210 (1956)
Gutlon v. Marcus, 43 N.E. 125 (1896)

Hadlock v. Books, 59 N.E. 1009 (1901)
Hagar v. Norton, 73 N.E. 1073
Hall v. Paine, 112 N.E. 153

(1905)

(1916)

Hampson v. Larkin, 318 Mass. 716 (1945)

Hancock Bank and Trust Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 309 N.E. 2d
482

(1974)

Harness Trucks Sec., Inc. v. Bay State Raceway, Inc., 373
N.E.

2d 353

(1978)

Harriman v. Harriman, 12 Gray 341 (1858)
Harris v. Delco Products, Inc., 25 N.E. 2d 740

Hastings et. al. v. Lovejoy,

2

Hawkes v. Keohoe, 79 N.E. 776
Hay v. Green, 12 Cush. 282

N.E. 776
(1907)

(1853)

Haynes v. Blanchard, 80 N.E. 504

(1907)

Hays v. Port of Seattle, 251 U.S. 233

Hayward v. Leonard,

7

Pick.

(1885)

181

(1920)

(1829)

Henchey v. Rathburn, 112 N.E. 862 (1916)

(1940)

385

Hill v. Grat, 141 N.E. 593

(1923)

Hobbs v. Massoit Whip Co., 33 N.E. 495

Hoffman

v.

(1893)

Charlestown Bank, 231 Mass. 324 (1918)

Hoetz v. Western Union Tel. Co., 294 Mass. 543

(1936)

Holyoke Water Power Co. v. American Writing Paper Co.,
300 U.S.

324

(1937)

Home Building and Loan v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398

Howard v. Zilch, 190 N.E. 2d 77

(1934)

(1963)

Hughes v. Wamsutta Mills, 11 Allen 201 (1865)
C.

W.

Hunt Co. v. Boston Elevated

R.

Co., 85 N.E. 446

(1949)

Hurley v. Boston, 142 N.E. 919 (1924)
In Bishop v.

Eaton, 37 N.E. 665

In De'Marc v.

(1894)

Capaldi, 146 N.E. 2d 517

In Dangelo v. Farina,
In Lennox v. Murphy,

39 N.E.
50 N.E.

2d 754
664

(1957)

(1895)

(1898)

92 N.E.

2d 254

(1950)

In re Wirthlin's Marriage,

527 P.

2d 147

In Tocci v.

Lembo

,

(1974)

International Textbook Co. v. Martin, 108 N.E. 469 (1915)
Iowa State University of Science and Technology v. United
States, 500 F. 2d 508 (1974)

Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U.S. 556

(1942)

Johnson v. Norton Housing Authority, 375 N.E. 2d 1209 (1978)
Jones v. Hoar,

5

Pick.

(1827)

285

Jordan v. Dobbins, 122 Mass. 168
Kaplan v. Shuer, 150 N.E.

9

(1877)

(1926)

386

Kelly v. Weiss, 102 N.E. 2d 93
Kemp v. Kemp, 142 N.E. 779

(1951)

(1924)

Keown and McEvory v. Verlin, 149 N.E. 115 (1925)

Kenyon v. Shepard, 127 N.E. 426 (1920)

Kerwin v. Donaghy, 59 N.E. 2d 299 (1945)

Kirkley v. F.

H.

Robert Co., 167 N.E. 289 (1929)

Kolas v. Larochelle

,

169 N.E.

662

(1930)

Krasner v. Berk, 319 N.E. 2d 879 (1974)

Kuzmeskus v. Pickup Motor Co., Inc., 115 N.E. 2d 461 (1953)
Kyle v. Kavanaugh, 103 Mass. 356

(1869)

La Chance v. Rogoli, 91 N.E. 2d 204

(1949)

Lampsaona v. Lariviere, 196 Mass. 34 (1936)
Lander v. Samuel Heller Leather Co., Inc., 50 N.E. 2d
962

(1943)

Lane v. Flint, 104 N.E. 570

(1914)

Lantz v. Chandler, 164 N.E. 2d 153

(1960)

Lariviere v. Lariviere, 24 N.E. 2d 659 (1939)
Larson v. So. Dakota, 278 U.S. 429

(1929)

Lascella v. Clark, 90 N.E. 875 (1910)
Lawrence v. Fox 20 N.Y 268

(1859)

Leavitt v. Fiberloid Co., 82 N.E. 682 (1907)
2d 369

(1942)

Town of Pembroke, 194 N.E. 698

(1935)

Lebold v. Inland Steel Co., 125
Lefebve

v.

Leigh v. Rule, 121 N.E. 2d 854

F.

(1954)

387

Lenox v. Murphy, 50 N.E. 644

(1898)

Leonard v. Woodward, 25 N.E. 2d 705 (1940)
Lewis v. Browning, 130 Mass. 173

(1881)

Lewis v. Salem Academy and College, 208 S.E. 2d 404

Libman

v.

Levenson, 128 N.E. 13

(1974)

(1920)

Lipson v. Southgate Park Corp., 189 N.E. 2d 191 (1963)

Lockwood Mfg. Co. v. Mason Regulator Co., 66 N.E. 420 (1903)
Lodi v. Goyette, 106 N.E. 601 (1914)

Loftus v. Lauf, 108 N.E. 533

(1952)

Long v. Inhabitants of Athol, 82 N.E. 665 (1907)

Lonnquist v. Lammi
Lord v. Wheeler,

1

,

240 Mass.

Gray 282

Loring v. City of Boston,

7

371

(1922)

(1854)

Mete. 409

(1843)

Los Angeles Traction Co. v. Wilshire, 135 Cal. 654

(1902)

Louis M. Herman Co., Inc. v. Gallagher Electric Co., Inc.,
138 N.E. 2d 120 (1956)

Louisville and Nashville
467

R.

R.

Co. v. Mottley,

219 U.S.

(1911)

Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555
(1935)

Love v. Harvey, 114 Mass. 80
L.

W.

(1873)

Severance and Sons, Inc. v. Augley, 125 N.E. 2d 415
(1955)

Lydon v. Allstate Ins. Co., 359 N.E. 2d 316
Lyons v. Coe, 59 N.E. 59

(1901)

Lynch v. U. S., 292 U.S. 571 (1934)

(1977)

388

McCullough v. Eagle Ins. Co.,

McCulloch v. Maryland,

4

1

Pick. 278

(1822)

Wheaton 316 (1819)

Mac Donald v. Stack, 189 N.E. 2d 221

(1963)

McFadden v. Nordblom, 30 N.E. 2d 852 (1941)
McKenny v. McKenny, 103 N.E. 631 (1913)
McNabb v. U.S., 318 U.S. 332 (1943)

McNair v. Knott, 302 U.S. 369 (1937)

McNamara v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 83 N.E. 878 (1908)
McTernan v. LeTendre

,

351 N.E. 2d 566

(1976)

Mackin v. Dwyer, 91 N.E. 893 (1910)
Macy v. Shelburne Falls and Colrain
197

S.

&

Ry. Co.,

210 Mass.

(1911)

Magnum Co. v. Fuller, 111 N.E. 399 (1916)
Magrath v. Sheehan,

5

N.E. 2d 547

(1936)

Mann v. United Motor Boston Co., 116 N.E. 239 (1917)

Mansfield v. Gordon, 10 N.E. 773 (1887)

Marcellino v. Carma, Inc., 324 N.E. 2d 629 (1975)
Marine Contractors, Inc., V. Hurley, 365 Mass. 280 (1974)

Marshall v. James, 147 N.E. 740 (1925)
Martin v. Jablonski, 149 N.E. 156 (1925)

Martin v. Meles, 60 N.E. 397 (1901)
Marr v. Heggie

,

58 N.E.

2d

1

(1944)

Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Green, 70 N.E. 202
(1904)

Mayer v. Haycock, 18 N.E. 2d 348

(1938)

389

Maynard v. Royal Worcester Corset Co., 85 N.E. 877 (1908)
Mead v. Parker, 115 Mass. 413 (1874)
Medeiros v. Petty, 324 N.E. 2d 902 (1975)

Melotte v. Tucci, 66 N.E. 2d 357 (1946)
Mellen v. Johnson, 76 N.E. 2d 658 (1948)
Mellen v. Whipple,

1

Gray 317

(1854)

Meredith Corp. v. Harper and Row Publishers, Inc., 378
F.

Supp. 686

(1974)

Merrimack Valley National Bank v. Baird, 363 N.E. 2d 688
(1977)

Metropolitan Coal Co. v. Pontel Co., 81 N.E. 640 (1907)
Meyer v. Estes, 41 N.E. 683 (1895)
Michael Chevrolet, Inc. v. Institution for Savings, 72
N.E. 2d 514

(1947)

Middlesex Co. v. Osgood,

4

Gray 447

(1855)

Milford v. Commonwealth, 10 N.E. 516 (1887)
Mills v. Wyman

,

3

Pick. 207

(1825)

Mitsakos v. Morrell, 129 N.E. 294 (1921)

Molloy v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 97 N.E. 2d 422 (1951)

Montgomery Ward Co.

v.

Johnson, 95 N.E. 290

(1911)

Montuori v. Barlen, 194 N.E. 714 (1935)
Morris Gordon and Son v. Totoni, 85 N.E. 2d 219
Morse v. Ely, 28 N.E. 577

(1891)

Morse v. Woodworth, 29 N.E. 525 (1892)

Moskew v. Marshall, 171 N.E. 477 (1930)
Moses v. Stevens,

2

Pick. 332

(1824)

(1949)

390

Moss v. Old Colony Trust Co., 140 N.E. 803 (1923)

Murphy v. Kilmurrary, 88 N.E. 2d 544 (1949)
Nathan v. Leland, 79 N.E. 793 (1907)

National Machine
N.E.

&

Tool v. Standard Shoe Machine Co., 63

(1902)

National Shawmut Bank of Boston v. Fidelity Mutual Life
Ins. Co., 61 N.E. 2d 18

(1945)

National Strike Information Center v. Brandeis University
of Waltham, Massachusetts, 315 F. Supp. 928 (1970)

National Vineaar Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., 115 U.S. 650
(1885)

National Vinegar Co. v. Jaffee, 58 N.E. 342 (1900)
Nash v. Lull, 102 Mass. 60
N. E.

(1869)

Foundation Co. v. Watrous

,

Inc., 27 N.E. 2d 756

(1940)

Neel v. Lang, 127 N.E. 512 (1920)

Nelson v. Hamlin, 155 N.E. 18 (1927)
New England Cabinet Works v. Morris, 115 N.E. 315 (1917)
New England Canteen Service, Inc. v. Ashley, 363 N.E. 2d
526

(1977)

Newell v. Hadley, 92 N.E. 507 (1910)

New Jersey v. Wilson,

7

Cranch. 164

(1812)

New Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana Light Co.

,

115 U.S.

(1885)

Nickerson v. Bridges, 103 N.E. 939 (1914)
Nickerson v. Weld, 90 N.E. 589 (1910)
(1921)
Noble v. Mead-Morrison Mfg. Co., 129 N.E. 669

650

391

Norman v. Baltimore

&

0.

R.

C.,

R.

294 U.S.

240

(1935)

Northwestern Fertilizer Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659 (1876)
Oberg v. Burke, 188 N.E. 2d 566

(1563)

O'Brien v. Boland, 44 N.E. 602 (1896)

O'Conner v. Hurley, et. al

.

16 N.E.

,

764

(1888)

O'Connor v. National Metals Co., 58 N.E. 2d 153 (1944)
O'Donnell Ex'r. v. Smith,

N.E. 350

8

(1886)

Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheaton 212 (1827)

O'Leary v. Hayden, 91 N.E. 2d 663 (1950)
Orr v. Koefood, 377 F. Supp. 673 (1974)

Osborn v. Martha's Vineyard

R.

Co.,

N.E. 486

5

(1886)

Papanastos v. Hellar, 116 N.E. 732 (1917)
Palfrey v. Portland, S.

&

P.

R.

Co.,

4

Allen 55 (1862)

Palmer v. Clark, 106 Mass. 373 (1871)
Peacock v. Board of Regents of Univ. and State Colleges of
Arizona, 380 F. Supp. 1081 (1974)
Peck v. Requa

,

13 Gray 407

(1859)

Pelletier v. Couture, 19 N.E. 400 (1889)

Pennsylvania Hospital v. Philadelphia, 245 U.S. 20 (1917)
Peretz v. Watson, 324 N.E. 2d 904

(1975)

Perry v. U. S., 294 U.S. 330 (1935)

Peterson v. Bay State Elevator, 162 N.E. 2d 807 (1959)

Phoenix Spring Beverage Co. v. Harvard Brewing Co., 45 N.E.
2d 473

(1942)

Pike v. Anglo South American Trust Co., 166 N.E. 553

(1929)

392

Pike v. Pike, 165 N.E.

(1929)

5

Pequa Branch of the Bank of Ohio v. Knoojs, 16 Howard 369
(1854)

Poland v. Beale, et. al

.

,

78 N.E.

728

(1906)

Polonsky v. Union Federal Savings and Loan Assoc., 138 N.E.
2d 115

(1956)

Pool v. City of Boston,

5

Cush.

219

(1849)

Putnam v. Grace, 37 N.E. 166 (1894)
Radich v. Hutchins, 95 U.S. 210 (1877)

Railroad Commission of California v. Los Angeles Ry. Corp.,
280 U.S. 145

(1929)

Rampey v. Allen, 501 F. 2d 1090 (1974)
Ratner v. Hill, 170 N.E. 69 (1930)
Ready v. Pinkham, 63 N.E. 887 (1902)

Realty Dev. Co., Inc. v. Wakefield Ready Mixed Concrete Co.,
100 N.E.

2d 28

(1951)

Republic Pipe and Supply Corp. v. Marnell Construction
Corp., 363 N.E. 2d 1361 (1977)
Rhoades v. Secunda,

4

N.E. 2d 449

(1936)

Ribock v. Canner, 105 N.E. 462 (1914)
Rich v. DeAmellar, 318 N.E. 2d 184

(1974)

Richmond Mortgage and Loan Corp. v. Wachovia Bank and Trust
Co.

,

300 U.S. 124

(1937)

Roberts v. Knowlton, 377 F. Supp
Roberts v. Rockbottom Co.,

Robinson v. Raquet,

1

(1959)

1381

Mete. 46

Cal. App. 2d 533

Rock Mfg. Corp. v. Music
417

7

.

&

(1974)

(1843)
(1934)

Television Corp., 159 N.E. 2d

393

Rooney v. Weeks, 194 N.E. 666
Rowe v. Peabody, 93 N.E. 604

(1935)

(1911)

Russo v. Foster, 24 N.E. 2d 666 (1940)
Ryan v. Gilbert, 71 N.E. 2d 219

(1947)

Saget v. Holland, 73 N.E. 2d 731 (1947)

Samborn v. Chamberlain, 101 Mass. 409 (1869)
Sanders v. Pottlitzer Bros. Fruit Co., 144 N.Y. 209

Sanford v. Boston Edison Co., 56 N.E. 2d

1

(1894)

(1944)

Savoy Finance Co. v. DeBiase, 183 N.E. 742 (1933)

Schelling v. Levin, 101 N.E. 2d 360 (1957)
Scott v. McFarland, 13 Mass. 309 (1816)

Schultz v. Frary, 109 N.E. 2d 134

(1952)

Sciaraffa v. Debler, 23 N.E. 2d 111 (1939)
Sears v. Eastern R. Co., 14 Allen 433

(1867)

Seaver v. Phelps, 11 Pick. 304 (1831)
Seaver v. Ransom, 224 N.Y. 233 (1918)
Segal v. Allied Mutual Ins. Co., 285 Mass. 106 (1934)

Shayet v. Holland, 73 N.E. 2d 731 (1947)

Sherman v. Sidman, 14 N.E. 2d 145 (1938)

Shirley v. Kelly, 86 N.E. 293 (1908)
Shopnek v. Rosenbloom, 93 N.E. 2d 227

(1950)

Simpson v. Bright, 153 N.E. 571 (1926)

Skinner v. Tober Foreign Motors, Inc., 187 N.E. 2d 669
(1963)

394

Slocum v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 139 N.E. 2d 669
(1963)

Smedley v. Walden, 141 N.E. 281 (1923)
Smith v. Gowdy,

Allen 566 (1864)

8

Solomin v. Kaufman, 145 N.E. 431 (1924)
St.

Germaine

& Son, Inc. v. Taunton Redevelopment Authority,
340 N.E. 2d 916 (1574)

Stadmiller v. Shirmer, 142 N.E. 905 (1924)
Stanley v. Westwood Auto, Inc., 322 N.E. 2d 768
Stark v. Parker,

2

Pick. 267

(1824)

Stal v. Barrett,

3

A.

2d 521

(1939)

State v. Earnest, 162 S.W. 2d 338
State v. Silva, 525 P. 2d 903

(1975)

(1942)

(1974)

Steranko v. Inforex, Inc., 326 N.E. 2d 222 (1977)
Stevens v. Thissell, 134 N.E. 398

(1922)

Stewart v. Keyes, 295 U.S. 403 (1935)
Stiff v. Keith,

9

Stinson v. Meegan

N.E. 527

(1887)

67 N.E.

2d 465

,

(1946)

Stoico v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 139 N.E. 816 (1923)
Sturges v. Crowninshield

,

4

Wheat. 122

(1819)

Sullivan v. Goulet, 182 N.E. 2d 519 (1962)

Sutcliffe v. Heatley, 122 N.E. 317 (1919)
Swift v. Bennett, 10 Cush. 436

Taylor v. Joyce,

4

(1852)

Cal. App. 2d 612

(1935)

Taylor v. Merchants' Fire Ins. Co., 13 L. Ed. 187 (1850)

395

Teele v. Rockport Granite Co., 112 N.E. 497 (1916)

Terret v. Taylor,

9

Cranch. 43

(1815)

Texas and N. 0. R. Co. v. Miller, 221 U.S. 408

(1911)

The Johnson Clinic, Inc. v. Huffnozle, 310 N.E. 2d (1974)

Thibault v. Lalumiere, 60 N.E. 2d 349 (1945)

Thibeault v. Pickering, 313 N.E. 2d 586 (1974)
Thompson v. Gould, 20 Pick. 134 (1838)
Thurston v. Thorton,

1

Cush. 89

(1854)

Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U.S. 444

(1924)

Tobin v. Larkin, 183 Mass. 389 (1903)
Town of Pawlet v. Clark,

9

Cranch. 292

(1815)

Town Planning and Engineering Associates, Inc. v. Amesbury
Specialty Co., Inc., 342 N.E. 2d 706 (1976)

Torrey v. Adams, 149 N.E. 618

(1925)

Tracy v. Brown, 163 N.E. 885 (1928)
Trainee v. Trumbull,

6

N.E. 761

(1886)

Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182 (1923)

Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward,

4

Wheat. 518

(1819)

Tushjian v. Karp, 177 N.E. 816 (1931)
United Shoe Marline Co. v. Kimball, 790 (1907)
United States v. Heinszen and Co., 206 U.S. 370 (1907)

Vander Realty Co., Inc. v. Gabriel, 334 Mass. 267 (1956)

Vannah v. Hart Private Hospital, 117 N.E. 328 (1917)
Varno, et. ux.

,

v.

Tindall, 51 S.W. 502

(1932)

396

Van Hoffman v. City of Quincy,

Wallace 535 (1867)

4

Vickery v. Ritchie, 88 N.E. 835 (1909)

Wagner v. Lectrox Corp.
Wait v. Maxwell,

,

et. al

Pick. 217

5

.

,

348 N.E. 2d 451

(1976)

(1827)

Walsh v. Young, 110 Mass. 396 (1872)

Wasserman v. Roach, 146 N.E. 2d 909 (1958)
Joseph Waterman and Sons, Inc. v. Hock, 141 N.E. 596 (1923)

Watkins v. Simplex Time Recorder Co., 55 N.E. 2d 203 (1944)
Webb v. Lathrop, 112 N.E. 203 (1916)

Weiner v. Slovin, 270 Mass. 392 (1930)
Weinstein v. Miller, 144 N.E. 387 (1924)
Wells v. Callman, 107 Mass. 514

(1871)

Welsch v. Polumbro, 73 N.E. 284 (1947)
Wesley United Methodist Church v. Harvard College, 316
N.E. 2d 620

(1974)

Western River Bridge Co. v. Dix,

6

Howard 507

(1848)

White v. Bigelow, 28 N.E. 904 (1891)
White v. Maynard, 111 Mass. 250
White v. Middlesex

R.

(1872)

Co., 135 Mass. 216

(1883)

White Spot Construction Co. v. Jet Spray Cooler, Inc., 183
N.E. 2d 719

(1962)

Widebeck v. Sullivan, 99 N.E. 2d 165 (1951)
Wilcox v. Lucos, 121 Mass. 21 (1876)
Wiley v. Bunker Hill National Bank, 67 N.E. 655 (1903)
(1925)
Wit v. Commercial Hotel Co., 149 N.E. 609

397

Witherington v. Eldridge

,

162 N.E.

Woodell v. John Hancock Mut
469

.

300

(1928)

Life Ins. Co., 67 N.E. 2d

(1946)

Woonsocket Machine and Press Co.
H.

Co., 131 N.E. 461

R.

v. New York, N. H.
(1921)

&

Worcester Bank and Trust Co. v. Nordblom, 188 N.E. 492
(1933)

Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56 (1935)
Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426 (1934)

Worthy v. Jones, 11 Gray 168 (1858)
Wright v. Venton Branch of Mountain Trust Bank, 300 U.S.
440

(1937)

Zembler v. Fitzgerald, 125 N.E. 299 (1919)

APPENDIX

I

"

399

APPENDIX

I

Legal Terms

Acceptance of Offer

Acceptance of an offer may be defined

:

as an expression of assent to the terms of the offer

while the offer is still open.
Accord and Satisfaction

:

In order to discharge an existing

cause of action, both the accord and satisfaction must
occur.

The accord is a bilateral contract whereas

satisfaction is the performance of such contracts.

Action

An ordinary proceeding in a court by which one party

:

prosecutes another for the enforcement or protection
of a right, the redress of a wrong, or the punishment
of public offense.

"Lawsuit

Action at law:

In common language a "suit," or

.

Court action in

a law case,

as distinguished

from equity.

Anticipatory breach
a

:

The doctrine of anticipatory breach of

contract is that if one of the parties to

a

bilateral

(executory) contract repudiates it before the day of

performance, the other party may institute an action
the time of
for breach of contract, without waiting for

the performance of the contract.

This rule is followed

.

.

.
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in most states and in the Federal Courts.

It is not

followed in Massachusetts

Appellant

A party who takes an appeal from one court to

:

another

Appellee

Assault

:

The party against whom an appeal is taken.

An attempt to beat another without touching him

:

(see battery)

Assignor

:

An assignor is the person who assigns his right

under the contract.

Assignee

An assignee is the person to whom the right under

:

the contract has been assigned.

Arrangement

A setting in order.

:

Avoid a contract

Battery

:

To cancel and make the contract void.

:

An unlawful beating or other wrongful physical

violence inflicted on another without his consent.
Battery includes assault.
Bilateral contract

:

A bilateral contract is a contract in

which there is a promise for an act.
Breach of contract:

Failure without legal excuse to perform

part or whole of a contract.

Cancellation

,

Intentional Destruction or Surrender

:

Con-

tractual duties are discharged by the cancellation or

destruction of the document embodying the contract or
or to
by its surrender to the party subject to the duty

someone on his behalf.

.

.
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Civil Action

One brought to recover some civil right or to

:

obtain redress for some wrong.
Common Law

:

Legal principles derived from usage and some

customs or from court decisions affirming such usages
and customs or the Acts of Parliament in force at the

time of the American Revolution, as distinguished from

law by enactment of American legislature.

Compensatory Damages

Compensatory damages are damages which

:

in the eyes of the court will place the Plaintiff in

the position he would have been in if the contract had

not been breached.

Condition Concurrent

A condition concurrent is

:

a

condition

which must be performed by one party at the same time
the other party performs.

It may be said that the

parties to the contract are to perform specific acts

simultaneously

Condition Precedent

A condition precedent is

:

which must happen, or,

a

a

condition

condition which is to be

performed before any contractual liability arises.

Condition Subsequent
referring to

:

a

A condition subsequent is
future event.

a

condition

If the future event so

specified happens, it gives one of the parties to the

contract

a

right to end the contract.

Consideration in contracts:
amount of money

The inducement, usually an

.

.
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Contract

An agreement upon sufficient consideration, to do

:

or not to do a particular thing; the writing which

contains the agreement of the parties with the terms
and conditions and which serves as proof of the

obligation

Contract action

:

An action brought to enforce rights under

a contract.

Corporate

Belonging to a corporation.

:

Corporation

:

Legal entity or artificial person created by

statute who subsists as a body politic, under

a

special

denomination and is vested by the policy of the law

with the capacity of perpetual succession, and of
acting in several respects, however numerous the asso-

ciation may be, as a single individual.
Creditor beneficiary

:

A person to whom the promisee owes

a

duty, e.g., composition with creditors and business

subscriptions

Criminal action:

Proceeding by which

a

party charged with

a

crime is brought to trial and punishment.

Damages

:

Damages means a sum of money awarded as compensa-

tion for injury caused by a breach of contract.

Decree

:

conOrder of court of equity announcing the legal

sequences of the facts found.

.
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Defendant

The party against whom relief or recovery is

:

sought in a court of action.

Defense

;

That which is offered and alleged by Defendant as

a reason in law or fact why Plaintiff should not

recover

Discharge by Avoidance of Voidable Duties

;

A voidable con-

tractual duty is discharged by the affirmative action

required for the exercise of the power of avoidance.
Donee

The person receiving the power or gift.

;

Donee beneficiary

:

A person to whom the promisee does not

owe a duty, e.g., a promise made to a father for the

benefit of his son; a beneficiary of
Donor

a

trust.

The person conferring the power or a gift.

:

Duress may be defined as any unlawful constraint

Duress:

exercised on a person so that he is forced to do something that he otherwise would not have done.

Emancipation of child

:

Surrender of the right to care,

custody and earnings of

a

child by its parents who at

the same time renounce parental duties.

Enjoin:

To require a person by writ of injunction from a

restrict
court of equity to perform, or to abstain, or
from,

Equity

:

some act.

theory,
Field of jurisprudence differing in origin,

and methods from the common law.

.

.
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Estoppel

An estoppel involves a change of position of the

:

parties so that the party against whom estoppel is
invoked has received a profit or benefit or the party

invoking estoppel has changed his position to his

detriment
Executed contract

Executory contract
Executor

A completed contract.

;

:

An incompletely performed contract.

Person designated by testator to carry out wishes

:

expressed in will.
Felony

:

Crime punishable by imprisonment in State prison or

by death.
Fraud

:

Fraud is defined as a false misrepresentation of a

matter of fact, whether by words or by conduct, by
false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of

that which should have been disclosed.

Holder in due course:

who took

a

A holder in due course is a person

bill (check or note) in good faith and for

value and that at the time it was negotiated to him
he had no notice of any defect in the title of the

person who negotiated it.

Injunction

:

A judicial process requiring the person to whom

particular
it is directed to do or refrain from doing a

thing

Intestacy

:

will at
The condition or state of not leaving a

one's death.

.
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Intoxicated

Intoxicated is defined by case law to mean

:

under the influence of an intoxicating liquor.

Thus,

an intoxicated person is a person under the influence
of an intoxicating liquor.

Law:

System of principles and rules of human conduct

1)

which includes decisions of courts and acts of
legislature
An enactment of a legislature,

2)

Liability
License

:

a

statute.

Legal responsibility.

:

Permission, conferring right to do some act which

would otherwise be illegal.

Liquidated damages

:

Liquidated damages may be defined as

specific sums of money agreed upon by the parties, to
be recovered by either of the contracting parties for

breach of the contract.
Malice

:

Intentional doing of

a

wrongful act without excuse

or just cause.

Malfeasance:

Merger

:

Commission of an unlawful act.

A merger involves a discharge of the contractual

obligation by operation of law.

Misfeasance

:

Improper performance of a lawful act.

Necessaries

:

Necessaries have been defined as indispensable

things

or

things proper and useful

of human life.

for

the sustenance

:

.
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Novation

A novation involves a substitution of a new party

:

with a discharge of one of the original parties by an
agreement of all these parties.

A new contract is

created with the same terms as the original one but
only the parties are changed.

Occurrence of a Condition Subsequent

:

Where there has been

breach of contractual duty followed by the happening

a

of a condition subsequent to the duty of the wrongdoer,

his duty is thereby discharged.

Offeree

The person who accepts the offer is termed the

:

offeree

Offeror

The person who makes the offer is termed the offeror.

:

Parole-Evidence Rule

:

Oral evidence as to matters not con-

tained in a written contract or other instrument is
not admissible.

Plaintiff
a

:

Person who brings action; he who sues by filing

complaint.

Police Power:

Power inherent in every sovereign state to

enact law within constitutional limits to promote the
order, health, education and welfare of society.

Promisee:

One to whom a promise has been made.

Promisor:

One who makes a promise.

Promissory

In the nature of a promise.
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Promissory Estoppel

:

That which arises when there is

a

promise which the promisor should reasonably expect
to induce forbearance or action of a definite and

substantial character on the part of the promisee,
and which does not induce such forbearance or action,
and such promise is binding if injustice can be

avoided only by the enforcement of the promise.

Promissory Note
a sum

:

A written promise or engagement to pay

certain within

a

limited time or on demand, or

at sight, to a person named therein, or to his order,
or bearer.

Quantum meritum

:

An implication that the defendant had

promised to pay Plaintiff as much as he reasonably
deserved for work or labor.

Ratification

:

By ratification of a contract is meant the

affirmation or confirmation of an act previously done
either by the party himself or another.

Registered

:

Entered or recorded in some official register

or record or list.

Release of Covenant Not to Sue

:

A contractual obligation

may be discharged by a release or covenant not to
sue if under seal or based on consideration.

Rescission of contract

:

Cancellation or abrogation by the

parties or one of them.
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Repudiation

Repudiation may be defined as a rejection.

:

In terms of a contract, it consists usually of an

absolute and unequivocal declaration on the part of
the promisor to the promisee that he will not make

performance on the future day that the contract calls
for performance.

It is in the nature of an anticipa-

tory breach before the performance is due.

Restitution

:

Restitution means the act of making good or

giving the equivalent for the loss.

The measure of

recovery is the reasonable value of the Plaintiff's
performance.

It is available only where there has

been a total breach of the contract.

If the breach

of the contract is partial the remedy is in damages.

Right of Contribution

:

By the right of contribution is

meant the right to reimbursement.

It is the act of

co-debtors (here co-promisors) in reimbursing one of
their group who has paid the entire debt, each to the

extent of their liability.
Right under Contract

:

The parties to the contract have

rights under the contract.

There must be

a

privity

of contract between Plaintiff and Defendant in order
to render the Defendant liable to the Plaintiff on

the contract.

.

.
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Specific Performance

:

Specific performance means the per-

formance of the contract terms in as near as possible
as the way as agreed upon.

Act of legislature.

Statute:

Statute of Frauds

:

The Statute of Frauds is a set of

statutes which was legislated for the purpose of pre-

venting fraud.

The Statute of Frauds requires that

specific contracts to be enforceable must be in

writing and signed by the parties to be charged.

If

the contract itself is not in writing, a memorandum
of it signed by the persons to be charged must be

produced
Substituted Performances:

Substituted performance is per-

formance of a contract whose terms were varied by

a

subsequent parol agreement which affected the mode
of performance of the contract only.

Testacy

The condition or state of leaving a will at one

:

s

death
Testator:

Person who makes the will.

Third Party Beneficiary

Tort

:

:

A person who acquires rights in

a

contract entered into for his benefit.

a

party to the contract.

He is not

or property of
Legal wrong committed upon the person

another independent of contract.

.
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Trover

Remedy for any wrongful interference with or detention of the goods of another.

Unconscionable Contract

:

An unconscionable contract is one

which a person of sound mind would not make.

It is

also one in which a fair and honest person would not

accept

Unilateral Contract

:

An unilateral contract is

a

contract

in which there is a promise for the act.

Ultra Vires
Void:

:

Acts beyond the scope of authority.

Ineffectual, having no legal force binding effect.

Voidable
Will

:

:

That which may be voided or declared void.

An instrument by which a person makes

a

disposition

of his property to take effect after his decease, and

which is, in its own nature, ambulatory and revocable
during his life.
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